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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis aims to develop a cognitive map of architectural reproduction to better 
understand it as both a medium for and the end result of disciplinary practices. To this 
end, the production of architectural space is understood as a form of mediation in which 
social relations are reproduced. This analysis is undertaken in an original manner – 
departing from live experiments in design workshops; using tools of Marxist cultural 
theory, the sociology of art, and accounts of the production of subjectivity; and focusing 
on the contradiction between ‘discipline’ and ‘dialectic’. The aim is to investigate 
possible routes for counter-hegemonic architectural practices that confront ideology and 
engage in politics. This cognitive map thus aims to clarify – in order to question – the 
traditional myths of the field and the notion of the individual architectural genius as an 
independent agent. To call these myths into question, we present an alternative to the 
narrative of the individual architect as the engine of architectural history – namely, 
transindividuality – and conceptualise architecture as the production of ‘things’ – 
understanding such objects as reifications of social relations. Restoring architecture’s 
dialectical relationship with the social mode of spatial production, the idea of a 
‘reproduction of architecture’ reveals its triple meaning: society reproduces the 
discipline; the discipline reproduces society; and architecture reproduces itself by 
reproducing subjectivities. For this reason, architecture will be investigated in terms of 
its processes of estrangement and the resulting reproduction. Estrangement will be 
investigated in terms of its deadlocks, its discipline, and its conception of the subject. 
Reproduction will be investigated in terms of its reification (production of things), its 
fetish (the technique of hiding artifices), and its phantasies (narratives that justify 
desire). The result is a cognitive map that is conceived as a tool for traversing the myths 
that reproduce architecture – in the sense that it provides aesthetic perceptions of these 
phenomena and enables self-reflexivity for collective subjects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reproduction (of the relations of production, not just the 
means of production) is not simply in society as a whole 
but in space as a whole. Space, occupied by neo-
capitalism, sectioned, reduced to homogeneity yet 
fragmented, becomes the seat of power (Lefebvre, 1976, 
83). 
The reproduction of architecture refers to three interrelated phenomena: architecture 
reproduces social relations; social relations reproduce architecture; and architecture 
reproduces architects’ subjectivities. This research was built on fieldwork that 
investigated design practices attempting to deliver concrete social changes. As the 
research developed, a series of paradoxes and deadlocks emerged from these 
experiments on ‘radical’ architecture. Based on the stake points provided by this 
observation, the research built a critical theory of how architecture prevents radical 
transformations of social relations and ultimately reproduces the status quo. Such 
reproduction was revealed to result from (1) the ‘reification’ of architecture, (2) the 
disciplining of architects’ labour as ‘fetish’ and (3) the field’s replication of myths and 
‘phantasies’. 
Per the classical Marxist critique, reification is understood as the conversion of social 
relations into things and vice versa. Fetish is understood as the ways in which reification 
is produced. As reification transforms social relations into apparently natural things, this 
production process – the actions – becomes incorporated into things. Thus, fetish 
produces an entwinement of thing and action. Therefore, fetish is both a noun and a 
verb; grammatically, it is a participle present – as we shall see later in Marx’s example 
of a ‘dancing table’. It is in this sense that fetish becomes method in architecture – it is 
the means by which architecture, the other and architects are objectified. Phantasies are 
the psychological variant of fantasies, and here, the term is used to mean the narratives 
that mobilise the ‘desires’ of architects and users, which creates the illusions of the field 
and prevents critical reflexivity. 
This thesis is a cognitive mapping of that reproduction of architecture. As we shall 
develop below, Jameson (1990) defined a cognitive map as a device that helps subjects 
to navigate in the image they create about their relationship with the world. In this 
sense, the research aims to develop a cognitive map that enables subjects to reposition 
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themselves in relation to the reproduction of architecture – i.e., the cycle of reification, 
fetish and phantasy. Although this condition is inescapable, the development of such a 
map aims to facilitate critical and reflexive awareness. By unveiling the reification of 
architecture and its transindividual subjectivity and challenging its common ontology 
(from structure to operations), the thesis proposes that architects can better situate 
themselves in the field and create possible detours from this map, thereby potentially 
avoiding common traps. 
 
The problem 
The main question of the thesis is clear-cut: why do architectural practices that aim to 
deliver radical social transformation fail? In short, such efforts fail because architecture 
reproduces not only the subjectivities of users through the products delivered but also 
the subjectivities of architects themselves, thus transforming the field into part of the 
machinery of social fetishisation. 
This problematic situation arguably only relates to those who are searching for an 
architectural practice that delivers radical social change. Nevertheless, to realise radical 
social change, one would need to challenge the idea of architecture itself, not only by 
critiquing its products (things, objects) but also by creating awareness of the process in 
which its subjects are reproduced. In this sense, this thesis does not aim to define the 
ground zero of radical architecture; rather, it aims to improve the critical awareness of 
architects’ positions in relation to the means of spatial production. Therefore, this 
cognitive map is simply a ‘helpful’ tool that can be used to support radical practices.  
Such a tool is helpful because the current debate in the field of architecture is immersed 
in various false dilemmas and phantasies that produce a cascade of mystifications and 
illusions. The theory of architecture has become a field of hopeless disputes over style 
and endless exegeses of celebrated narratives. The thesis traces these false dilemmas 
only as a means to step outside the cacophony of such discussions and to focus on a 
reflexive account. In using the term ‘reflexivity’, we refer to a theory that can survive 
itself, reveal the self-references deployed by a subject, and acknowledge its own 
theoretical agency; in short, reflexivity is conscious of its own limits. 
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To confront these dilemmas, this research was conducted in an innovative set of three 
operations. First, concrete field research of design practice was developed. This 
fieldwork was approached as actual experiments. Just as a chemist combines chemicals 
in his laboratory to observe the reactions, we engaged in participant observations to mix 
different components and reveal transformations in and permanent features of the field. 
Second, the critical points in the field revealed by these experiments enabled us to start 
drawing a map of how architecture frames the subjectivities of architects. Thus, this 
research has drawn a cognitive map that challenges the traditional ontology of 
architecture and the conception of the subjects involved. Finally, this map enabled an 
independent critical power of the everyday reification of the profession, thereby 
exposing a distinctive view of the operations involved and their entanglement with 
social reproduction. Although this map is not a handbook for ‘how to do radical 
architecture’, it highlights the challenges faced along this road. 
The original set of three operations was possible because instead of analysing the effects 
of architectural products – both things and theories – it engaged in the subjective means 
set in motion by architects in the process of architectural production. This relates to 
what Lefebvre (1967, p.370; 1971b) proposes as an ‘end’ to philosophy – a 
metaphilosophical approach – which is neither a philosophy outside the praxis nor a 
philosophy of praxis. Rather, the research aimed to overcome the duality of philosophy 
and praxis, discussing the process of production and reproduction of forms of truth. It 
was not concerned with a new ‘real truth’; rather it was concerned with the reality of the 
invention of truths – philosophy as praxis. 
To clarify this point, the following analogy may be helpful: imagine that Foucault 
changed his investigation from the effects of the panoptic in modern society to an 
investigation of the subjectivity of Jeremy Bentham himself and the process involved in 
the production of such ideas. Therefore, we did not aim to propose a concept of 
architecture in abstract; rather, we investigated the abstractions present in the production 
of architecture and the engagement of supposedly neutral abstractions. In other words, 
we approached architecture not as an ideal (a pure object in abstraction); rather, we 
approached how architecture concretely reproduces abstractions into reality. 
This thesis can hardly be said to solve or ameliorate the identified problem – the 
reproduction of architecture –  as it instead unveils how the problem goes beyond any 
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such amelioration of concepts within the field of architecture. Nevertheless, by making 
the ‘problem’ larger, this thesis arguably offers a coherent and credible conclusion that 
enables a critical and radical approach to architecture: first and foremost, a subject must 
be able to position himself in the world to be conscious of his estrangement from the 
very means of his profession. In this sense, we will argue in due course to ‘traverse the 
fantasies’ of the discipline – thus, enabling self-reflexivity – rather than attempting to 
overcome them. Therefore, the thesis is in itself a cognitive map conceived as a tool to 
facilitate self-reflexivity. If one were to argue that this step lacked an impetus, the 
following counterargument would suffice: more important than the steps taken in the 
field of research are the landscape that they envision, the roads that they trace and the 
possibilities that they enable. There are no predicaments or prescriptions; there are only 
engaged processes of reflection through an independent means of investigation: live 
experiments subjected to dialectical reflections. 
 
Scope and particular universality 
Arguably, this thesis and the cognitive map developed here do not claim to be what is 
commonly understood as ‘universal’ (encompassing all building activities, times, 
subjects and cultures). Rather, it is based in a long tradition of critical cultural studies 
(e.g., Lukacs, 1971; Adorno, 1996; Williams, 1973; Lefebvre, 1967; Jameson, 2002; 
Harvey, 2000), which explores particular objects – things, or objectified social relations, 
as we shall see in Chapter 4 – and their relations with global social and economic 
processes.  
Although we will not develop a critical history of the concept of universality here (for 
that, see Amaral, 2008, pp. 11-91), it is important to position our point of departure in 
relation to other common formulations. Therefore, we should initially delineate a 
critical view on the concept of universality, so as to envision how dialectics can enable 
the movement of thought that reveals the interconnections of concrete experience and 
global processes. 
Classical studies of architecture based on classical epistemologies of science would 
believe that reason can mimic reality (as a mirror does with an object), thus producing 
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some type of universal truth. Epistemologies of classical criticism (e.g., Popper, 1989) 
would argue that reason can never reach the reality of an object (the thing-in-itself), thus 
proposing many variants of how the proximity of ideas and reality could be measured. 
Although some of these approaches propose that theories can be improved by logical 
refutations and revelation of which is ‘more false’, at the same time it defines reality as 
a categorical ‘absolute’, completely separated from any idea. Finally, negative 
dialectical epistemologies would argue that any ideal is confined by context (e.g., 
capitalism). Although it proposes that only a radical negation of everything that exists 
could deliver truth, at the same time it defines the efforts of the radical philosopher – 
and the negation he produces – as a categorical absolute (a negative ideal), even if 
always inaccessible in full. 
By contrast, Boaventura Souza Santos (2007, p. 39) critiques this last proposal as a 
‘universality of the negative’, proposing instead a ‘negative universality’: both a theory 
of the impossibility of a unique general theory, and a theory of the possibility of 
multiple general theories. He argues against what he calls the ‘monoculture’ of 
scientific knowledge (2007, pp. 29-32), which creates a linear time with western 
civilisation at the centre, a naturalisation of hierarchically produced social relations, a 
form of valorisation centred in mass production, and social domination based on the 
imposition of supposedly universal frameworks. He argues such universal knowledge 
only to exists by means of power, control of influence and monopoly of the means of 
knowledge production. Alternatively, he proposes an ecology of knowledge, where a 
diversity of ‘truths’ (emerging from different contexts and experiences) could interact in 
a dynamic process of exchange and mutual influence. Instead of framing the “Other” 
(the particular and the local) as a homogeneic part of a universal truth, each single form 
of knowledge is conceived as potentially able to produce new universalities and new 
conceptions of the whole. 
Harvey (2000, p. 32) would go even further, proposing a generalisation of this relation 
between particularism and universality, place and space, local and global. For him, as 
workers based at factories (a place) could universalise their demands to society as a 
whole (the communist hypothesis), other particularisms could develop valid universal 
abstractions if they could expand their condition towards globalising claims. Therefore, 
he argues, universal claims always involve political commitments and an ethical point 
of view. 
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For Santos (2007, p.23) there is no such a thing as ‘pure science’, because science is 
part of a historical and cultural context in a social and technical realm of production. 
Therefore, he argues that ‘objectivity’ is always politically engaged. His idea of an 
‘engaged objectivity’ avoids the supposition of neutrality – the assumption that the 
concrete subject producing knowledge was eliminated – but reinforces the possibility of 
objectivity – the application of rigor and methodology – and at the same time he 
emphasises the partiality and context of any proposal (Santos, 2007, p. 11, 57). This 
approach seeks to envision and enhance the political engagement of any given scientific 
product. 
This idea of universality avoids the beliefs in both naïve neutrality and vulgar 
subjectivism – where any theory would be equally true. This conception of universality 
does not propose an immutable truth, and it does not propose a neutral relativity of any 
theories. Instead, the negative universality proposes that different truths create different 
possible realities. 
Lefebvre (1967) called this possibility of ideas creating reality poiesis. In contrast with 
the ideas of praxis – the concrete practical experience – and mimesis – the ideal 
representations of the mind –  Lefebvre argues that poiesis is the production of concrete 
experience using ideal representations. The concept of poiesis refers to how ideas 
change (social) reality, and therefore it aims to understand the foundations, the 
groundwork, the decisions made in the process of creating truths/reality (Lefebvre, 
1967, p. 64-65). Lefebvre (2001, p. 108) argues that this process is not concealed by the 
limitations of ‘deduction’, ‘induction’, ‘reduction’ or ‘representation’; it is rather a 
process of ‘transduction’ – the formulation of a possible object departing from empirical 
reality but confronting it with imagination (we shall discuss more about transduction in 
the writings of Simondon and Toscano in section 3.6.). For Lefebvre, this creates a 
dialectics between (historical) subjects and (historical) objects, between ‘content’ and 
‘form’. In this sense, all universalities are partialities and, inversely, all partialities can 
potentially create new universalities. 
Furthermore, for Lefebvre (1967, 375-377), to create a new reality poiesis operates in 
the residual left untouched by current epistemologies. Lefebvre (2003b, pp. 23-44) 
argues that every epistemology has ‘virtualities’ and ‘blind-fields’. This means that 
every idea has specific (ethical) potentialities and it has specific parts of reality that 
 
 
7 
 
remain hidden and not articulated into potential realisation – the limits of reason. For 
him, poiesis creates reality by bringing this obscure, blind and hidden part of reality into 
presence. Therefore, the limits of what an epistemology sees is the source of creation of 
new understandings.1 
In the production of our cognitive map, these ‘blind-fields’– the epistemological limits 
revealed by the fieldwork – played an important role. We called those ‘stake points’, 
because they are the points at stake in the discipline and the referencing points upon 
which we have drawn our map. 
 
Fieldwork as concrete groundwork 
In short, this research departed from concrete experiences in architecture, investigating 
how the conventional and radical ideas of architecture could reveal blind spots in the 
architectural discipline. This enabled to reveal the points at stake in the discipline. By 
doing so, it was possible to investigate architecture not as an abstract ideal, but how it 
concretely operates. Therefore, the initial fieldwork is the concrete groundwork of the 
theories formulated in this thesis (i.e., the negative universal possibilities excavated by 
this research has its origins in the partiality of the concrete fieldwork). 2 
This relates to Lefebvre’s (1975b) argument that a dialectical approach can be 
developed only after an initial stage of formal analysis. This initial stage uses deductive 
analysis (the dissection of complexity into small data) and fact checking in order to 
approach concrete reality. But this initial step is unable to overcome the manifested 
contradictions of ‘realised’ reality, and therefore a second and a third step should be 
introduced: a regressive analysis of the contradictions identified in reality – which we 
present in part 1 – and a critical return to elucidate the present social configuration of 
spatial production – which we present in part 2.  Nevertheless, to note some elements 
and main conclusions of the first step of fieldwork is important to situate the discussion 
developed in the following chapters. 
                                                          
1 We shall return to this point in chapter 2, when discussing the difference between analysis and 
dialectics and between deduction and transduction. 
2  This fieldwork is reported in the appendices. And an alternative way of reading this thesis is jumping 
from the end of this introduction to the appendices, and then returning to parts 1 and 2. 
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Initially, the observation and analysis of the concrete production of common spaces in a 
contemporary city (London) revealed that architecture is not only the enclosure of social 
space by means of neutral things. Instead, this production is a deeper aesthetic process 
that causes social relations to be seen as things. Later, by engaging in workshops aiming 
to intervene in these common spaces, a ‘participant observation’ then revealed how 
adding the ‘concept’ of hacking to the discipline cannot change the foundation of the 
discipline itself. Furthermore, a second workshop revealed that the idea of a ‘micro-
utopia’ can only be applied to architecture if what we understand as ‘architectural 
things’ is completely subverted into a ‘being becoming’. Furthermore, the last workshop 
in the appendices was engaged in an ‘observation of participation’, which revealed that 
architecture not only produces objects (i.e., social relations transformed into things) but 
is also a triple reification process of users, architects and architecture. This survey was 
the starting point that enabled us to stake out reference points and mark guiding lines for 
the construction of a cognitive map of the reproduction of architecture. 
These stake points formed the two main axes of the thesis, namely, reproduction and 
estrangement. Reproduction is formed by a series of shared and accepted (if not 
imposed) ideas that limit the potential operating range of the subject. Estrangement is 
the existing means of these operations, which separate concrete subjects from their 
means of production. 
As we observed in the fieldwork, the main engine of this disciplinary reproduction is the 
discourses (narratives) that support the praxis. Subjects in positions of power repeatedly 
reinforced false dilemmas and arguments to impose a certain way of working in the 
studio, especially clear in the last workshop – style and ‘good design’ were ideas that 
repeatedly served as a way of reinforcing hierarchy and imposing choices. To further 
investigate the basis of these assumptions and to unveil the lack of reflexivity, we will 
need to dissect the unconscious phantasies involved in this process (we shall discuss this 
stake point in chapter 6).  
These narratives were the means through which a continuous process of appropriation 
of authorship occurred, rendering a procedure that can be called the ‘surplus of creation’ 
– the fetish of architecture. In this sense, ‘cultural capital’ can operate in the same way 
that ‘money capital’ does – as a means of surplus extraction just as Marx (1991, pp. 
283-339) described the fetish of commodity in Capital – Volume 1. 
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In surplus extraction, a given abstract concentrated power (for instance, financial 
capital, but in this case, cultural capital as well); one person justifies the hierarchical 
appropriation of another’s work as if it were the result of his own enterprise. This 
enterprise comes to be associated with the owner of capital only by means of power 
relations. In turn, this hierarchy is defined by whomever has a greater concentration of 
(cultural) capital. As a capital holder invests in a certain activity, all the products of 
others’ labour are considered the output of the capital holder – the ‘genius’. This 
unwritten rule applies to the capitalist who invests in clothes factory machinery – all the 
t-shirts produced by said machinery are appropriated by him. The same applies in an 
architectural studio, where the investor in cultural capital is given credit for all the 
design produced therein. To dissect this ‘surplus’ expropriation of the creative act, we 
must investigate how ‘fetish’ operates in architecture (we shall discuss this stake point 
in chapter 5). 
Furthermore, the fieldwork in London’s privatised public spaces revealed that the 
objectification of architects has its origins in the reification of users and of the field of 
architecture, which we refer to as triple reification: of the other, the self and the field 
(we shall discuss this stake point in chapter 4). 
In addition, to move in the direction of disrupting this process, the subject commonly 
conceived to producer of architecture must be repositioned. If one aims to understand 
how the ‘genius’ does not actually play the whole game but instead appropriates its 
products, a different understanding of the subject who actually produces architecture 
must emerge (this point will be developed in chapter 3). 
Furthermore, in order to enable detours in this condition, the development of a map is 
imperative to enable the navigation in the conflicting forces of subjectivity disciplining 
and dialectical potential of architecture. The ways in which the discipline is imposed on 
architects will be mapped (in chapter 2). 
Finally, the first step in this journey will be a sketching of the general landscape of the 
main conceptual fallacies – a sort of literature review of the ‘mistakes’ of the art – that 
supports the current estrangement of architects from their means of production (such 
deadlocks are mapped in chapter 1). 
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This initial groundwork problematised key common assumptions in the field. Therefore, 
to introduce the definition of some key terms and limitations of this thesis is important. 
 
Defining what this thesis is not about 
First, this thesis is not concerned with the ‘classical controversies’ of defining the 
essence of architecture nor it is concerned with revealing the small contradictions in the 
infinite discourses in the field. These controversies only reinforce the underlying field. 
Therefore, we only approach them as symptoms of the general aspects of the field, 
transcending the micro disputes of distinction to reveal their similarities. In this sense, 
we aim to produce a tool for navigating the larger landscape of the field rather than 
providing a 1:1 map of it. 
Second, we do not seek to trace the ideology in supposed utopias or to simply unmask 
their ‘lies’. This research understands these ‘masks’ and ‘lies’ as distinct components in 
the production of architecture. In this sense, the ‘architectural facts’ are instead seen as 
‘factishes’ – discourses of truth built through techniques of phenomena (we shall 
discuss this topic more in section 5.3.). Architecture not only intervenes in reality but 
also produces reality. Furthermore, it produces reality repeatedly, i.e., reproduces it. 
Third, the notion of reproduction also aims to avoid the theoretical deadlock of ‘puppet 
appearances’ – a topic to be further addressed in chapter 1 – of many radical critiques. 
A very powerful notion asserts that architecture is only a reflection of the means of 
production, simply delivering products that mirror the dominant ideology. In this sense, 
society would have to be understood as an ‘enclosed system’, and architecture would be 
only a cog in its gears. Although relevant, a critique of system theory is not the point to 
be made now (we shall return to this point in chapter 2). For now, suffice it to say, in an 
effectively dialectical account, contradiction is part of the real. Therefore, we are 
witnessing neither complete stagnation nor simple ‘repetition’. 
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The concept of ‘reproduction’ 
In contrast to the abovementioned theories of an ‘enclosed system’ of architecture, the 
reproduction of architecture and social relations is dialectical and processual. As Henri 
Lefebvre argued, 
There can be no reproduction of social relations either by simple inertia 
or by tacit renewal. Reproduction does not occur without undergoing 
changes. This excludes both the idea of an automatic reproductive 
process internal to the constituted mode of production (as system) and 
that of the immediate efficacity of a ‘generative nucleus’. The 
contradictions themselves re-produce, and not without changes 
(Lefebvre, 1976, pp. 90-91). 
In addition, the full disclosure of the concept of reproduction results in a reversal of 
traditional Marxism. A shift in emphasis from production to reproduction results in a 
shift in focus from the factory floor to the body, from the realm of work to the realm of 
everyday life, from the means of production to ideologies; furthermore, it moves the 
realisation of capital from the expropriation of labour to the mobilisation of 
consumption and desire. 
In traditional Marxism based solely in Volume 1 of Capital (as argues Harvey, 2010), 
the means of production, the conflict over salaries, the dismal conditions of labour, and 
the control of the means of production were at the centre of most struggles. In that 
approach, if the realm of production was the means through which capitalist social 
relations were imposed, the realm of reproduction was a consequence. Therefore, the 
realm of the ‘reproduction of the worker’ was conceived only as the small scale of 
individual survival related to ‘making a living’ and ‘getting by’ – a battle already lost. 
Thus, the body, the self, the ideologies, the everyday and the necessities (needs and 
desires) were understood only as reflections of the production realm. For Harvey 
(2010), this undermines the whole picture of Marx’s ‘project’, which would concern the 
‘realisation of capital’ in the realm of reproduction in Volume 2. 
As is the case with the differences between reproduction and production, the differences 
between repetition and reproduction are also important. The contemporary 
intensification of reproduction contrasts with the two common uses of the term: making 
again – i.e., production in large quantities over time – and imitating – i.e., representation 
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and ultimately simulation. Although these aspects are of fundamental importance in 
modern times, the intensification of reproduction takes the matter to a new level. While 
‘simulation’ has the same appearance with a false essence, in the contemporary 
‘intensified reproduction’ the appearances change and the essential social relations are 
reproduced. While ‘technical reproduction’ delivers mass production – i.e., the multiple 
re-presentation of the original, as in a ‘photocopy’ – in the contemporary ‘intensified 
reproduction’, originality functions as a means to hide the artifices of production, where 
a flexible mode of production makes sameness resemble diversity. 
Although capitalist social relations increasingly present themselves as a continuous 
novelty, under their spectacular appearances lie the old hierarchies, forms of power and 
strategies of alienation. In this context, to reproduce is to repeatedly produce the same 
traps but in different guises. In addition, this reproduction is accomplished not simply 
by inserting timely elements into a neutral space; rather, the relations of power are 
imposed via the reproduction of the whole environment. 
For Lefebvre, 
Power, the power to maintain the relations of dependence and 
exploitation, does not keep to a defined ‘front’ at the strategic level, like 
a frontier on the map or a line of trenches on the ground. Power is 
everywhere: it is omnipresent, assigned to Being. It is everywhere in 
space. It is in everyday discourse and commonplace notions, as well as in 
police batons and armoured cars. It is in objets d’art as well as in 
missiles. It is in the diffuse preponderance of the ´visual’, as well as in 
institutions such as school or parliament. It is in things as well as in signs 
(the signs of objects and object-signs) (Lefebvre, 1976, p. 86). 
To clarify this argument, Lefebvre uses architecture as an example. He argues that 
‘When architectural urban space responds to the “social commission” of developers and 
the authorities, it is contributing actively and openly to the reproduction of the social 
relations. It is programm[ing] space’ (Lefebvre, 1976, p. 88). Furthermore, Walter 
Benjamin (2008, pp. 36, 40), in his essay about the work of art in the age of technical 
reproduction, argued that architecture not only provides an object that is collectively 
received (through perception and only visually). Moreover, architecture is absorbed by 
the masses in a state of distraction, because buildings are received through use 
(tactilely). Through use, architecture creates habits: the ability to master certain tasks in 
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a state of distraction. In this way, through architecture, social relations become 
incorporated habits. 
 
The meaning of the term ‘architecture’ as it is used within this thesis 
Architecture is understood here not as a substance (an immutable essence or ideal) 
which could be traced down and defined in absolute borders; rather, it is understood as a 
discipline: a social practice framing ways of behaving, seeing and acting in the world. 
Therefore, the term refers to no distinctive boundaries and the phenomena it 
encompasses is dynamic, fragmented, porous, scattered, and interpenetrates different 
realms of social life. Similarly to Henri Lefebvre’s account on the term space, what 
brings its use together are its social use, its accepted notion, and the way it mobilises 
social practice. 
“In other words, we are concerned with logico-epistemological space, the 
space of social practice, the space occupied by sensory phenomena, 
including products of the imagination such as projects and projections, 
symbols and Utopias”. (Lefebvre, 1991b, p. 11-12). 
In this context, the classical definitions of architecture are meaningless for investigating 
the reproduction of architecture. For instance, there is no point in separating the realms 
of ‘construction’ and ‘art’ of architecture, whereas engineers and common people would 
produce bad examples in the former, and geniuses and architects would produce the 
latter. In any which way, there is incorporation of habits, and therefore, disciplinary 
reproduction of architecture. 
In these terms, architecture should be viewed through its social dialectics, its disciplined 
practices of production and as social products that, in turn, disciplines habits. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines discipline as (1) the practice of training people to – 
or in the case of a verb, to train someone to – obey rules or a code of behaviour, using 
punishment to correct disobedience; and (2) a branch of knowledge, typically one 
studied in higher education. Thus, investigation of architecture as a discipline relates to 
the two common understandings of this word, emphasising the social intertwining of 
both – i.e., how the knowledge of architecture is also the means through which subjects 
are trained to obey. 
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Therefore, our cognitive map of the reproduction of architecture is not concerned with 
an abstract, pure and universal ideal of what architecture ‘is’. Rather it concerns an 
investigation of the concrete experience of contemporary architecture and how it 
reproduces practices and subjects of architecture. It is thus a localised and particular 
investigation, but one that aims at a larger understanding of the production of social 
reality through the production of truths in a particular field of negative universalities.3 
If we acknowledge that architecture is a historically produced social practice, then there 
is no sense in searching for the true ‘essence’ of the being of ‘architecture’. Hence, the 
scope of this research into architecture does not provide a ‘concept’ of what architecture 
‘is’. Rather it is concerned with how specific conceptions of architecture have concrete 
results in the reproduction of practices socially ‘seen’ as architecture.  
For those reasons, the research departed from concrete fieldwork as a starting point to 
trace the logico-epistemological elements set in motion in these concrete social 
practices and how they reproduce and reinforce social relations. In this sense, the 
research aims to connect the particularity of the researched practices – within and 
against the discipline – with the specific socially accepted universalities reproduced by 
them. 
In this sense, although the research departs from particular examples, the object 
observed extends beyond their immediate context. Thus, the research does not propose 
an abstract universal concept of architecture, neither does it provide a complete map of 
all concepts in the field. Nonetheless, it was able to identify an underlying phenomenon: 
                                                          
3 ‘This is not a political rebellion, a substitute for social revolution, nor is it a revolt of thought, a revolt of 
the individual, or a revolt for freedom: it is an elemental and worldwide revolt which does not seek a 
theoretical foundation, but rather seeks by theoretical means to rediscover - and recognize - its own 
foundations. Above all it asks theory to stop barring its way in this, to stop helping conceal the 
underpinnings that it is at pains to uncover. Its exploratory activity is not directed towards some kind of 
“return to nature”, nor is it conducted under the banner of an imagined “spontaneity”. Its object is “lived 
experience” - an experience that has been drained of all content by the mechanisms of diversion, 
reduction/extrapolation, figures of speech, analogy, tautology, and so on. […] This fact, however, can 
most definitely not be made into the basis of an overall definition […] It is not simply a matter, therefore, 
of a theoretical critique, but also of a “turning of the world upon its head” (Marx), of an inversion of 
meaning, and of a subversion which “breaks the tablets of the Law” (Nietzsche). […] How did this magic 
ever become possible - and how does it continue to be possible? What is the foundation of a mechanism 
which thus abolishes the foundations?’ (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 201-202) 
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the process of reproduction of social relations by means of the discipline of 
architecture.4 
Paradoxically, in these terms, what is socially conceived as ‘architecture’ matters 
precisely because it is what is being demolished. This socially conceived idea of 
‘architecture’ has a social existence and therefore reproduces social habits. Although, 
we presented no specific conceptualisation of architecture, the critique revealed how 
social relations are actively reproduced by different conceptualisations of architecture. 
In addition, this social existence of architecture was revealed to have three dimensions – 
products, methods and discourses – that correspond to the three means of its 
reproduction – reification, fetish and phantasies. This is the reason why the expression 
‘reproduction of architecture’ has a triple meaning: architecture reproduces social 
relations; architecture is reproduced by specific social relations; and architecture 
reproduces the role of the architect in society. 
Finally, there is no privileged space for the discussion of high fashion architecture. This 
last point relates to the difference between Tafuri’s and Kracauer’s critiques of 
architecture (to which we shall return in detail in Chapter 3). When attempting to 
radically critique architectural ideology, Tafuri (1976) ultimately reinforced the main 
ideology of the field – that architecture is the result of individual geniuses. His critique 
of the history of ‘world architecture’ is a critique of the discourses and styles of 
European and American high-profile architects. Alternatively, Kracauer’s (1995) essays 
from the 1920s aim to reveal how the aesthetic act is immersed in a blind field; 
therefore, what it obscures is more important than what it reveals. In this sense, ‘vulgar’ 
architecture – such as the hotel lobby for Kracauer – can more easily reveal the process 
of reproduction of habits and the blind fields it creates. Later, these ‘blind fields’ and 
this reproduction of habits can further elucidate the critique of high-profile architecture 
(which is here understood simply as the ‘core’ of architectural ideology). 
 
                                                          
4 In this sense, there is no contradiction in the fact that different investigations would deliver different 
cognitive maps (for instance, an investigation on the reproduction of vernacular architecture would 
display different elements in the map). Nonetheless, the underlying process of reproduction (even if 
with different elements) would continue to be the operative dimension. 
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The idea of a ‘cognitive mapping’ of the architectural reproduction 
In the 1970s, Louis Althusser and Lefebvre, among others, brought to the forefront the 
importance of the reproduction of relations of production in the realisation and survival 
of capitalism itself. This shift was not simply theoretical, as the development of neo-
capitalism also brought strategies such as marketing and ideological alienation to the 
forefront. As we shall return to later, ideology (with its rites and rhythms) for Althusser 
and the everyday (with its reification and fragmentation) for Lefebvre were fundamental 
to the reproduction of capitalism. 
Althusser (1971, p.5) argued that ‘The ultimate condition of production is therefore the 
reproduction of the conditions of production’. He meant that two apparatuses ensured 
‘submission to the rules of [the] established order’: a repressive state apparatus and an 
ideological apparatus. Architecture can be a slow form of repressive social ‘violence’ in 
many ways (see ‘Rebel Architecture’, 2014), but the focus here is on the subtle ways in 
which architectural theory becomes ideology.  
For Althusser (1971, p. 165), ideology is the image that an individual has of his social 
condition. However, this image has a paradoxical ‘material existence’ precisely because 
it shapes the possibilities of what exists in the everyday life of a subject. This 
paradoxical image especially occurs through ‘interpellation’ (an identity mirror). 
Interpellations create the subject because they place the individual in a relation to the 
world and in a position from which he can act in the world. Interpellations occur when 
‘embodied’ ideological instruments (an advertisement, a building and even the 
placement of chairs in a room) address the individual, making her/him the subject of 
expected social interactions correlated with institutions and discourses. Thus, embodied 
ideologies mould internal subjectivities. Therefore, the material condition of a mode of 
production has a dialectical relationship with the subject’s cognitive awareness of his 
place in this condition. For this reason, Althusser asserts that there is no escape from 
ideology: ‘ideology never says, “I am ideological”. It is necessary to be outside 
ideology … to say: I am in ideology’ (Althusser, 1971, p. 175). 
Fredric Jameson (1990) proposed the idea of a ‘cognitive map’ to investigate the 
relation between ideology and awareness in contemporary societies. He combined 
Althusser’s argument that ‘ideology’ is the subject’s representation of his own position 
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in the social structure with Kevin Lynch’s (1960) studies of city imageability (how 
people build the image of a city to navigate it). 
Nevertheless, Jameson questions the positivist non-dialectical and ahistorical approach 
of Lynch. This is especially true if one bears in mind that ‘cognitive mapping’ has its 
origins in behaviourist psychology, and is based on Edward Tolman’s (1948) work with 
rats in a maze. Tolman’s work was later developed by O’Keefe and Nadel (1978), who 
analysed how specific groups of neurons in the hippocampus are related to different 
functions, including location, orientation, and recognition of borders. It is important to 
note that for the Nobel laureate on this topic Edvard Moser (2014), a map is not only a 
representation used to retain, encode and recall the elements in a space but also an 
instrument for exploration that permits the development of detours and shortcuts. To 
allow such exploration, a cognitive map depends on its capacity to enable ‘flexible 
behaviour’ and to generate predictions (e.g., ‘If you do this, that will happen’). 
In the same sense, Jameson’s cognitive map aims to create a device not only to trace 
ideological images but also to enable people to take a detour from the very image that 
they have created of themselves in relation to the transformation of social structures. 
Jameson (1991) notes that due to the increasing complexity of the contemporary social 
structures, such maps have become imperative. His argument is that a new type of 
aesthetic is necessary to trace how reality is constantly being reshaped and to reveal 
possible rearrangements. 
Toscano and Kinkle (2015) also emphasise that a cognitive map is about enhancing 
perception of the abstract logics of social life. For instance, they argue that the 
television series Wired is a cognitive map of the city of Baltimore. In this sense, 
drawing a cognitive map does not resemble the traditional methods of cartography. 
Cognitive mapping is not simply drawing and representing, nor it is simply 
conceptualising and diagramming, because it ‘does not provide a method, or advance a 
concept; rather, it poses a problem which is at once political, economic, aesthetic and 
existential’ (Toscano and Kinkle, 2015, 22). In this sense, concepts and diagrams are 
used only as heuristic instruments to make visible and problematise the abstract 
mechanisms of a given social condition. 
 
 
18 
 
Similarly, a cognitive map of architecture should be a tool of clarification. In other 
words, it should not simply mimic the complexity of reality; rather, it should enable 
subjects to navigate reality. Our specific map should clarify the interconnections, 
structures, dialectics, exchanges and conflicts surrounding architecture. Furthermore, it 
should enable subjects to visualise the dialectical interaction between architecture and 
society and help them understand how the subjectivity of architects is reproduced. 
 
A map of this thesis 
 
Diagram 1: Map of the thesis. Source: the author. 
This initial set of ideas lead us back to the cognitive map that this thesis is. As 
mentioned above, the fieldwork – reported in the appendices – were a tool that enabled 
to identify the key paradoxes of the discipline of architecture and the ways in which 
these disciplinary structures result in the reproduction of architecture. Therefore, this 
fieldwork is an omnipresent source for the discussions in the chapters that follow, 
functioning as a mediator between Part 1 and Part 2.5 
                                                          
5 The fieldwork resulted in four stake points – further discussed in the appendices –  upon which the 
map was developed. These stake points generated the two axes (the estrangement of part 1 and the 
reproduction of part 2). They are stake points not only in the sense that they refer to the ‘building 
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Part 1 is an abstract account of how to critically approach the deadlocks uncovered in 
the discipline, and Part 2 is a reflexive return to the concrete experience of the 
architectural profession. Thus, Part 2 elucidates how disciplined deadlocks frame the 
architectural unconscious, transforming architecture into a disciplining force that 
reproduces social relations rather than accomplishing its potential to engage in political 
struggles. In this sense, each chapter has a theoretical relationship with its symmetrical 
peer in the other part (see diagram 1 above).  
Chapter 1 describes the different deadlocks of architectural theory, establishing the 
literature landscape that this thesis aims to avoid: It is about what it is not about. 
In Chapter 2, we begin designing our cognitive map, tracing the disciplinary elements of 
the field of architecture and its dialectical overcoming. This design creates not only a 
new picture of the territory of architecture but also renders a new theory of the subject 
inhabiting this map. 
In Chapter 3, we further develop the idea of the current subject of architecture, its 
historical emergence, and a theoretical framework of a ‘subject to change’. Rather than 
architecture being understood as a structure subjected to an operation that results in a 
later structure (S-O-S), a new ontogenesis of architecture is developed, allowing the 
understanding of architecture not as a ‘thing’ but as a ‘process’ – an operation that 
creates a structure only as a phase in the emergence of a new operation – (O<  >S<  
>O). In this new ontogenesis of architecture (a being becoming), architectural 
subjectivities become the driving means of the reproduction of architecture. Thus, the 
following three layers of architectural reproduction emerge: reification, fetish and 
phantasy. 
In Chapter 4, we proceed with a critical return to the concrete everyday of the 
profession, revealing how the conception of architecture as a thing is in fact a 
thingification of social relations. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 5, we investigate how architecture operates this thingification, 
namely, through fetish. Fetish is understood as a ‘present participle’, both a noun and a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
surveying’ of our map but also because they reveal the main paradoxes in radical practices: the points at 
stake. 
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verb. Thus, architecture is revealed to be a technique of phenomena (i.e., a method of 
fetish), capturing the work of others, hiding artifices of power and framing 
subjectivities. Subjectivities are framed through a process in which architects 
themselves become instruments: things operated by others. In addition, understanding 
how architects come to desire their own oppression is the topic of the following chapter.  
In Chapter 6, we unveil how the narratives produced in the field are the means through 
which the subjects of architecture come to desire their own instrumentalisation. 
Subjected to framing, fragmentation and hierarchy, the collective subject of architecture 
is expropriated by phantasies of ‘princes’. In line with Althusser’s interpretation of 
Machiavelli’s prince, ranked architects are nothing more than representations and a 
socially accepted means of expropriation. Princes and ‘utopias’ are investigated as the 
main phantasies of architecture. In Slavoj Žižek’s approach to Lacan’s 
conceptualisation, phantasies are conscious narratives that are developed to justify and 
mobilise unconscious desires. Therein lies the foundation of architectural reproduction 
and the core of architectural estrangement – i.e., the separation of architects from the 
means of their own production. The result is a map that enables subjects to traverse 
these phantasies. 
No solution is provided here. Although somewhat discouraging, what is at stake is the 
use that someone might have for this map. 
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PART 1: 
ARCHITECTURAL ESTRANGEMENT: 
Mapping discipline, dialectics and subjects 
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On the one hand, architecture seems to implode inside the illusions created by the field 
itself. On the other hand, architecture seems to explode into divergent and dissenting 
practices that attempt to critically overcome the limits of the field. The question we 
aimed to investigate comes from the conflict between these two dynamics: Can we find 
in these practices of dissent some way of producing architecture that delivers radical 
social changes?  
If we position ourselves at a radical distance from the discipline of architecture and 
examine it from an impartial abstract viewpoint, we find the discipline of architecture to 
be so intertwined with the reproduction of the social system, that many critical accounts 
suggest architecture to be ‘the problem’ of ideologically framed social spaces (for 
instance, see Carcciari, 1993; La Cecla, 2008). These accounts assume ‘architecture’ to 
be constrained by its ‘disciplinary condition’, leaving no space for dialectics or 
contradictions; in addition, such accounts do not consider practices outside the formal 
discipline – such as vernacular or vulgar architecture.6 In these approaches, architects 
are trapped in the spiral of the mode of production, thereby reinforcing ideologies, if 
they do not simply accept an ad hoc position in some pre-established social role. 
Nevertheless, contradictions are manifested in this condition by the two inverse 
dynamics: on the one hand, the field seems to implode on itself and, on the other hand, 
it seems to present fragments of an explosion. 
In the first dynamic, the structures and hierarchies of the field are pressed towards an 
increasing concentration of power, with internationally acclaimed architects occupying 
positions of social esteem. The romantic figure of the solitary humanist architect is 
replaced by large offices resembling the structures of corporate and international brands, 
wherein the labour of hundreds of architects is concentrated. 
In the second dynamic, widespread discontentment with the ‘rules of the game’ 
motivates thousands of emergent critical initiatives aimed at escaping the constraints of 
the discipline and engaging in the social and political realms. Around the world, 
                                                          
6 Alternatively, as we discussed in the introduction, we aim to investigate the dialectic between the 
discipline of architecture and the reproduction of social relations. Paradoxically, in this way, the socially 
accepted concepts of what architecture is matters precisely because they are a topic of debate. 
Furthermore, the approach of the reproduction of architecture considers the (social) products that 
architecture delivers – usually seen as ‘things’; the methods established in practice to create ‘facts’ – here 
argued to be the techniques of phenomena in the form of fetishes; and architecture as the narratives that 
justify the mobilisation of collective desires – namely, phantasies. 
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collectives, non-profit organisations and independent groups are attempting to develop 
activities that reengage architecture with the production (or the imagining) of alternative 
social spaces (for an account of these experiences, see Appendix 3). 
Substantial to these efforts is the research and experiments developed in the realm of 
academia, especially in the form of so-called ‘Live Projects’. Harriss and Widder (2014) 
organised a network of the institutions involved in these experiences that aims to 
transform the pedagogy of architecture into a ‘hands-on’ activity. This approach aims to 
move beyond the ‘design studio’ – detached from reality – emphasising a ‘complex 
participation in the world’ in a process focused on collective and trans-disciplinary 
efforts rather than individual initiatives. Like a nail in the head of this discussion, Alan 
Chandler (2014) finds the fact that ‘building’ is both a noun and a verb to be a 
fundamental point. As an ‘action’, architecture is more than a ‘thing’ in the common 
sense of the word, and its status as a process and an activity of production and labour 
fully reveals the social relations involved in architecture. 
To understand the interference of architecture in the reproduction of social relations, we 
focused our investigation on design experiments related to public spaces. We started 
with an analysis of the condition of contemporary public spaces (the fieldwork in 
Appendix 2). A sample of constructed projects approved after 2009 were subject to a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis, resulting in a picture of the average new traces of 
these spaces. In this sense, these spaces are new ‘common spaces’ in contemporary 
cities because they are both becoming the usual and ordinary things (commonplaces) 
and forming the new ‘commons’ of society. 
We advanced the research by investigating a series of UEL Live Projects both in the 
master’s module ‘Urban Ecology’ and in the post-graduate professional architecture 
programme module ‘Construction Week’ (the fieldwork in Appendix 3). These projects 
aimed to design and construct interventions in urban spaces in London and abroad. As 
we aim to understand how architecture is prevented from interfering in the production 
of social relations, we focused on three workshops that entail a close relation of 
architecture with public spaces, especially focusing on the paradoxes that inhibited the 
aims of the workshops. 
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We did not aim to undermine the multifaceted richness of the experiences; we instead 
sought to focus on the critical points that these experiences were able to reveal, namely, 
the ones in which the discipline is pushed against its own ‘limits’.7 
In this way, the conflict between the implosion and explosion of architecture pointed 
directly to the problem to be investigated in this first part. A question that returns is: 
Can this conflict suggest how architecture can produce new social relations instead of 
reinforcing the existing ones? 
To assess the elements at play, we developed initial working hypotheses. These 
hypotheses were provisional conceptual frameworks that aimed at allowing exploratory 
research, in the sense that these ‘constructed expectations’ could facilitate the 
navigation of the different elements at play. The working hypotheses were as follows: 
(1) new privatised public spaces were a form of ‘urban enclosure’; (2) architecture 
could operate as the production of micro-utopias in the sense of Foucault’s micro-
politics, suspending or countering the current mode of production at the scale of 
experience; (3) as the social mode of production is shifting towards a society of control 
framed by information technologies (IT), the last hypothesis implied the possibility of 
change by means of methods similar to IT hacking (a more detailed account on these 
working hypotheses can be found in Appendix 3). 
In the conflict between implosion and explosion and in the paradoxes faced by critical 
practices, we found the elements that revealed our initial hypotheses to be limited. 
Nevertheless, they enabled the emergence of a new one – the reproduction of 
architecture. The point of no return on the road to an architecture that might shape new 
social relations does not emerge by adding new ideas within the constraints of a 
disciplinary field; instead, it resides in enabling a new subject to emerge and reposition 
itself in the disciplinary process that architecture reproduces. 
For that, in the first chapter of this part, we mapped how architectural theory frames the 
discipline in a series of deadlocks forming its main paradox: can architecture produce 
rather than reproduce social relations? This problem not only concerns architecture but 
                                                          
7  More detailed reports of these workshops were developed during the research process as a means for 
discussing with the supervisory team. Nevertheless, to preserve the anonymity of the participants, these 
reports are not included in either the body of this work or in the appendices. 
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also involves a wider realm of theory concerned with social products, from which the 
architectural debate borrows different approaches.  
After this first chapter, we were able to trace a cognitive map picturing how the 
discipline of architecture reproduces itself and social relations, establishing the context 
for the debate between the disciplinary character of the architectural field and its 
dialectical relations with society (presented in Chapter 2). 
This map helps to navigate the ordinary forms of illusio in the field and uncovers the 
gaps in the state of the art.8 In addition, in the final chapter of Part 1 (Chapter 3), we 
challenged the idea of agency and the vulgar concept of the subject in architecture, also 
developing our hypothesis regarding a transindividual subjectivity in architecture that is 
an operation rather than a thing, thus paving the way for the conceptualisation of 
practices ‘within’ and ‘against’ the field. 
This cognitive map of architecture intends to enable navigation in the field as it 
currently operates and to offer a critically reflexive perspective on the operations that 
maintain the architectural paradox (to shape, and not to shape society). Doing so 
provides a preliminary tool for any radical project that seeks to challenge or redefine 
these terms. 
  
                                                          
8 As we shall see, illusio is a concept from Bourdieu that aims to unveil how the ostensibly 
‘revolutionary’ proposals in a field are simply cyclical repositions of old hierarchies within the same 
framework. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
The architectural deadlocks: to shape or not to shape 
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In general, common sense would accept the idea that ‘architecture has always shaped 
society’ (‘Rebel Architecture’, 2014). Monuments, squares, streets, patterns, houses, 
nature, and rituals, among others, are understood as elements that mould the cultures 
and ways of life in every city. By contrast, we increasingly accept the idea that the field 
of architecture cannot change society because it is a small part of a complex 
socioeconomic structure. The fundamental paradox of architecture lies in, at the same 
time, being able to shape and unable to reshape.  
Initially, it will be important to map how the current debate in architecture frames this 
paradox by means of a series of deadlocks. These ‘frames’ may reveal how the debate 
creates different types of false dilemmas and arguments for moderation, which result 
from internal disputes that deflect radical inquisitions about the architect’s social role. 
The architectural paradox (to shape and yet be unable to shape) hides a fundamental 
contradiction in architectonic epistemology. Normally, architecture is theorised as a 
‘given’ rather than a social product. Architecture as a way of seeing and acting in 
society is not a natural fact. Architecture and its activities are social constructs, the 
products of human activities in a given context. However, architecture is not a random 
or spontaneous activity free of any foundation. Architecture is a complex activity that 
engages in a series of processes in a chain of production; it involves a complex system 
of knowledge and skills that are handed down from generation to generation. Therefore, 
history is the matter of architecture. 
Furthermore, architecture is a (form of) discipline. As a ‘profession’, a topic of 
‘knowledge’, an assemblage of ‘corporatist’ interests, a shared cultural language, a 
social praxis, a set of skills or a division of labour, the phenomenon usually referred to 
as ‘architecture’ serves as a disciplinary force within society. It regulates patterns of 
behaviour, defines measures of comparison, controls interactions among individuals, 
imposes ways of thinking, defines what is seen and what is unseen, suggests what 
should be supported and what should be opposed, defines identities and social roles, 
establishes a rhythm and regulates everyday life. At the very least, architecture is 
currently designed to do these things. In this way, architecture as a discipline establishes 
a specific form of subjectivity among its followers and determines a series of practices 
and mechanisms to produce a similar range of ‘objects’. 
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These objects are evaluated, hierarchically distinguished, disseminated and reproduced 
through a series of institutions and protocols. In turn, these objects interpellate subjects 
(see introduction and Althusser, 1971), as they place the subject in expected social roles. 
This interpellation occurs in the abstract field of architecture, as much as in the concrete 
field of everyday life in real cities or in the imaginary world of desire promoted by 
propaganda and the media. Thus, denying that architecture plays a role in the process of 
reproducing social relations would be at the very least imprecise. Moving from the 
symbolic to the concrete, from the abstract management of production to the pragmatic 
experience of the everyday life, architecture functions as a means of realising ideologies 
in social space (see Spencer, 2012, pp. 105-109). 
What process, then, still renders architecture as both incredibly powerful and hopelessly 
impotent? How can such diffuse and contradictory ideas paint architecture as a 
discipline that shapes but is unable to shape social relations? In this chapter, we argue 
that a series of theoretical deadlocks generate this paradox. Therefore, we shall first 
trace the most common deadlocks to be avoided, which will be reviewed according to 
the following groups:9 
(1) Dead ends: when the propositions do not overcome the elements identified as 
problematic; 
(2) False dilemmas: when pseudo ‘technical errors’ in the profession are blamed 
as the structural causes of social problems; thus, a different ‘style’ would be 
able to solve the problem; 
(3) The fallacy of autonomy: when architecture is estranged from society, 
denying its embeddedness and social interaction, as if it could be conceived 
outside political and ethical considerations; 
                                                          
9 In concrete manifestations, these deadlocks intertwine and reinforce each other. The presented 
systematisation has only an instrumental character, and it aims to map the different aspects of the paradox 
of architecture. Furthermore, this prolegomenon will focus on the logical errors in the cognitive 
reproduction of the architectural paradox; thus, we will retain the analysis on the formal aspects of the 
reasoning. This approach aims to investigate how architectural theory frames a condition in which 
architects can do nothing but reproduce the field. In the next chapter, we will map the discipline of 
architecture and the ways in which a dialectical approach can facilitate detours in the field. 
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(4) The denial of the dialectic: when architecture is regarded as a mimetic reflex 
by denying that architecture and cultural products counteract society, i.e., 
architecture is considered a ‘superstructure’ that is separate from the ‘base’ 
– a sort of ‘effect’ detached from deeper causes; 
(5) A lack of reflexivity: when any ‘idea’ about architecture is considered ‘false’ 
and the spokesperson is presumed to be the only possible emissary of the 
absolute ‘truth’ about reality (either positively or negatively). 
 
1.1. Dead ends: charity, resignation, escapism and protest 
Dead ends can generally be identified as a lack of critical detachment or a lack of 
imagination. Nevertheless, the complexity of the problem might blur some boundaries, 
and it might even be used as a cynical or dissuasive instrument to simulate a radical 
approach. Most notably, dead ends in architecture appear in the following modes: 
charity, resignation, escapism and protest. 
 
Charity 
Architecture that is produced as charity presupposes the possibility of solving a problem 
with the same formula that has created the problem. For instance, to remedy the 
shortage of housing in capitalist societies, architects should intensify and spread 
capitalism, developing more houses for the market and targeting excluded groups. More 
than a moral concern about ‘making profit out of poverty’, what matters here is the 
rejection/incapability of overcoming the precise logics that reproduce inequalities in the 
first place. 
Alejandro Aravena is an illuminating example of today’s fashionable practice of 
targeting low-income consumers as a form of redemption. In a lecture at UEL (24 
November 2015), Aravena described how the ‘market’ used to ignore him until he went 
to Harvard (a ‘distinguished’ institution), where a colleague noted that social housing 
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was an ignored ‘niche’ market in architecture. Therefore, he and his colleague proposed 
a module that explored student projects in this field. His proposal was to ‘do better’ 
architecture in the very ‘same game of the market’. Aravena (2015) recalled how these 
experiments remained relatively unknown and academic until he met the Chilean 
Housing Minister, who was a Harvard alumnus and became a close friend. With the 
Housing Minister’s influence, he was able to attract a vast number of state-funded 
business-led projects. 
Aravena’s projects aim to smooth inequalities rather than eliminating them altogether. 
At the UEL event, he described how he wanted to transform architecture into a device 
like ‘the beaches in Brazil’. According to Aravena, the reason that rich and poor people 
do not ‘kill each other’ in Brazil is because the beaches work as a social device that 
smooths the enormous social contrasts by offering enjoyment and pleasure. When asked 
how he could draw the line between ‘charity’ and ‘really tackling’ the problem, he 
dismissed the question, answering ‘I only do design’ (a tactical answer very common 
among famous architects). To make his point, Aravena used a hypothetical project for 
Syria, in which he would simply ‘not think about war’ because it would interfere with 
good design practice. In this sense, charity in architecture can be precisely understood 
as a form of deflecting the problem that it should address, thus reproducing its roots by 
either extending its contradictions to a wider field or covering the problem with a 
beautiful façade. Furthermore, despite any good intentions, the charity approach will 
ultimately address the effects rather than the causes of a problem.10  
 
Resignation 
Resignation is another form of dead end. There are two faces to the same resignation 
coin: abdication and abnegation. 
To abdicate is to give up. It is to recognise one’s failure in carrying out a duty, thereby 
renouncing a position of social power. To abdicate in architecture is to deny its social 
power, as power is understood to exist elsewhere. In this attitude, architecture must be 
                                                          
10 For other variations of this approach, please refer to Architecture for Humanity, 2006; Smith, C., 2007. 
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accepted as a natural fact that occurs within a society and be understood as regulated by 
natural laws. In this sense, architects are powerless. They do not act; they only actualise. 
Truth is seen only in the immediate experience; thus, the status quo becomes absolute. 
For the architect, there is no room for critique, reflection or consciousness. Only with 
this form of reasoning can architecture be understood as merely the solution of an 
equation or as a technical procedure. 
Arguably, the most famous proponent of this idea is Patrik Schumacher. For 
Schumacher (2015), the time when architecture aspired to interfere in society is in the 
past. He argues that architecture is a discipline and that politics is another field; thus, 
architecture should stick to its own corner. For him, architecture should only mirror the 
contemporary condition rather than trying to interfere with it. In his words, 
Architecture has no capacity to resolve political controversy. Political 
controversy and activism would overburden and explode the discipline. 
However, architecture can and must respond to transformative historical 
developments that become manifest within the economy and the political 
system. Architecture can only react with sufficient unanimity and 
collective vitality to dominant political agendas that already have the real 
power of a tangible political force behind them. Architectural discourse 
must develop innovative architectural responses to these historical 
transformative trends. […] The author [referring to himself in third 
person] argues that parametricism is the only truly innovative direction 
within architecture and should be promoted as the only credible 
candidate aspiring to become the unified epochal style for architecture, 
urbanism and all the design disciplines for the 21st century. This thesis is 
being argued for within a comprehensive, unified theory […] All top-
down bureaucratic attempts to order the built environment are bankrupt. 
[…] The functional (programmatic) dimension of this new urban order is 
being delivered by client-entrepreneurs competing and collaborating 
within the institutional framework of the global market process: neo-
liberalism (Schumacher, 2015). 
By contrast, Douglas Spencer (2012) has demonstrated how contemporary architects, 
such as Schumacker and Foreign Office Architects (FOA), have ultimately reproduced 
and mimicked the abstract instruments of a ‘society of control’ that Deleuze (1992) 
criticised. Once the status quo is regarded as natural, neoliberalism becomes axiomatic 
and the law. Once capitalism is considered ‘natural’, any critique, proposed change or 
intention to produce a counterplan is labelled ‘fascism’. The only alternative is to enjoy 
the flow and to use architecture to providently mimic what is already there: the status 
quo and the discipline become absolute.  
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According to this epistemology, there is no ambiguity in architecture. Architecture is 
conceived as either having an immutable essence or as obeying a recognisable universal 
law of evolution to which architects should adapt. Arguably, the architect’s position 
results from a choice of ignorance and impotence. The architect chooses to ignore that 
architecture is a social product with a conflicting history. He or she ignores the conflicts 
and different ethical and political dilemmas implicit in various practices. However, he 
or she ultimately chooses impotence, accepting things as they are and expecting 
immediate benefits in return for his or her resignation. In fact, abdication does not deny 
the power of architecture to shape society; instead, through circular reasoning, the 
architect who abdicates chooses impotence by accepting nothing more than the shapes 
aligned with the machinery of the status quo. Thus, he or she resigns to circumstances, 
which are expected to be absolute truths. 
Abnegation, a gesture against the self, is the act of denying oneself something.  
Abnegation does not deny the power of architecture; it instead hands over this power in 
an act of self-denial.11 Abnegation in architecture distributes its power to other 
individuals rather than the architect, transforming architecture into a medium and 
denying the architect’s responsibility by inviting others to exercise the power that he or 
she has given up. Thus, the architect resigns in favour of others, who are expected to 
have some form of absolute wisdom. Abnegation most commonly appears in the form 
of participation, when the one in power renders his decision-making capacity to 
others.12  
Claire Bishop (2006, 2012), on the one hand, praises participation as an instrument that 
creates ‘factual events’ in the world, extending our capacity to imagine our relationship 
with the world. On the other hand, she criticises how participation became an escape 
route after the collapse of communism, thereafter embracing an attitude of post-
                                                          
11 Alternatively, a very different attitude can be understood through the verb ‘abrogate’ (formally repeal). 
When Peter Kropotkin famously rejected his title as prince at the age of 12, he was not giving up a fight 
or submitting himself to powerlessness. He was paving the way to build an anarchistic struggle. Similarly, 
when Anthony Neil Wedgwood (1998), known as Tony Benn, renounced his hereditary 2nd Viscount 
Peerage, this act would ultimately enable him to join the political struggle and develop his famous key 
questions: ‘What power do you have? Where did you get it? In whose interests do you exercise it? To 
whom are you accountable? And, how can we get rid of you?’ 
12 This deadlock was famously represented in Arnstein’s (1969) Ladder of Participation, which had eight 
steps, starting with less participation and increasing with each step: manipulation, therapy, informing, 
consulting, placation, partnership, delegating power and the ideal aim of citizen control. Planning thus 
becomes a neutral means. This deadlock is usually associated with charity in many contemporary 
examples (see Schinkel et al., 2014; Architecture for Humanity, 2006; Smith, 2007) 
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politicality, marketisation, populist neoliberalism and a ‘Reality Show’ aesthetic.13 In 
some cases, she notices how participation entirely merged with spectacle instead of 
serving as an oppositional force.14 In this sense, she argues that participation is not a 
privileged medium nor a ready-made solution. Participation yields better results when it 
maintains a tension between artistic critique and social critique. Perhaps similar to the 
way in which Marcuse (1981) describes art as a break with reality and the imagination 
of another possible dimension, Bishop argues that artistic representation can sometimes 
generate more dissent and consciousness than participation in reality, making the most 
ineffectual gestures even more exemplary (‘however uncomfortable, exploitative, or 
confusing’) than pragmatic micro-interventions, as artistic representation might invent 
an unpredictable subject rather than allocating a fixed space to fill the voids left by 
dominant powers. For her, ‘good intentions shouldn’t render art immune to critical 
analysis” (Bishop, 2006). 
For Bishop (2006, 2011), the turn towards ‘participation’ is often made as a strategy to 
avoid ‘spectacle’, which aims to transform passive citizens (lost in images) into active 
citizens. Nevertheless, following Baudrillard (1994), she argues that images and the 
medium have merged into simulacra; even if citizens were to participate in, say, 
architecture, they would do so in a realm of masquerades, preconceptions and false 
values rather than being exposed to fundamental contradictions in society. In developing 
Hegel’s master-slave paradox, Paulo Freire (1996) argued that the ‘oppressed’ only 
know the logic of the ‘oppressor’, thus reproducing the attitude of the oppressor in his 
mind. In this sense, participation only encourages emancipated subjects if it creates 
some form of consciousness (an awareness of the fabricated relationship between the 
self and world). 
 
                                                          
13 In addition to noting the fact that voluntary work also means unpaid and precarious work, Bishop 
(2011) criticises the dichotomy between an ‘art critique’ (focused in disenchantment, inauthenticity, 
individualism, egotism, networking, mobility, project work, and affective labour) and a ‘social critique’ 
(focused on oppression), as it creates a detached realm for art, in which oppression focuses on individuals 
and has no roots or real consequences. This duality ‘underlines, for me, the necessity of sustaining a 
tension between artistic and social critiques (…) a continual play of mutual tension, recognition and 
dependency’, in which the irreconcilable tension between individual and society can be explored and 
propaganda and moral discourses can be avoided. 
14 See Anthony Gormley, One and Other (2009). Participants became immediate and temporary centres of 
the spectacle, which Higgins (2009) referred to as ‘twitter art’ in The Guardian. 
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Escapism 
However, various forms of 'escapism' or 'myths of evasion' constitute another dead end. 
In the modernist vanguard, escapism consisted of an attempt to flee civilisation’s 
contradictions by escaping to a primitive environment.15 Such was the notorious case of 
Gauguin’s escape to Martinique and then to Tahiti.  
In spatial terms, Oswald Mathias Ungers, of whom Rem Koolhas is an ambivalent 
disciple, proposed the architectonical classic of such escapes. He conceived of projects 
as utopian islands in the city that disrupt the regular social structure.16 Similarly, the 
proposals of Temporary Autonomous Zones (TAZs) aim to produce interventions in 
which social rules are momentarily suspended: 
The TAZ is like an uprising which does not engage directly with the 
State, a guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of 
imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, 
before the State can crush it (Galloway 2004, 35). 
The TAZ is inspired by Foucault’s (1986) concept of heterotopias, although the former 
does not recognise that any existential space would already be formed by multiple 
dimensionalities, rituals and layered experience. Instead, disconnected spatial structures 
in short-lived detached experiments are proposed as pure potentiality; thus, they are 
disengaged from the concrete experience and, in this sense, escape from its constraints. 
In a similar but distinct vein, Sande argues for the creation of ‘micro-utopias’ or the 
‘acting as if one is already free’ (Sande 2013). Ringel (2012), using an ‘anthropologic-
anarchist approach’, conceives that micro-utopias should be dedicated to creatively 
producing free spatialities, thus avoiding a neoliberal evacuation of the future by 
                                                          
15 See Michelli, 1991. 
16 Ungers based his political dialectic on his previous research on the housing interventions in ‘Red 
Vienna’. Those interventions created isolated superblocks as ideal spaces for workers. These spaces were 
not like the modernist minimum standard but instead were performance spaces for the full realisation of 
life. In addition, Ungers researched alternative communities in the USA and became convinced of the 
possibility of creating entities that were autonomous from the overall social system. These ideas would 
combine to form his most famous paradigm: the Archipelago. The Archipelago was inspired by 
Schinkel’s interventions in Berlin. It was conceived as an alternative to urban expansion because by the 
1970s, Berlin was shrinking. Therefore, Ungers proposed that the city become a system of ‘cities within 
the city’, archipelagos of urbanity surrounded by green spaces. In this sense, the city would be formed by 
contrasts, opposing forms, conflicts, and a hodgepodge of different collective dimensions. Therefore, each 
island would become a micro-city. In other words, each island could create its own utopic proposal (see 
Aureli, 2011 and 2008, pp. 177-228, especially p. 178). 
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developing a ‘creative presentism’, which creates new grounds for hope. Webb and 
Lynch (2010) analyse how the post-punk scene constructed new experiences of reality 
that were momentarily actualised in ‘pirate spaces’ of globalisation and then actualised 
into the ‘lifeworld’. Bourriaud (2002a, p. 31) argues that traditional critical theory can 
no longer sustain artistic strategies, as the strategy of total negation and transformation 
of society is no longer available. Thus, he argues for everyday tactics, working within 
the system and promoting new forms of conviviality and encounters. For him, 
contemporary art already works through the invention of idiosyncratic ‘vanishing lines’; 
he argues that what ‘artists are trying to do now is to create micro-utopias, 
neighborhood utopias, like talking to your neighbor’ (Bourriaud, 2002b). For him, these 
micro-utopias are a new form of ‘possible’ micro-politics. Similarly, John Wood (2007) 
proposes designing micro-utopias in a less rational, critical and negative way, 
dismissing both the idea of a monolithic utopia and Western mechanistic individualism 
in favour of a multifaceted proliferation of imaginative ‘miracles’ and ‘dreams’ in an 
ethics of flow. Alternatively, Pier Vittorio Aureli (2013) proposes a monastic 
architecture in which subjects can detach themselves from society and realise the true 
nature of their inner selves, thus escaping society through ascetic cells of an absolute 
architecture that is supposedly based on a true and natural human essence (Aurelli, 
2011).17 
For Douglas Spencer (2016), these proposals fail to critically acknowledge their own 
positions and to effectively confront the complexity of the contemporary condition. 
Thus, by accepting the possibility of an architectural autonomy and mystifying the 
notion of an individualistic subject (detached from any social constraints), they 
precisely and inadvertently align themselves with the most characteristic neoliberal 
ideology: there is nothing beyond the realm of free individuals making free choices. 
Thus, all these approaches fail in two ways. On the one hand, they avoid the problem 
not by resigning but rather by abandoning and departing from the problem of how 
architecture is reproducing society. On the other hand, they aim to address the essential 
nature of a ‘free subject’, ignoring the historicity of architecture, its practices, and the 
                                                          
17 A final variation of this escape comes from architects such as Peter Zumthor and FOA, who escape the 
ethical implications of architecture by addressing the supposedly absolute and pure joy of corporeal 
experiences of the senses in a realm of pleasure, idyllic experiences and futile affect (on the politics of 
affect, see Spencer, 2012, pp. 179-194). 
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ways in which the architect’s subjectivity (as well as any other subjectivity) is 
historically and socially produced (interpellated) and contingent.18 
 
Protest 
The last mode of the dead-end group involves transforming architecture into protest. 
Important radical architects ultimately fell into this logical entanglement. Although they 
have developed a powerful critical view that enables them to identify how architecture 
is used as an instrument of power and ideology, the solutions proposed are all versions 
that involve either ‘taking over’ the discipline or committing a ‘symbolic kidnapping’ of 
the existent structures. In such cases, architecture remains trapped in a system of 
representation; thus, it can at most be used to denounce its own mistakes. For instance, 
although Aldo Rossi developed an important and critical theory, he ultimately fell into 
this dead-end deadlock. 
According to Aureli (2008, p. 56), Aldo Rossi, under the influence of Gramsci, 
understood architecture not as a product of Great Masters but as an integral part of 
urban phenomena, formed in the dialectic of individual actions, political economy and 
social history. Therefore, he managed to avoid any metaphorical justifications, 
developing an approach that could directly address the concrete aspects of a place’s 
political production, as the uniqueness of his concept of ‘locus’ could not be reduced to 
capital integration (Aureli, 2008, p.63). 
For Rossi (1982), architecture, as a repository of labour, has a ‘profound value as a 
human thing that shapes reality and adapts material[s] according to an aesthetic 
conception’. Although Rossi also critiques ‘naïve functionalism’, he does so to rescue 
political values and social content, which are embedded in architecture as ‘artefacts’. 
For him, an artefact is the result of social labour and careful conceptualisation. When 
Rossi creates the concept of typology, he does so to address architecture’s social 
heritage and historical symbolism in the city. A type is a repository of culture, social 
knowledge and collective work. 
                                                          
18 For a more extensive critique of this conception of the subject, please refer to the discussion in the end 
of Chapter 2 and Chapters 3 and 6.  
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At this point, the theory is extremely consistent, but from diagnosis to prognosis, a 
‘Mexican standoff’ is reached.19 A representative project is that for the Centro 
Direzionale de Torino. The proposal aims to reveal the social conditions of labour and 
to avoid creating a pseudo-Eden; instead, it aims to reinforce the workers’ massive 
collectiveness. Although architecture is the property of the dominant class, the 
structures’ silent rigidity says nothing about anything but its massive existence, shifting 
attention to the locus, to the greatness of the social union (in this emblematic ‘worker’s 
city’), and to the architectural act of providing that union with monumental symbolism. 
Although this architectural symbolism expresses a political choice, it does not interfere 
with how architecture is produced nor with how it reproduces and reinforces pre-
existing social structures. 
In this dead end, architects engage with the context and the design with political 
intentions, positioning themselves in urban social struggles and using architecture as a 
representation of their positions. Nothing fundamentally changes in architecture, except 
that it becomes a sign that is raised in protest. However, architecture continues to be an 
image that covers all the implicit mechanisms of its production, its machinations, its 
arrangements, its articulations, its organisation, and its gears. No social change can be 
delivered before some ‘outside event’ resolves the contradictions represented by ‘the 
standoff’: one must wait for the ‘final revolution’. Despite all the advancements of 
Rossi’s theories, they accomplish nothing outside the system, nor do they contribute to 
the production of a different ‘condition’. Yet again, the architect is locked in a paradox 
of ‘re-presentation’; (re)presenting an alternative image rather than building something 
new.20 
 
                                                          
19 A Mexican standoff is a confrontation between two or more parties in which no participant can proceed 
or retreat without being exposed to danger. As a result, all participants must maintain a strategic tension, 
which remains unresolved until some outside event makes a resolution possible (from Wikipedia). 
20 Notably, we are not arguing that images have no power; instead, we are arguing the opposite. We aim 
to unveil the power of creating images. In Chapters 3 and 6, we will see how the architect might be 
conceived as a ‘prince’ in the Machiavellian sense (see Althusser, 2000) or as the ‘vanguard of the 
proletariat’ in the Gramscian tradition; thus, the architect becomes the image of a political endeavour (a 
representation), an instrumental abstract symbol of a social desire. Nevertheless, to return to a previous 
metaphor, Rossi is still playing the game of ‘football’. In Brazil, there is a football team called 
International who play in a red kit, and was the first to accept black players in the squad in early 20th 
Century. Somehow, silently, they might still represent the ideals (images) of The Communist 
International. However, our aim is less compliant with the ideologies implied by the game (such as 
competition). The aim is to explode the stadium. 
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1.2. False dilemmas 
Developing ‘false dilemmas’ is a common way to avoid the radical roots of the 
architectural paradox. Architectural theory and practice have systematically developed 
many variants of ‘technical errors’ to explain why stated conceptions of architecture are 
unable to reshape social relations, thereby moving beyond what is regarded as its 
catastrophic failures. According to this kind of reasoning, the architect will propose a 
dichotomy: first, the ‘wrong view’ shared among architects and, second, the ‘right way’ 
of tackling the problem (the proposed method). Methodologically, the operation consists 
of presenting a ‘straw man’, which represents a particular line of ‘reasoning’ by 
distorting the original logic in order to reduce it to absurdity. Then, the straw man is 
used to represent the ‘mistakes’ being applied, which allows the alternative to be 
presented as the solution of these problems. Nevertheless, in this process, the overall 
structure of the field remains the same, only reshuffling the dominant players. 
For instance, Sharon Zukin (2010, pp. 219-227) demonstrates how Jane Jacobs 
represents the complex change from a ‘centralised state’ to a ‘neoliberal ideological’ 
mode of urban production, as if the former were a ‘technical misconception’ of the 
architectural avant-garde. The fact that modern cities are ‘dying’ is thus represented as 
the technical incapacity of architects to read the elements that compose urban ‘life’. For 
Zukin (2010, p. 227), Jacobs ‘was too smart a journalist, and too experienced a 
community activist, to ignore the forces that structured, and structure still, what is built 
and how: the force of money and state power’. Zukin (2010, p. 25) suggests that this 
camouflaging of social conflicts can be explained by the origins of Jacobs’ funding (the 
Rockefeller Foundation) and her links to powerful media institutions (such as Time 
Life). Therefore, Jacobs’ critique is inserted into the rules of the game, taking a position 
in favour of certain interests in the guise of a certain ‘school’, thus proposing a change 
in style rather than a political change in spatial production (i.e., the way that architecture 
is engaged in the social production of space). 
False dilemmas, such as those mentioned above, have sparked internal disputes between 
different ‘schools’ in the field – from Robert Venturi’s defence of a ‘popular language’ 
in architecture against the ‘erudite language’ of modern architecture to the conflicts 
among Frank Lloyd Wright’s ‘organicism’, Le Corbusier ‘formalism’, Walter Gropius’ 
‘functionalism’, and Mies van der Rohe’s love for the ‘absolute’ fact. Such dilemmas 
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are not merely the peculiarities of architects; as Bourdieu (1996a) would assert, they are 
the ‘Rules of Art’. 
For instance, De Stijl and Mondrian proposed a new and pure plastic order, based on 
fundamental and universal facts, such as the primary colours and vertical and horizontal 
lines based on M. H. Schoenmaekers’ neoplatonic philosophy (Frampton, 2000). Thus, 
the ‘false’ perception of reality was substituted for a ‘true’ one. By contrast, the Realist 
Manifesto of Naum Gabo and Antoine Pevsner (Gabo, 1920; Krauss, 2001, pp. 292-
303) recognised some advances in this artistic avant-garde. But for Gabo, all the avant-
garde was embroiled in the scale of ‘machines’, fascinated by low velocities while the 
‘sun travels at 500 km/s’; thus, for him, conflicts involving pictorial superficiality could 
never reflect the essence of the universe. Therefore, Gabo proposed an art spirit as 
‘precise as a compass’, where the line was the central element in the movement of 
sculptures. 
This method is always the same: first a straw man and then a new reasoning chain as a 
new illusio. Bourdieu (1995, pp. 227-231, 331-336) referred to an illusion as playing by 
the rules of the ‘game’, where a ‘genius’ is supposedly capable of reinventing the whole 
field by providing a new image of the whole (we will discuss this idea further in 
Chapter 2). 
Tshumi’s (2000, pp. 214-229) The Architectural Paradox [originally published in 1975] 
is of great interest to the present discussion due to its complex presentation and his 
disappointing final argument for moderation (argumentum ad temperantiam). Although 
a common strategy in rhetoric (presenting two chosen propositions as extreme 
radicalism, such that a third position can be presented as a moderate equilibrium), this 
strategy is uncommon in artistic theory, likely due to his attempt to tackle dialectical 
thinking, although he never overcomes the ‘disjunction’ of dichotomies.21 
In The Architectural Paradox, Tschumi (2000) argues that ‘the impossibility of 
questioning the nature of space and at the same time experiencing a spatial praxis’ is an 
internal contradiction in architecture. He summarises this ‘impossibility’ as a 
                                                          
21 See Tschumi’s (1994) Architecture and Disjunction for an example of his use of dichotomies and the 
treatise in dialectical reasoning of Lefebvre (1975) for the impossibility of dialectic without overcoming 
dichotomies. 
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contradiction between the pyramid (conceptual/ideal) and the labyrinth 
(senses/praxis/experience). Therefore, he criticises architecture’s ‘failure’ to tackle 
experience because of its supposed focus on the wrong ‘abstract dimension’.22 Although 
most of his argument centres on ‘experience[s]’, ‘event[s]’, ‘jouissance’ and the 
liberation of internal drives (what could be easily contextualised in the hopes of 1968), 
he remains aware that pure affect will eliminate the conscious control of one’s own 
destiny.23 In this sense, he makes a rather convoluted argument for moderation. 
Although he aims to move towards the ‘general organisation of building processes’ and 
to avoid the contradictions that he identifies, he proposes an unnecessary, ephemeral 
and orgasmic architecture. In this sense, he does not try to tackle the paradox that he 
identifies (concepts versus experience); he instead tries to escape it by conceptualising a 
way of fully immersing into experience, not negating concepts but proceeding with a 
sort of sublimation of concepts into reality. In doing so, he centres on one side of the 
dichotomy (experience) and takes the other (concepts) to be an element of the first, thus 
aiming to produce an experience which is in itself ‘the experience of a paradox’. 
Notably, the proposed dichotomy becomes an absolute – an inevitable fact – where pure 
experience is the basis for moderating the other pole, the conceptual. Inadvertently, he 
uses a concept (of experience) to sublimate all other concepts. This position actually 
blurs into the next deadlock to be analysed, as it presupposes a fundamental disjunction 
(to useone of Tschumi’s key terms) between ‘experience’ and ‘society’ (history, 
context, values, politics, consciousness, the production of subjectivity, and so on), thus 
unwillingly taking the first step towards architecture’s fallacy of autonomy from 
society. 
                                                          
22 Only through the production of a ‘straw man’ can different theories, such as those of Gottfried 
Semper’s textile architecture, Adolf Loos’ Raumplan, Frank Lloyd Wright’s organic spatialities, Le 
Corbusier’s promenade, Alvar Aalto’s materiality, and Sverre Fehn’s phenomenological architecture 
(together with Norberg Schulz in the PAGON group), be considered to ignore experience. What matters 
in the ‘straw man’ is not its precision but its capacity to flip these theories into absurd consequences. 
23 Tschumi addresses important points for the theory of architecture, aiming to be closer to a dialectical 
and political theory. Although his thought is complex and entangled, a careful analysis reveals his 
translation of philosophical concepts to architectural elements to be somehow too literal. ‘Experience’ is 
related to ‘immediate perception’, ‘events’ to ‘programme’ and ‘activities’, and ‘jouissance’ to immediate 
plaisure. For instance, as we shall see in Chapter 3, ‘event’ has a deeper meaning in Badiou (2012) as the 
bringing a truth and a collective subject into being, and so does jouissance for Lefebvre (2014), as the 
production of desire by appropriation. 
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1.3. The fallacy of autonomy 
Although the fallacy of autonomy is also a type of false dilemma, it has unique 
characteristics. While the previous arguments of false dilemmas would affirm the 
possession of a key universality as opposed to a false condition (by building a 
dichotomy with a straw man), the denial of a conjunction between architecture and 
society instead amplifies the dichotomy to completely separate the realm of architecture 
from the world as it is. Thus, only what is maintained within the architectonic illusio is 
viewed as a positive effort, while any contact with reality contaminates the purity of the 
discipline. This fallacy creates an absolute separation from reality, allowing total 
freedom to operate in a completely imaginary field. Thus, architecture becomes a fairy 
tale, developing a series of myths, illusions, internal rules, role play, and so on. In other 
words, the essence of architecture becomes its own fantasies. 
In this sense, the dichotomy presents itself as the recognition of an absolute border: on 
one side of a line, there is the dirty and imperfect condition of the world (society or 
related conceptions); on the other side, there is architecture (a crystalline object of 
purity). Even though this autonomy can be easily unmasked by architectural diversity 
linked to cultural and historical differences (thus revealing how architecture is 
connected with culture), this fallacy does not simply assert that the realm of illusions is 
‘better’. Furthermore, it presents itself as an ‘absolute’ illusion, more real than reality 
itself. Thus, it enters the realm of the simulacrum, an illusion built upon illusions, where 
architecture is pure fantasy. Žižek explains fantasy in the Lacanian sense: 
So, what is fantasy? Fantasy does not simply realize a desire in a 
hallucinatory way; rather it constitutes our desire, provides its co-
ordinates – it literally teaches us how to desire (26).  
This is the favourite paradoxical deadlock of famous architects because the inherent 
circularity of this reasoning reaffirms the central role of celebrities in the ‘game’. In 
what Bourdieu (1998, pp. 166-173) called ‘the production of beliefs’, there is an internal 
‘social logic’ in which any field of art determines the value of its products. In a position 
of celebrities, star architects are given pedigree in an aristocratic court (Bourdieu, 1996, 
pp. 11-18), thus evoking a distinguished value to their achievements. This value is 
considered self-evident, as the existing institutions and structures of the field reinforce 
it. In other words, the position of celebrity (as part of an architectural aristocracy) is 
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taken as evidence of its true value. In this parallel world, celebrated works are regarded 
as rules that define what is right or wrong, good or bad, smart or stupid, advanced or 
backward, and of the future or of the past. In this parallel world, no paradox exists 
because ‘I (the celebrity) am the truth’. In addition, others must attentively respect these 
definitions.  
In this context, much criticism aims to reinforce the parallel reality of architecture. 
Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter (2000 [originally published in 1978]) and Peter Eisenman 
(2006 [originally published in 1984]) defended architecture as an autonomous practice 
that should forget society and concern itself with only ‘technical’ or internal matters. 
Architecture thus becomes a geometric ‘game’. Shapes from different contexts and 
epochs can thus be compared without conflict. Even the historicity of geometry can be 
ignored. The construction of this parallel world allows famous architects to feel 
comfortable designing for dictators, using construction sites that operate based on 
contemporary slavery, and promoting primitive accumulation, segregation and 
expropriation as if those things ‘didn’t exist’. Or, rhetorically, ‘didn’t concern good 
design’, after all, Zaha Hadid was only doing ‘design’ (understood as drawings) in the 
case of a dictator’s award-winning museum (see Catling, 2014; Fairs, 2014). 
Rem Koolhaas enjoys a specific deviance in this fallacy, resulting in his acknowledged 
‘cynicism’ of the game. His office does not ignore reality completely; it uses reality as a 
game of representations. For instance, his office plays with history as an imaginary 
identity, social context as fictional allegories, and laws as rules of the game. The 
depoliticisation of Unger’s dialectic (Aureli, 2008) allows the Koolhaas ‘brand’ to 
instrumentalise the context and irreverently appropriate the most despicable 
characteristics of the status quo as an inevitable absolute. He can thus develop his work 
as blind utopias, a kind of dystopia without critique, as he does in ‘Voluntary Prisoners 
of Architecture’ and ‘Junk Space’ or in the transformation of architecture into 
‘branding’ for Prada (see Spencer, 2012, p. 239 and 298). 
We will further develop the analysis of this phantasmatic dimension of architecture in 
Chapter 6. For now, retaining its logical contradiction will suffice: the production of this 
parallel world of architecture does not avoid the contradictions of society. In fact, 
because architecture is absorbing and accepting the status quo as inevitable, it fully 
engages in the process of turning ideologies into masquerades and fantasies.  
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By proposing the fallacy of autonomy, architecture not only masks its relationship with 
society but also becomes an instrument that reproduces the fantasies of the status quo 
(i.e., to accept is already an ethical choice). This process of collective fantasy is only 
possible through the grounding of the architectural discipline in fetish (the production of 
facts by means of sprezzatura and techniques of phenomena, as we will address in 
Chapter 5). 
As opposed to the fallacy of autonomy, which implies an absolute border, asserting 
architecture as an ‘automatic’ reflection of deeper social causes, i.e., as a superficial 
image or representation, implies a negation of the dialectic, as we shall see next. 
 
1.4. The denial of the dialectic 
Analysing the denial of the dialectical power of architecture, beyond the simple 
abdication in the dead ends analysed above, will require entry into much deeper and 
marshier territory. This trek will demand a preliminary review, a generalisation of 
positions, and a position to be taken in the debate. We will proceed by focusing on the 
field of critical cultural studies, using the analysis of this problem by Raymond 
Williams (1973) as a guide and adding contemporary contributions with a special focus 
on architecture.24 
First, although the increasing complexity and fragmentation of spatial production has 
transformed ‘architects’ into a small fraction of the immense machinery of spatial 
production, 'architecture' has become, as a matter of social fact, an increasingly 
important device in interfering in the everyday experience of the city, especially in the 
production of spectacles and simulations of socialisation, such as the ‘revitalisation’ of 
communities. These simulacra produced by architecture have a concrete social impact (a 
topic to be further explored in Chapter 4). 
                                                          
24 The objective here is not to exhaustively describe the debate but to establish the contradictions and the 
position of this research in the debate. This will allow contextualisation of the investigation in the next 
chapters. By critical cultural studies, we mean the current influenced by cultural Marxism but not 
restricted to Marxism itself. 
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Nevertheless, some authors present the relationship between society and architecture as 
a parallel to the relationship between the base (material conditions, economy and the 
mode of production) and superstructure (culture, values, ideas), where the first is the 
ultimate root of causes and the second is only an effect or consequence of the first. This 
approach is usually referred to as ‘Orthodox Marxism’, even though it does not 
resemble Marx’s dialectic approach; therefore, it is often referred to as ‘economic 
determinism’ or ‘vulgar materialism’ (as opposed to ‘dialectical materialism’). 
Although many authors have identified this problem and demonstrated the need for a 
dialectical take on the relationship between the base and the superstructure (Williams, 
1973; Lefebvre, 1975b; Harvey, 1990; Jameson, 1991), it is easy to fall into the trap of 
thinking, on the one hand, that architecture has no effect on social genesis or, on the 
other hand, that architecture is an automatic effect, producing the mimetic ‘images’ of 
precise material conditions. Therefore, in this debate, it is important to establish the 
dialectical relationship that we aim to investigate later. 
In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels (no date [1846]) were primarily fighting 
against ideas and theories that were detached from the concrete experience of reality. 
For instance, the definition of justice or human rights (e.g., the right to healthy 
alimentation) had no relevance if it was debated in purely abstract terms. These 
concepts would only be important according to their actual realisation (e.g., what really 
matters is if people can eat every day). In addition to this concrete use of ideas, Engels 
[1880], in a text discussing the dialectic method, emphasises how ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ 
and the limits of things are interactive factors that mutually define one another.25 
In this sense, the dialectical method does not allow simplifications that establish the 
‘base’ as the determinant of cultural facts. Nevertheless, the mistake might have 
                                                          
25 ‘[E]very organized being is every moment the same and not the same; every moment, it assimilates 
matter supplied from without, and gets rid of other matter; every moment, some cells of its body die and 
others build themselves anew; in a longer or shorter time, the matter of its body is completely renewed, 
and is replaced by other molecules of matter, so that every organized being is always itself, and yet 
something other than itself. Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis, 
positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition, 
they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which 
only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in 
their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become 
confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are 
eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa’ 
(Engels, 1880). 
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originated in Engels’ [1883] speech at Marx’s funeral, when he entered into a brief 
discourse in emotional and symbolic praise about how his friend brought the economic 
mode of production to the forefront of cultural discussions.26 In light of previous 
observations, this praise does not imply a mechanic determinism of the economic but 
states the aim of philosophy, which must be focused on the dialectical realisation of 
ideas rather than on an autonomous parallel reality (as we observed previously in the 
fallacy of autonomy)27. 
                                                          
26 ‘Marx discovered the law of development of human history: the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an 
overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can 
pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc.; that therefore the production of the immediate material means, 
and consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given 
epoch, form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, art, and even the ideas 
on religion, of the people concerned have been evolved, and in the light of which they must, therefore, be 
explained, instead of vice versa, as had hitherto been the case (Engels, 1883). 
27 As in much of Marx’s thought, this point is rich in subtleties and has been the topic of long debates. 
Marx only approaches this problem directly in a preface (Marx, no date [1859]) and in a famous footnote 
of ‘Capital’ (Marx, 1990, 175) that cites the previous work. In this footnote, he asserts that vulgar 
bourgeois economists will consider any institution of another time or culture ‘artificial’ and all 
bourgeoisie institutions ‘natural’, very much in the same vein as the ‘Fathers of the Church’, who treated 
pre-Christian religions as inventions and their own religion as an emanation of God. Thus, he concludes 
that ‘the economic structure of society’ is ‘the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness’ and that ‘the mode of 
production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life’. In his 
analysis of this matter, David Harvey (2010, pp. 195-201) argues that the difference between 
‘conditioning’ and ‘determining’ is fundamental to this point. For him, Marx endeavours to avoid pure 
speculation (as in the post-Hegelians) and to first observe concrete contradictions and then interpret them. 
For Harvey (2010, p. 198), it is ‘Marx’s way of moving by descent: you start with the surface appearance, 
then dive deep down beneath the fetishisms to uncover a theoretical conceptual apparatus that can capture 
the underlying motion of social processes. That theoretical apparatus is then brought step by step back to 
the surface to interpret the dynamics of daily life in new ways’. Thus, Harvey points to another footnote 
(Marx, 1990, pp. 493-494) in which Marx argues that a history of technology should consider its 
collective nature and the ways in which it is a human invention (not a natural law) and that it flows from 
social relations. For Marx, even a history of religion should consider the social material basis from which 
it emerges and should not be purely written ‘in abstraction’, such that the misty inventions can be 
revealed, ‘i.e. to develop from the actual, given relations of life the forms in which these have been 
apotheosized’. Thus, his method avoids pure speculation by rooting itself in the analysis of the concrete 
material base. In 1873, in the ‘Postface of the Second Edition’, Marx (1990, pp. 99-100) notes ‘That the 
method employed in Capital has been little understood is shown by the various mutually contradictory 
conceptions that have been formed of it’, highlighting that some authors describe him as ‘metaphysical’ 
and that others view his work as ‘deductive’, ‘analytic’ or ‘Hegelian sophistry’. Finally, he points out that 
an article in The European Messenger of St. Petersburg ‘finds my method of inquiry severely realistic, but 
my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical’. The author asserts that his method is 
idealistic in form and realistic in content; rather than finding universal laws as in physics, his method is 
akin to biology, as each new period creates a new set of laws. The author also claims that this method 
analyses how social movements determine consciousness and takes part in a process that always 
confronts a fact with other facts rather than speculations and ideas. However, Marx refutes these 
observations because they describe the dialectic method, and his method is something else: ‘My dialectic 
method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite’. For Marx, the ‘ideal is nothing 
else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought’, and its 
object is ‘every historically developed social form as in fluid movement’ and ‘its transient nature not less 
than its momentary existence’. Fundamentally, his method is ‘in its essence critical and revolutionary’. 
Thus, Marx does present a reflection, a consciousness, an idea, and an understanding of a given material 
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Furthermore, the determinism of the base will create a condition in which subjects are 
only passive spectators of the external world. Such determinism also produces a 
common deadlock in the architectural paradox, which can be called ‘Tailism’, i.e., the 
idea that society will develop itself spontaneously, following the ‘tail’ of progress. This 
term was rescued from Lenin by Lukács (2000) in his Defence of History and Class 
Consciousness. In the context of architecture, the deadlock refers to the belief that the 
newest style, the newest technology, or the newest social tendency will always be better 
than the previous one as a result of a ‘natural’ evolution of humankind.28 In this sense, 
the new is accepted as the better or best fit. Here, there is no space for critical practice, 
nor there is space for human imagination. There is only space for ‘sensibility’ that can 
‘capture’ a tendency. This reasoning is used by recent ‘accelerationists’ (Srnicek, 2013, 
Williams, 2013, Mackay and Avanessian, 2014) and architects such as Koolhaas (1994 
[originally published in 1978], 2002). Lukács was radically critical of this kind of 
approach because of the mechanical hope in progress and the elimination of conscious 
subjects concretely participating in the creation of the historical process. 
An opposing but mirror-like position is delineated in Manfredo Tafuri’s (1976) famous 
book, Architecture and Utopia. Although his analyses are fundamental to the 
understanding of the articulation between material conditions, the economy and cultural 
practices, he concludes that architecture is nothing more than an ideological reflection 
of a mode of production, i.e., nothing more than the appearance of the economic base. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
condition to visualise the possibilities of transforming it revolutionarily. That is why ‘the method of 
presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry’. This point can ultimately be understood if we 
analyse the lines that Marx suppressed in his quotation and that followed in the preface of ‘A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’. There, Marx (1959) asserts that social existence 
conditions intellectual life and that in a certain stage, a conflict between ‘the material productive forces’ 
and the ‘relations of production’ emerges, which leads to social revolution and a change in the 
superstructure. Thus, for him, ‘in studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish 
between the material transformation’ and the ‘ideological forms in which men become conscious of this 
conflict and fight it out’. Therefore, consciousness is not unimportant to the struggle, but instead of 
explaining it through speculations, one can explain this consciousness ‘from the contradictions of material 
life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production.’ In 
other words, because the mode of analysis differs from the mode of presentation, the analysis only serves 
as the basis for creating a revolutionary consciousness, which is available in the final theoretical 
presentation. Or, as Harvey (1990, p. 198) puts it, ‘the following sentence form the Critique, which 
explains that it is in the superstructure that we become conscious of political issues and fight them out’. 
28 A conception that dates back to Comte’s (1848) positivism and his faith in ‘progress’. 
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Nevertheless, this approach is typical of what has been termed ‘Messianic Marxism’, 
where in the absence of the ‘Messiahs’, a righteous life is impossible.29 
For Tafuri, architecture is ‘“Uselessly painful” because it is useless to struggle for 
escape when [something is] completely enclosed and confined without an exit’ (Tafuri, 
1976, p. 181). In this sense, Tafuri conceives of the social ‘system’ as a perfect enclosed 
machine. Furthermore, for him, ‘the subject is now the system’ (Tafuri, 1976, p. 55). 
Based on that conception, in the absence of a communist society, a correct epistemology 
is impossible.  This conclusion cannot withstand Marx and Engels’ dialectical approach, 
and the paradox returns in a new version of the previous deadlock: this time, a form of 
escapism into the abstract realm of ‘negative criticism’ and the belief that the critic is a 
‘free’ subject, who is capable of detaching himself from the grime and dirt of reality, 
thus supposedly bringing a pure ‘negativity’ to the surface. 30 
In this sense, Jameson (2000) notes four main constraints in Tafuri’s thought, which 
largely relate to his ‘negative dialectic’: (1) Tafuri conceives capitalism as a completely 
enclosed system (‘far worse than Max Weber’s iron cage’); (2) aesthetics is somehow 
detached from the ‘real’ causes of social and political transformation, being a 
‘reflection’ of structural causes; (3) Tafuri was concerned with revealing ‘the truth’ of 
architecture rather than acknowledging that he was producing a truth; and (4) an 
emancipated architecture can only be conceived in an already emancipated society, only 
after ‘the’ revolution had arrived (yet another variation of a Mexican standoff). 
Although Tafuri (1976) took important steps in critically demonstrating how different 
artistic proposals are part of an ideological context – thus implying that any project has 
a series of social preconceptions, hierarchies, theories, reasoning, causal series, and so 
                                                          
29 For Lukács’ critique of ‘utopian messianism’, see his preface to the 1967 edition of ‘History and Class 
Consciousness’ (Lukács, 1971, p. xiii-xv, xxv) 
30 In a colloquium in 1972, when Tafuri presented ‘structuralism’ as a capitalist ideology and ‘workers’ 
struggles’ as the engine of capitalism, Lefebvre ironically remarked directly to him, ‘You put everything 
into your system,’ to which Tafuri responded, ‘Not mine, that of capitalism’ (in Lukasz Stanek, 2011, p. 
165). Here, it is easy to see the lack of reflexivity in Tafuri. If he is not talking about ‘his system’, he is 
inevitably talking about ‘his conception’ of the absolute ‘System of Capitalism’. Reflexivity is the topic 
of the next section. 
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on – he ultimately fell into the same abyssal separation of architecture and politics that 
did Schumacher, as previously cited in this chapter.31 For Tafuri (1976, pp. 181-182), 
...it is useless to propose purely architectural alternatives. The search for 
an alternative within the structures that condition the very character of 
architectural design is indeed an obvious contradiction of terms. 
Reflection on architecture (...) cannot but go beyond this and arrive at a 
specifically political dimension. 
 
This is indeed an obvious ‘false dilemma’, where things and processes must be ‘purely’ 
either ‘architecture’ or ‘politics’, which leaves no room for the possibility of a ‘political 
architecture’ (i.e., the possibility of a politics within architecture and of an architectural 
practice as political action). Only a carefully designed dialectical method can overcome 
this paradox and thereby approach any architecture as already political (even if it 
blindly advocates for the status quo). In the last section of this chapter, the theory of 
hegemony and a counter-hegemonic culture will be important in this endeavour. 
However, we should first briefly overcome the last deadlock of considering oneself free 
of ideology and thus suffering from a lack of reflexivity. 
 
1.5. Lack of reflexivity 
For Bourdieu (1998, p. 206-207), reflexivity is a subject’s capacity to identify how his 
methods are proceeding in constructing his object of knowledge and to develop a theory 
that survives his own critique. In this sense, a theory that defines any ‘idea’ as false is 
immediately defining itself as false.  
                                                          
31  We do not seek to undermine the importance of Tafuri (1969) in the present work. Many of his 
passages fit perfectly with what we observe in the fieldwork (see appendices): ‘the rediscovery of the 
game as a condition’ and architecture assuming ‘a new, persuasive rather than operative role’ (p. 30). He 
argues that ‘there can be no proposals of architectural “antispaces”’ (p. 33). As we shall see in Chapters 4 
and 5, Tafuri comments on ‘the “public,” who use the city while being unknowingly used by it’ (p. 16); 
the figure of the architect assuming a ‘deliberately “heroic” act and as a bluff, conscious of its own self-
mystification’ (p. 16); and even ‘the fetishization of the art object and its mystery’ (p. 19) and ‘on the 
horizon, feared as the worst of all evils: the proletarianization of the architect’ (p. 31). In addition, as we 
shall see in Chapter 6, Tafuri highlights how some architects ‘are attempting pathetically to relaunch 
modern architecture “ethically” (p. 31). Nevertheless, there are differences. Only with an epistemological 
rupture can we avoid the absolute negative ontology of Tafuri’s negative messianism, where the city is 
completely ‘structured as a machine’ (p. 16, p. 21) and where ‘there can never be an aesthetics, art or 
architecture of class’, leading to a conception that is ‘[u]selessly anguished because it is useless to 
struggle when one is trapped inside a capsule with no exit’ (p. 32). 
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Tafuri’s (1973) position is the antithesis of the antithesis of modern utopia, a negative 
utopia (a u-utopia) that condemns any proposal as part of the superstructure or simply as 
a reflection of a given economic base. Thus, addressing an architectural narrative or 
biography can be understood to be equivalent to addressing the ‘base’. In other words, 
based on this formulation, architecture is part of the social mode of production; 
therefore, its conceptions have all the political features of the social system. In this 
sense, what Tafuri conceives to be ‘architecture’ cannot interfere in the social 
dimension. The architect is trapped not only in the social system but also – because 
architecture is the spatial component of the labour division – in the hierarchical and 
symbolic structures of established power. For Tafuri (1973, p. 181), 
…no ‘salvation’ is any longer to be found within it [architecture]: 
neither wandering restlessly in labyrinths of images so 
multivalent they end in muteness, nor enclosed in the stubborn 
silence of geometry content with its own perfection. For this 
reason it is useless to propose purely architectural alternatives. 
As a result, the radical architect is reduced to a role of negation, which should aim to 
reveal the hidden fallacies of any proposal and the power relations embedded in the 
production of forms. For him, there can be radical critique of architecture but not a 
radical architecture. For him, there is no critical architecture. 
Jameson (2000, p. 444) analysed Tafuri’s historiography and suggested ‘that Tafuri’s 
position is also an ideology [in the sense of a logic of ideas], and that one does not get 
out of ideology by refusing it or by committing one’s self to negative and critical 
“ideological analysis.”’ Thus, Jameson aims to demonstrate that Tafuri’s proposition is 
part of a larger intellectual history; rather than being an absolute knowledge, Tafuri’s 
claims are framed by a specific methodological context.  
Tafuri’s position is not the only one that will err in this way.32 Very important radical 
works, such as Cacciari’s (1993) negative appraisal of architecture, do not survive self-
criticism either. From a different perspective, even the very rich work of La Celca 
(2008), which identifies architecture as ‘the’ problem of contemporary cities, arguing 
                                                          
32 Variations of this reasoning would propose different alternatives of ‘anti-architecture’ by either 
romanticising the traditional and vernacular (Rappoport, 1972), or nihilistically proposing the death of 
architecture (see Cacciari, 1993; La Cecla, 2008; Bicca, 1984; Ferro, 2006), or even in variations that 
melancholically hope for the disintegration of the world as it is (see an account of those in Cunningham & 
Warwick, 2013). 
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that architecture is itself the process of expropriation and spectacularisation, cannot 
survive a reflexive analysis, as it simply ignores the contradictory forces that are part of 
the architectural field (including his own). Although linking architecture with ideology 
(in a bad sense) helps elucidate many important aspects of the production of space in 
contemporary capitalist societies, it fails to recognise that there are residual, emergent, 
non-incorporated and oppositional ideologies in society, even though these forces never 
appear in pure and uncontaminated forms. 
Thus, to be reflexively aware of one’s own biases would allow the subject of knowledge 
to recognise the forces of subjectification acting on him and the position that he assumes 
in the social structure. Furthermore, in analysing the thinking of Machiavelli, Althusser 
(2000) argues that ‘appearances’ or ‘representations’ also have a social existence; thus, 
they are positive forces in social reality. Thus, for instance, whether architecture ‘by 
nature’ can or cannot change society is not at issue; instead, understanding how 
architecture – despite and by means of its phantasies – ‘actually’ interferes in the game 
at play is the problem: how architecture mediates the production of social relations and 
how social relations forge the reproduction of (certain ways of producing) architecture. 
Thus, despite any ‘falsehood’, what is socially referred to as architecture is reproducing 
concrete social relations of power. Thus, the concrete architectonic products of this 
social activity (to be analysed in Chapter 4), the methods employed in the production 
process (to be analysed in Chapter 5) and the subjectivities being reproduced (to be 
analysed in Chapter 6) are the key elements that will unfold the operations of the 
reproduction of architecture. In this sense, if Tafuri [1974] aimed to investigate the 
private perversions of architectural practices in his Architecture dans le Boudoir, we 
alternatively aim to investigate the collective phantasies of architectural ideology. 
Therefore, we arguably aim to make an analysis of ‘Architecture in a Divan’. 
 
1.6. The belly of the architect 
Our paradox remains in all the deadlocks addressed above. How can architecture shape 
society while the architectural discipline seems unable to shape society? Why is 
architecture constrained in reproducing the rules of a game wrote by itself? We 
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hypothesise that, in the production of architecture, social relations, architecture and 
architects are reproduced. 
As argued by Raymond Williams (1973) following Marx’s Grundrisse, the most 
important thing that a worker ever produces is himself. To explain himself, Williams 
applies Lukács’ argument for ‘totality’ – as opposed to an approach that distinguished 
between societal and cultural layers. This notion of totality does not intend to generalise 
in terms of a uniform context, nor does it imply that minor individuals are determined 
by colossal forces.  Instead, ‘totality’ elucidates the importance of the element of 
‘consciousness’. If the conscious mind is constituted by ideas, consciousness is the 
awareness that individuals have regarding the broader formation of those ideas. Thus, 
ideas are never meant to be ignored, as they are instruments of real political struggles, 
as Gramsci explains: 
For the philosophy of praxis, ideologies are anything but arbitrary; they 
are real historical facts which must be combated and their nature as 
instruments of domination revealed, not for reasons of morality etc., but 
for reasons of political struggle (...) For the philosophy of praxis the 
superstructures are an objective and operative reality (or they become so, 
when they are not pure products of the individual mind). (...) The 
philosophy of praxis itself is a superstructure, it is the terrain on which 
determinate social groups become conscious of their own social being, 
their own strength, their own tasks, their own becoming. (Gramsci, no 
date [1929-1935]) 
For Williams (1973), the Gramscian concept of ‘hegemony’ refers to the dominant 
culture in a society, which is based on a ‘common’ sense (thus, it is not something 
singular). This hegemonic way of thinking is not simply something abstract; it is 
actually lived, embodied, and used in the practical everyday, modulating expectations 
and a sense of reality in general groups of people. Thus, the hegemonic way of thinking 
tends to reproduce the thought of dominant classes, institutions and individuals. 
Hegemony is the logic of the ideas that define the traditional structure of a specific 
society. If we add that traditions are produced and evolve historically, hegemony is a 
continuously mutating part of social structures. 
For Williams (1973), the cultural elements of a society (such as architecture) are made 
of residual culture (reminiscences of facts from the past) and emergent culture, with 
new tendencies being born by recombining social elements. Residual elements can be 
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both ‘incorporated’ and ‘not incorporated’ into the hegemonic culture. The same is true 
for emergent elements. Thus, new elements can be both regressive or progressive in 
kind. Likewise, in cultural proposals, ‘alternative’ only means ‘different’, and such 
'alternatives' might ultimately be incorporated into hegemony. For Williams, critical 
cultural practices should be oppositional, forcing changes in society. 
For those reasons, Williams considered Gramsci’s work fundamental to an 
understanding of the dialectical interactions of consciousness, social structures and 
cultural practices. Although we shall discuss this point further in Chapter 3 and 6, one 
preliminary point must be made about our paradox here. 
We do not aim to classify all theory of architecture as paradoxical or to propose that our 
account magically escapes this paradox. Instead, we seek to convey that the way that 
one approaches this architectural paradox interferes with the answers delivered. 
However, we do not mean to imply that there is no escape or that theory is useless, as 
though it cannot develop or have any consequences. On the contrary, we aim to create a 
tool that reveals that these images are constructs, snapshots of the relationships between 
architectural theory and social practice. In this sense, the paradox is the result of 
accepting some ‘truths’ about architecture without realising that they, too, are social 
products. If architecture is a means of projecting abstract ideas into social space, the 
first step in gaining an awareness of the process involves being able to reflect on one’s 
own position within the field. Therefore, we are not escaping the paradox; we are 
merely starting to enter its void.  
Nonetheless, our investigation does have a scope. We do not aim to understand 
architecture as everything and thus as nothing. We intend to explore the limits presented 
by concrete practices that challenge the discipline and its reified subjectivities. 
However, although this research departs from punctual experiences, its critical analysis 
investigates the consequences in the social totality, mapping not only the field but also 
its possibilities. Thus, the analysis of punctual events is intended as evidence of larger 
social forces. The analyses of experiences do not accept the illusions and values of the 
field, instead using them as the means of reflection. 
We aim to produce a cognitive map of the process of the reproduction of architecture, 
underlining the correlations of power involved in the social organisation of the 
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discipline. As such, this research may contribute to a reflexive awareness in the 
profession of architecture. In the next two chapters of Part 1, we aim to advance in the 
production of this cognitive map and in the interactions between architecture and the 
reproduction of social relations. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
The reproduction of architecture: mapping discipline and dialectic 
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In this chapter, we aim to draw the first sketches of a cognitive map of the reproduction 
of architecture, so later we can reposition how subjects are conceived in relation to the 
production of social space. We thus seek to enable possible detours and new 
possibilities to avoid the deadlocks identified in the previous chapter. To do so, we shall 
debate the implications of the idea of architecture reproducing social relations within the 
architectural field and in society. This debate implies some recognition of the conflict 
between the disciplinary field and the dialectical movement of transformation. On the 
one hand, this investigation of the discipline aims to establish a preliminary moment of 
analysis of the forces in operation by identifying them through five general elements 
(centralities, axes of habitus, social dimensions, distinctions, and illusios). Nevertheless, 
the discipline cannot be seen as a closed system from which there is no escape. Rather 
than considering the discipline of architecture an ‘apparatus’, we shall trace its non-
trivial machinations. In ‘trivial machines’, each input corresponds to a symmetrical 
output. As we shall see, ‘non-trivial machines’ have a complex structure that shifts and 
interacts with the inputs and the outputs in a dynamic process of metastability. On the 
other hand, we shall develop a critique of vulgar structuralism through dialectical 
theory. This critique aims to envision the fissures in this field, and how the ‘structure is 
absent’. Furthermore, structures are ‘produced’ and are, in turn, inventions that create 
mediations in a metastable field, as we shall clarify through Simondon’s (2013) theory. 
Doing so will enable us to conceive a cognitive map of the reproduction of architecture 
that moves beyond the dichotomy of subject/field; therefore, we aim to create a device 
that enables architects to take a detour through the image that they create of themselves 
in relation to the transformation of social structure. This device implies an 
acknowledgement that architecture operates in the production of transindividualities and 
reproduces preindividualities in the unconscious of architect’s subjectivities. 
 
2.1. The reproduction of social relations 
Henri Lefebvre is a philosopher of great importance in the theory of space. As such, he 
has particularly influenced disciplines such as geography and architecture in recent 
decades. A prolific writer, Lefebvre wrote more than 60 books on various topics, and 
even though he has been very involved in the architectural scene (Stanek, 2011, pp. 33, 
40), none of his work was known to specifically address architecture until 2008, when 
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Lukasz Stanek retrieved a lost Lefebvre manuscript entitled Towards an Architecture of 
Enjoyment, which was written in 1973 and published in 2014 (see Lefebvre, 2014). 
Writing specifically about architecture, Lefebvre outlines his view on the possibility of 
thinking about architecture in revolutionary terms.  
Lefebvre asks, ‘…an architectural revolution? Why not?’33 Although Lefebvre (2014, p. 
27) argues that architecture has the potential for achieving ‘radical subversion’, setting 
‘aside’ relations of production and temporarily ‘turning the world upside down’ (as 
would occur within large institutions), he also admits that ‘[t]his project alone is 
incapable of changing the world’. As he has argued elsewhere, a revolutionary project 
needs both ‘contempt’ and ‘corruption’. In other words, it needs, on the one hand, a 
form of consciousness that critiques a social condition and, on the other hand, a form of 
consciousness that can also somehow result in the concrete ‘rehabilitation of everyday 
life’ (Lefebvre, 1991a, pp. 127). 
Thus, his curtailment of the discipline is a means of narrowing a form of provocation: 
‘Can change occur without expectation, without exploration of the possible and the 
impossible?’ (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 27) Essentially, his argument is that although a 
revolution produced by architecture alone is impossible, no revolution is possible 
without a renewed imagination of social spaces. In other words, there is no architectural 
revolution, and there is no revolution without architecture. For these reasons, his inquiry 
(in the abovementioned book) aims to go beyond ‘the architect’, ‘the discipline’ and its 
internal disputes to approach architecture in a wider sense: ‘It is a question of 
“mankind” and its future’ (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 29).  
Therefore, Lefebvre’s initial question (‘[A]n architectural revolution? Why not?’) has 
conflicting connotations. It can be read as a rhetorical device, a challenge, a provocation 
(negative or positive), or the perplexity of a disbeliever. The irresolute character of this 
                                                          
33  Lefebvre’s discussion of architecture is clearly critically opposed to Le Corbusier’s (1986) classical 
book Towards a New Architecture, not only in terms of the similarity of the book titles but also in relation 
to the chapter Architecture or Revolution. This chapter is an expansion of the famous dictum of Le 
Corbusier in L’Espirit Nouveau in the early 1920s, when he praised the rise of fascism in Italy in his 
notebooks, declaring it the manifestation of his ideals (see Brott, 2013), and worked alongside the Vichy 
government in France (Jackson, 2001). The main message of Le Corbusier to the powers that be in the 
modern world is that revolution can be avoided if architecture is allowed to pacify societal conflicts. We 
shall return to this point on the relationship between power and architecture in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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intriguing question might be caused by the different levels upon which it acts – what it 
enunciates, what it desires and what it implies. 
With that question, Lefebvre is simultaneously enunciating a possibility, desiring a 
challenge, implying a fact and considering a condition sine qua non. Later, he describes 
the revolutionary possibilities for architectural practices but also the limits of 
architecture. He imagines how a revolutionary architecture can exist by producing 
virtual objects (of desire) but implying the constraints in his questions: Why not? Why 
isn’t architecture revolutionary? This impediment often arises because the space in 
which architecture operates is not a neutral space. Space is already a social product.  
For Lefebvre (1991b), space is not an a priori element of reality nor an abstract entity 
into which one can insert contents; instead, space is socially produced. For him, 
To speak of ‘producing space’ sounds bizarre, so great is the sway still 
held by the idea that empty space is prior to whatever ends up filling it. 
Questions immediately arise here: what spaces? and what does it mean to 
speak of ‘producing space’? (Lefebvre, 1991b, p. 15). 
Every social space is the outcome of a process with many aspects and 
many contributing currents, signifying and non-signifying, perceived and 
directly experienced, practical and theoretical (Lefebvre, 1991b, p. 110). 
…if there is a productive process, then we are dealing with history; (…) 
we may be sure that the forces of production (nature; labour and the 
organization of labour; technology and knowledge) and, naturally, the 
relations of production play a part (Lefebvre, 1991b, p. 46). 
Therefore, as space has a changeable historical and cultural existence, it is not a simple 
thing; it instead encompasses the (re)production of social relations. For Lefebvre, 
The object of interest must be expected to shift from things in space to 
the actual production of space, but this formulation itself calls for much 
additional explanation. Both partial products located in space – that is, 
THINGS – and discourse on space can henceforth do no more than 
supply clues to, and testimony about, this productive process – a process 
which subsumes signifying processes without being reducible to them. It 
is no longer a matter of the space of this or the space of that: rather, it is 
space in its totality or global aspect (Lefebvre, 1991b, p. 37). 
(Social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among 
other products: rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses 
their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity – their 
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(relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. It is the outcome of a sequence 
and set of operations (Lefebvre, 1991b, p. 73). 
What exactly were the great cathedrals? The answer is that they were 
political acts (Lefebvre, 1991b, p. 74). 
 
Lefebvre’s theory defines space as a product of social, philosophical and practical 
human activities; therefore, it is not a natural fact but a social construct with social 
implications. Furthermore, for him, the production of space is a key element in the 
reproduction of social relations in general. This is the case because ‘the production of 
space itself replaces – or, rather, is superimposed upon – the production of things in 
space’ (Lefebvre, 1991b, p. 62). 
Furthermore, in The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of 
Production, Lefebvre (1976, p. 83-86) argued that capitalism has managed to avoid 
extinction through the production of space. According to his argument, because space is 
produced within a cultural logic (say, capitalism), it also reproduces a field of everyday 
life in which rules and social relations are objectified in space. In this way, capitalism 
reproduces itself as the dominant social reality, and architecture plays an active role in 
this reproduction. 
An even more significant illustration of this can be obtained from 
architecture, a specific, partial and specialized practice which has close 
links with the everyday. The Architect receives what might be termed a 
social commission, forcing him to realize spaces which suit society, i.e. 
which ‘reflect’ its relations by concealing them under the décor 
(Lefebvre, 1976, p. 88). 
They mould it, fill it, and produce their own specific kind of space, 
which is both homogeneous and fragmented, visual and pulverulent. The 
architect cannot free himself from them, either in practice (his projects 
and designs) or in his imagination. (...) But it is the everyday that carries 
the greatest weight. (Lefebvre, 1976, p. 88) 
Power occupies the space which it generates, the everyday is the very 
soil on which the great architecture of politics and society rise up 
(Lefebvre, 1976, p. 89). 
For instance, ‘private spaces’ become a social reality when spatial elements (which 
distinguish them from public spaces) project this abstract concept onto social reality. 
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Thus, spatial elements (say, fences, limitations, contracts, walls, borders, coercive 
control, and so on) are both concrete and abstract. 
In this sense, architecture as a social practice is not simply inserted into the general 
logic of society. In a society ruled by commodity fetishism and objectified social 
relations, architecture becomes a device that continuously reproduces that logic within 
space. Thus, architecture reinforces and traps society inside a restricted set of rules, 
thereby reproducing society. In this sense, the expression, ‘the reproduction of 
architecture’ has a triple meaning: it reproduces of society; it is reproduced by society; 
and it reproduces itself. Nevertheless, for Lefebvre, this social reproduction is not ‘a 
pre-existing system’. Therefore, 
…it follows that the ‘real’ cannot be enclosed. It is not a situation where 
there is no possible outcome, nor is the only outcome global collapse; for 
the contradiction themselves develop though unevenly. And finally, 
theoretical concepts may escape the system, even though they are born in 
it and have emerged from (…) space dominated by the strategy of 
homogenization and of the programmed everyday. But they still have to 
free themselves from that system (Lefebvre, 1976, pp. 90-91). 
In this sense, our findings should be differentiated from current use of Foucault’s idea 
of the ‘apparatus’ (dispositif). Clare O’Farrell (2005, p. 129) has defined an apparatus as 
‘various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and knowledge 
structures, which enhance and maintain the exercise of power within the social body’. 
This is an important point to consider when analysing how the architectural discipline 
frames the production of spatial forms and how it reifies subjectivities (of the public but 
also of the architect) to reproduce itself, trapping reasoning within its rules. However, to 
understand society as an apparatus or a ‘trivial machine’ misses the point that society is 
neither an absolute totality nor ‘total’ stability. Social space is not a ‘trivial machine’ in 
which an input inserted into an absolute system always and precisely corresponds with a 
specific output.34 
                                                          
34 We will discuss this process of structuration of social space further in the next chapters with the theory 
of Simondon (2013). Although Simondon cites various sources on cybernetic theory and builds part of his 
theory upon it (especially the differentiated conception of information, not as a message but as mise en 
forme, i.e., in formation), he approximates but does not mention the idea of non-trivial machines. 
Nevertheless, this concept will allow us to prepare the terrain to later introduce Simondon’s theoretical 
scheme, which moves beyond the idea of an absolute structure with the classical sense of stability towards 
a metastable system of complex dynamics. 
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Von Foerster (1972), discussing trivial and non-trivial machines, used physics and 
philosophy to create what came to be known as second-order cybernetics. As we can see 
in the diagram below, he argues that a trivial machine is characterised by a one-to-one 
relationship between input and output, where this invariability precisely defines what 
the machine is. As a deterministic system, once an output for a given input is observed, 
the system becomes predictable. However, in the non-trivial machine, the input-output 
relationship is variable and depends on previous inputs. A broader description of this 
relationship can be described in the second algorithm below, where the input, once 
processed, produces a transformation in the structure of the machine and the output 
creates a new context that further transforms the internal structure of the machine. Thus, 
the non-trivial machine operates with conflicting internal structures. This new structure 
produces a virtual transformation of the original context of inputs, further conditioning 
subsequent inputs. Thus, the concept of a non-trivial machine can elucidate how a social 
space operates in a complex field of historical and conflicting relations.  
Furthermore, to discuss concepts of subjectivity, Alberto Toscano (2006, pp. 136-156) 
introduces dynamic system theories, arguing that a system can be conceived without a 
previous hierarchical order, in a complex interaction between the internal and the 
external, and with no stable and distinct objects. He relates this idea with various 
elements of the theory of the individual in Simondon and discusses the idea of the 
‘theatre’ of operations and individuation. In the process of producing a metastable 
system, irreversibility is created, which he calls ‘trace’ and which determines the 
context of the next transformations. This conception aims to avoid genetic determinism 
(as in biology) and representationalism (as in psychoanalysis) (Toscano, 2006, p. 148). 
It also avoids deterministic theories, rejecting the possibility of isolating categorical 
causalities, but without falling into the traps of holism – for instance, as in Spinoza, 
where everything is God – and organicism – where everything has a pre-established 
place – in which no transformation of a given system is conceivable (Toscano, 2006, p. 
149). 
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Diagram 2: Trivial and non-trivial machines. Source: the author (based on – but not 
identical to – ideas from Von Foerster, 1972). 
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Only in this way can we approach the system of the architectural discipline not as the 
product of a sort of ‘Big Brother conspiracy’ and can develop our map as a metastable 
field in which conflicts and tensions can emerge dialectically. In this sense, architecture 
is not simply the reflection of a status quo pre-established system, although it operates 
in the reproduction of specific ‘traces’ and in the permanence of specific social 
structures, i.e., ensuring that the same frames are reinserted into the system. In these 
terms, the idea of a ‘reproduction of architecture’ is a key concept that is useful in 
overcoming the paradox of ‘to shape or not to shape’: architecture is shaping over and 
over again. Therefore, the concept of reproduction in architecture leads to a conflict 
between discipline and dialectics. However, conflicts are what dialectics is all about. 
 
2.2. The conflict between discipline and dialectics 
To unveil the conflict above, it is important to note that discipline is a condition, not an 
essential truth. Architecture as a disciplining force is a social condition that has been 
historically produced. This vital key helps us understand why the deadlocked discourses 
of architecture are not enough to expose the fundamental contradiction between 
discipline and dialectics, i.e., the fundamental contradiction between the social 
apparatuses that discipline architects to behave in a certain way and the dialectical 
movement produced by the conflicts, the imagination and the desire to create other 
possibilities. 
The dialectic is contradiction or nothing at all. In the Communist Manifesto, history is 
contradiction (Marx, no date [1848]). Furthermore, the whole effort of Marx (1990) in 
the first chapter of Capital is to show the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist 
system: how the reification of social relations contradicts the assumption of ‘things as 
they are’ as natural, how ‘exchange’ value contradicts ‘use’ value, how capital and 
concrete exploitation contradicts the supposedly ‘free market’, and how the labour value 
embodied in products contradicts the commodity fetishism. 
For Lefebvre, to obtain a dialectical logic (instead of an abstraction of the dialectic), one 
must overcome the old principle of identity (the principle of ‘no contradiction’ or the 
‘excluded third’, see Lefebvre, 1975b, p. 2). For Lefebvre, the two terms in a 
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proposition are dialectically implied in one another, transforming one another. These 
terms are both true and false, depending on the reference. This is true even in the case of 
A = A, where the repetition already introduces a difference (1975b, pp. 8-10). 
Furthermore, Lefebvre argues that connecting form (A) with a concrete reality is 
already a social and ethical judgement of a fundamental ‘fissure’ between forms and 
contents. 
For instance, to say ‘architecture is just architecture’ is already a contradiction, which 
states that architecture should be understood as what someone understands as 
‘architecture’. Similarly, for Marcuse, there is always a struggle, a contradiction in any 
such affirmation. For example, Marcuse (1967, pp. 133-134) asserts that saying that ‘the 
State is reason’ or ‘men are free’ is already to disregard (or sublimate) all circumstances 
in which the state is irrational and men are enslaved. This is, according to Marcuse, an 
ethical choice, an engaged option that relates particular content to a particular form. 
Thus, any affirmation already originates from a political positioning in the debate. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of contradiction has been denied by a sort of critique 
founded in absolute negation. For Adorno (1951, §18), ‘There is no right life in the 
wrong one’. For Foucault in Discipline and Punish (1979, pp. 84), refusal is only an 
internal mechanism of the system to allow development. Similarly, Baudrillard (1991, 
pp. 9-14) claims that we are condemned to live in a simulacrum.  
For Jameson (2002, pp. 75-78), these positions within a ‘total system’ can trace their 
roots to Weber’s ‘iron cage’, where change is relegated to the ‘nonmeaningful’, thus 
eliminating the possibility of dissent and reintegrating any form of struggle as a 
functional part of the system. To avoid ‘operational myths’ and teleologies, Jameson 
(1981, pp. 125-126) argues for a move towards a genealogy in which one departs from a 
‘full-blown system’ only as a means to retrace history to discover the elements that 
created the potential for such a system to emerge.  
Furthermore, according to Rancière (1994, p. 59), we must move beyond simplistic 
‘genealogies’: ‘What must succeed the genealogies and emblems of royalty is a new 
way of thinking about the transmission of meaning and about legitimate descent’. Thus, 
genealogy is at risk of falling into a field that chronicles the ‘nobles’. In this logic of 
filiations there is an offspring hierarchy – the firstborn – reducing the diversity of 
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origins into a linear causality that directs to one single cause – the patriarch. In this 
methodological inverted tree structure, the present is always subordinated to the past.35 
To overcome this paradox, we should move further towards the original sense of the 
active nihilism of Nietzsche (1987) and the break with the tree model in genealogy, as 
Deleuze and Guatarri suggest with the rhizome (Gilbert, 2016), which adds the 
perspectives of horizontal and complex relations of dependency beyond that of 
offspring. For instance, in the case of the history of machinery, Guattari (1995, p. 40) 
asserts the following: 
The phylogenetic evolution of machinism is expressed, at a primary 
level, by the fact that machines appear across ‘generations,’ one 
suppressing the other as it becomes obsolete. The filiation of previous 
generations is prolonged into the future by lines of virtuality and their 
arborent implications. But this is not a question of a univocal historical 
causality. Evolutionary lines appear in rhizomes; datings are not 
synchronic but heterochronic. Example: the industrial ‘take off’ of steam 
engines happened centuries after the Chinese Empire had used them as 
children's toys. In fact, these evolutionary rhizomes move in blocks 
across technical civilisations. 
With those points in mind, what was thought to be irreconcilable, the paradox between 
discipline and dialectics, can be overcome if one is prepared to accept that no original 
pure essence of architecture (a glorious lineage) exists and that the social system is not 
‘closed’; instead, it is a process of ‘enclosing’ by ideology.  In this continuous process 
of enclosure by both the discipline and its products, there is no reason to assume that 
struggles and ‘difference’ cannot emerge. Dialectic implies the emergence of difference; 
and contradicting the idea of an absolute apparatus, the system does not encompass the 
possible and the impossible. 
Can an analysis of architectural practices in these terms reveal new possibilities for the 
profession? Can theoretical straitjackets be overcome and a theoretical map for the 
exploration of new territories of possibilities and struggle be developed? 
                                                          
35  In the field of architecture, the paradigmatic example is Charles Jencks’ evolutionary trees of 
architecture, in which the branches are abstract categories. This reductionist device allows him, for 
instance, to locate ‘Fascist’ architecture, Lucio Costa and Carlos Raúl Villanueva all in the same branch 
of the ‘Self-Conscious’, because they share the same ancestral (Beaux-Arts’ Perret). For the list of these 
‘trees’, see Guermazi, 2014 (available at: 
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/26553/Guermazi_washington_02
50O_13406.pdf?sequence=1) 
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Jameson (1998, pp. 442-461) uses Gramsci to overcome the abovementioned theoretical 
straitjacket of ‘disciplinary apparatuses’. A counter-hegemonic proposal must be 
developed – a perspective that enables transformative proposals rather than an absolute 
solution. At a conference in 1990, Jameson (1990) proposed the development of 
‘cognitive maps’ that could help us understand and visualise the current social condition 
in which we live and thereby place ourselves in a counter-active position in relation to 
the existing structures. 
The following strategy is to draw such a cognitive map, enabling an assessment of the 
fissures and counter-hegemonic possibilities within the field and how different 
contemporary proposals address that disciplining field. In other words, this mapping 
exercise aims to launch a reflexive investigation, in which the architectural discipline is 
only the context for tracing potential fissures and dialectical struggles. In this sense, 
even though power and discipline are active realities, they are not pure original essences 
in society (i.e., part of its fundamental ‘nature’). 
Therefore, to say that ‘there is a possibility of an architecture that struggles the 
reproduction of preset fantasies and contemporary social relations’ is not to say that 
‘this is the essence of architecture’ or that ‘such architecture exists’. Instead, this effort 
aims to search for this possibility exactly where the disciplinary field insists that it is 
impossible. Thus, this search implies a wish and, beyond that, announces the ethical 
motivation for the endeavour to come. 
However, we do not mean to provide a complete inventory of every aspect of the field. 
Instead, we aim to construct an instrument to guide analysis and critique. This aim 
implies a critique of exactitude in science, as outlined by Jorge Luis Borges (1975): 
In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the 
map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of 
the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable 
Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of 
the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point 
for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the 
Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast map 
was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered 
it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, 
still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals 
and Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of 
Geography. 
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Even though the analysis of how architecture has imposed a disciplined mode of spatial 
production (namely, the reproduction of architecture) can be investigated by means of a 
cartography, it is important to remember that the ‘map’ that we are proposing is not 
equal to ‘the territory’. This instrument can be used to locate the deadlocks that we have 
identified in the discipline, which can be explored as dialectical conflicts. When all that 
is solid in the discipline vanishes into thin air, the potential for new possibilities can be 
articulated. In this sense, to produce new potentialities is to rearticulate the old in its 
present form of conflict. 
In this endeavour, we have already recognised two forces: on the one hand, the 
discipline reproducing architecture and, on the other hand, the dialectic and its 
recognition of the possibility of ‘the new’ and its appeal to find fissures through which 
concrete transformations can emerge. To approach the ‘discipline’, we will first conduct 
a diagrammatic analysis of the structures in play, only to enable a second step in which 
to develop a properly dialectical framework. As in Lefebvre’s (1975b) argument 
mentioned above, dialectical logic draws upon a first moment of formal analysis. For 
him, 
To reduce is a scientific procedure facing the complexity and the chaos 
of immediate findings. At first, one should simplify, but next and as fast 
as possible one should restore progressively what the analysis takes 
away. Without that, the methodological requirement is transformed into 
servitude; and from legitimate reduction one moves towards 
reductionism (Lefebvre, 1975b, p. 116, our translation). 
Similarly, Carlos Lessa (1972) discusses the difference between formal analysis and a 
dialectical approach. For him, analysis dissects reality into small and distinct parts, 
while radical critique involves the establishment of relationships between the parts and 
the whole. To do so, it uses dialectics, searching for the interrelations, the implicated 
dynamics, and the contradictions in reality and between objects-ideas (see diagram 3 
below). For Edward Soja (2000, pp. 86, 272-274, 282-283), the Chicago School 
understood the city as a mosaic, very much in the sense of analysis, and dissected the 
city into small pieces. He argues for a fractal approach to scale, in which each part is an 
image of the whole and vice versa.  In this sense, we can investigate the superimposition 
of the scale of the ‘part’ – the neighbour, the concrete realisation, the body, the 
everyday, the inner psychology, the micro, and so on – and the scale of the ‘whole’ – 
the distant, the abstract, the macro political economy, the transindividual, and so on. 
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Diagram 3: Formal analysis and critical dialectics. Source: the author (based on – but 
not identical to –  ideas from Lessa, 1972).  
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Therefore, we will approach the ‘discipline’ analytically and later dialectically explore 
its contradictions. For the analytical step, we will use the methodology of Bourdieu 
(1996a, 1996b), which was developed to investigate the social field of art. This 
approach served as the basis of many studies in the field of architecture (Stevens, 1998, 
Deamer 2015, Wood, 1999). Although this provides a revealing enough picture of the 
forces in play, defining its limits, structures and the elements, it does not provide a 
theoretical approach for comprehending the reproduction and the fictitious and 
historical character of this metastable field. Thus, in the next section, this preliminary 
picture will be used only as an approximating device to identify how the field pseudo-
critiques are disciplinary forces. In this way, for the dialectical step, we shall trace 
routes to the fissures of this non-trivial apparatus. In a latter step, we aim to enable a 
visualisation of the dialectical relationship between the discipline and society as a 
whole. 
Therefore, the apparent conflict in using such different theories (one from Bourdieu and 
one from Jameson) is just a methodological strategy to first describe discipline and then 
to overcome it dialectically. Furthermore, this approach will enable us to deconstruct the 
idea of an individual subject opposed to an absolute territory, thus opening up the 
possibility of thinking of architecture as the product of a transindividual force that is full 
of tensions, struggles and fissures (c.f. Toscano & Kinkle, 2015; Simondon, 2013).  In 
this way, we will be able to change the subject of architecture from an individual to a 
field of transindividuality (to be presented in the next chapter). 
 
2.3. Discipline: a description of the field and its illusions 
Pierre Bourdieu (1996a, 1996b) initiated a series of studies of different social fields, 
such as education, literature, fashion, and gastronomy. His aim was to develop a 
systematic account of how social relations would interfere in professional fields that 
were rhetorically defined as autonomous. For Bordieu, the field of literature, for 
instance, is a complex structure formed by celebrative instances, forms of narrative, 
meeting places, social agents, institutions, means of communication, bureaucratic 
moments, professional bodies and so on. Such elements would interact with one 
another, thereby establishing the actors in positions of social domination or 
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subordination. His study of literature was very influential in other fields, including some 
studies in the field of architecture.  
In architecture, we can argue that similar elements of the ‘field’ account for the overall 
rules in the architectural discipline, training subjects to obey certain laws, to behave 
according to established codes, and to accept a pattern of variations. Furthermore, the 
discipline also establishes a branch of knowledge and correlated discourse on truth. This 
discipline is not imposed, but forms a prerequisite collectively shared. To take part in 
the game, practices and methods must be accepted.36 
To sketch the disciplinary field of architecture, we will first identify five general 
elements: (1) Centralities; (2) Axes of habitus;  (3) Social dimensions;  (4) Distinctions; 
(5) Illusios. 
 
(1) Centralities 
Bourdieu (1996a, pp. 205-207) uses the idea of the field to convey its multiple polarities 
and to overcome the traditional duality of internal/external interpretations of art. Such 
analyses would divide the study of art into two separate realms: contextual forces 
(social, historical, economical, etc.) and internal factors (biography, schools, etc.). For 
him, these elements interfere jointly in the formation of the multiple dimensions of the 
field. 
The idea of the ‘field’ in science spread after Einstein’s (1920) theory of general 
relativity gained traction.37 Before his theory was accepted, theoretical physics generally 
assumed the existence of some kind of ‘ether’. This ether would be an empty entity or a 
kind of neutral void, in which all matter could be supported by and organised into 
                                                          
36 For instance, this framework allows us to explain the recent success of Aravena in the field (in the case 
mentioned in Chapter 1). Although he works in a niche market usually associated with radical practices, 
he maintains the axioms of ‘only doing good design’, he comes from a distinguished institution in the 
field, he has networks with powerful people, he advocates for the free market as the solution to all 
problems, and he aims to manage inequalities by design. It is the latter conditions that made him a 
recognized member of the main institutions in the field. 
37  I use the term ‘spread’ here instead of ‘invented’ because recent and exhaustive research has 
demonstrated that Einstein did not ‘invent’ the theory of relativity (Gine, 2010, Gray, 1995, Pierseaux, 
2005). We shall examine this topic in further detail in Chapter 5. 
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universal laws. Nevertheless, the principle that each object can establish a centrality for 
coordinating time and space (the general relativity) in a four-dimensional space, 
demands a non-Euclidian geometry to be applied to space – a ‘curved space’ in the 
famous insight of (Georg F. B. Riemann, commonly attributed to and appropriated by) 
Einstein.38 
Thus, the notion of a neutral dimension underlying space is replaced by the idea of a 
‘field’. According to this conception, the field will be multiform and will change its 
coordinates according to the object in play. New objects create new gravitational 
centralities, changing the form and dynamic of the field. 
Lefebvre (1991b, p. 13, 399) uses the idea of field to flesh out his conception of 
differential space. For him, social space has multiple centralities, which are produced in 
different epochs and are dependent on social interests and struggles. Furthermore, he 
argues that the social field is formed by multiple representations. Therefore, each 
representation generates different dimensionalities to the social space. Lefebvre cites the 
concept of heterotopy in Foucault (1984) to explain how the same space can have 
different dimensions for different social groups (e.g., class, age, and culture). 
For Lefebvre (1991b, pp. 38-41), this space of representations is formed by the ideas 
that have been objectified (realised in social objects) throughout history. These 
objectified ideas are perceived as the dimensionalities of the space. These ideas might 
be long-standing traditions and ways of seeing and living our everyday lives, or they 
may be actively created and imposed through a rational activity, for instance, the 
abstractions produced by architects. 
In contemporary society, a whole series of centralities create an ever-changing field of 
multiple centralities and dimensions. A diagrammatic representation of the multi-
centrality of the field can be found on the next page. 
                                                          
38 ‘This question leads to a quite definite positive answer, and to a perfectly definite transformation law 
for the space-time magnitudes of an event when changing over from one body of reference to another’ 
(Einstein, 1920). 
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Diagram 4: The multi-centrality of the field. Source: the author (based on – but not 
identical to – ideas from Bourdieu, 1996a, and Lefebvre, 1991b)  
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In a certain way, each of these centralities generates a frame of power that spreads its 
influence on social life, rules, images, tastes and discourses. These frames interact and 
resonate with one another, both contradicting and reinforcing one another.  They can be 
imagined as an electrical field, in which forces interact dynamically; however, the 
difference is that, in this case, equal polarities are attracted to one another rather than 
being repelled by one another (see diagram 5 on the next page). 
Therefore, we can understand how a field such as architecture can have complex 
dynamics yet structured tendencies; the system produced by the field is the result of 
struggles for the realisation of different programmes and points of view by different 
centralities. Thus, depending on the result of these struggles (between actors and 
institutions), the field will provide different guidance for the ‘perceptions’ and the 
‘choices’ available within the system, which might be contradictory and incoherent in 
nature. 
In this sense, the mutability of the field will be conditioned by a series of elements, both 
historical and emergent: inherited concepts, social demands, hierarchical positions, the 
pre-dispositions of actors, the need for differentiation, and so on. Although mutable, this 
field creates a frame for what is possible and impossible to achieve. Furthermore, these 
centralities operate as gears in a cogwheel, whereas the different elements of a specific 
programme generate momentum and attraction within the field (see diagram 6 on the 
following page). 
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Diagram 5: Centres of power in the field. Source: the author.  
 
 
74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 6: The vortex momentum of the centres. Source: the author.  
 
 
75 
 
(2) Axes of habitus  
What determines the intensity of the social power in these centralities is a complex 
question as well. Bourdieu (1996) created a famous diagram for the relationship 
between cultural capital and economic capital in the field of gastronomy. In this 
diagram, two axes (economic capital and cultural capital) create different ways of 
valuing and developing lifestyles (see diagram 7 on the next page). 
These axes of value are ways of establishing norms for a culturally accepted social 
hierarchy. For Bourdieu, they are the roots of what he calls the habitus: a general 
system of dispositions and schemes of perception. These axes establish a social 
hierarchy and define the mechanics of conflict between different actors who are 
attempting to occupy dominant positions in the field. For instance, Bourdieu (1996a, p. 
49) mentions how Napoleon III overcame his condition of political farce by means of 
cultural events, celebrations and gifts, thus creating a new system of value and a new 
way of life in which his social position was guaranteed. Similarly, in the field of 
architecture, institutions will promote events, celebrations and prizes to impose their 
own conceptions of architecture. 
Bourdieu (1996a, pp. 179-180) develops the idea of habitus as a generative device that 
emerges from empirical observations, not from an abstract interpretation. He derived 
this concept from Panofsky’s idea of how a scholastic habitus produced the medieval 
architecture. Thus, a subject’s habitus is the conscious and unconscious mechanisms 
that he or she uses to operate in the world. Although Bourdieu (1996a, p. 198) praises 
Foucault’s method of enabling a readout of cultural products connected to social 
strategies, systems of rules and cultural differences, he argues that Foucault gets lost in 
a semiotic field of discourse. Thus, for Bourdieu, the idea of habitus has the potential of 
connecting the realm of ideas (interests, polemics, mental practices, values) with 
concrete praxis (relations between agents, institutions, socio-logics, hierarchies and so 
on). 
Furthermore, a whole series of combinations of these axes that blend different elements 
of social power can arguably be proposed: tradition, technology, ideology, media 
exposure, political power, networking and so on. 
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Diagram 7: Variations in food taste. Source: the author (based on – but not identical to – 
images 9, 10 and 11 from Bourdieu, 1996b). 
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(3) Social dimensions  
Social dimensions are the delimitations of spaces of action and the interests of different 
agents; they also define the places in which these agents operate and their character in 
the production of different aspects in the field. For instance, Bourdieu (1996c, pp. 65-
66, 163) asserts that the literary field has two main dimensions. 
On the one hand, the literary industry is centred on editorial groups, newspapers and the 
market in general. In this dimension, the artistic production is a commodity like any 
other, driven by diffusion, immediate success, the numeric print run, the mind-set of 
clients, public demand, known formats and so on. This dimension relates to capital, 
tendencies and short-term investments. On the other hand, high-profile literature is 
created by the salons, high society, patrons, groups, and so on. In this dimension, 
products are seen as unique; it is a luxurious market that is guided by specific instances 
of acclamation within an internal courtesan politics of the academy, fellowships, 
friendships, prizes and so on. For Bourdieu, this dimension relates to symbolic capital, 
historical value and long-term investments. 
The field of architecture can be divided in many ways. The overall manifestation of 
spaces inhabited by humans is arguably a matter of concern for the field. Such spaces 
include not only slums but also natural spaces. By contrast, one might understand 
architecture only as the place where beauty, function and durability come together in the 
form of a building – to use a classical definition. In addition to the infinite ways that this 
delimitation can be proposed, the way that these dimensions create ‘focused interests’ 
and discourses is also of interest in this study. Thus, the accuracy or truth of these 
definition matters less than the fundamentals (read prejudices) that they create with a 
given rhetoric. Furthermore, taking one step back, ‘dimensions’ are not important 
because they reveals truth and lies in the field; instead, dimensionality can be regarded 
as a device for investigating existing conflicts in the field. For instance, the diagram 8 
below shows the different relations between the whole social space, the space controlled 
by bureaucracy, the space managed as commercial activity, the intersections with 
celebrated spectacular buildings and the spaces valued by the media. This diagram 
might serve as an instrument that delineates the realm in which one intends to act within 
or against a given dimension.  
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Diagram 8: Social dimensions of the field. Source: the author.  
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In addition to these more abstract dimensions, for Bourdieu, there are also concrete 
places in the production of art in general. Like nodes of structuration, each of these 
places articulates different concrete dimensions. In the case of art, these places include 
the café, the salon, the school, the foundations, the state departments, the studio, the 
aristocratic clubs, the learned societies, and even virtual places such as journals, 
reviews, museums and internet sites. These places are important because they articulate 
the ‘circumstances’ that make works of art possible, establish the context in which such 
works are evaluated, and permit the organisation of networks. 
Finally, for Bourdieu (1996c, pp. 196-197), these dimensions are established by 
concrete persons, but they generally assume stereotypes in the manner typical of 
Balzac’s literature: the prophet, the priest, the artist, the craftsman, the bohemian, the 
critic, the bureaucrat, the proletarian, the editor, the merchant, and the colleague are all 
figures of everyday experience that render valuation and intersubjective values in the 
field, and they can become centralities themselves.39 
(4) Distinctions 
For Bourdieu, the pressures that mediate the production of various works are both 
internal and external to the field, and they also relate to the symbolic capital of the 
involved agents and their positions in the social hierarchy. The routine that the 
institutions impose on the agents establishes a symbolic order, a circle of valuation, a 
level of publicity and a definition of legitimacy. This imposed order establishes 
hierarchies and differentiations in the field. This process is not scientifically precise; 
instead, it is the result of social struggles for dominant positions in the field (Bourdieu, 
1996a). 
Here, the celebrative instances play an important role in the ‘game’. They are 
responsible for the ‘symbolic alchemy’ or the mode of valorising the works of art. 
Although this mode of valorisation is intertwined with the economy, it functions in an 
upside-down manner, according to Bourdieu (1996c, p. 198). This is the case because 
the more a work of art defies the bourgeois mode of valuing things, the more valued it 
becomes. The centralities that we observed above are those that are entitled to create a 
                                                          
39 We shall propose a different view on subjects and agents later in this thesis. 
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habitus, foment desires, and establish institutions and hierarchies, properly mobilising 
the libido and the acceptance of the order. Precisely by creating a desire for distinction 
in the field, these distinct actors are able to define what is good or bad.  
To establish such distinction, ‘biography’ is a rather diffuse mode of operation (as we 
will describe in further detail in the next section). Currently, the narratives of artistic 
biographies are based on the ideology of ‘creation’ (Bourdieu, 1996c, p. 193), in which 
the products are seen as mysteriously produced by geniuses (Bourdieu, 1996c, p. 212). 
Bourdieu argues that, in this way, the artist is ‘created’ by the work of the critic, which 
preserves an aura of ‘detachment’ around the artist (Bourdieu, 1996c, p. 194). These 
narratives usually focus on revealing affiliations (proving the nobility of the actors) and 
to create a biography of the ‘great man’, where the work is evaluated through a 
mythological account of the formation of his subject (Bourdieu, 1996c, p. 213). 
For Bourdieu, this process creates the illusion of an omnipotent intellectual, which he 
sees in the figure of Sartre, who occupies a special position in the field, securing the 
control and centralisation of a vast army of subservient intellectuals (Bourdieu, 1996c, 
p. 238). This illusion culminates in the invention of a ‘pure aesthetic’ and the figure of 
the major artist, who is allowed to commit transgressions and be utterly free of any 
moral responsibility. This apotheosis allows the modern artist to unabashedly indulge in 
a random mix of bourgeois excesses, scientific asceticism and bohemian hedonism. 
Nonetheless, the ‘great man’ only exists immersed in the orthodoxy and dogmas of the 
culture that sustains his fame (Bourdieu, 1996c, p. 131).40 This cult of personality and 
biography creates illusions of a retrospective coherence in the life of great characters 
(visible in sentences such as ‘From a young age he already showed signs of…’).41 This 
cultish ritual also leads to the production of ‘false ruptures’, for instance, demonising 
old idols or simply inverting current trends, to change the hierarchy within the field 
without questioning its structure (Bourdieu, 1996c, pp. 213, 218-219).  
                                                          
40 Tony Benn addressed the appeal of co-optation as follows: ‘When you get to No 10, you've climbed 
there on a little ladder called “the status quo”. And when you are there, the status quo looks very good’ 
(House of Commons, 1995). For Bourdieu (1996c, p. 74-77), even if they are critical of it, artists tend to 
align themselves with power or vanish in silence. For him, modern art has never actually been radically 
critical of the bourgeoisie; in fact, it has been a form of self-criticism: the recognition that the bourgeoisie 
had no style and the development of a style based on its cultural logic (narratives, abstraction, rationality, 
ruptures with the past, and so on). Thus, modern art aims to overcome the aristocratic monopoly of style 
and to bring to light bourgeoisie’s real grandeur, its truthful way of living, rather than to diminish it. 
41 In the next chapter, we shall discuss examples in architecture of such narratives. 
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(5) Illusios 
Bourdieu called illusio the overall effect, the magic that makes the field function, the 
fantasies that one must accept to ‘believe’ in the truths that the whole system proclaims 
to carry. These fantasies include the rites, the dogmas, the rules of the game, the 
planned obsolescence, in addition to the systemic forms of rupture that proclaim a 
‘revolution’ but deliver only simulacra of novelty. For Bourdieu (1996c, p. 131), actual 
artistic revolutions never come from the dominant agents in the field because these 
agents have no interest in the radical change of the order that consecrates them. 
Arguably, these illusios are reproduced through the deadlocks and false reasonings we 
observed in the previous chapter. This reproduction can be organised in following table: 
Deadlocks 
Dead ends 
Charity 
Pacifying and managing inequalities 
Using the poison as treatment 
Intensifying causes 
Profiting from poverty 
Being ‘better’ at the ‘game’ 
Resignation 
Abdication 
Failure to carry a duty 
No critique of preconceptions 
Nothing but ‘design’ 
Mirroring the ‘spirit of time’ 
Apparatus for reproducing ideology 
Abnegation 
Self-denial 
Believing the medium to be ‘neutral’  
Mirroring the ‘hegemonic logic’ 
Reproducing the ‘oppressed’ logic 
Escapism 
Myths of evasion 
Archipelagos of acceleration 
TAZ (detached and short-lived) 
Monastic neoliberalism 
Protest 
Mexican standoff 
Simulation of radicalism 
Symbolic kidnapping 
Denouncing own mistakes 
Lost in representation 
False dilemmas 
Straw men and selective criticism 
Operative disputes of styles and schools 
‘Technical errors’ and a-political solutions 
Argument to moderation (false dialectic) 
Escape to individual pleasures 
Fallacy of autonomy 
Cynicism 
No politics (naturalising the status quo) 
No ethics (anaesthetisation of apartheid) 
History as imaginary identity 
Context as deluded allegories 
Universal laws Natural evolution above agency 
Essentialism Immutable fundamentals of architecture 
Simulacra 
Radical escape into illusion as absolute 
Star architects as centre of disciplinary cosmos 
Denial of dialectic 
Base/superstructure paradox 
Architecture as mimetic image (puppet) 
Ultra-abdication 
Tailism 
Negative messianism (ultra-Mexican standoff) 
Lack of reflexivity 
Positive ‘I, the celebrity, am the truth’ 
Naïve ’All, who dares to imagine, are truthful’ 
Negative ‘Everything, except my [situated] critic, is false’ 
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As diagram 9 below represents, illusions always present themselves as expansive 
movements that hide the infinite vortexes at the centre of their spirals (A); these 
movements pretend to be part of a linear evolution ascending towards a sublime human 
existence (B); instead, they are more like complex struggles between ‘styles’, swinging 
between conflicting trajectories but having a common centre (C), and they are propelled 
by different axes of power in the discipline (D). Despite this complexity, we can 
identify the general form of these movements as the creation of two lines of circular 
reasoning on the axis of the discipline, setting into motion continuous conflicts in the 
field, without questioning the balance of power in the discipline and centring resolutions 
in its vortex, ‘the belly of the architect’  (E); furthermore, the pacified poles of conflict 
are binary dichotomies and false dialectics, always creating mechanisms of flipping 
value (‘straw men’), which each illusio creates on its opposing pole to gain the 
momentum to achieve a new position (F); as a result, the structure of the field always 
remains in place, and each ‘style’ or ‘school’ is just another face of the same forces, i.e., 
the reproduction of a game of masquerades (G). In this sense, although an illusio claims 
to be radical, it ultimately reinforces what it ignores, and the whole structure of the 
discipline is accepted as an inoffensive field of social hierarchies.42 
However, Illusios are not trans-historical devices. They evolved from a fetish produced 
by stewards in a court who were trying to fortify a society around their masters to a 
process of sprezzatura, which hid the artifices of courtesans to maintain positions of 
power, to parasitic structures of imperialistic struggles, and, finally, to the reproduction 
of myths structuring assembly lines of inventions, protocols and techniques of 
phenomena.  
In Part 2, we will investigate the means of production for these illusions in the field of 
architecture. For now, suffice it to say that the reproduction of disciplinary illusios are 
sustained by three dimensions: they seem to be things (making ‘social constructs’ into 
natural things, i.e., the reification discussed in Chapter 4); they are magical (hiding their 
means of production, appearing as givens, i.e., the fetish discussed in Chapter 5); and 
they embody desire (i.e., the biopolitical phantasies in Chapter 6). 
                                                          
42 For Kuhn (1987), the commitment to the existing rules of a discipline is a pre-requisite for developing 
accepted normal science, so there is always a tension between the desire for innovation and the demand to 
think within the discipline. 
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Diagram 9: Swinging illusios. Source: the author. 
 
 
84 
 
This leads us to the point of Lefebvre and Marcuse discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter: saying that ‘A’ is ‘A’ is already the choice that ‘A’ should indeed be accepted 
just as I conceive ‘A’. Therefore, traditional histories of architectural utopias are 
nothing but a collection of illusions. Although entertaining and somewhat interesting for 
those who aim for a 1:1 cartography of the field, for the reasons mentioned above, these 
illusions are only of interest in this research from a bird’s-eye view. Thus, we can 
visualise the phantastic territory upon which we shall navigate only with the aim of 
traversing it. In this sense, a cognitive mapping should have the following aspects: 
Cognitive Mapping 
Enabling subjects to represent their positions in the social structure  
To set architecture on the analytic divan (the belly of the architect) 
Reflexivity: enabling the traversing of unconscious choices 
Routing: navigating the opaque and obscure waters of the field 
Enabling detours: revealing counter-hegemonic potentialities 
 
 
2.4. Dialectics: a cognitive map of architectural reproduction 
The following diagrams aims to produce heuristic devices for understanding the 
dynamic relations of the field from which we aim to take a detour. As Toscano and 
Kinkle (2015, p. 16) assert, cognitive mapping should enhance the ‘aesthetic’ power of 
mediating ‘the disjunction between experience and abstraction’, thus revealing ‘the 
causes of our social life’ that are ‘elsewhere’ (Toscano and Kinkle, 2015, p. 16). In this 
sense, this diagramming ‘does not provide a method, or advance a concept; rather, it 
poses a problem which is at once political, economic, aesthetic and existential’ 
(Toscano and Kinkle, 2015, p. 22). 
Transforming that into a cognitive map implies the inclusion of the dialectical relations 
between the field, society and subjectivity. To locate ‘the architectural subject’ in his 
self-conceived position in the field of architecture, we shall start by understanding the 
different 'logics' used to conceive causalities and structures. For approaching that we 
will use, as did Jameson (Jameson, 2002, pp. 8-9), Althusser’s three modes of 
increasing complex causality: the mechanical, the expressionist and the structural. In 
doing so, we might be able to propose a dialectical ‘overcoming’ of them.  
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 Diagram 10: Linear formal logic. Source: the author (based on – but not identical to – 
ideas from Jameson, 2002).  
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Diagram 11: Variations of expressive causality. Source: the author (based on – but not 
identical to – Jameson, 2002).  
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Diagram 12: Clavis universalis. Source: the author (based on – but not identical to – 
Harvey, 2010; and Kapp, 2004).  
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 Diagram 13: Structural logic. Source: the author (based on – but not identical to – 
Jameson, 2002).  
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 Diagram 14: The obsessive (absent) structure. Source: the author (based on – but 
opposed to – Eco, 1991).  
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Diagram 15: Dialectical regulation. Source: the author (based on – but not identical to – 
Soja, 2000; Harvey, 2010; and Jameson, 1991).  
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Diagram 16: Dialectical reproduction of space. Source: the author (based on – but an 
alchemy of – Harvey, 2010; and Lefebvre, 1976).  
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The first mode of causality is linear formal logics, which Jameson attributes to 
Descartes. It involves the formulation of a chain reaction similar to a billiard ball effect 
in a mechanistic and transitive mode (see diagram 10, above). In this form of reasoning, 
the ‘parts’ are the focus of thought, and the ‘whole’ does not necessarily interfere with 
those parts. This sort of analysis produces rigid conclusions – of the ‘the base 
determines the superstructure’ type – as we discussed previously. Its linearity allows for 
no dialectical reasoning (of the sort we mentioned in Engels’ account). 
Second, Althusser discussed the idea of an ‘expressionist concept’ like that of Hegel and 
Spinoza, in which the ‘whole’ would be an all-encompassing essence to which any 
phenomenon would be simply a manifestation – a reflection of an essential nature 
(diagram 11, above). For Jameson (2002), this expressive causality is the one that Riegl 
applies to epochal styles or the teleological and universal subject of Hegel’s history. 
This reasoning has an important theoretical function. Harvey (2010) notices how 
philosophers position different aspects at the centre of their equations. For instance, 
autonomists centre on labour process, feminists on daily life, Friedman on technology, 
Hegelians on mental conceptions, Frankfurt scholars on ideologies, and so on. 
Nevertheless, this proposition ultimately proposes a type of clavis universalis (Kapp, 
2004), an ‘all-encompassing cause’ that is the key for interpreting everything. In this 
way, the whole becomes a closed system (see diagram 12, above). 
In a context of multiplicity, uncertainty, complexity and diversity, such reasoning is 
relatively useless because it presupposes that a synthesis can reduce all the 
contradictions and dynamics of social reality. It also presupposes the unconditional 
determination of the part by the conceived whole, thus leaving no room for 
contradictions (for instance, the absolute system in Tafuri).  
Third, Althusser would argue for a structural causality in which different ‘levels’ would 
have ‘semi-autonomy’, maintaining different structural connections and interactions but 
with no deterministic causality. For Althusser, this ‘structure’ is not an ‘essence’; 
instead, it should be seen as a fluctuating combination of multiple chains of cause and 
effect (see diagram 13, above). 
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 Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine how this position will be able to overcome the 
essentialist causality, as the structure per se will become a sort of clavis universalis. If 
Umberto Eco’s (1991) self-criticism is correct, the ‘structure is absent’, meaning that it 
is not equal to the real and is instead an interpretative tool. We can also note works 
inspired by Bruno Latour’s ‘Actor-Network-Theory’, which tend to direct their analyses 
towards complex social structures. This complicates the scheme of structuralism, yet it 
continues to imply the presence of a structure in the form of a ‘network’ (see diagram 
14, above). 
Thus, this approach involves the same contradiction of that of Eco, where the structure 
that one develops to understand a social group is not a fact; instead, it does not exist 
prior to the ‘processing into data’. In addition, we should recall that our aim is not a 1:1 
map but an interpretative tool that envisions relations and interactions in the field to 
mobilise new possibilities and detours. 
Therefore, to provide an appropriate dialectical interpretation, the approach of the so-
called ‘school of regulation’, where different spheres of society interact with one 
another, dialectically reinforcing one another in constant historical development (see 
diagram 15 above, and Soja, 2000, Jameson, 1991), would be a good place to start for 
our cognitive map.  
For instance, the mode of production would depend on and interact with a regime of 
accumulation (e.g., colonialism and mercantilism, Fordism and mass consumption or 
Toyotism and flexible accumulation), an ideological apparatus (e.g., imperialism, 
modernism or post-modernism), and a mode of social regulation (e.g., absolutism, 
welfare state or the neoliberal market). Thus, different social spheres cyclically regulate 
and reinforce one another. 
In addition, as Lefebvre (1976) argued, the production of space plays a fundamental role 
in the reproduction of social relations. Space is the produced social field, the realm 
where everyday interactions and hierarchies frame existence. In this sense, the 
production of space coordinates the interactions among the different spheres of society. 
Developing Lefebvre’s point through David Harvey’s (2010) ‘scheme’ will result in 
diagram 16 (above), which represents the junction of social regulation (the outer vicious 
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circle on that diagram) and spatial reproduction (in itself a technology, and the 
coordinating pyramid in the diagram’s centre). 
Harvey’s ‘scheme’ comes from a footnote in Marx’s Capital he draws attention to, in 
which Marx ‘links in one sentence six identifiable conceptual elements’ (Harvey, 2010, 
pp. 191-192). This sentence is marked in italics (by us) in the quotation below: 
A critical history of technology would show how little any of the 
inventions of the eighteenth century are the work of a single individual. 
As yet such a book does not exist. [...] Darwin has directed attention to 
the history of natural technology, i.e. the formation of the organs of 
plants and animals, which serve as the instruments of production for 
sustaining their life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man 
in society, of organs that are the material basis of every particular 
organization of society, deserve equal attention? And would not such a 
history be easier to compile, since, as Vico says, human history differs 
from natural history in that we have made the former, but not the latter? 
Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, the direct 
process of the production of his life[43], and thereby it also lays bare the 
process of the production of the social relations of his life, and of the 
mental conceptions that flow from those relations. (Marx, 1990, p. 493) 
The elements Harvey identifies are technology, relations to nature, actual process of 
production, reproduction of daily life, social relations, and mental conceptions. 
In the diagram, social regulation is realised through technology and science, the mode 
of production, and the social relations and it is mediated by values, the reified everyday 
(the ‘everydayness’ of Lefebvre and Levich, 1987) and nature. In this diagram, 
reproduction is the creation of mediations between the different spheres. In this sense, 
the mode of production in capitalism will transform social relations into things, thus 
objectifying them, and this reification is what programs the modern everyday into a 
dynamic yet repetitive experience (we shall discuss ‘reification’ further in Chapter 4). 
The fetish is the force that articulates technology (methods, techniques, knowledge and 
so on) and responds to a given arrangement of production. The interaction of these two 
spheres produces what we perceive as ‘nature’ and the ‘natural’ in social life (we shall 
discuss fetish in Chapter 5). Finally, phantasies are the processes of subjectivation that 
                                                          
43 In the first English edition (available at www.marxists.org) this ’element’ is alternatively translated as: 
‘the process of production by which he sustains his life’. Therefore, we deduced from it, and represented 
in the diagram 16 as: the ‘mode of production’ and the ‘reproduction of daily life’, or ‘everydayness’, as 
Lefebvre and Levich (1987) conceptualise it.  
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articulate social structures in a given technological condition, resulting in ways of 
thinking, mental conceptions and forms of value (we shall discuss phantasies in Chapter 
6). Thus, this diagram orientates the investigation regarding how the production of 
space reproduces complex dialectical relations between different social spheres. 
Bourdieu (2009) aimed to draw a precise picture of the field to investigate how social 
logics are manifested in concrete practice. Our cognitive map does turn the investigation 
upside down: the diagrams are heuristic and aesthetic devices that can help envision 
how concrete practices are reproducing abstract social relations. 
Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is conceived as the ‘actual’ practice of 
‘agents’ producing the ‘structure’, which is supposed to be regulated and regular. By 
contrast, these agents are not free individuals who are self-inflicting an external system. 
This is not the case because the means of reproduction in the field are historical 
abstractions transversally shared by multiple subjects. In this sense, the subject of the 
‘architect’ is not an absolute individual who freely operates in a field of closed 
possibilities. Architects are not detached atoms, as they confront and act in the world 
through a very old frame of subjectivity: the way that they see, the methods that they 
use and the procedures that they develop are historically produced.44 This notion leads 
us to the following question: what subject inhabits the sort of cognitive map that we aim 
to draw?  
 
2.5. Overcoming the subject-territory dichotomy in the map 
In the next chapter, we will dissect how subjects are traditionally conceived in 
architecture and how counter-narratives can be conceived. Nevertheless, we should first 
map how different subject-society relationships have been conceived. To do so, we will 
                                                          
44 Bourdieu relates the critique of the notion of the absolutely free subject facing ethical choices in a 
totally free field to Sartre’s existentialism. As we shall cover in detail in the next chapter, saying that it is 
the ‘agency’ of the individual that is framed by the field is insufficient. Instead, the ideas of ‘agency’ and 
‘individual’ should be questioned altogether. There is not only no antecedent-less struggle between a 
subject and the social world but also no such a thing as a subject without a social world that enables his 
emergence in first place. 
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introduce four metaphors for conceiving this relationship: the ideological individual, the 
interindividual, the prince and the transindividual.  
The ideological view of the individual is the simplest and most widespread. The field is 
understood as a neutral stage, where abstract dimensions do not interfere in the 
performances of the players, who are considered equal individuals competing in a fair 
game. In this way, current ideologies can justify the hierarchies based on personal skills. 
Thus, an architect who occupies the top of the pyramid got there because of his ‘talent’. 
The narrative of the field becomes one of the ‘ladder’ and the ‘leader’. According to this 
line of reasoning, once someone has passed through all the phases of his development, 
he will be in a leadership position, and the architects below him will remain there 
because of their flaws (see diagram 17 below). 
 
Diagram 17: The ideal logic of the individual. Source: the author. 
 
This metaphor ignores all the facts presented thus far in this chapter. As we have 
observed, the space in which architecture is produced is not a neutral space. Different 
centralities produce a field of power in which the struggle for hegemony endures. The 
social habitus frames different values and thus different lifestyles. Furthermore, 
architecture is divided into different social dimensions, different realms of operation and 
pertinence. Additionally, different institutions compete in the production of the field’s 
dominant illusions and not only act on behalf of their disciples but also establish the 
very rules of the game that reproduce their hegemony. In this sense, to understand how 
architecture reproduces itself, one needs an approach that reveals the historical and 
social dialectic of the architectural field, its subjectivities and its products.  
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The second metaphor is the intersectional individualities developed by Georg Simmel 
(see Stoetzler, 2016). For Simmel, increasingly complex individualities would be 
formed through the development of different ‘social circles’. According to this idea, 
complex modern individualities are the result of the articulation of different circles of 
identity, such as gender, family, class and religion (see diagram 18 below).  
 
Diagram 18: Intersubjectivity. Source: the author (based on – but not identical to – 
Simmel, in Stoetzler, 2016). 
 
In this conception, a group of people might inherit a common culture ‘A’ through some 
tradition, and a group of professionals might develop a shared knowledge ‘B’ by 
working together. The association of these two social circles with other identities (such 
as class and gender) would explain increasingly complex individualities. In this sense, 
the subject of agency is not an isolated individual but an intersection of the social circles 
that interconnect different groups of people. This conception acknowledges how ideas, 
conceptions and values are shared and produced in collective social ensembles. 
Although histories of architecture usually assert the contrary, no architect is entitled to a 
single ‘great idea’, as such ideas are the result of a collective shared knowledge. In this 
sense, multiple common circles inhabit multiple subjects. 
Nevertheless, this conception still regards the individual as a kind of inner-centred knot, 
and it does little to explain how individuals come to actualise different traits of 
individuality at different moments in their lives or to elucidate the formation of 
collective subjects. 
 
 
98 
 
The third conception is the prince. This proto-critical approach comprehends the 
mechanisms of power and representation. This conception was first systematised by 
Machiavelli (2008, and for a critical analysis Althusser, 2000). Here, the leader is 
neither in a natural nor in a neutral position in the field. His position is produced by a 
series of social articulations and manoeuvres. The prince wins his position of power 
through the control exercised over other subjects. In this metaphor, the prince is a public 
image that represents political relations and intersubjective desires. The prince is the 
image of a social body, a social institution, a social mechanism of production, a 
collective will, and so on. Thus, the prince is an abstract instrument that can incorporate 
(extract) the social power of a collective (see diagram 19 below; we shall discuss that in 
further detail in Chapters 3 and 6). 
 
Diagram 19: The Machiavellian subject of history – the prince. Source: the author 
(based on – but not identical to – Machiavelli, 2008, Althusser, 2000). 
 
In this metaphor, a process of ‘subjectivation’ is developed, framing the subjectivities of 
others so they can be expropriated. This process is also a form of social control. Many 
variations of this metaphor have developed, such as: the conception of classes (a 
representation of a ‘collective prince’) or political parties. Again, such ‘princely’ 
representations colonise what is collective into a single entity. 
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Furthermore, the subjectivity of the ‘prince’ is not the only thing forged in this process. 
In fact, all subjects are transformed into a kind of impotent princes. Toscano and Kinkle 
observe how the television series The Wire portrays its characters in relation to the 
cityscape of Baltimore: ‘While traditional narrative locates causal agency at the level of 
individual characters, in The Wire the socio-economic system (...) is the opaque 
subject’, so individuals feel impotent (Toscano and Kinkle, 2015, p. 139). For Toscano 
and Kinkle (2015, p. 155), a cognitive map should reveal the domination and 
exploitation that remains opaque and obscure. This 'obscurity' causes 'agents' to feel as 
though they are always being co-opted by the system against their will. 
For instance, to implement their practices, architects who are critical of the system, 
sooner or later, will have to either resign and decline to act or repeatedly adhere to 
actions that they reject, just as in The Wire, where the characters feel ‘the inevitable 
frustration that comes from attempting to “buck the system”’ or ‘the fatalism of playing 
“the game”’ (Toscano and Kinkle, 2015, p. 140). Ultimately, subjects will acknowledge 
‘how we’re all, all of us vested, all of us complicit’ (Toscano and Kinkle, 2015, p. 153), 
as does Freamon, a detective in The Wire. 
Although this metaphor is important for understanding how the field’s ideology 
operates through the production of figures such as ‘princes’, thus making it possible to 
reveal the fetish of the field, it does not provide an alternative approach for positioning a 
critical subjectivity on our cognitive map (i.e., repositioning the subjects’ representation 
of their own condition in the world). In other words, although this metaphor has a 
concrete presence in reality, capturing collective labour, it does not give the collective 
(behind the mask of the prince) an operative image of its own condition. 
For Toscano and Kinkle (2015, p. 147), the aim of a cognitive mapping is to represent a 
given condition ‘in such a way that it could be available for critique’. If, on the one 
hand, cognitive maps ‘capture that we are tragically enmeshed in the urbanised 
accumulation and reproduction of capitalism’, on the other hand, this ‘inquiry into the 
aesthetic’ ‘realism of abstraction’ (Toscano and Kinkle, 2015, p. 151) aims to enable a 
reflexive experience that views both the subject and the world as products, producing 
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and reproducing themselves. In this sense, the idea of a cognitive map implies the 
deconstruction of the idea of an individual centred on himself.45  
While analysing the multiple layers of the ‘production of subjectivity’, Guattari (1995, 
p. 22) proposed ‘to decentre the question of the subject onto the question of 
subjectivity’. Subjectivity would be an ensemble of delimiting and self-referencing 
conditions, formed by an ecology of apparatuses and incorporeal universes of 
references, institutions, spatialities and ethico-aesthetic paradigms (Guattari, 1995, p. 9). 
As such, Guattari argues that an approach to ‘subjectivity’ should be less of a scientific 
paradigm and more of a multi-faceted cartography of cognitive references, myths, 
rituals, symptoms, anguish, affect, inhibitions, drives, family relations and 
neighbourhood identities (Guattari, 1995, p. 11-12). Thus, he argues for a map with a 
series of musical metaphors of existential orchestrations, which are precarious partial 
objects, such as harmonies, polyphonies, counterpoints, rhythms, and aesthetic 
subjectivities (Guattari, 1995, p. 18). For him, subjectivity is pre-personal, polyphonic, 
collective and machinic; thus, it is not centred on the individual (Guattari, 1995, p. 21). 
Nevertheless, Guattari is struggling against structuralism, using its theoretical apparatus 
to build a complex theory rather than a theory of that complexity. The result is the 
creation of complex structures, with multiple elements layered in partial levels and 
made of complex refrains, with temporary (yet precise) consistencies, interfaced by 
non-discursive virtualities, and so on (see especially Guattari,1995, pp. 23 and 27). To 
use his musical metaphor against his argument, such theory could explain the complex 
functioning of an orchestra but not the dynamics of jazz improvisation. Therefore, he 
applies semiotics to escape structuralism by rendering this very structuralism more 
complex, and still the complexity of reality escapes his complex structure. 
Therefore, the concept of subjectivity will demand something completely different from 
ontology, escaping the requirement for the ontological elements of structuralism – no 
matter how complex they might or might not sound. This different approach does not 
aim to reveal the hidden universal ‘music sheet’ behind the orchestra, nor to make a ‘1:1 
record’ of the flow of the jazz; instead, it seeks to investigate this social field’s process 
                                                          
45 In this sense, Feltham affirms that ‘Badiou's subject of praxis is not identical to an individual person; in 
his view, subjects are constituted by works of art, scientific theorems, political decisions, and proofs of 
love. Despite this, a “subject” is not an abstract operator; any individual may form part of such a subject 
by their principled actions subsequent to an event’ (Feltham, 2006, xxxi). 
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of coming into being. Returning to the musical metaphor, to investigate the formation of 
subjectivities – the conflicts and struggles in the social production of tastes, musical 
sensibilities, hierarchies of value, and so on – that acknowledge such objects as music. 
Thus, we arrive at our last metaphor: transindividuality (in Chapter 3 we will develop 
further this idea, and in Chapter 6, we will investigate how it is reproduced in 
architecture). Simondon (2013) departs from a long history of the concept of the 
individual and concludes that the idea is based on a conception of an inner-centred 
substance in the individual or in a convergence of matter into a particular form. His 
argument is that instead of approaching the already individuated individual, one should 
focus on the process of his becoming – his individuation. By only studying being qua 
being, one departs from the effect rather than from the process and its causes. 
Thus, Simondon changes the inquiry from an ontology of universal and eternal beings 
towards an ontogenesis. This conception helps explain how, for individuation to be 
possible, a preindividual field of possibilities must exist beforehand. In this sense, for 
Simondon, the individual is only a ‘phase’ (an ‘actualisation’) in a series of potential 
individuations. In this sense, how a subject is formed of contradictory internal energies 
can be better understood. In this sense, the individual is not a resolved centre of being 
that exists in some kind of classical stability (the only one known by the ancients). That 
conception cannot explain how radical transformation of being is possible. 
Mixing thermodynamics with philosophy, Simondon (2013) conceives of ‘being’ as a 
process of information (mise en forme – to shape). This information is a provisional 
structuration of dynamic forces into a metastable resolution. Beyond the simple 
actualisation of inner virtualities (as a seed that becomes three), his theory is a 
conception of individuation as a process of structuring disparate forces. Thus, the 
individuation is the creation of a mediation that articulates a field of conflicting energies 
(or disparate orders of magnitude). To understand the individual as a process of 
individuation, Simondon (2013) argues that a third term – namely, energy – must be 
added to the ancient duality of matter and form. In this sense, the inquiry shifts from an 
investigation of the internal (individual) as opposed to the external (society) to an 
investigation of an energetic process in constant actualisation. 
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Simondon (2013) conceives of individuation as a 3-phase process. The first phase is the 
physical individuation, where a limit is established between an inside and an outside. 
This first individuation cannot develop and only decays, as it occurs in physical 
individuations, such as the process of crystallisation. The second phase is the living 
individuation, where the formation of a limit is instead the production of an inner realm 
in continuous relation to an outside. In this individuation, an internal dynamic is 
constantly interacting with external dynamics, forming a ‘kingdom inside a kingdom’, 
in a continuous ‘theatre of individuation’. The third phase is a double individuation, 
both psychic and collective, where reminiscent elements of preindividualisation 
(remaining unactualised in different individuals) are connected, thus actualising a 
transindividuality. 
We aim to unveil how the field of architecture produces potential predindividualities 
and reproduces ‘mediations’ for the formation of transindividuals. We shall 
provisionally call this process the reproduction of the architectural unconscious. We will 
discuss this process further in Part 2. For now, we shall sketch this idea in one last 
coordinate of our map.  
 
2.6. One last sketch: a bird’s eye view of the architectural unconscious 
In his last thesis on Feuerbach, Marx famously argued that ‘Philosophers have hitherto 
only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it’ (Marx, no date 
[1845]). In addition, he conceived of the role of philosophy as an instrument of social 
transformation in a letter entitled For a Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing 
(Marx, 1978). In this sense, the history of the theory of architecture is a quarrel between 
different interpretations, and only a ruthless critique of everything can highlight new 
directions in our cognitive map. To provide theoretical instruments for architects to 
reposition their condition in the reproduction of social relations, we shall excavate the 
different levels of ideology that operate in the reproduction of architectural discourses. 
To do so, we should sketch one last aspect of architectural transindividuations, so we 
can add, in the next chapter, a political dimension to Simondon’s account. 
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In Marxism, alienation usually means the general condition of being separated from 
one’s inner being. Reification is one kind of alienation, which turns social relations into 
‘things’ and ultimately objectifies humans themselves. The fetish of commodity is one 
kind of reification, which uses the abstract value of capital to measure the value of 
things and to mediate reification of social relations, transforming relations between 
humans into relations between things. Fantasies are the shared values, attitudes and 
beliefs that accept this order of things and that mobilise the desires to consume such 
things. Therefore, fantasy is a subset of fetish; fetish is a subset of reification; and 
reification a subset of alienation (see diagram 20, below). 
If fantasies have recently been used to understand alienation (Žižek, 2014), the 
dissemination of the concept is due to its use by various disciples of Freud, who 
famously used an iceberg as a metaphor to map the human mind. According to Freud, 
we are only conscious of the tip of this iceberg, and we are preconscious of a not-so-
deep level, called the preconscious. Part of the Ego, the rational self, has emerged from 
the water, while some of it remains submerged; the same is true of the Super-Ego, or the 
social structures and expectations that inhabit our minds; but the Id, the centre of our 
drives and impulses, would be completely unconscious and submerged (see diagram 21, 
below).  
More than a map of generic subjectivities, our cognitive map aims to reveal how the 
field is reproducing specific forms of subjectivity. Thus, our map is not so much a map 
of supposed universal cognitive faculties as it is a map of the estrangement that subjects 
face with regard to the means of production of architecture. Departing from the 
understanding that human beings themselves have no natural essence, as the genus 
homo is an artificial construction (see Taylor, 2010 and Appendix 2), we will not 
conceptualise alienation as separation from an inner nature; instead, it is the production 
of social ‘estrangement’. In this sense, estrangement is separation from the social means 
of producing one’s own reality. Therefore, estrangement produces the feeling that social 
structures are placed apart from one’s capacity to know and act. Estrangement is the 
unidentifiable distance between the subject and the instruments that can make him an 
active producer of the world around himself.  
Thus, we will need a different metaphor – a buried pyramid – to understand the 
architectural unconscious, as it is not only submerged but also separated. As diagram 22 
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(below) shows, estrangement is the distance between the observer and the inner core 
(what structures the shape of this architecture). Estrangement is generated by the 
abstract surface of the pyramid and its ruining walls.  These ruined walls have holes and 
fissures that make passing observers to wonder. However, only a bird’s eye view can 
trace the depth of this pyramid. Reification, the process of objectifying architects and 
social relations, is halfway underground. In archaeology, social events and the 
reproduction of space (for instance, the demolition and reconstruction of houses in an 
ancient city) will create layers that archaeologists call ‘context’, which successively 
buries the origins of a social structure. In our metaphor, fetish is the next of these layers. 
In architecture, the fetish includes the hidden tricks, the abstract methods and the 
techniques that produce spatial phenomena. The fetish is the means with which 
architects transform abstractions into spatial relations. Even deeper are the phantasies: 
the blindly accepted narratives that ground architectural practice.46 
 
Thus far, in Part 1, we have identified elements of the reproduction of architecture. In 
the last chapter of this part, we shall focus on the reproduction of the subject of 
architecture. If our sketched map thus far envisions the field in which the collective 
fantasy of architecture is produced, we shall next deconstruct the narrative of the 
subjects in contemporary architecture and the ways in which we might conceive of 
social transformation without falling into the trap of individual agency. In other words, 
we have set the stage for the necessary beheading of the architectural princes. To finish 
the job, we shall now construct a theoretical guillotine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 Each chapter of Part 2 matches each one of these layers. 
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 Diagram 20: The inception of estrangement. Source: the author (based on – but not 
identical to – Marx, 1990, Žižek, 1997). 
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Diagram 21: The unconscious iceberg. Source: the author (based on the early Freud – 
but not identical to the late Freud). 
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Diagram 22: The architectural unconscious. Source: the author. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Subject to change: beyond and beneath the architect 
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3.1. The architect’s gap 
There is a gap between the actual means of architectural production and the narratives 
of the field – a gap that conceals the fundamental contradiction between the rhetoric of 
the ‘genius’ and the collective character of cultural production (the ‘general intellect’ of 
Marx, no date [1857]). In an effort to reveal this contradiction, we aim, in the discussion 
below, to critically address the narratives of how architecture is produced so that we can 
transform the way we conceive the subjects of architecture and their relation to the 
reproduction (or transformation) of social relations. 
In so doing, we should start by noting (as did Stuart Elden, 2004) that the title of 
Lefebvre’s book – The Survival of Capitalism: reproduction of the relations of 
production – is more ambiguous in the French language – La survie du capitalism – as 
‘survie’ means both survival and afterlife. In this sense, the reproduction of architectural 
ideology operates not only by way of its own self-maintenance but also in the way that 
its phantasmatic elements embody the subjectivities approaching it. 
Arguably, the hegemonic form of architectural ideological survie is narrative, taking 
the form of supernatural and fantastical tales. These tales are produced in an enchanted 
lethargy of body and soul, seducing by irresistible songs and echoing from the obscure 
realms of new mythologies. Where all artifice is hidden, there lie heroes without any of 
the shortcomings of living men, of whom all is forgivable; yet, these heroes are praised 
by the mourning zeal of legions of believers. This praise arises from the whisperings of 
dead architects. 
This plight is shared not only by believers but also by many critics. For instance, 
although Tafuri (1976a, 1976b, 2006) builds a devastating critique of the ideology of 
architecture, his critique targets architecture understood as the work of ‘individuals’. 
Alternatively, Kracauer provides the means to circumvent this theoretical representation 
by addressing the paradoxes of architecture using vulgar examples, as in his famous text 
The Hotel Lobby (Kracauer 1995, 173-188, originally written in the 1920s). 
The approach below will enable a counter-narrative of the (re)production of 
architecture, moving beyond criticisms that remain in the realm of ‘agency’. Only 
through a ‘Copernican revolution’ in the concept of the individual will we be able to 
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transform the ideological conception of the subject of social transformation – i.e., we 
will change the concept of the subject who changes – thus revealing the different forms 
of the representation of the ‘subject to change’. This approach aims to develop the 
understanding that the reproduction of architectural subjectivities operates through 
collective preindividuations in a transindividual realm; it also operates through a 
socially mediated process of individuations. 
Beyond the concept of individual beings, we shall find the continuous process of 
individuation. According to Simondon (2013, 260-266), traditional ontology seeks the 
essence of ‘being’ in individuals who are already individuated. This approach causes 
research to fixate on the ‘part’ (the effect of beings already individuated) instead of 
investigating the roots of what caused the individuation to occur in the first place. 
Therefore, Simondon proposes an ‘ontogenesis’, or the study of how individuals happen 
to become. Arguably, this shifts the traditional separation of being and becoming (such 
as in Heidegger) towards a study of how being becomes. Not only is this the study of 
the becoming of being, it is also the study of being as becoming. This approach 
radically transforms the ideological ontology of architecture – seen as the production of 
individual structure by individual architects – into an ontogenesis of architecture 
conceived as operations, which creates a structure only as a means of allowing a new 
possible operation to emerge.  
 
3.2. Intermezzo: dead architects 
These whisperings are something quite different from the last century’s way of 
spreading the ideals of dead architects: a scheme that took the form of foundations. Le 
Corbusier, Buckminster Fuller, Frank Lloyd Wright, Mies Van der Rohe, Lina Bo 
Bardi, and practically all major figures of modern architecture have left foundations that 
are responsible for spreading their convictions, developing research, supporting 
publications, funding disciples and reproducing the architects’ ideals. This was a 
mechanism for safeguarding a prominent and increasingly powerful position in the field 
of architecture. 
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In 2012, when Oscar Niemeyer died at the age of 105, he was still ‘designing’ a vast 
number of buildings around the world. A few days after his funeral, his grandson, the 
architectural director at Niemeyer’s office, declared that the firm would finish the 
projects already started, setting an end to 78 years of architectural practice, even if one 
could not measure the size of Niemeyer’s contribution towards the end of his life. 
Nevertheless, Niemeyer remained very talkative and engaging in his lectures, always 
surrounded by admirers astonished by his unceasing commitment to designing.  As 
expected, Niemeyer left a foundation to protect his legacy, even if his grandchildren are 
now in a fierce legal battle over his heritage. 
The death of Zaha Hadid, in early 2016, led to a very different turn of events. At the 
time, Zaha Hadid Architects (ZHA) had offices in London, Beijing and Hong Kong. 
These offices had already developed more than 950 projects, and the firm was about to 
open a new office in New York, with additional plans for offices in Dubai and Mexico. 
Some weeks after Hadid’s death, finding the world of architecture in mourning, Patrik 
Schumacher, who had become a partner at ZHA in 2002, declared to the NY Times that 
ZHA would continue designing (Erlanger, 2016). According to Schumacher, Hadid had 
set a precedent; she had imbued the practice of architecture with a ‘new repertoire’ and 
a new ‘spirit’. On this basis, he could ensure that the firm’s 400 staff members could 
confidently continue her vision and research (see Erlanger, 2016). Thus, Zaha Hadid 
lives: 
any star in architecture has been born in the discipline itself, and emerges 
through schools, competitions and colleagues. (…) We want to tell the 
world that we’re still a viable, vibrant address for major work of cultural 
importance. (…) My ambition is to become more visible as a leader of 
the field to clients (…) This star signature is a relatively new 
phenomenon (…) We feel very confident that we will carry on and go 
forward with her vision and her legacy and the experimental research she 
established in the office (Patrik Schumaker in Erlanger, 2016). 
Arguably, these spirited architects controlling a design practice by means of 
supernatural means is a new phenomenon in architecture. However, this is not a new 
phenomenon in other fields, such as the fashion industry, where many designer names 
have continued after the deaths of the founders.47 Nevertheless, in architecture, the 
                                                          
47 Consider, for example, Coco Chanel, Gucci, Versace, Prada and Benetton. Except for the first, these are 
family names, and the companies continued after the founders’ deaths, with family members playing 
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image of the ‘gifted architect’ determining the structure of the field with his pen 
demanded a quite different discourse, and notions of brand used to be quite 
extraneous.48 
Another paradox seems inevitable. The history of architecture has traditionally 
remained distant from the logic of the market, developing its own distinctive qualities 
apart from market value (Bourdieu, 1996c) and building a parallel system of 
valorisation. In this system, biographical narratives have been the most important 
reference for measuring the greatness of a ‘genius’. With few exceptions, ever since the 
first history of painters by Giorgio Vasari in 1550, the history of art has been depicted 
as a collection of biographies that chronicle the ‘succession of inventions’ delivered by 
each individual artist along a linear timeline, sometimes with the addition of contextual 
information for background. Could the meaning of ‘genius’ now return to its original 
Latin sense of ‘spirit,’ thus animating a brand’s industrial business? Or has ‘genius’ 
always been part of the fetish of the field? 
As Schumacher demonstrates in his first pronouncement after Zaha Hadid’s death, in a 
Facebook post entitled ‘Zaha’s Incredible Moves’, he is very resolute in reinforcing 
Hadid’s genius contribution to the field: ‘The bounds of architectural possibilities had 
shifted. Architectural design gained a whole new dimension’. He is even more direct in 
the following passage: ‘Zaha had indeed delivered an unprecedented expansion of the 
discipline's repertoire’; and finally, he writes of the ‘wholly original and empowering 
“discoveries” that Zaha gifted to our discipline’.49  
                                                                                                                                                                          
different symbolic roles. For instance, when Christian Dior died in 1957, some considered closing the 
company (see http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/christian-dior-s-a-history/). 
Nevertheless, since its beginning, the company had been financed and controlled by the industrial 
complex of Marcel Boussac, and since the first year, Pierre Cardin had been the head of the 80 
employees’ creative workshop. Thus, continuing under the artistic direction of Yves Saint-Laurent was a 
natural move for a business born as a corporation. Furthermore, by 1950, the company started a licensing 
program, putting its famous name on dozens of products produced by a wide range of companies 
worldwide. Although this scheme created controversy among colleagues in high-fashion, who wondered 
about the pedigree of the inventions, this would soon become a model for the rest of the industry. Since 
its start, the Dior brand has been behind a wider chain of creative productions and factories. 
48 Now, Rem Koolhaas has openly advised the team of ZHA to follow in the steps of fashion houses; see 
http://www.dezeen.com/2016/05/14/zaha-hadid-architects-should-follow-example-of-mcqueen-says-rem-
koolhaas/  
49 For the ‘Facebook post’ please refer to 
https://www.facebook.com/patrik.schumacher.10/posts/10208103116688623 It is remarkable enough to 
see how a drawing of a student exercise can be used to corroborate the narrative of ‘inventiveness’ and 
‘innovation’ in the field, even though it mimics experiments carried by Van Doesburg, Gerrit Rietveld 
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Thus, the phenomenon of the architectural ‘star’ introduces new elements, allowing the 
emergence of a phantasmagorical era in architecture in which the magic produced by 
these architects does not even require that they be alive.50 Some new questions also 
emerge: would it be possible for a well-trained and highly tuned team to continue not 
only the legacy but also the inventiveness associated with a dead architect? And more 
radically, could we, for instance, resuscitate Le Corbusier? 
This question reveals a conflict in the internal logic of the field; it also reveals the 
intensification of a contradiction in the discourse on how architecture is produced. So 
far, the mainstream history, as documented by the academy and the offices, persists with 
the rhetoric of a great figure: the great (wo)man who had a vision and a set of skills, and 
who, with his/her hand and pen (or computer), changed the world. We now see a veiled 
move, intensifying the idea that an architect is not a normal human acting in flesh and 
bone – a normal human who will one day die. He or she has been replaced by a new 
spirited genius who, rather than producing architecture directly with his/her hands and 
brain (as a living worker), is a type of device that manages complex and abstract 
processes and coordinates the actions of hundreds of other architects and employees. 
This is a step closer to the image of a prince(ss) who is nothing more than a 
representation of collective work. Thus, Zaha Hadid shall live. 
This condition only reveals the gap between the actual means of production of 
architecture and the narratives of the field. While the narrative is that Zaha Hadid’s 
personal cleverness created a whole new field,51 this narrative is nothing more than a 
representation of the work of 400 employees and the (human and financial) capital 
necessary to maintain her office from 1979 until her first built commission in 1993. It is 
important to note that this myth of ingenuity is widespread in today’s culture. Mariana 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and El Lissitzky (cf Frampton, 2000, 157-178) more than half a century before, simply by mentioning the 
inspiration of painter Malevich and eliminating from the formula the previous spatial and architectonic 
experiments. Thus, to build an illusionist narrative, a chain of causalities is reshuffled by means of 
discourses confirmed and reproduced by the main institutions in the field. 
50 Douglas Spencer (2014), using Adorno and Benjamin, explores how architecture has transformed into a 
phantasmagorical practice, in the sense that architects impose specific social relations by means of 
architectural shapes and forms that ‘appear’ as natural, as in a play with animated shadows. What follows 
is an intensification of this phenomenon, in which the architect himself becomes a shadow, an 
appearance, a spirit or a phantom. 
51 Certainly there is a question of belief at play here. Did the Pharaoh really believe he was god? Did Zaha 
Hadid really believe she was a genius? How come both we and they can believe in this kind of social 
mystification? There is a social frame – a mode of visibility – at play, a social fantasy that goes beyond 
personal opinions and frames the possibilities of what we can – and cannot – believe. 
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Mazzucato (2011) has recently attacked these myths of innovation. Most notably, she 
debunked the myth that the iPhone was the product of the ‘vision’ and ‘ingenuity’ of 
Steve Jobs, exposing how, in reality, the major innovations have come from state-
funded research, i.e., they have been collectively produced. Then, such innovations have 
simply been appropriated by companies and produced by thousands of workers 
overseas. In this sense, Mazzucato’s argument reinforces the idea that production is the 
result of a social and collective process – a ‘general social knowledge’ in the words of 
Marx (no date [1857]) – that we shall examine below.  
Thus, we should proceed directly to the argument of this section: the myth of the 
architect as an enlightened prince is a form of abstract machinery for harvesting 
symbolic distinction in the field and for capturing the work of other architects. To 
counter the reproduction of architecture in these terms, a new subjectivity must be 
conceived for architecture. 
In the previous chapter, we aimed to map how architecture frames society, i.e., how 
architecture both disciplines architects and dialectically shapes their social context. 
Now, we aim to specify how the subjectivity of the architect is reproduced so that we 
might trace emergent routes for oppositional architectural practices. To excavate 
potential oppositional subjectivity in architecture, we would like to establish some 
principles to overcome the myth of the genius in architecture. To do so, we must 
critically address our understanding of how architecture evolves – the narrative of 
causal change – and its correlated conception of the ‘subject’ who creates architecture. 
 
3.3. Producing counter-narratives 
Clearly, a complete analysis of the evolution of the epistemology of historical narrative 
is beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, it is essential to underline the internal 
contradictions of different modes of architectural valorisation. In addition and more 
fundamentally, this analysis might underline how a narrative of the evolution of the 
discipline is related to a specific form of imagining the development of architecture and 
the contribution of individual architects to this process. 
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The aim is to bring to the foreground the conflicts and contradictions in the different 
modes of establishing cause and effect in architecture. Thus, the focus is to explore the 
limits of ‘critical accounts’ of architectural history, focusing particularly on revealing its 
blind spots and unquestioned truths. 
This strategy would help to overcome a long-standing dichotomy in historical narratives 
between a ‘chronicle of the princes’ and a ‘history of the masses’ (Rancière, 1994).52 
For Rancière, there is a poetical struggle in the production of history, where those in 
positions of power aim to make history the result of their own actions, thus silencing the 
concrete history experienced by others. 
It is in this sense that Kracauer (1995 [a collection of texts ranging from 1920 to 1933], 
101-106) argues biography to be the ‘Art Form of the New Bourgeoisie’.53 For him, the 
novel of the previous century, in which individual unity was immersed in an overall 
context, was replaced by (and condensed in) the history of highly visible heroes. As the 
‘actual life’ of individuals gives a sense of ‘certainty’ to historical veracity, facts 
become crystallised, making history the ultimate result of individual actions. For 
Kracauer, this is the ultimate form of ‘evasion’ from the masses and the collective 
character of history. 
Manfredo Tafuri (1976), in his History of World Architecture: Modern Architecture, 
made important progress on the project of a critical theory and history of architecture. 
Nevertheless, some evident blind spots in his arguments (such as equating high-profile 
western modernists with the ‘world’) might offer important clues for our purposes.  
                                                          
52 For Baumer (1990), modern history starts with Voltaire, who applied a set of invariable principles to 
explain the variety of historical events, thus treating time as Newton treated space. This allowed him to 
‘add’ chapters on the history of China, India, and the Americas to the universal history of Europe. For 
Lefebvre (1971b), the 19th century was the mother of science, providing explanations for the vertiginous 
transformations of the time. The model provided by Hegel explained the continuous evolution of 
contradictions, with the models of Saint-Simon and Comte being caricatures of an evolutionist social 
physic. For Hobsbawn (1998), Marx adds the historicity of social structures, interactions with the 
economy and concrete experience as engines of the construction of the modern man’s own destiny. For 
Rancière (1994), the evolution towards the ‘Ecole des Annales’ (of Lucien Febvre, Fernand Braudel and 
Jacques Le Goff) pushed towards the everyday and the concrete experience of the masses in the 
understanding of the factual history beyond the narrative of ‘heroes’. For Rancière (1994), the theory of 
history has only recently tried to approach not only what lies on the ‘wave crest’ but also the enormous 
forces moving in the ‘depths of the sea’. For Jameson (2000, p. 445), there has been a crisis in the 
narrative storytelling of history since the end of the nineteenth century, which culminates in a critique of 
representation. He argues in favour of Althusser’s position, that the historian should conceive his work as 
that of producing history, rather than representing it. 
53 In a era of digital media, perhaps this art form is not decaying; rather, it is imploding into the form of 
‘profiles’: abbreviated and simulated representations in the shapes of avatars. 
 
 
116 
 
Although Tafuri ([1974] in Hays, 2000) was well aware of the historiographical 
problem in the traditional history of architecture, he still ascribed an important role to 
the narrative provided by the buildings of high profile architects, and even if he avoided 
the architects’ justifications, he reproduced their distinction in the field. For him, 
architecture was a reflex of the mode of production and was the means by which 
capitalism could realise ideologies. Thus, he would criticise the production of the field 
of architecture without reflexively questioning its representation or distinctions. 
Therefore, the fetish of architecture is located completely within a blind spot: 
But this forces us to abandon almost entirely the paraphernalia of the 
traditional categories of judgment. Since an individual work is no longer 
at stake, but rather an entire cycle of production, critical analysis has to 
operate on the material plane that determines that cycle of production. In 
other words, to shift the focus from what architecture wishes to be, or 
wishes to say, toward what building production represents in the 
economic game means that we must establish parameters of reading 
capable of penetrating to the heart of the role played by architecture 
within the capitalist system. One could object that such an economic 
reading of building production is other than the reading of architecture as 
a system of communication. But we can only reply that it will never be 
repeated too often that, when wishing to discover the secret of a 
magician’s tricks, it is far better to observe him from backstage than to 
continue to stare at him from a seat in the orchestra ([1974] in Hays, 
2000, 165). 
Tafuri’s (1987, pp. 1-24) ‘project’ aimed to fight what he called ‘operative’ history, 
which was the production of historical narratives as a manifesto to the followers of 
modern architecture. For Tafuri, a critic should not take the role of an ideologist. 
Furthermore, Tafuri (2000 [originally published in 1969], pp. 14-15) addresses 
important points in this debate: architecture has become a history of things, further 
demonstrating the commodification of society; and, the myth of individual architects 
who define the social future was a further bourgeoisie heroic myth. Nevertheless, by 
reinforcing the idea of the individual as simply actualising an inevitable ‘destiny’ of the 
city, he avoids addressing the political economy of the means of architectural 
production.  
As a result, the overall effect of his effort reinforces the discourses in the field, up to the 
point that one of his objects of critique (and one of his best friends) can call himself a 
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follower (see Eisenman, 2008).54 For instance in ‘L’Architecture dans le Boudoir', 
Tafuri’s (1987, pp. 267-290) analysis enters into a deep discussion of the semiotic logic 
of the arguments of high-profile architects, leaving aside any concrete aspect of 
architectural production. Thus, he continues to structure the narrative of his history of 
architecture around the chronicle of the mishaps of the ‘masters’ and is thus unable to 
avoid writing history as a series of biographies; as a description of groups, friendships, 
and quarrels; or as a compilation of self-legitimating discourses, even though all of 
these are negated as ideology and associated with social economic contexts using 
complex theoretical gymnastics. 
For Jameson, Tafuri’s negative dialectics was able to deliver a sweeping critique of all 
aspects of culture in contemporary capitalism. Although it delivered a strong and 
condensed account, at the same time, it also delivered a sense of failure, closure and 
impossibility of acting against an all-encompassing structure (Jameson, 2000, p. 446). 
For Jameson, Tafuri’s method departs from a retrospective account of reality, proposing 
the current state of affairs as an inevitable result interconnecting the totality of all 
previous events and causalities. In these terms, even ‘resistances come to be seen as 
mere inversions within the system’ (Jameson, 2000, pp. 447-452). For Jameson (2000, 
p. 454), Tafuri was too quick to presume an immediate symmetry of architectural form 
and social condition, as he himself provided empirical examples in which architectural 
style simply did not make any difference at all. 
Kracauer (1995), in his analysis of the ‘Hotel Lobby,’ adopts a different strategy. 
Instead of developing a rigorous analysis behind the ‘discourse’ of famous architects’ 
buildings – the magician’s trick seen from behind the scenes – he aims to investigate 
how, in the process of aesthetic production, by aiming to produce a totality and 
ultimately failing to do so, the aesthetical act – due to its contextual condition – ends up 
maintaining this totality as the veiled frame of its appearances. In this sense, what the 
                                                          
54 This friendship is frequently recalled by Eisenman, and it is true that academic cordiality and friendship 
might blur the line of ruthless critiques, but there is no basis in the interpretative gymnastics that sees 
praise where critique is delivered: ‘To dismantle and reassemble the geometric metaphors of “the 
compositional rigorists” may prove an endless game, which may even become useless when, as in the 
case of Peter Eisenman, the process of assemblage is all too explicit and presented in a highly didactic 
form. In the face of such products, the task of criticism is to begin from within the work only to break out 
of it as quickly as possible in order not to remain caught in the vicious circle of a language that speaks 
only of itself, in order not to participate guiltily in the “infinite entertainment” that it promises’ (see 
Tafuri, in Hays, 2000, p. 161).  
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object obscures is more important than what it reveals (just as Tafuri’s blind spots 
reveal more about the discipline than do his own negative critiques). In this sense, his 
analysis, for instance, uses the detective novel as a means to show society its ‘own face 
in a purer way,’ making it possible to reveal ‘a whole out of the blindly scattered’ 
(Kracauer, 1995, p. 175). In this sense, there is no logical justification for focusing on 
examples of ‘star’ architects to reveal the contradictions of the field. In Kracauer’s 
words, ‘For no matter how insignificant the existential power that gives rise to the 
artistic formation may be, it always infuses the muddled material with intentions that 
help it become transparent’ (Kracauer, 1995, p. 174). 
This reveals a double dialectic. On the one hand, both ‘high art’ and ‘mass ornament’ 
deliver, as by-products of their aesthetics, precisely what the artist and the culture 
cannot entirely grasp or see. Similarly, for Marcuse (1981), the obscure material of an 
aesthetical work can only be captured by means of the critical thinking that causes 
primordial violence to the object, in the sense of rupturing its common appraisal and 
accepted appearance. It is necessary to remove the object from its regular context of 
appreciation, revealing what was not initially possible to contemplate. On the other 
hand, critique is an aesthetical work, bringing to the visible what is secretly changing in 
the subterranean. 
Thus, aesthetics and visibility are key issues in critical analysis. For Rancière, aesthetics 
is a political act, which has nothing to do ‘with aesthetic utopia, with a certain idea of 
artistic radicality and its capacity to perform an absolute transformation of the 
conditions of collective existence’ (Rancière, 2009, p. 19). Rather, ‘what links the 
practice of art to the question of the common is the constitution, at once material and 
symbolic, of a specific space-time, of a suspension with respect to the ordinary forms of 
sensory experience’ (Rancière, 2009, p. 23). Thus, art is not political because of the way 
it represents society but rather because of the distance it creates from society and the 
type of space it has enabled as a result. A political aesthetic elicits awareness of the 
mechanisms of domination, thus turning a passive ‘spectator into a conscious agent’ 
(Rancière, 2009, p. 45). 
We shall return to the problematic of the ‘agent’, but first we would like to focus on 
how this aesthetic operation acts on the present as formed by concrete objectifications 
of the past. It is in this sense that Walter Benjamin (no date [1940]) famously proposed 
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the task of brushing ‘history against the grain’. For him, our awareness of the present is 
moulded by those who have been victorious; thus, we should make an effort to revive 
the views of those who have been defeated. 
This is an approach to history as a situated assessment of contradictions empirically 
observed, followed by a contextualised excavation of its origins, followed by a 
reframing of the problem.55 In our case, this approach shows how architecture, despite 
all its rhetoric of innovation, creativity and revolutionary conception, concretely 
operates as an instrument of reproducing social relations. For this reason, to conclude 
the first part of this thesis, we will need to deconstruct the idea of ‘agency’ attributed to 
the architect.  
 
3.4. Beyond agency 
It is important to recognise that the research project entitled Spatial Agency: Other ways 
of Doing Architecture (Till et al., 2011) has made important contributions to new 
understandings of the field of architecture and of how architects contribute dialectically 
to the production of space. Most remarkable is how this project presents the different 
practices, discarding any linear or compartmentalised narrative and rupturing with the 
notion of linear evolution in the field. Rather than presenting a series of affiliations and 
schools, the report presents practices in alphabetical order, simultaneously eliminating 
both hierarchy and precedence. Practices are addressed as a network of interconnected 
yet individual contributions. 
This approach is developed, fundamentally, by merging Lefebvre’s (1986) notion that 
space should be understood as a social product, Latour’s (2005) theory that actors 
should be understood within a network, and Giddens’ (1984) idea that ‘agency and 
structure should be understood as a duality, two linked but separately identifiable 
conditions’.  
                                                          
55 This proposal would change the way we approach architectural history. It is not a cartography, nor a 
compilation of manifestos, nor the critique of promoted illusions, nor the revealing of the magical 
convergence of base into aesthetic. It should not be a collection of bourgeois narratives, nor of 
biographies of architects, and not even the revelation of a supposed fall from paradise and our 
condemnation to sin. 
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The ‘Spatial Agency’ book (Till et al., 2011) allegorically starts with a ‘half-joke’ made 
by Latour: ‘There are four things that do not work with the Actor-Network-Theory... the 
word actor, the word network, the word theory and the hyphen’. Latour’s (1999b) 
intention was to stress his proposal as a method of reconstructing how actors build their 
activities rather than to formulate a new social theory (which he sees as ‘grand-
narratives’). Nevertheless, he ultimately concedes that his theory fails to take into 
account the ‘pressure’ of epistemology (what is ‘out there’) and of psychology (what is 
‘in there’) (Latour, 1999b, p. 23). Arguably, to advance beyond the ideas of an ‘actor’, 
of a ‘network’ and of a ‘hyphen’, it would be necessary to overcome the long-lasting 
structuralist model of ‘langue-parole’ (the logical origin of ‘network-actor’, in this 
case).56 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the proto-post-structuralist agency theory of 
Giddens (1984) is, in his words, an attempt to overcome this ‘dualism’ by means of a 
‘duality’ (sic), thus – more or less – delivering the same partial self-criticism as Latour. 
Nevertheless, I would like to argue that Umberto Eco has applied his previously 
mentioned self-criticism (1972) with more rigorous consequences (in his book The 
Absent Structure). There, he presents the origins and developments of structuralism, 
from Saussure until the full mainstream semiotics, and provides a long account of the 
relation of langue-parole, i.e., the language (the structure) and the actual linguistic 
performance of individuals (parole is, for instance, speech, sentences or poetry). Thus, 
language is the overall structure of rules – syntagma, paradigms, phonemes, words and 
so forth – assumed to pre-exist; and parole is the concrete (and sometimes poetic) 
deployment of phrases that could, in its originality (and if powerful enough), reframe 
the entire structure. Despite Eco’s mastery of the semiotic method, his ultimate 
masterpiece is (in its title) the recognition that the structure does not exist; it is ‘absent’. 
In this sense, Eco acknowledges the post-structuralist critiques and postulates the use of 
the idea of ‘structure’ only as a useful device, not as an ontological element of reality. 
                                                          
56 We will argue that what Latour is recognising (without saying so) is the socio-political instance of the 
production of subjectivity, i.e., the collective nature of both the subject who produces and the object that 
is produced. 
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This is rather more radical than solving the problem by identifying an intricate sort of 
inseparable ‘duality’.57 
Pierre Bourdieu (2009, p. 39) tries to overcome this paradox by considering the 
exchange of 'the model of reality for the reality of the model'. Thus, he proposes that 
although the structure is a social representation, it has actual impact. This is a relevant 
point, and therefore, the analysis of the structure of the field matters. Nevertheless, this 
account does not illuminate the way in which this structure is actually internalised in 
individual subjectivities, nor does it allow us to build a form of action that moves 
beyond the necessity of a ‘personal’ actor who provides the creative shift in the 
structure.58 The solution of this paradox will demand the reframing of the problem 
altogether. 
This step could not be a caricature of post-structuralism, which bases itself in a 
complexification of the structure, critiquing and deconstructing it endlessly, aiming to 
provide the utmost model of the continuum of reality.59 Once again, we should 
remember that the aim of this thesis is much more modest. Rather than providing a new 
1:1 cartography of the absolute complexity of reality and its cognition, we aim to 
produce a map that allows us to navigate it, to build shortcuts, to create deviations and, 
hopefully, to allow readers to conceive possible detours around these paradoxes. 
The fundamental problem of the idea of ‘agency’ is the assumption of an ‘autonomous’ 
subject, acting with free will in a neutral structure. Nonetheless, to move beyond the 
                                                          
57 According to Jameson (2000, p. 443), the escape to a phenomenology of the ‘body’, as an ahistorical 
weighing of human ‘nature’ or a dialectic of ‘negativity,’ would ultimately mean that ‘In all the arts, the 
new “textual” strategies stubbornly smuggled back into their new problematic the coordinates of the older 
political question, and of the older unexamined opposition between “authentic” and “inauthentic.” For a 
time, the new mediations produced seemingly new versions of the older (false?) problem, in the form of 
concepts of “subversion,” the breaking of codes, their radical interruption or contestation (along with their 
predictable dialectical opposite, the notion of “cooptation”).’ 
58 ‘By forcing one to discover externality at the heart of internality, banality in the illusion of rarity, the 
common in the pursuit of the unique, sociology does more than denounce all the impostures of egotistic 
narcissism; it offers perhaps, the only means of contributing, if only through awareness of determinations, 
to the construction, otherwise abandoned to the forces of the world, of something like a subject’ 
(Bourdieu, 2009, p. 21). However, ultimately, Bourdieu’s account needs something ‘like a subject’. 
59 A general critique of post-structuralism would note how the method departs from a process of 
complexification of all structuralist categories up to the point of collapse (the mechanism was to contrast 
structuralism with the critique of its limits, unveil the fortuitous character of its categories, remark on the 
subjective nature of its propositions, remark on its ethical implications, and develop variations ad 
infinitum, multiplying the variations into an account, thus contrasting it with increasingly complex 
metaphors and so on) and to the point of uselessness (the map will never be the territory). 
 
 
122 
 
concept of agency does not aim to deny the possibility of action; rather, it aims to 
engage in how social structures frame possible choices, condition alternatives, foment 
drives, and induce behaviours by expectation; and, furthermore, to engage in how 
subjects are (from the start) subjected to a past that goes beyond individuals. 
 
3.5. Subject to change: beneath (re)presentations 
As we saw, emerging at the end of the 19th century, the 'biography’ genre became 
fundamental for the individualistic subject of capitalist society.  Beneath that, the 
architectural imagination is trapped in a deeper conception of history based in the 
chronicles of ‘princes’.60 
Arguably, the notion of a ‘prince’ directing history was first systematised in 
Machiavelli’s (2008) book The Prince [1513]. According to Althusser (2000), 
Machiavelli’s ultimate goal was to create an ‘intellectual dispositive’ to inform political 
practice. He was specifically concerned with ‘fortuna’, the circumstances or conjectures 
that a prince would have to face to ‘command and act’. The prince was a device thought 
to act ‘negatively’ and ‘objectively’ to control the randomness of the future.61 For 
Althusser, this negative objectivity was what Machiavelli conceived as virtù. 
                                                          
60 We will develop further (in Chapter 5 and 6) the implications of this concept for architectural 
subjectivity. For now, it is important to note that conceptions of history are not themselves, however, 
trans-historical. In his history of the development of ideas, Foucault advises (2005: 271) that one must 
recognise the ‘historicity’ of the concept of ‘history’. 
61 According to Althusser (2000, pp. 37-42), the theory of Machiavelli was based on three theses and one 
form of action. The first thesis concerns the immutable order of human affairs, which made the history 
and knowledge of previous experiences fundamental for those who wanted to intervene. Machiavelli 
demonstrated this in a rather concrete manner, approaching the effective experiences of previous forms of 
government and thus using history as a device rather than as a winner’s chronicle to legitimate the status 
quo. The second thesis is the idea that the world is in constant motion and is never in perfect equilibrium. 
This thesis is in antithesis to the first and negates immutability while simultaneously presupposing it. The 
third thesis is the cyclical theory of history, borrowed from the Aristotelian theory of the cyclical return of 
government forms. Nevertheless, Machiavelli’s proposed action is to develop a government that 
combines the three ‘good’ modes of government (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy). Therefore, his 
proposal is that a prince should impose a synthetic form of government that negates the cyclical nature of 
history. Louis Althusser considers the book The Prince (by Machiavelli) to be the first political manifesto 
for concrete action. Although Machiavelli would consider the ancient experience as a form in ‘eternal 
return’, he would always take an approach that was directly interested in the ‘effective truth of things’ 
(Althusser, 2000: 16). 
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Machiavelli (cf. Althusser, 2000) was not inventing the figure of the prince per se. He 
was systematising and transforming, or ‘capturing’, a traditional practice in its purest 
form (as an ideal, a prince as a re-presentation). So, the representational character of the 
prince was intensified and conceived as an image, and specifically as a public image. 
This image, then, could support a figurative narrative of political developments and 
international affairs. The interactions among social conditions (fortuna) are then 
ideologically manipulated by means of the image of a ‘prince’, which aims to capture 
social drives and expectations to build a new (logical) chain of necessity in the form of a 
new linear narrative (virtú). In this sense, the prince is a device, conceived to achieve 
social goals. For instance, in the case of Machiavelli, the goal was the unification of 
Italy, and a new virtuous prince should emerge in order to articulate this social 
transformation (in this sense, his prince was a representation of a complex context, 
different forces and different interests that could mobilise and direct the action of a 
social collective). 
Thus, a prince is an operative public image of a political narrative; he is an image of 
power or truth rather than power or truth itself.62 It is by means of this intellectual 
operation that the ‘prince’ becomes ‘the subject’ of history, and the majority of theories 
and histories of architecture are arguably based on ‘architectural princes’. In this sense, 
although much research, including Tafuri’s approach, has made great advancements in 
contextualising architecture in a social context, scholars have ultimately reinforced the 
abstract device of the ‘prince’ because the critique was centred on representations (be 
they architects or buildings) conducting the evolution of architectural history.63 
In critical theory, attempts to re-imagine the broken subject of history have revisited 
texts such as Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon and The Civil War in 
France. In those texts, Marx uses his historical method: in the former, he demonstrates 
the gradual formation of mechanisms of control in the formation of modes of 
production, and in the later, he aims to demonstrate the Paris Commune as a critical 
moment of increasing contradictions in society. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx (no 
                                                          
62 For instance, Barack Obama is just an image of Power who gained prominence with a narrative of hope 
and peace, even winning a Nobel Peace Prize, although the actual economic power and oil interests he 
represents delivered the worse humanitarian crisis of our time (https://www.amnesty.org.nz/syria-worst-
humanitarian-crisis-our-time). Nevertheless, the image does the trick. 
63 For instance, Tafuri’s (2006) last work was ‘Interpreting the Renaissance: Princes, Cities, Architect,’ 
which deployed many interesting interpretative tools to consider the interactions among those actors. 
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date [1848]) set out his famous concept of history as the eternal struggle between 
classes. Thus, class becomes the central engine of history. This implies that ‘class 
consciousness’ is a key element for historical change, as Lukacs (1971) observed. As in 
Blanqui’s judgement, by recognising himself as a ‘proletarian’ and by making the judge 
include this as a ‘profession’, he was founding a new class and taking part in a new 
political subject.64 
Thus, a theoretical problem would soon emerge: that of organisation (Lukacs, no date 
[1924]). This problem was first developed by Lenin (1961 [originally written in 1902]) 
in the pamphlet What is to be done? His solution was to conceive the Communist Party 
as the ‘vanguard’ of the proletariat, thus entitled to act on the behalf of that class. 
Nevertheless, Freire (1996) would famously assert that those who are oppressed by 
society could not enter the struggle for freedom in the condition of objects and only 
later become fully entitled as human beings, otherwise the struggle would be lost from 
the start. It is in this sense that Freire proposes a pedagogical strategy centred in the 
development of subjects who are critically conscious of their place in society. 
In this discussion, the important point to retain is what Amir Djalali (2014) has 
identified as the ‘common’ of architecture, wherein architectural knowledge is produced 
by the entire field, whose origin is collective in nature. Although this production is 
collective, its products are captured by social apparatuses. This is a point of no return. 
The general intellect that produces architecture is not a princely ‘subject’, and it could 
only be identified as such by means of phantasies (a point to which we will return in 
chapter 6). Architectural knowledge is the product of a general subjectivity that is alive 
in a trans-individual dimension beyond any single architect. 
For Jason Read (2010, p. 123) the political problem arrives because this subjectivity is 
‘reified’ (framed/moulded/distorted) by abstract social machines and structured by a 
‘fetishisation in which the qualities and attributes of social existence are attributed to a 
thing’. Thus, ‘Society itself exists as a fetish’ (Read, 2010, p. 125) and therefore Read 
asserts that, as Marx had put it before, ‘production not only creates an object for the 
                                                          
64 ‘judge: “What is your profession?” Blanqui: “Proletarian.” Judge: “That is not a profession.” Blanqui: 
“What! Not a profession? It is the profession of thirty million Frenchmen who live by their labour and 
who are deprived of political rights.” Judge: “Well, so be it. Let the clerk record that the accused is a 
proletarian”’, in Benjamin (2002), The Arcades Project, p. 735. 
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subject, but a subject for the object’ (p. 120). Our aim is to investigate how the architect 
gets trapped in this process of ‘reification’ and how architecture becomes an instrument 
of fetishism. For Read (2010, p. 114), this idea is 
often seen as tantamount to a denial of political agency altogether, to the 
assertion that everything is an effect of power, that agency and action 
cannot exist. What I would like to propose is that far from being a 
theoretical dead end for politics the production of subjectivity is the 
condition for its renewal (…) It is a matter of articulating this common, 
the unrepresentable transindividual collectivity, against the conditions 
and practices that conceal it (…) not a matter of looking for ‘the subject’ 
(Read, 2010, p. 130). 
However, how can a collective subjectivity possibly be mobilised? For Alain Badiou 
(2012), an ‘event’ is the moment when a new political truth is collectively accepted. 
Thus, an event is the emergence of a truth into being. The event is a process of 
collective subjectivation, in which a group of people accept a new appearance of a given 
social condition and mobilise their will to act. In this sense, an event is similar to a work 
of art because it brings about a new aesthetic of things.65  
Badiou calls this an ‘idea’ that assembles collective participation in a singular political 
process in the form of a historical decision. It is retroactively projected onto the 
symbolic movement of history, giving a name to those who had no say (Badiou, 2012, 
pp. 8-9). An event is the process by which a social necessity appears, rupturing ‘the 
normal order of bodies and languages as it exists for any particular situation’ (Badiou, 
2012, p. 6), becoming the affirmation of something that was, up until then, ‘impossible’. 
However, this conception of an event is not one of a single point in time (an instant), 
nor is it a variation of something like a function or an activity (such as in Tschumi, 
1994). Rather, as Zizek (2014) draws upon Badiou, an event emerges when reality is 
reframed by a sudden moment of truth (as in an insight), or by a subject who recognises 
how his cogito builds his own existence, or when a mistake’s incongruence with reality 
                                                          
65 In this process of event as an art production, Zizek (2014, 136-148) argues there is a reversal of 
contingency into necessity: a master-signifier of the past is changed in order to make the present its 
inevitable result. In this sense, the unity imposed by a work of art re-appropriates the past. This is not 
simply illusory, nor simply imaginary, as it establishes a new social reality by symbolically restructuring 
the entire field (even though there is no new content, everything might seem different) and retroactively 
changes the past chain of causalities that brought us to the present. Thus, the creativity of the work of art 
as event is to make visible a chain of causality in a process of transformation. 
 
 
126 
 
reveals the abyss of everyday madness, or when the imaginary realm of social 
representation is unmasked and recreated. Thus, events transform both subject and 
reality. For Feltham (2006), commenting on Badiou, ‘The “and” of “being and event” is 
thus up to the subject: it's open’ (Feltham, 2006, p. xxxi). 
It is in this sense that, for Badiou, truth is always and only politically real because it is 
the projection of an exception to ordinary programmed life. For him, ‘an idea is always 
the assertion that a new truth is historically possible’ (Badiou, 2012, 12). Notoriously, 
Alain Badiou’s favourite idea is ‘communism’. Thus, this idea must be something 
shared by a collectivity to become reality (Badiou, 2012, p. 11). This is why he names 
‘being’ as an event, which is something coming into socially accepted existence and 
instigating a transformation in the social order. Could architecture be understood as an 
event, or as the process of reframing the possibilities of a given moment? 
 
3.6. Beyond the individual: being becoming 
Our investigation of the processes of estrangement in architecture leads to the most 
perplexing inquiry: How does the reification of architecture result in the reification of 
the architect himself? A similar difficulty has been depicted in the controversial movie 
Exit Through the Gift Shop (2010), by Banksy. On the one hand, the movie depicts an 
aspiring artist who uses a series of artifices to become famous, even without any 
apparent talent or deep understanding of the philosophical implications of that practice. 
On the other hand, what lies below the narrative is the fact that the atelier of Banksy and 
the field structure that makes him a star artist are the same as those used by the 
protagonist. The paradox rests, therefore, not so much in the subject pretending to be 
radical (while using the ‘system of art’ in a fetishistic way) but in the artist who is 
willing to be radical but finds himself trapped in the reproduction of his reified practice.  
Our argument is not simply that the field encloses the artists and makes them subject to 
its heritage. Rather, we would like to deconstruct the understanding of an agent facing a 
field, a subject confronting an object, a soul more or less attached to a body, a 
consciousness distinct from an unconsciousness; in general, a dualism of matter and 
form. To do so, we will draw on Simondon’s (2013) critique of the idea of an 
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‘individual’ formed by matter and form, and we will substitute it for a metastable 
system in which tensions, contradictions and non-actualised potentials function not as a 
substance (inside the individual) but as a process (the individuation); in other words, as 
a live and continuous ‘theatre of individuations’. 
Beyond Deleuze’s assertion that ‘Nothing is harder to define than the individual’ (in 
Toscano, 2006, p. 157), this is also an old problem that has its own development in the 
history of ideas (see Simondon, 2013, pp. 357-520). Here, we do not aim to retell this 
history, only to map the differences that might build an understanding of how the 
disciplinary process in architecture and the reproduction of the subjectivity of the 
architect are one and the same process. 
Giacoia JR (2012) thus synthesises two different aspects of Simondon’s critique of 
ontology. Simondon critiques (1) the Ontological Monism that takes being as 
‘substance’ and unity in itself and (2) the various forms of Hylemorphism in which 
reality can be categorised into types, species and individuals, thus explaining 
differences as subparts. According to Giacoia (2012), Simondon makes a move in the 
same direction as Nietzsche and puts the centre of ontogeny in the ‘becoming’ 
(devenir). In this sense, there is no substance in individuals (such as the negative 
humanism targeted by Lukács, which we discuss in chapter 4); there is only an 
unfolding of relations, events and continuous processes of becoming. 
Toscano (2006, p. 142) also synthesises Simondon’s critique in a similar way. 
According to Toscano, Simondon first attacks the conception that information can be 
the copy of an ideal reality (such as in Plato) and the conception that individual being is 
an independent and substrate matter that takes a form (as in the hylemorphist tradition 
of Aristotle), proposing instead an operational fundament of reality. For Toscano 
(2007), Simondon thus avoids the risk of substantialising antagonisms and even of 
preconceiving antagonism because the way an operation might transform a system is 
neither transitive nor latent in it but is open to invention and hazard. In this sense, for 
Toscano (2006, pp. 43-44), the concept of information in Simondon means a mise en 
form (in formation, i.e., to set in form), which avoids the problems of the absent 
structure in structuralism and of the arbitrary games in hermeneutics. Simondon is 
aware of the availability of many potentialities and is focused on the genesis of the 
conditions of the operation that produces specific individuations (becoming being). In 
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other words, being is the operation that resolves a series of processes, conflicts, tensions 
and possibilities into a sustained structure (i.e., a structuration). 
Conceiving the production of subjectivity in this way is very different from the average 
view of the unconscious substance of the individual. For instance, the Freudian 
approach to the unconscious is the search for a deep root of the essence of the subject. 
To illuminate the deadlock of this type of search for the essence of the subject, we will 
use Jean Baudrillard’s (1994) 3 metaphors of knowledge. For Baudrillard, classical 
epistemology understood knowledge as a mirror in which ideas would be the perfect 
image of the real itself. The second epistemological stage was that of the ‘Mask’, in 
which thinkers would recognise that knowledge itself creates a deformed image of the 
real, such that the thinker should engage in trying to see the ‘real’ behind the mask. For 
Baudrillard, this is the spirit of Sigmund Freud, who wants to understand the human 
drives behind the surface of the conscious, thus developing an understanding of the 
unconscious as the real cause of drives. Baudrillard’s last metaphor is the simulacra: 
where the unveiling of a mask would only lead to the realisation that we are trapped in a 
new mask, which, when unveiled, would lead to a continuous spiral where concepts 
would never reach the depth of their references. For Baudrillard, this is the birth of a 
hyper-real in which all reality is nothing more than simulation. In this sense, Baudrillard 
himself is trapped in the hylemorphic paradigm that Simondon critiques, as this 
paradigm is trapped in an increasingly paranoid search for the primordial substance of 
being. 
Simondon displaces this problem by not considering the individual and instead by 
putting the process of individuation at the centre. The individual is not an immutable 
being in which one should search for a substantial truth behind the masks of appearance 
(behind the conscious the unconscious, behind desire the drive, behind the principle of 
reality the fantasy, behind the fantasy the primordial phantasy and so on). If one 
understands the individual as a metastable system in which a certain order is actualised 
by an operation, the reality of being reveals its full dynamic condition. If we take our 
case of interest, the architect and the discipline of architecture, although there is no 
substance in the architect, each architect’s subjectivity is a dynamic structuration of a 
complex series of conceptions, ideas, desires and forces, with some parts actualised, 
some parts only as potential, some elements in priority positions, and some in secondary 
positions. Each subjectivity is a complex, dynamic structure of realised, virtual and 
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potential possibilities. In this sense, even though each architect manifests an individual 
‘system’ of subjectivity, this system is composed of past subjectivities and potential 
subjectivities before they are realised (or not), which Simondon calls preindividual 
(what comes before the operation of individuation). 
In this sense, it is not our intention to understand the development of the idea of the 
unconscious. We are not searching for the ‘dark substance’ of the architect’s mind. 
Similarly to how Vygotsky (no date [1930]) puts it in his discussion of the unconscious, 
‘the subconscious is not so much a psychological problem but the problem of 
psychology’.66 While investigating the reproduction of the architect’s subjectivity, we 
are not so much concerned whether reproduction is an architectural problem; rather, our 
problem is the reason why architects reproduce the status quo even when they sincerely 
desire to transform it. This architectural subjectivity is not a problem per se but rather 
the problem of the person who wants to avoid its reproduction. Or as Combes (2013, p. 
50) asserts, Simondon’s thought displaces the Kantian question ‘What is man?’ with the 
question ‘How much potential does a human [in our case an architect] have to go 
beyond itself?’ 
What we aim to do next is to eliminate the discussion of substance (building a negative 
humanism) and to put action, energy and power (in one word, process) in its place. In 
this sense, to overcome the hylemorphism of architectural theory, we shall add energy, 
action, process, operation and labour to the event of individuation. 
The following discussion aims to unveil how the traditional hylemorphic conception 
presupposes a substantial individual, on which, for instance, the whole edifice of Freud 
is based. Therefore, we will develop Simondon’s conception of individuation, which is 
fundamental to understanding the production of subjectivities as a process/event.  
 
                                                          
66 Vygostky (no date [1930]) aims to build a dialectical approach to psychology to overcome the main 
currents of psychology: ‘Such are the three paths: the refusal to study the mind (reflexology), the “study” 
of the mind through the mental (descriptive psychology), and the knowledge of mind through the 
unconscious (Freud).’ For him, Freud remains in the realm of a mechanic materialism: ‘inasmuch as he 
introduces the idea of the strictest determinism of all mental manifestations and reduces their basis to an 
organic, biological drive, namely the reproductive instinct, Freud remains on materialistic grounds… a 
hopeless blind alley.’ 
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A Copernican revolution on the principle of fundamental narcissism 
The final paragraph of Freud’s (1957 [originally published in 1914], p. 101) analysis of 
the fundamental ‘narcissism’ of the unconscious starts with a remarkable conclusion: 
group psychology could be understood on the basis of individual narcissism as long as 
the collective is understood as a manifestation of homosexual libido, or ultimately, self-
love. Arguably, Simondon’s scheme provides a theoretical framework with which to 
overcome the duality between individual and collective, thus supporting a ‘Copernican’ 
revolution in this conception of individual and collective. 
 
 
Diagram 23: Orbit of planets before and after the Copernican revolution. Source: the 
author. 
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For our purposes, it does not suffice to critique the theory of Freud in the manner of 
Marcuse, who reveals Freud’s prognosis to be constrained by the prejudices of his 
time.67 Our first step in critiquing a production of the architect from the perspective of 
the discipline demands to break with Freud’s diagnosis of subjectivity as an ‘energy’ 
centred in the ‘individual.’ Once Freud’s entire theoretical framework is developed on 
this basis, the resulting picture is of planets and stars orbiting around the earth. As we 
discussed earlier in this chapter, it is a specific conception of history that centres in the 
individual the forces of social production. From this point of view, all other elements 
seem to revolve in complex ways around the figure of ‘geniuses’. Repositioning the 
centre of the forces of social gravity does not proceed without consequences. To 
understand this issue, it is worth taking a brief look at the picture of self-centrism. 
Very schematically, for Freud, the unconscious is the root of what moves a man; it is 
behind the ‘mask’ of consciousness, and it is based on a primitive narcissistic instinct of 
autoerotism and self-preservation.68 For Freud, this ego-libido only moves towards the 
other when this other serves his self-interest.69 In this sense, although he conceives of 
‘ego-libido’ as the antithesis of ‘object-libido’, the later only becomes an ‘object-
cathexis’ as long as it mobilises an ‘auto-erotic instinct’ (Freud, 1957, pp. 76-77). In this 
sense, although the conception of an ‘ego’ is not available to the mind of the child from 
the start, his ‘instinct’ is there. Therefore, all further development would be only a 
projection of the self. In this sense, he introduces a ‘differentiation in psychical 
energies’ only to explain a ‘later confusion’ (from the consciousness of the individual) 
of what is ‘essentially’ (unconsciously) self-love. 
                                                          
67 ‘The psychiatrist takes care of the Don Juans, Romeos, Hamlets, Fausts, as he takes care of Oedipus-he 
cures them’ (Marcuse, 1967, p. 74). 
68 ‘Narcissism in this sense would not be a perversion, but the libidinal complement to the egoism of the 
instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature.’ 
(Freud, 1957, pp. 73-74) 
69 Even if not properly self-love (narcissistic), one would still love the other because the other represents 
one who ‘feeds’ or ‘protects’ him:  ‘What I have so far said by way of indication may be concluded by a 
short summary of the paths leading to the choice of an object. A person may love: (1) According to the 
narcissistic type: (a) what he himself is (i.e. himself), (b) what he himself was, (c) what he himself would 
like to be, (d) someone who was once part of himself. (2) According to the anaclitic (attachment) type: (a) 
the woman who feeds him, (b) the man who protects him, and the succession of substitutes who take their 
place.’ (Freud, 1957, p. 90) 
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Paradoxically, Freud concludes his argument on Narcissism with the possibility of using 
psychoanalysis to explain ‘group psychology’.70 What is axiomatic here is the 
convergence of all ‘forces’ towards the centre of an individual principle, as one ‘mask’ 
is unveiled after the other, in a continuous motion of thought that seeks to find the 
central substance behind the appearances. Through this process, truth itself emerges as a 
narcissistic gaze that finds, behind the images of reality, its own narcissistic primordial 
instinct. 
For this reason, arguably, Freud’s account of Narcissism is founded in a narcissistic 
principle. According to some versions of the myth of Narcissus, when he looked into the 
pool of water, he saw in that ‘otherness’ (the water) nothing but the beauty of himself. 
Fascinated by his own image (re-presentation) apparent in that external object, he 
jumped into the pond, trying to re-encounter the beauty of himself, and died without 
noticing the ‘other’ engulfing him. For Freud, the external world is only such a mirror 
of the individual. 
Although Lacan (1949) made important contributions to the Freudian paradigm of the 
mirror foundation of the ego by means of including in his argument a semiotic theory of 
a ‘doubled mirror’, the centre of his model continues in the individual. That is, behind 
the image (mask) of a mirror, there is another mirror. Vanheule (2011) analyses the 
evolution of the mirror model in Lacan  –  passing from one mirror to two, and later 
abandoning these models completely in favour of the concept of Fantasy, and later, in 
favour of a fundamental phantasy  –  to explain the formation of desire as a 
manifestation of an even deeper drive: 
as his inquiries shift toward understanding what fuels desire rather than 
describing how desire is articulated in signifiers, Lacan left this scheme 
behind [the doubled mirror]. Arguing that a crucial aspect of drive-
related functioning cannot be understood in terms of signifiers, but 
should be studied in terms of a dialectical tension between drive and 
signifier… [thus] Lacan shifts to topological models, like the interior 
eight and the Möbius strip (Vanheule, 2011, p. 8). 
                                                          
70 ‘The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the understanding of group psychology. In addition to 
its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class or a nation. 
It binds not only a person's narcissistic libido but also a considerable amount of his homosexual libido 
which is in this way turned back into the ego. The want of satisfaction which arises from the non-
fulfilment of this ideal liberates homosexual libido, and this is transformed into a sense of guilt (social 
anxiety).’ Freud (1957 [1914], pp. 101-102) 
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All of these theoretical instruments are not useless as thought experiments, and they do 
provide considerable mental exercises (as, for instance, the double mirror provides 
grounds on which to imagine a virtualisation of self-representation or a virtual 
projection of the self as an outside object, in its turn product of the gaze of the 
individual). Nevertheless, the fundamental centre of gravity remains axiomatically in 
the individual.71 Therefore, it is worth noting that Althusser (2000) conceives the 
narcissistic view of the world itself as a ‘doubled mirror’ but in a very different sense 
than Lacan’s virtualisation of self-representation. Rather, in Althusser, the doubled 
mirror is a device that, instead of reflecting, projects a specific subjectivity as if it was 
reality. 
Following his text on Narcissism, Freud went on to write Group Psychology and Society 
and its Discontents. Jodi Dean (2016) offers a solid analysis of how Freud’s ‘sociology’ 
reduces the collective (specifically the crowd) to a collection of individuals. As Dean 
asserts, all this deviation is important to understand how 
Not only is agency privileged over structure but the presumption that 
agents are individuals formats the alternative of autonomy or subjugation 
as an opposition between individual and collective. Collectivity comes to 
be associated with constraint, with preventing rather than enabling 
creativity and initiative. Liberal political theorists explicitly construe 
political agency as an individual capacity; others take the individuality of 
the subject of politics for granted. I argue that the problem of the subject 
is a problem of this persistent individual form, a form that encloses 
collective political subjectivity into the singular figure of the individual 
(Dean, 2014, p. 364).  
Dean (2014, pp. 368-369) asserts that this representation is itself a fantasy that places 
what one can only do among ‘others’ into an imaginary ego, thus making twin concepts 
of agency and the individual. Dean notes here how Freud’s theory produces an 
‘enclosure of the individual’ (Dean, 2014, p. 371). Dean’s (2014, p. 372) analysis of 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego explains how this enclosing is 
accomplished. She argues that Freud developed his analysis based on Le Bon’s The 
                                                          
71 In this sense, the Lacanian search continues, seeking to reveal, one after the other, the hidden 
substances behind the ‘mask’ of appearances. For Zizek (1997, pp. 130), ‘[t]he Lacanian answer is that 
spectrality is not the ultimate horizon of our experience: there is a dimension beyond (or, rather, beneath) 
it, the dimension of drive attained when one “traverses the fundamental fantasy”’. Behind experience, 
there is spectrality; behind spectrality, the fundamental fantasy; behind fundamental fantasy, the drive. 
Lacan’s theoretical evolution is a continuous self-negation providing neurotic and layered answers for a 
substance behind a former appearance, which, in turn, becomes a new appearance. 
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Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind and that Le Bon himself was ‘a pessimistic 
conservative who presented his racist, elitist, and misogynist ideas as scientific 
discoveries’ and instructed the reader to fear the primitive communism of the crowd. 
(Dean, 2014, pp. 374, 375) Nevertheless, for Le Bon, the crowd was a ‘process’ and had 
an unconscious of its own in the form of a racially hereditary substratum (p. 376). 
However, for Freud, the crowd could not have an unconscious (p. 378), although the 
unconscious would be a crowd in two senses: ‘The first is an analytic or structural sense 
of a repressed product of history, whether of family or species, as it impresses itself 
within the individual’, and the second sense is only metaphorical, in which the 
unconscious behaves in movements analogous to the flow of the crowds (p. 377). 
According to Dean (2014, p. 378), for Freud, a crowd does not create anything new, it 
only creates ‘what is already contained in the human mind’ in the dimension of the 
‘unconscious repressed’. With this assertion, Freud aimed to establish ‘the reputation of 
psychoanalysis by demonstrating its explanatory power’ (p. 381). Therefore, for Freud, 
the crowd feels powerful because our deepest selves lack responsibility and the crowd 
enables the suspension of repressions (p. 378); the crowd has no desire, and what is seen 
is only the amplification of frustrated individual desires (p. 381). The crowd behaves 
collectively through the manifestation of the ‘scientific myth’ of the primal horde (a 
supposed patriarchal entity of prehistoric socialisation) (p. 381). The fierce violence of 
the crowd can be explained by the same phenomena that mobilise hysterical teenagers 
around a musician (p. 383); and the demand for justice derives from an original envy (p. 
387). Furthermore, the crowd cannot ‘suggest’ any behaviour, so that looking ‘behind 
the shelter, the screen, of suggestion’, Freud finds love (p. 382) in the form of a 
homosexual desire for the ‘leader’ (i.e., self-love); and, ‘Just as Freud transposes the 
activity of the crowd on the leader, so too does he transfer the crowd’s creativity to the 
poet’ (p. 385). And in this way, Freud ‘enclosed in the bourgeois sites of boarding 
school and concert hall, the ferocity of collective power’ (p. 383). 
Although Freud did not ‘discover’ the unconscious, nor did he ‘invent’ it (as would go 
the vulgar narrative), he was a central figure in disseminating the concept in western 
culture. Here, one should not throw the baby out with the bathwater, and if Freud, 
despite himself, is not the discoverer of a universal truth of the human species, he has 
the precise value of describing the ideal logic (ideology) of bourgeois society: his ideas 
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reveal the limits and constraints of conceiving society, agency, substance and political 
action by means of individual agency (as applying Krakauer’s method would suggest). 
Two further points are worth noting in Jodi Dean’s account of the enclosure of the 
subject. She inverts Althusser’s famous formula by saying that it is not the case that 
ideology interpellates the individual as subject, rather, capitalism interpellates subjects 
as individuals. In addition, in the beginning of the paper, she promises, but does not 
develop to its radical consequences, the idea of transindividuality, thus ultimately 
remaining in the realm of Zizek’s folded interpretation of Lacan’s multi-folded 
hermeneutics.72 
For Simondon (2013, p. 170), Freud does not distinguish tendencies (social) from 
instincts (actualised individuations). Thus, he conceives the individual in a univocal 
way as if an absolute unity could be founded in his being. For Simondon, because it can 
be subject to change, any being must be in a metastable condition and thus has non-
actualised potentialities. If there are non-actualised potentialities, any individual must 
have internal tensions and dualities, if not multiplicities. For him, Freud adheres to the 
doctrine of ‘vitalism’ and can only conceive of conscience as long as it is included 
inside a perspective of a species as a manifestation of a biological monism. In this 
sense, the ‘good form’ for Freud would be one of stability and centrality of being, but 
for Simondon (2013, p. 204), this type of ultimate stability is only encountered by living 
individuals upon their deaths. 
For Simondon (2013, p. 300) the difficulty of the whole doctrine of Freud resides in the 
identification of the subject with the individual. To understand this assertion, we need to 
understand how Simondon builds his approach not on the basis of the individual but on 
the basis of individuation. The error resides in giving to the atom already-individualised 
a status of principle, i.e., in presupposing the individual as if it were the essential reality 
to be explained. Simondon’s (2013, pp. 24-25) effort is to conceptualise being as (the 
continuous conservation) of becoming, to acknowledge the individual by means of its 
actual process of becoming – its concrete operation of individuation – and not the 
                                                          
72 ‘My goal is to demonstrate the sense in which this interiority is transindividual, a crowd at the heart of 
the person’ (Dean, 2014, p. 370). To reify the crowd inside the ‘heart’ of the individual does nothing to 
break the hylemorphism in Dean’s proposal. As we will see, Simondon’s alternative is much more 
radical, as the individual is only a metastable phase of a presubjective being that preserves itself only 
through the movement of becoming (devenir). 
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opposite way. In this sense, being is not seen as substance, nor matter, nor form but as a 
system in a precarious state of (not fully) resolved tensions and in a continuous process 
of transformation. This conception will help to formulate – in terms of the production of 
subjectivities – what Lukács outlined (see chapter 4 of this thesis) as a negative 
humanism and the idea of things as social relations. That theoretical framework is what 
we shall (in the next sections) firstly outline, later politicise and, finally, apply to 
architecture. 
 
 The production of individuation: preindividual and transindividual 
There are two views according to which the reality of being as individual 
can be approached: a substantialist view, considering being as consisting 
in its unity, giving to itself, founded upon itself, not generated, resistant 
to what is not itself; and a hylemorphistic view, considering the 
individual as generated by the encounter of form and matter. But in those 
two views there is something in common (...) Departing from the created 
individual, the effort is to reach back to the conditions of its existence 
(...) it is the individual as long as constituted individual the reality of 
interest, the reality to be explained (...) Such a perspective of research 
gives ontological privilege to the constituted individual. Thus, it risks not 
approaching a truthful ontogenesis, of not positioning the individual 
inside the system of reality in which the individuation is produced 
(Simondon, 2013, p. 23, our translation). 
It is in this way that Simondon begins his PhD thesis, approaching the history of the 
concept of the individual – displayed in full in 166 pages of its Appendices – in two 
groups. These two views together represent a model that presupposes an opposition 
between being and becoming, even if becoming might be conceived as an ability of 
being to produce different phases of its own reference (Simondon, 2013, p. 25). 
Alternatively, if one considers becoming as a dimension of being, then relations are 
being, and it is possible to think of the individual as ‘taking part in’ a relation between 
its interior and its exterior, without naming any new obscure substance (as in ‘behind 
the mask of appearance’).73 
                                                          
73 In the case of becoming as a dimension of the living being, the individual reveals a continuous ‘theatre 
of individuations’ (Simondon, 2013, p. 29). The living individual is the one who continuously re-enacts 
the operation of its becoming (its individuation). 
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For Simondon (2013, p. 49), to overcome substantialism, thought must depart from the 
process of the genesis of the individual, from the action of individuation (i.e., becoming 
being, without the ‘and’ in the middle). In doing so, one must complete the 
hylemorphism of matter and form with a third term: energy. Only by adding energy to 
this formula is it possible to think of being as a dynamic system, as a process of 
relations and interactions (i.e., being becoming), and even as the product of an intention, 
of a work, of an act of production.  
Simondon elegantly illustrates this three-term ‘ontogenesis’ with a long consideration of 
the ‘taking form’ of a brick (Simondon, 2013, pp. 39-58). The ‘clay’ as matter is not 
simply passive raw material; it has multiple possible transformations; it has aptitudes 
and tendencies. However, the clay is already a processed material, for which the grains 
were selected and to which the right amount of humidity was added. Additionally, it 
was collected and transported. Its properties and identification were only made possible 
by means of a long process of knowledge. As for the ‘mould’, it is not simply an 
abstract shape, conceived in advance by an intellectual process; it has a procedural role 
in imposing a limit on the transformation of the clay. This is an active action; more 
precisely, it is a reactive action of an equal and opposite force in relation to the one 
exercised by the clay on it. 
The process of individuation of the brick is, so far, already composed of a dynamic 
system of interaction, with potentialities and forces interacting to produce a final state of 
stability. Nevertheless, one should add to this scenario the actual work of the artisan, 
which separates, discharges and presses the clay, while also using complex and subtle 
artifices to open and close the mould and give it perfect geometrical limits. 
Nevertheless, Simondon notes that the individuation of physical and technical objects 
occurs (usually) only once. Thus, such individuation is relatively stable and cannot 
transform itself. It can only degrade. For Simondon, classical philosophy knew only this 
type of stability, but the thermodynamic concept of ‘metastability’ offers new 
possibilities for understanding living individuations. We shall approach these different 
‘phases’ of individuation later; for now, we should note some differences this scheme 
introduces to the understanding of individuals. 
For Simondon, seeing reality as becoming transforms the ‘finite’ being of 
substantialism into a being that is instead ‘limited’ (Simondon, 2013, p. 93). Being, as 
 
 
138 
 
such, can be conceived in dynamic terms, as an undefined being bearing potential 
energy bigger than its factual actualisation. Thus, the idea of the ‘limited’ being is able 
to acknowledge how being can relate to outside matter and how it can incorporate, 
reorder and transform. For Simondon, only in this way can transformation (creation and 
invention) be consistently conceived. Finite and eternal beings are not subjected to the 
possibility of change for the simple fact that what is said to be ‘fundamental’ is assumed 
to be ‘being as such’ (the pure ultimate and supreme undifferentiated reality, which is 
therefore inaccessible and immutable). Rather, Simondon argues, the limited limit of a 
being is not fixed. This limit is a process of structuration, a process of giving structure 
to a relational space between an inside and an outside (Simondon, 2013, p. 95). 
Combes (2013, pp. 14-15) explains the change produced by this scheme – named 
Allagmatic, meaning a theory of operations – by introducing a theoretical analogy. She 
argues that Marx traced the constitution of capitalism by the substitution of the formula 
C-M-C for the formula M-C-M. Here, C stands for commodity and M for money. 
Initially, in the former mode of exchange, a commodity was traded using money, which 
could later be exchanged for another commodity. Once money becomes the beginning 
and the end of the process, with the commodity only being its means, Capital is born 
and starts to reproduce itself. Similarly, she argues that Simondon changes the original 
notion of S-O-S (where S stands for structure and O for operation) to the notion of O-S-
O.74 In this sense, ‘operation’ becomes the beginning and the end, and the structuration 
is only an instant when form and matter coincide. 
Furthermore, for Toscano (2006, 153), the fundamental concept of Simondon’s method 
is ‘transduction’. This concept opposes traditional reduction, deduction and induction 
(see diagram 24 below). Transduction is conceived as the process of resolving internal 
contradictions and energy conflicts inside an individual.75 In this sense, information is 
not a form of communication between two separate beings; rather, it is the production of 
                                                          
74 This conception of being as becoming can be seen in the architectonic workshop of Wood Street, 
presented in Appendix 3. The architectural device produced did not create a permanent structure, rather, it 
only created an operation that mobilized and mediated implicit potentialities, allowing the emergence of 
subsequent operations.  
75 Toscano (2006, 149, 150) introduces a series of what Simondon’s theory is not: it is not qua agent (but 
theatre); it is not stability (but local resolution of disparations); it is not agency (but site of becoming); it 
is not a subject of decision (but resolution/invention) [although, we should note, Simondon (2006, 300) 
differentiates Subject of Individual by means of the idea of choice]; not autopoietic sovereignty (there is 
internal disparition); not a centre (but a constructivist ontology of relation). Also Lefebvre (1967, 2001) 
uses the concept of transduction with fewer details, and as a method for the production of possibilities. 
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a ‘mediation’, of an element that potentially connects two internal dimensions, thus 
bringing into being what was not realised in the individual (previously existing only as 
the preindividual). 
 
Diagram 24: Deduction, Induction, Reduction, Transduction. Source: the author (based 
on – but not equal to – Simondon, 2013, and Toscano, 2006). 
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It is in this sense that Simondon (2013, p. 170) asserts that an individual is not a virtual 
(in the Aristotelian sense) that actualises itself (always in the same way); rather, it is a 
transduction that performs a real transformation of the possibilities of the system.76  
Arguably, Toscano’s (2006) approach to Simondon could not be satisfied with the 
formula O-S-O, as the links between the terms are not causal. It is not a primacy of 
operation (O>>S) or of structure (O<<S); it is not a resolute correspondence (O=S); 
rather, it poses a fundamental void between these terms (O<   >S), in which invention is 
the production of one among many possible mediations between contradictory internal 
and external elements, as a connection between two scales or potentialities unresolved 
inside a metastable field. Different from classical stability, metastability is a concept 
that comes from thermodynamics, where an excess of energy creates a precarious state 
of stability, which can be ruptured with a disturbing object (as in the case of water over 
a hundred degrees that suddenly evaporates due to contact with an external object).  
With this torsion of ontology, individuality cannot be understood only in its manifested 
form; rather, it must be understood as a manifestation of something that existed before 
as potentiality: the result of a preindividual, which is actualised transindividually. As we 
advanced in chapter 2, preindividuality is the dimension of being that comes before an 
individual is individuated. In this sense, each individual is a structured process of 
limiting (see diagram 25 below). It bears inside itself contradictions and possible 
individuations (expressed as S3 in the scheme). By means of an operation (O1), a 
mediation (M) and an interaction (I) are made possible between different orders of 
magnitude (also referred to as preindividual scales), where this process is called 
transduction (t). Thus, structure is only an instant, a means between the first operation 
and the following being becoming (O2). 
Furthermore, Simondon distinguishes among three ‘phases’ of being: the physical (as 
we saw in the case of the brick, entailing the formation of a stable limit); the biological 
(as in living beings, which are in a continuous process of individuation that is therefore 
                                                          
76 To emphasise this difference, Combes (2013) introduces a distinction between virtuality and 
potentiality. For Simondon (2013, 68,69), when thinking about individuation one must apply the notion of 
relation, introducing the possibility of a system with potential energy (capacity for transforming energy 
into form, matter or work). Combes (2013) also follows Simondon when introducing a distinction 
between individuation and individualisation (which allows the conception of a dual and non-fully realized 
status of the individual). 
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called a ‘theatre of individuation’, where the internal is a kingdom inside a kingdom, 
circumscribing in the internal a part of the external); and finally the Psychic/collective 
individuation. This last phase of being explains the relation of individuals and society as 
a sort of double (perhaps multiple) individuation, whereas individuals individuate 
themselves as singular and collective individuals at the same time. This double 
individuation is what Simondon (2013, pp. 260-266) calls individualisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 25: Ontogenesis of individuations. Source: the author (based on – but not equal 
to – Simondon, 2013,). 
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The possibility of a collective individuation is possible because the individual is just a 
provisional actualisation of a shared field of pre-individualities, thus formed of internal 
‘disparations’. An event is necessary to produce a mediation, or modulation, able to 
interconnect un-actualised fields of possibilities. This collective dimension of 
individuality is what Simondon calls the transindividual, expressed in the diagram 
above by the letter (T).77 
It is here that Simondon’s distinction between the subject and the individual emerges 
(Simondon, 2013, pp. 298-303). For Simondon, the subject is the articulation of the 
three dimensions of individuality: preindividual, individuated and transindividual. His 
central point on the subject is that it emerges by means of a ‘choice’. This choice creates 
an actualisation of a part of the internal preindividual that had not been individuated 
previously. However, it can only emerge by means of a collective. This choice is thus a 
process of structuration inside the subject but directed towards other subjects. For 
Simondon, this implies that the subject is more than the individual. 
Although Simondon builds a new ontology of genesis (including concepts of process, 
operation, energy, work, non-determinacy and so on), which actually creates a new 
basis for a new social thinking, he does not clarify how ideology, society, hierarchy, 
social struggles and conflicts (i.e., politics) interfere in the production of 
preindividualities and transindividualities (be they disciplined or radical). 
Toscano (2007) even suggests that one could see an ‘anti-political tendency’ in 
Simondon’s writings, if one takes, for politics, terms such as ‘sovereign’ and 
‘democratic representation’. Nevertheless, Toscano asserts that it provides fertile 
ground to think about ‘pre-revolutionary’ conditions and the emergence of resolutions 
of internal conflicts. In this sense, one would need to think of politics as a process of 
philosophical ‘torsions’ of metastable individualisations that occur through the 
production of events. As in the crystallisation of water in metastable conditions, an 
event is ignited by means of the insertion (invention) of a ‘structuring germ’, able to 
mediate and create new transubjective individuations.  
                                                          
77 In this sense, Toscano (2006, 153) explains that the preindividual is not an a priori, just as 
transubjectivity is not an a posteriori. Rather, this allagmatic expresses a systemic a praesenti: an 
informative and interactive process, at the same time bigger and smaller than the individual. 
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Although the concept of transubjectivity enables the understanding of the emergence of 
transformation, the theory of Simondon does not advance in the political behind these 
transformations: the struggle for the emergence of new subjectivities; and the conflict 
between different ‘pre’ and ‘trans’ individualities. Therefore, beyond acknowledging 
the production of individualisation, we will need to discuss the (re)production of 
presubjectivities and transubjectivities themselves. For that, we will return to the 
dialectical psychology of Vygotsky (no date [1930]) so as to inform this discussion 
politically. 
 
The production of transubjectivities  
Despite the great contributions of Simondon’s framework, which help to visualise the 
continuous process of the production of the individual, his framework does not advance 
far enough in terms of the production of preindividualities and in the reification of 
possible transindividualities. To advance further, we will have to approach how the 
‘subjective senses’ are produced. In this way, we can politicise the debate over 
transubjectivity. 
González Rey (2007) rescues the concept of ‘subjective sense’ and that of ‘units of 
subjectivities’ as key concepts in the late work of Lev Vygotsky. These concepts are 
concerned with the production of the social dynamic configurations of the collective 
psyche. Against the understanding of the human mind as a blend of standardised traits, 
Vygotisky was concerned with the dialectical production of consciousness. For that, he 
expands the Freudian concept of transference to better comprehend external influences 
on personal behaviour.  
Nevertheless, González Rey (2007) asserts that Freudian psychoanalysis took the 
direction of proposing a universal subject, formed of essential libido energy. Thus, by 
proposing an abyssal division between psyche and culture, modern psychology ended 
up reifying a specific cultural condition into its theory. The use of the term subjectivity 
by Soviet Psychology aimed to break down this abysm. Subjectivity does not aim to 
encompass all the phenomena of causalities or a description of substances; rather, it 
aims to create an ‘intelligibility of this reality’. For this reason, Vygotsky does not 
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eliminate the use of the term ‘unconsciousness’ but cleanses it of the ‘internal universal 
drive’. 
In this sense, González Rey (2007) asserts that Vygotsky’s concept of ‘subjective sense’ 
aims to address the configuration of subjectivity resulting from lived experiences, 
historical background and contexts of life, including the relationship among activities, 
memories and fantasies in a network of what is symbolic and emotional. In this sense, 
‘The psyche becomes a symbolic production within cultural scenarios, yet it is not 
reduced to a symbolic phenomenon’ (González Rey, 2007, p. 6). In this way, the sense 
of a word can only be understood in the context of a phrase, a phrase in a book, a book 
in the work of an author, an author in the context of a nation, a nation in the context of 
the world. Thus, subjective senses are integrations between cognitive and affective 
processes, forming a ‘dynamic system of senses’. 
The social becomes subjective not because of internalization, but by 
sense production related to living experience... The subjective sense is 
not confined to being intrapsychical. It always exists in the continuous 
tension between already organized subjective configurations, which are 
always under pressure from social subjectivity, and the subject’s action 
(González Rey, 2007, p. 9). 
Subjective senses are the units of a dynamic system of subjectivities, and they are 
defined by how different social spaces are interrelated. These senses create internal 
contradictions, and an important source is the ‘Social representations and discourses 
from which the social evaluation of people is produced’ (González Rey, 2007, p. 11). 
A parallel to this idea of ‘subjective senses’ can be found in Feyerabend’s (1989) 
concept of ‘natural interpretation’. Feyerabend argues that what Kant takes as a priori 
concepts of the mind are actually produced concepts that frame how we observe a 
specific phenomenon. In this sense, the reality of a phenomenon would depend on 
which ‘ideas’ we mobilise to observe a phenomenon. It is in this sense that he analyses 
the famous ‘Tower Controversy’ used against the Copernican hypothesis to ‘prove’ that 
earth was not in motion – otherwise a stone thrown from a high tower would fall in a 
curve instead of falling in a perpendicular line. To counter this argument, Galileo 
introduced a new ‘natural interpretation’ of inertia dynamics and a principle of 
relativity, allowing one to see that when two objects are in equal motion, the motion 
between them is perceived as equal to zero. 
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To understand architecture as a disciplining of the ‘subjective senses’ is to understand it 
as producing this sort of natural perception. Thus, one new conception of architecture 
produces one new dimension in a complex field composed of multiple forms of 
subjectivity, in which contradictory psychic states may coexist. However, the question 
remains: how are these subjective senses produced and reproduced by architecture? 
We shall investigate how this is accomplished in the field of architecture in chapter 6.78 
For now, we shall finish this chapter by reinforcing its key conclusions. 
 
Conclusions 
The representation of the production of architecture by princely individuals is a complex 
form of ideology. It is framed by a historical narrative that imposes a specific logic of 
causality. This ideology reproduces a specific form of the reified perception of 
architects in relation to the means of production of architecture: architects see 
themselves as detached individuals imposing new structures on the world, i.e., as heroic 
princes in a field of windmills. To avoid this fantasy, a Copernican revolution regarding 
the concept of the individual must be activated, creating a completely new 
understanding of architecture as operation (O<  >S<  >O). 
This conception adds a completely new dimension to the Wood Street fieldwork 
(presented in Appendix 3). When the housing block and a local square were facing the 
risk of demolition and privatisation, a mediation between different groups (University of 
East London, E17 Architects, Wood St. First community group, WF Council, and the 
RIBA) enabled the production of an ephemeral architectonic structure built in the 
square. This structure functioned only as a means to mobilise a series of activities and to 
enable the participation of the community in the debate about the transformations to 
come in the local area. The object produced was less important than the event it created. 
One could argue that after the event, the square remained physically exactly as it had 
been before. In classical architectural ideology, this could not be understood as 
                                                          
78 Later, in Chapter 6, we will investigate how phantasies reproduce reified ‘unities of subjectivities’. This 
will allow us to expose how the discipline of architecture operates its reproduction by the framing of the 
architect’s ‘pre’ and ‘trans’ individuality. 
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architecture, as it did not produce a permanent structure. Only with the understanding of 
architecture as operation, as ontogenesis, could one understand it as an operation that 
enabled further operations. This mobilisation led not only to the interruption of the plans 
to regenerate the square but also to other initiatives to protect the important spaces for 
the community. If architecture can be understood as the creation of counter 
potentialities, then it can change reality by opening new horizons: a potential, yet real, 
existence. In that case, architecture is neither codes of beauty, nor a style, nor an 
affiliation with a school; it is a political praxis.  
 
Our aim so far was to set up reflexive tools for understanding architecture as a process 
of transformation rather than as a process endlessly reproducing unconscious social 
relations. Our hypothesis is that the field of architecture is a historically specific 
structured mediation, a non-trivial machinery reproducing specific ideas of subjects 
conceived in specific positions in relation to their means of production. As we have 
mapped in this chapter, this disciplinary reproduction depends on the reproduction of a 
specific subject of architecture. As we mapped in the previous chapter, the reproduction 
of this unconscious subjectivity (actually a process of estrangement) is founded on three 
levels: reification, fetish and phantasy. In the next chapters, we shall investigate these 
levels more deeply so that we can traverse this phantasmagorical narrative of 
architecture, thus delivering a complete cognitive map to enable architects to 
consciously reposition themselves in this phantasmatic field. This is not a blueprint for 
‘new practices’, only a first step for understanding the power relations involved in this 
dynamic field. In these terms, if Marx (no date [1867]) saw his book Capital as ‘without 
question the most terrible missile that has yet been hurled at the heads of the 
bourgeoisie’, this cognitive map is instead programmed to ignite from within the heads 
of the architects themselves. 
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PART 2: 
THE MEANS OF REPRODUCTION: 
Reification, fetish and phantasies 
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In Part 1 of this thesis, we presented the overall map of architectural estrangement, or 
how architecture reproduces a narrative of phantasmagorical individuals, ultimately 
rendering concrete subjects into a disciplined practice, unable to provide them with a 
critical position in relation to the transformation of their condition in the world. In Part 
2, we aim to further investigate how architectural subjectivity is reproduced by 
unconscious layers of subjectification. 
These layers were identified in the analysis of the fieldwork (reported in Appendix 3). 
On the fieldwork about the privatisation of public spaces in London, we identified how 
social relations were reified into architectural things, later further reifying subjectivities 
in the city. In the fieldwork engaged in participant observation, we recognised how the 
fetish of architecture goes deeper than the surface of the concepts employed, and the 
ontology of architecture were set into question (could architecture be something beyond 
a thing?), thus revealing how architecture becomes a process of hiding artifices, 
intentions, desires and instrumentalisation of others (fetish). In the fieldwork engaged in 
an observation of participation, it was possible to further reveal the processes at play. 
The fetish of the master was based in a process of reification of subjectivities and 
hierarchically controlled by the individual architect occupying the position of a ‘genius’ 
or ‘prince’, thus controlling the reproduction of myths and phantasies. 
Part 2 aims to critically explore the limits and contradictions of this process of 
reproduction so that we can reposition the means of production of architecture as a 
means of transformation of social relations (operations) in the hands of possible 
collective transindividualities. 
If in Chapter 2, we used the metaphor of the pyramid to map the architectural 
unconscious, how its surface functions as an instrument of estrangement, and how the 
production of architectural subjectivities has three levels (reification, fetish and 
fantasies), in Part 2, we aim to investigate these levels more deeply. 
The first level of reification is the subjective sense that sees architecture as ‘things’. 
Things are the objects of immediate everyday experience, they operate at the level of 
‘appearances’, but as we will discuss, these appearances are socially and historically 
produced. Reification is the process of transforming social relations into relations 
among things, as we will investigate in chapter 4. 
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Furthermore, architecture is only able to produce this ‘thingification’ by means of a very 
ancient method of fetishisation, which operates at a preconscious level and is produced 
by concepts, methods and ways of thinking that confine architects into hidden artifices 
of the production of social truths. This problem will be investigated in chapter 5. 
In chapter 6, we will investigate the fundamental basis of this unconscious architectural 
pyramid, including the phantasies that mobilise (prince complex) and justify (utopia) 
desire in architecture. This highly unconscious level depends on a shared narcissistic 
epistemology, and the result goes beyond producing things and leads to the 
thingification of architects themselves (a condition of which subjects-objects are 
unaware).  
These aspects will be investigated with the help of examples of hegemonic architecture, 
chosen as poles of tendencies in contemporary patterns, regardless of their valuation as 
‘exceptions’. Chapter 4 develops its argument using the fieldwork on a generic 
sampling of the production of architectonic things in the city of London. Chapter 5 
investigates – in a regressive perspective – how architecture becomes a means of 
producing social fetishes, i.e., a method of objectifying ideologies (framing ideas and 
logics into things). Chapter 6 will use high profile architects as exemplary poles of 
shared phantasies in architectural subjectivity. 
As we discussed at the end of chapter 2, this unconscious architectural pyramid is not an 
‘iron’ pyramid, as in Weber’s ‘iron cage’ (Jameson, 2002, 3-8, 75-78, 126), nor is this 
investigation a simple revelation of excavated truths. The process of critique is also a 
process of tracing potentialities in the field by investigating its social implications and 
its historical production. For Jameson (2002, 126), 
In genealogical construction, we begin with a fullblown system 
(capitalism in Marx, and in the present book, reification) in terms of 
which elements of the past can ‘artificially’ be isolated as objective 
preconditions: genealogy is not a historical narrative, but has the 
essential function of renewing our perception of the synchronic system as 
in an x-ray, its diachronic perspectives serving to make perceptible the 
articulation of the functional elements of a given system in the present. 
Our X-ray perception departs from the full-blown system of the massive process of 
reification of public spaces in London. Our interest is to investigate the dialectical and 
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multiple relations that these unconscious structures create between the reproduction of 
architectural subjectivity and the reproduction of social relations.  
In addition, the model of the pyramid should not be seen as linear or hierarchical, as the 
layers are not on top of each other but are incorporated into a shared spatiality, adding 
the perspective of horizontal relations, superpositioning and complex relations of 
dependency. In this sense, the investigation of the paradox of discipline and dialectics 
aims to map how this unconscious is being produced socially and how it frames the way 
this subjectivity ‘sees’ simple architectonic ‘things’, ‘facts’ and ‘chains of causality’. 
This realm of appearances is not an absolute, and it has historical roots. Thus, the 
material presence of the past is fundamental to this investigation. Part 2 will be 
organised according to the regressive-progressive method of Lefebvre. Henri Lefebvre 
(2003a, 111-120) developed this method in an essay on rural sociology, acknowledging 
that social reality is formed by a two-fold complexity: one horizontal, in which 
antagonistic social and political phenomena interact in the formation of a given 
historical moment, and a vertical complexity, in which one can trace the paradoxical 
juxtaposition of archaic and modern formations, which are borne back in different 
moments in time. To capture that, he proposed a method consisting of three parts: (1st) 
a descriptive moment, in which observation in the field would bring to the foreground 
the current contradictions of a given condition (see chapter 4); (2nd) a regressive 
analytical investigation, part of an attempt to describe and rescue the processes of 
formation of the conflicting elements of the present condition (see chapter 5); and (3rd) 
a historic-genetic account, returning to the present with an elucidated understanding (see 
chapter 6). 
In our investigation, we must first identify reification as the main contradiction in the 
random data from the production space in London, which leads us to the regressive 
investigation of how architecture produces fetish (namely, with techniques of 
phenomena), and finally, we return to the present with the critique of the hegemonic 
phantasies of the field (prince complex and utopia) that support this phantasmagorical 
pyramid. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
Disentangling reification: the social relations in architectural things 
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This chapter aims to arrive at a first-hand account of the relation between architectural 
‘things’ and the reproduction of social relations. For that it draws upon the theory of 
reification and the fieldwork about public spaces in London. The analysis aims to shed 
light on the relation between the architectonic production of public spaces, the 
reproduction of social relations in the city and the reproduction of architectural 
subjectivity. This also sheds light on the contrasts and continuities of social relations in 
the modern metropolis. Thus, what has been observed by scholars and the new aspects 
observed in the field can be compared. The aim is to discuss how the process of spatial 
reification is being produced by the contemporary discipline of architecture and how 
social relations are transformed into the new appearance of ‘things’ in cities. 
Reification is a form of ‘hypostasis’, a fallacy that takes abstractions as if they were a 
concrete entity (e.g., the map for the territory), but furthermore, reification is a modern 
social process of imposing historically designed and abstractly produced modern social 
relations as if they were inevitable, and thus, it is connected to the birth of capitalism in 
the 15th Century. Thus, arguably, reification in architecture could be said to start that 
Century, when Alberti (1988, originally published in 1485) first called architecture ‘De 
Re Aedificatoria’ (literally the building thing); and it is a notion that persists through the 
whole history of modern architecture and still plays a key role in the contemporary 
ideology of architecture. 
For instance, the main theme of the Venice Biennale of 2014 directed by Rem Koolhaas 
was conceived as a collection of ‘fundamentals’, which was presented as a series of 
‘things’ (see OMA, 2014). These things were understood to be the ‘fundamentals of our 
buildings, used by any architect, anywhere, anytime’. These things were understood to 
be: floors, walls, ceilings, roofs, doors, windows, façades, balconies, corridors, 
fireplaces, toilets, stairs, escalators, elevators, and ramps. Here, it is not enough to 
notice that not a single one of those ‘things’ was present in the first image at the 
entrance of the Brazilian pavilion: an indigenous architecture and no floor, no wall, no 
ceiling, no roof, no door, no window, no façade, no balcony, no corridor, no fireplace, 
no toilet, no stair, no escalator, no elevator, no ramp, yet, architecture. Rather, the 
radical step emerges by revealing how Koolhaas’ office concretely produced this 
thingification of architecture. 
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This reification of architecture was designed upon a reification of other architects. 
Initially, by conceiving the exhibition ‘Monditalia’, Koolhaas’ office (see OMA, 2014) 
captured other biennales and festivals of the city (such as dance, music, theatre and 
film) into his own – thus the whole cultural activity of the city became one single thing. 
In addition, in one in a series of ‘for the first time’ in Venice Biennales, Koolhaas’ 
office proposed an overall idea to be addressed by the national pavilions – namely, how 
the modern movement built the architectural aesthetics of each country. In this way, 
from the start, Koolhaas’ office framed the ‘Others’ proposals into an inquiry that was 
his own. Furthermore, this formatting of proposals was reproduced in the part of the 
exhibition that was supposed to be of his own personal initiative; it was produced in an 
assembly line of design. 
The exhibition was divided into small pieces, each thing designed by a different group 
of architects. In an interview with one of the architects who participated in the 
production of the exhibition (who preferred to remain anonymous), it was revealed that 
his office was approached by one member of Koolhaas’ staff and was offered 20,000 
euros to design and build one of the elements of the exhibition. Without ever meeting 
Koolhaas, their first idea was refused for being too radical, too political and too 
polemical. A second proposal was made and approved. It remained only ‘too 
polemical’. The budget was too small to cover the costs of the construction of the 
exhibition piece, let alone the labour time, transportation, daily costs and lodging. 
However, the possibility of participating in a famous event, hosted by a famous 
architect, kept the participants motivated. This partition of the exhibition into an 
assembly line of design not only reduced architecture to atomised things, it also reduced 
architects themselves to objects instrumentalised by one mastering will.  
We shall return to this objectification of the architect in subsequent chapters. For now, 
rather than investigating whether architecture could be something other than a thing, we 
aim to investigate how an ‘architectural thing’ is actually something more than a neutral 
object - namely, a process reproducing relations as if they were unconditional. 
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4.1. Getting one thing straight: things are social relations 
As we have seen, Lefebvre (1976) argued that capitalism has managed to avoid crisis by 
reproducing the relations of production. According to his argument, this reproduction is 
achieved by destroying traditional spaces and by producing instrumental logic in space. 
Thus, architecture (and the city) has become the means for trapping society inside the 
capitalist system, mainly by establishing the fetish of the commodity as a guiding 
principle of its production. What is a specific logic becomes ‘natural’ (supposed neutral 
space). This process could be called spatial reification. 
The means of reification have many variations and subtleties of interpretation, having 
been described in the work of many authors under different names, such as 
mystification, instrumentalisation, phantasmagoria or protocols (see Marx 1996; Adorno 
and Horkheimer 1996; Lukács 1972; Galloway, 2004). The inauguration of this 
discussion can be found in an important passage in Marx’s Capital: 
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore 
simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of 
men’s own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour 
themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things … It is nothing 
but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes 
here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things (Marx, 
1990, pp. 164-165). 
Unlike Marx, we will not focus on general commodity reification-fetishism but rather 
on architectural reification-fetishism specifically. In this chapter, we will investigate the 
immanent aspect of turning social relations into things – the reification. In addition, in 
the next chapter, we will investigate the ‘mysterious ways’ of this process – the method. 
One common definition of reification is as follows: 
Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were 
things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms. Another 
way of saying this is that reification is the apprehension of the products 
of human activity as if they were something else than human products – 
such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of 
divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own 
authorship of the human world (...) The reified world is, by definition, a 
dehumanized world. It is experienced by man as a strange facticity, an 
opus alienum over which he has no control rather than as the opus 
proprium of his own productive activity (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 
pp. 82–3, italics in the original, in Silva, 2013). 
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The word ‘reification’ comes from the Latin res, which means thing or object. Hence, 
reification is also referred to as thingification or objectification. These three terms have 
been used interchangeably and are central terms in Marxist theory. Although all three 
terms refer to the same process, here we shall use ‘thingification’ to emphasise the 
naturalisation of social aspects, ‘objectification’ to emphasise the instrumentalisation of 
space and subjects, and ‘reification’ to emphasise the conversion of social relations into 
things and vice versa.  
 
Reworking things out 
Arguably, the essay ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’ from 1922, 
by Georg Lukács (1971), was a benchmark of this debate and influenced many studies 
that followed. Here, we do not aim to discuss all aspects and implications of the work of 
Lukács, as our aim is to clarify how the discipline of architecture contributes to the 
process of estrangement by both reproducing social relations as well as by reifying the 
subjectivity of architects (or what Lukács called the ‘soul’). 
For this reason, we shall start with Lukács’ own ‘self-critique’ in the Preface to the New 
Edition of 1967 (Lukács, 1971, pp. ix-xxxviii) as a means of introducing a radical view 
of the production of objects (things) and subjects (souls). There, Lukács notes what he 
considers a ‘fundamental and crude error’ of his previous work: the matching of 
reification and alienation. For him, this comes from Hegel’s notion that ‘the object, the 
thing exists only as an alienation from self-consciousness, to take it back into the 
subject would mean the end of objective reality’ (Lukács, 1971, p. xxiii). Alternatively, 
Lukács’ self-critique recognises that objectification is an instrumental device of the 
mind and is part of both ‘true’ and ‘false’ approaches. 
Every externalisation of an object in practice (and hence, too, in work) is 
an objectification, that every human expression including speech 
objectifies human thoughts and feelings, then it is clear that we are 
dealing with a universal mode of commerce between men. […] And in so 
far as this is the case, objectification is a neutral phenomenon; the true is 
as much an objectification as the false, liberation as much as 
enslavement. (Lukács, 1971, xxiv) [Thus he concludes:] For no 
purposive activity can be carried out in the absence of an image, however 
crude, of the practical reality involved. Practice can only be a fulfilment 
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and a criterion of theory when it is based on what is held to be a correct 
reflection of reality (p. xxv). 
Lukács identifies alienation as the problem of reification, noting that only when the 
existence of man is ‘subjugated, deformed and crippled can we speak of an objective 
societal condition of alienation and, as an inexorable consequence, of all the subjective 
marks of an internal alienation’ (Lukács, 1971, p. xxiv). In this sense, he was criticising 
the following use of his theory, which resulted in a generic critique of any form of 
rationality, as the ideas in his ‘book were converted into fashionable notions’ (Lukács, 
1971, p. xxxviii). In this sense, his self-critique is directed to the possible misuses of his 
theory. By stressing that there is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objectification, he is condemning the 
schools that equate any object in society with ‘bad’, as he suggests is the case with 
‘messianic negative idealism’ (i.e., the impossibility of reaching truth in the absence of 
the messiah, but in idealistic negation). 
As Lukács himself does recognise other achievements of his work, we shall bear in 
mind the fact that the production of objects and things is a human condition. Thus, we 
focus on the identification of estrangement: how things become as pure ‘facts’, and 
separate subjects from awareness of how they are created, produced, invented and 
historically imposed (Lukács, 1971, pp. 128, 130, 140). This is the key to identifying 
how subjects comprehend (and are estranged from) their own positions in the system of 
production, and how there are always social processes inherent in apparently objective 
things (Lukács, 1971, p. 179). 
 
A sure thing of all things 
The fundamental point of Lukács’ book was to show how things are not absolute facts. 
Rather, they are ‘produced’ in a social and historical process; therefore, things are the 
result of an ‘action’, which presupposes a subject who acts and, thus, more 
fundamentally, ‘creates’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 140). We must acknowledge that ‘we shall 
have raised ourselves in fact to the position from which reality can be understood as our 
‘action’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 145).  Thus, the ‘action’ is the fundamental epistemological 
key to the process that unites history, social conditions, subjects and objects. 
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For Lukács, man is the product of a social milieu, and the social milieu is the product of 
man; this is the ‘epistemological problem of production, in the systematic question of 
the subject of an “action”, of the “creator of a unified reality”’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 135). 
Therefore, he points to ‘the decisive problem of this line of thought: the problem of the 
subject of the action, the subject of the genesis’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 145), which can be 
found in ‘the identical subject-object, the subject of action’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 149). 
In this sense, we aim here to emphasise the relations between architectural things and 
the production of subjects: how conscious these subjects are about these processes; how 
the production of things (reification) concretely reproduces social relations (alienation); 
and how subjects accept these things as ‘facts’ beyond the action of concrete subjects 
(estrangement). Thus, instead of accepting or conceiving architecture as a ‘thing’, an 
immutable ‘absolute’, we aim to disentangle in concrete processes how architecture 
simultaneously produces ‘things’ and ‘subjects’.79 
 
One thing led to another 
Furthermore, the following account does not propose to build an absolute theory of 
reification, only to enable ‘self-critiques’ of the process – in a sense, to reproduce 
Lukács’ melancholy. Consequently, it performs a constant ethical unveiling of subject-
object constructions in the ideas presented. 
Lukács’ approach in 1922 (Lukács, 1971, pp. 83-209) has his own ethical commitments: 
it departs from the understanding of knowledge divided into two main blocks (one 
bourgeois, the other in the direction of the negative consciousness of the proletariat). 
Rather than consider it a simplification, we could understand it as a theoretical tool used 
to clarify points of view. Thus, on the one hand, he enables us to understand how the 
first type of knowledge departs from the ‘immediate’, and the latter from a ‘mediated’, 
point of view. He goes on to analyse what he calls ‘bourgeois thought’, treating it as a 
coherent whole only to envision how different philosophical systems are variations of 
                                                          
79 In this sense, Object Oriented Ontology or Object Oriented Philosophy simply misses the fact that 
objects are produced, and thus have a history, a social condition and subjects defining them, and for this 
reason it is not a critical philosophy.  
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the acceptance of immediate objects as the sources of universal laws. Things become 
absolute facts. 
For Lukács, therefore, that thought builds a pragmatic discourse on truth by departing 
from those supposed ‘facts’. Thus, instrumental rationality and calculability accepts the 
status quo as an axiom, and the existent objects as natural absolutes. Thus, this way of 
thinking ignores what he called the ‘social processes’: the continuous and complex 
transformations of social things, the historicity of the social relations that had produced 
those things in the first place, and most important of all, the fact that all knowledge and 
social existence are produced by humans themselves. In this sense, Lukács argues that 
bourgeois thought and practice necessarily mythologise what ‘exists’ as unconditional 
and what ‘ought to be’ as unthinkable (Lukács, 1971, pp. 126, 150, 155, 160-163). 
On the other hand, he also criticises those theories that depart from the mediated and 
take the transcendental as an absolute, as in Hegel’s theory wherein the products of the 
human mind are taken as absolutes in themselves. He goes on to analyse many thinkers, 
especially Kant, and how his absolute separation of reason and the ‘thing-in-itself’ 
ultimately turns the bourgeois social condition into an absolute. 
The belief that the transformation of the immediately given into a truly 
understood (and not merely an immediately perceived) and for that 
reason really objective reality, i.e. the belief that the impact of the 
category of mediation upon the picture of the world is merely 
'subjective', i.e. is no more than an 'evaluation' of a reality that 'remains 
unchanged', all this is as much as to say that objective reality has the 
character of a thing-in-itself. 
It is true that the kind of knowledge which regards this 'evaluation' as 
merely 'subjective', as something which does not go to the heart of the 
facts, nevertheless claims to penetrate the essence of actuality. The 
source of its self-deception is to be found in its uncritical attitude to the 
fact that its own standpoint is conditioned (and above all that it is 
conditioned by the society underlying it) (Lukács, 1971, p. 150). 
For Lukács, the concept of ‘thing-in-itself’, in addition to presupposing a necessary 
idealism from the start, also assumes that what is socially produced is an absolute. For 
Lukács, that absolute separation of form and content can only lead to a false 
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relativism.80 Thus, in that situation, rationality can only act upon partial things, while 
the totality is not seen as the result of human action and is seen as belonging to a blind 
power – an irrational immanence – and as rendering fate to an uncontrolled force that 
acts against our will.  In Lukács’ (1971, p. 191) words: 
For as long as society, as it is, is to be declared sacrosanct it is 
immaterial with what emotional force or what metaphysical and religious 
emphasis this is done. What is crucial is that reality as it seems to be 
should be thought of as something man cannot change and its 
unchangeability should have the force of a moral imperative. 
Therefore, Lukács ethical commitment is to unveil the social relations in and the ethical 
implications of any ‘thing’. However, if things are social relations, then what are social 
relations? 
 
In the least little things 
For Lukács (1971) to overcome the trap of the disjunction between the immediate and 
the mediated, it is necessary to break the immediacy of things – the objects as they 
appear – and to analyse how the totality of human society integrates each singular thing 
in human existence. 
Reification [relating here to the ‘alienated’ type, we should note] is, then, 
the necessary, immediate reality of every person living in capitalist 
society. It can be overcome only by constant and constantly renewed 
efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretely relating 
to the concretely manifested contradictions of the total development, by 
becoming conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions 
for the total development. But it must be emphasided [sic] that (1) the 
structure can be disrupted only if the immanent contradictions of the 
process are made conscious […] (2) […] What is crucial is that there 
                                                          
80 For Lukács, much like the assumption that all knowledge is false, this separation ends up taking what 
‘is’ as absolute: ‘it inevitably reverts to the dogmatic position of those thinkers who likewise offered to 
explain the world from premises they did not consciously acknowledge and which, therefore, they 
adopted uncritically. For it is one thing to relativise the truth about an individual or a species in an 
ultimately static world (masked though this stasis may be by an illusory movement like the "eternal 
recurrence of the same things" or the biological or morphological “organic” succession of periods). And it 
is quite another matter when the concrete, historical function and meaning of the various “truths” is 
revealed within a unique, concretised historical process. […] For it is only meaningful to speak of 
relativism where an “absolute” is in some sense assumed. The weakness and the half-heartedness of such 
“daring thinkers” as Nietzsche or Spengler is that their relativism only abolishes the absolute in 
appearance.’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 187) 
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should be an aspiration towards totality, that action should serve the 
purpose, described above, in the totality of the process […] [because] the 
individual elements incorporate the structure of the whole. [...] Hence (3) 
when judging whether an action is right or wrong it is essential to relate 
it to its function in the total process (Lukács, 1971, p. 197, italics in 
original). 
Here, Lukács bring to the forefront an issue that we have discussed before: the relation 
between scales, and the dialectic between the part and the whole. As in fractal geometry 
or in a kaleidoscope, any change in the whole changes the part, and vice versa. 
Therefore, although the part manifests idiosyncratic appearances – which might lead to 
the error of acknowledging them as individually independent – the individuation of the 
part is only an actualisation of the whole (i.e., the transindividuality in Simondon). 
This brings Marx and Simondon closer. In Marx, things are social relations because: 
they were historically produced, and therefore relate to the context and the concrete 
labour that produced them; the ideological apparatus (values, knowledge, science, laws, 
believes, values and so on, mobilised to see, recognise and represent things in thought 
and action) is historically and socially produced; and not only things represent 
abstractions (as in the case of money), but they also mediate the relations between 
subjects. Therefore, the accepted ‘nature’ of things is produced by complex interactions 
of subjects in a society. In addition, for Simondon (as we represented above in diagram 
25) the individuation of things occurs by the production ‘mediations’, where form and 
content are mediated by an energetic process of action (labour). To shape (the 
information, mise en forme) is to create a mediation between different orders of 
magnitude, upon which a potentiality is actualised. Therefore, things are the shaping of 
a limit, and the living individual is a ‘theatre of individuations’, constantly re-enacting 
the relations of interior-exterior mediated by this limit. As a result, bringing Marx and 
Simondon together enables us to understand how social relations are not simply 
constitutive of subjects but are also constitutive of all beings and each little thing. 
Both Lukács and Simondon acknowledge that ‘reality’ is not an a priori thing-in-itself; 
rather, it is a reality that becomes (what we called ‘being becoming’), and therefore 
things are processes, as we can see in the following assertion: 
This reality is not, it becomes […] the transformation of things into a 
process provides a concrete solution to all the concrete problems created 
by the paradoxes of existent objects (Lukács, 1971, p. 203). 
 
 
161 
 
Thus, for Lukács, every ‘thing’ is a process, a historically produced object, dependent 
upon concrete actions. To realise that, one must be critical of its own condition (in a 
negation of itself), and that is why he sees the proletariat as existing in a pivotal 
historical condition: the proletarian is denied access to the objects he produces, he is 
dispossessed of everything, just as he himself is objectified as a commodity in the 
market where he sells the only thing that remains with him, namely, his own body. This 
condition creates a unique experience of ‘object-subject’, as long as a class 
consciousness emerges to recognise that the subject himself has become, 
simultaneously, both subject and object of the system. It is in this sense that, for Lukács, 
the proletarian is a negative subject. 
 
The grand scheme of things 
The negative subject also implies a negative humanism. It is in this sense that Lukács 
notes Marx’s opposition to humanism. For Lukács, Marx considered that humanism 
would ultimately turn a socially constructed concept of ‘the human’ into an absolute. 
Therefore, Marx aimed to take a step beyond Feuerbach’s transformation of philosophy 
into anthropology (Lukács, 1971, p. 186) in the sense of proposing a non-existent man, 
a man without essence, a man aware that his ‘manhood’ is a social product.81 
This consciousness only becomes radical once the subject realises not only that he is 
historically transformed but also that he is himself produced and created, thus 
generating what Lukács called a dialectical humanism. Thus, Lukács’ theoretical 
struggle is against the acceptance of the status quo as absolute and in favour of a fluid 
notion of a complex process of existence that continuously transforms abstractions into 
things. 
However, if we are to understand Lukács’ theory in light of his later self-critique, we 
should understand that the concept of reification per se is not enough, as he noticed in 
The Changing Function of Historical Materialism: ‘It has frequently been stated with 
justification: socialisation is a question of power’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 251), and thus a 
                                                          
81 The obvious problem in searching for a ‘human nature’ to fundament a philosophy of reality is the 
historical fact that when humans emerged as a species, their existence was already funded in artificiality – 
stone tools, fire, and so on (see Taylor, 2010 and Appendix 3). 
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matter of who is able to impose a truth over the objectivity of things, i.e., to impose a 
form of reification over others. Therefore, he quotes Marx’s second Thesis on 
Feuerbach: ‘The question whether human thinking can pretend to objective truth is not a 
theoretical but a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, 
the “this-sidedness” of his thinking in practice’ (Lukács, 1971, p. 198).  
Thus, the definition of things defines not only social relations but also relations of 
power and where each subject is positioned with regard to its actions in society. In this 
sense, the products of architecture are not neutral: architectural things reify social 
relations and (re)produce mediations between subjects. In turn, these mediations reified 
in space by architecture become the social condition inherited by the following 
generations. In this sense, space bears the remains of past reifications. Therefore, space 
is not neutral either. 
This enlightens the specific question of this chapter, which could be synthesised as 
follows: how does the production of things by architecture in turn reproduce social 
relations and subjects? 
To continue answering that, we will next return to London’s privatisation of public 
spaces to demonstrate how things reproduce subjects and social relations by: enclosing 
space and framing possible mediations between subjects (reification); producing a realm 
of appearances, an artificial immanence, where the aesthetic turns social rules into 
natural things (thingification); and transforming the urban experience in a form of 
control and instrumentalisation of space and subjects (objectification). This 
reproduction is mediated by the products of architecture; and in the next chapters we 
shall investigate the reproduction mediated by the methods (fetish) and desires 
(phantasies) of architectural subjectivity. In addition, we shall arrive back to London 
through one last detour. 
 
4.2. Intermezzo: first things first – primitive enclosures 
The process of transforming space to introduce new forms of social relations is not new. 
In Part VIII of Capital (1990 [originally published in 1867]), Karl Marx famously 
analysed the process of privatisation of common land in England as an example of a 
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form of 'primitive accumulation'. In that context, he demonstrated how capitalist 
development in England was preceded, on the one hand, by a legislative process of 
wealth expropriation that mainly focused on confiscating common land and transferring 
its ownership into private hands. This created a dispossessed and dependent mass of 
proletarians. Examples of this process were the 'Enclosure Acts' created by Parliament 
(chapter 27). On the other hand, new legislation was produced to criminalise the 
behaviour of the poor through a series of statutes that were created to enforce a culture 
of wage labour behaviour and to control 'beggars' and 'vagabonds' (chapter 28, entitled 
'Bloody Legislation…'), thus establishing a disciplined and dependent proletariat. 
De Angelis (2000) argues that Marx's 'primitive accumulation', as explained in the ‘land 
enclosure’ process, was not a process concealed in time and space; rather, it is a 
continuous process of wealth accumulation that constantly reproduces inequalities based 
on access to power. In this sense, the 'primitive' has a sense of 'in anticipation', i.e., the 
base that allows capital accumulation and that finances the separation of workers from 
the means of production. For De Angelis, this separation is the basis of Marx's theory of 
reification: the transformation of free subjects into objects in the marketplace through 
the alienation from the source of materials and instruments of production, thus imposing 
on them the condition of wage labour. Therefore, he argues that 'primitive accumulation 
could be identified in those social processes or sets of strategies aimed at dismantling 
institutions that protect societies from the market' (De Angelis, 2000), demonstrating 
how this procedure is constantly re-emerging and even reinforced in the neoliberal 
context. 
In addition, Wark (2004) argues that we are facing a new mode of production wherein 
extreme mechanisation and automation have not delivered the promises of release from 
work. Jonathan Crary (2013) has demonstrated how physical toil has been replaced by 
stressful mental work. This happens because the complexity and instability of 
production increase, which demands even more immaterial work to coordinate 
production and consumption. Even in cases of reduced working hours, labourers face an 
everyday life that is colonised by productivity: we rest to be productive, we have leisure 
to amplify creativity, we exercise to be more productive, we travel to network, and so 
on. 
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In this scenario, Ross Adams (2014) argues that architecture in contemporary society is 
becoming a technology of subjectivity, functioning as a means of crystallising specific 
forms of socialisation while pretending to be ahistorical. For him, architecture has 
become an ‘inferno of the same’, admitting no negativity or difference. Furthermore, 
architecture becomes a meta-architecture, an explosive ‘interior’ encompassing the 
whole environment. This meta-architecture is subtle and light, almost immaterial, and 
its means are transparent and seem to entail no appearance, only fascination. Therefore, 
Adams argues that architecture becomes as vast as the world, an ‘act of pure enclosure’, 
which he suggests is the proper phenomenology of empire (as in Negri, 2000). 
London's urban reification process follows a path similar to that of the Land Enclosure 
Acts: it is focused on strategies of both 'behaviour control' and 'dispossession'. The 
process of behaviour control is secured by increasingly severe legislation known as the 
'Anti-Social Behaviour Orders', as well as by strategies of 'security by design' and 
'public spaces privatisation'. The process of dispossession was guaranteed by changes to 
and the interpretation of the 'Compulsory Purchase Orders' legislation and 'Land 
Assembly' strategies. These new conditions of legality in urban production tend to 
produce a new form of public space. 
In this sense, just as the very appreciated idyllic landscape of the Highlands is the result 
of the Land Enclosure Acts, which violently cleared peasants from the land (Marx, 
1990, chapter 27), the velvet architecture of London is the result of a new process of 
enclosure, a re-emerging primitive accumulation: this time in urban spaces and subtle 
and deceptive; it is a process of urban reification by comfort and disorientation, rather 
than disciplining and punishment. 
 
4.3. A thing or two we learned from the urban enclosure of London 
In practice, we learned three things about London’s enclosure: fractal social relations 
are reifying tangled orbits of control that disorient users into passivity; spectacle and 
comfort are the thingification of an (an)aesthetic velvet ground, seductive enough to 
tame behaviour in a bird’s nest prison; and the managing of a compulsive anxiety into a 
game experience objectifies citizens into driven consumers (see Diagram 26 below). 
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Diagram 26: Summary of London’s Enclosure. Source: the author. 
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(a) The reification into tangled orbits 
The reification of fractal social relations creates tangled orbits of social control. This is 
achieved through: a constant shift in the rules for the use of spaces; a fragmentation of 
experience, where users cannot fully master space; a disorientation, and a form of 
remote control; the production of ‘invisible cages’ by adding widespread techniques of 
surveillance associated with objects designed to induce behaviour. 
In contrast to the apparent accessibility of these spaces, their uses are controlled and 
managed by different undemocratic entities. This allows the management of a spectacle 
of beauty and order, while at the same time delivering a feeling of comfort and 
efficiency for those who join the rules. Nevertheless, similar to the evasion of 
surroundings in the dark room of a cinema, as Benjamin (2008) argues for the creation 
of distracted appropriation, this new urban experience cancels the overstimulation so 
characteristic of modern metropolitan spaces in order to control and guide experience. 
Therefore, to live in cities, we used to have to confront contradictory experiences that 
revealed our incompleteness and the cognitive dissonance of our senses, thus enriching 
experience (Sennett, 2002, p. 371). If Simmel (1950 [originally published in 1903]) 
once characterised the metropolis as the space where individuals could feel free of the 
‘orbits’ of control to which they were subjected in small communities, the new 
fragmentation of public spaces creates a field of entangled orbits, obliging the user to 
‘anaesthetise’ his behaviour to adapt to constantly changing rules. 
Therefore, this ongoing process is generating a new set of tangled social ‘orbits’. If 
Simmel’s modern metropolis became the experience of freedom by transcending the 
orbits of small communities and thus only accounting for 'inner laws', the new 'blurred' 
boundaries of the cities are the naturalisation of ‘outer laws’ inside the individual.  
 
(b) The thingification into velvet grounds 
In the London fieldwork, we saw how a new aesthetic of things reproduces 
estrangement disguised as the natural order of things. This is achieved by: controlling 
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all the aspects of the environment so they become cosy and hospitable; so this comfort 
anaesthetises the urban experience, and citizens are domesticated; this is enforced by the 
elimination of politics and dissent from these spaces; this frames subjects into target 
profiles, and an automation of the citizen is imposed.  
Richard Sennett (2002) challenges the idea of a pacification of the city. For him, this 
notion of comfort is a social construction, which conceives citizens as passive elements, 
rather than in a hard gained political arrangement: ‘Intense civic bonds arouse from the 
very play of displacement [...] Yet the ancient city was itself not like a monument to 
stability’ (Sennett, 2002, p. 371). 
Whilst the embrace of the concept of domestication sounds ‘delightful’, it is self-evident 
that it also has connotations of control, patronising and hierarchy. Rather than 
domesticating, this taming (to ‘make less powerful and easier to control’, according to 
the Oxford Dictionary) is actually a form of dressage (an ‘art [...] that develops 
obedience, flexibility and balance’, according to the Oxford Dictionary). Therefore, 
these new public spaces are not neutral things. They create homogeneity and comfort in 
order to frame experience and manage the passivity of object-subjects, so they can 
become full potential consumers.  
It is in this sense that these strategies transform the city’s spaces into a ‘velvet ground’ 
created by comfortable, shining and blurred spaces. This (an)aesthetic of things 
conditions citizens to appropriate the space by means of consumption, carefully placing 
each element to induce a compulsive consumption experience. Anaesthetised by the 
constant vibration of 'urban life', the wandering citizen represses his innermost values 
by experiencing the place only by playing the game of repeated consumption. 
 
(c) The objectification into driven citizen-consumers 
Furthermore, citizens become instruments and objects of a game of driven spatial 
consumption. This is achieved by carefully orienting all elements of design to acts of 
consumption. The whole environment becomes a simulated spectacle, where consumers 
are themselves appropriated by distraction that turns the whole environment into a fetish 
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of commodity. This is achieved by a careful management of space and anxiety, so 
citizens enter into a compulsive repetition of consumption in order to regain the lost 
appropriation of space by means of a game experience.  
Sennett (2002) argues that the urge to experience comfort in cities is a dangerous game, 
because too much protection from 'stimuli' can create a 'sickness of lack'. He argues that 
pleasure can only emerge as a distension of unpleasurable experiences and that we need 
to confront ourselves with the 'reality principle' to acknowledge the degree to which our 
minds are playing with our senses of pleasure and unpleasure. 
This idea is founded in the Freudian text Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1955 
[originally published in 1920]), in which it is argued that although unpleasure and 
pleasure are important elements with which to understand mental life, it is the process 
of the 'repression of desires' that is the key principle. As Freud (1955, p. 11) asserted, 
'Most of the unpleasure that we experience is perceptual unpleasure' because our 
instincts and desires are repressed inside our unconscious by our social experience. This 
perceptual unpleasure is formed, in such cases, by the expectations of unpleasure and 
danger, or by the pressure of unsatisfied instincts. Therefore, a conflict emerges 
between the repressed unconscious and the actual experience, creating a compulsion to 
repeat the manifestations of that repressed desire. Those manifestations can emerge as 
painful experiences or as accepted social games. Freud explains this condition by 
describing a game played by a child. The child repeatedly throws a toy behind the bed 
to enjoy reencountering this toy when he finds it. The child achieves, by incessantly 
repeating the disappearance of an object and its rediscovery, a form of revenge and the 
feeling of mastery over his destiny. Therefore, the child regains control over ‘the 
passivity of the experience’ only through 'the activity of the game' (Freud, 1955, p. 17). 
Latham and Koch (2013, p. 6), with the story of a 'piano in a square', inadvertently 
described how the passivity of the urban experience is created by such games. In a 
regenerated London square, a man saw a piano in the street and asked the waiter if he 
could sit on the chair, only to be shown a sign reading, 'Play Me. I'm Yours!' After 
playing music and being applauded by the surrounding customers, who kept asking him 
for 'one more', the man left. The passivity of his experience in the velvet architecture of 
London was joyfully overcome through a planned 'game activity' reified into the form of 
a well-placed piano. 
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However, this is a subtle game. In contemporary entangled spaces, the anxiety of the 
experience (generated by the multiple reifications of social rules in such spaces) is 
swamped by the specific game of consumption. The feeling of belonging is carefully 
orchestrated so that one only feels suited to the space as he engages in the game of 
consumption. Tables and chairs, as well as views and pianos, are carefully orchestrated 
by business intentions. Thus, the former blasé ‘abstract distance’ is transformed into 
domesticated ‘consumer closeness’. This is the repeated game of consumption, a game 
of incessantly repeating the disappearance of citizenship and its reencounter in the form 
of commodity. 
These new forms of reification, thingification and objectification extend the realm of 
impact of the operation (i.e., reproducing it on new grounds). Thus, the reification of the 
city's spaces extends its focus from the workspace (the organisation of the factory into 
an assembly line, for instance) and becomes a process of reifying the space of everyday 
life as a whole. Although this process presents itself as ‘natural’, it has been supported 
not only by the new set of legislation and the massive strategies of 'regeneration' but 
also by a good deal of spectacle, rhetoric and law enforcement (for more details see 
Appendix 2). 
In the London fieldwork, we saw how the majority of the new public spaces are being 
transformed into privatised public spaces, and that transformation has a large impact on 
the public realm. This process is a dialectical arrangement of economic, political and 
social doctrines, which creates new codes of interpersonal behaviour in the city. 
Furthermore, a critical analysis of the arguments in favour of such changes will be 
helpful to trace back the acceptance of things as absolute and to trace back its ethics and 
veiled elements of control. 
 
4.4. Against ‘taking things easy’ 
For De Magalhães, there is no reason to be 'overpessimistic' about the privatisation of 
public spaces, and pessimistic views on this process come from a frozen, idealised 
concept of public space (see De Magalhães, 2010). He argues that it is just a matter of 
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recognising the 'natural' necessity of current developments, as the bankruptcy of the 
welfare state is an unquestionable fact (De Magalhães, 2010, p. 560). For De 
Magalhães, the only possible action is to technically understand the process and, by so 
doing, learn to control it. For him, the ongoing process can be described as a simple 
'contracting out' of the public character of cities' spaces, and the heart of the matter is 
knowing how to make good contracts to balance rights and duties. He argues that this is 
not a history of 'corporate take-over' or 'exclusion' but rather a 'complex redistribution of 
roles' and a 'domestication' of public spaces. 
Similarly, Latham and Koch (2013) argue that the ongoing process of transforming 
public space is the ‘hard work of domestication’. They contrast their use of the concept 
of domestication with its former critical use (see Zukin, 2010). For them, the spaces in 
question have never been ‘wild’ because they are artificial products. In this sense, it has 
not been tamed because it was tamed from the beginning. 
In these terms, by ignoring dissent, social conflict, politics and the whole history of 
mankind, De Magalhães, Lathan and Koch can understand the domestication of urban 
space as an expansion of ‘home-making’ by blurring any social difference between 
private and public. This provides many points to apply to our cognitive map (even if it 
is still under construction). 
The first point is the supposed neutrality of the process of ‘contracting out’. This 
assumption disregards both the condition in which these contracts are made, and the 
positions of power of the subjects that are engaged in the negotiations. In this way, the 
rhetoric of neutrality acts in the reproduction of social relations in two ways. 
First, the social actors involved in the contract are informed differently about the 
elements and the rights that are been sold (most of them will never know what happened 
in this negotiation), while developers are usually aware of the elements at play, as these 
opportunities emerge from systematic efforts on their behalf. In contrast, as was the case 
in Wood Street experiment, sometimes local authorities might not be aware of other 
alternatives, and be influenced by ‘trendy’ experiences. Furthermore, authorities suffer 
different pressures, from campaign funding to budget austerity, which might force a 
choice for abdication. The citizens, object-subject of the interventions, are in turn 
submitted to techniques of disengagement and propaganda. Therefore, the proposal that 
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it is simply a matter of knowing to ‘technically control’ the process is an academic’s 
delusion. It ignores the political choices and the struggles of interest involved; it also 
ignores the power that emerges from economic and cultural capital: both influencing 
decisions and producing consensus by financed design and research (we will discuss 
examples of that in the next chapter). 
Second, the lived space is fragmented, into a profusion of rules (sometimes formalised 
in these contracts, sometimes not), transforming the public space into a tangled orbit. 
Thus, these rules will potentially change from place to place, square to square, street to 
street. The regular citizen, walking through the city, experiences a constant 
metamorphosis of the city’s character, becoming persistently more or less free, more or 
less familiar, more or less active, more or less detached. For those in the streets, the 
feeling is a constant shining, blurred and soft, estrangement. The way out of the anxiety 
induced is managed, so it is found only through consumption. In this way, experience of 
citizenship in the city is objectified (instrumentalised). 
Furthermore, the complex fragmentation of rules can enable the emergence of malicious 
domestications (dressage) without any social control over it. Additionally, the blurring 
of boundaries makes awareness of limits difficult, so individuals become atoms (a small 
cog), that cannot master the means of space production. Space (the whole) is turned into 
a machine of reproduction. This condition prevents the emergence of significant 
differences, as it enforces passivity and eliminates political dissent. Dissent, as the basis 
of politics (see Rancière, 2010), is one of the first targets of these many ‘contracted out’ 
rules, usually prohibiting any form of protest and even leafleting. This enforcement of a 
de-politicisation of public spaces – evident during the Occupy movements – is a 
fundamental shift in the character of public spaces. 
The second point is the naturalisation of domestication and the formulation of a 
narrative that fundaments an ethical linear causality: domestication = cosy + good = 
tamed + unconditional = citizens’ dressage is fine. 
Although the human condition is artificial before even the emergence of the species – as 
we noted before – there is a fundamental difference between ‘domestication’ and 
‘dressage’, as there is a difference between ‘being a subject of’ and ‘being subjected to’. 
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In that proposition, architecture becomes the social engineering of subjective 
homogeneity, as it is evident in Latham and Koch’s enumeration of the elements to 
create domestication: 
‘Foundations’: the reimagination of the place, which is not a tight script, 
but is enforced by social and legal legislation (such as ‘permits, 
licensing, management contracts, leasing agreements, service 
provisions’). ‘Important here is the idea that foundations are not only 
about the material. They are also about a kind of ethos  –  a way of 
thinking about the kind of public space that might be put together.’ [...] 
Furnishings: [..] ‘Engagement with a range of material objects […] we 
can outline a process of domestication here consisting of several general 
features. First, there is the construction of regular, predictable routines 
associated with the use of these furnishings. Secondly, there is the 
establishment of roles for taking responsibility for the space and its 
furnishings. Thirdly, […] practical activity can generate collective 
affects’. [..] Invitations: [..] ‘The hard work of domesticating a public 
space – creating a new ‘‘patterned ground’ […] norms, conventions, 
expectations, appropriate forms of behaviour and so forth. […] making a 
regular habit […] the routines already described did not magically 
happen on their own. People needed to be invited to make themselves 
[…] Accommodation: [..]  ‘Closely following this example, a fourth 
element in the domestication of public space is accommodation: the 
process of adapting or adjusting to others in order to get on with living.’ 
(Latham and Koch, 2013, pp.15-18) 
Despite the ‘delightfulness’ provided to those willing to obey, there is a problematic 
effect of this line of thought. As Simmel (1950) asserted, the foundation of modern 
rational freedom in the metropolis is based on the experiences of abstraction, distance 
and difference that are made possible by the big city. In opposition to this modern 
space, the feudal city was formed precisely by a domesticated space, fully experienced 
through emotional relations to the place, and mediated by the ‘heart’ and tradition, with 
the sensation of a cyclical and eternal stability that can only be felt at home. Therefore, 
the proposition of transforming the modern city into a home is, by logical conclusion, 
regression from a long-fought battle for freedom in the modern metropolis.  
Therefore, the domestication advocated by Latham and Koch (2013) entails both 
delightfulness and elimination of the abstract distance and solitude among the multitude, 
which is so important to creating the uncomfortable encounter with freedom and the 
(not reified) Other. As Simmel (1950, p. 418) argued: ‘For here as elsewhere it is by no 
means necessary that the freedom of man reflect itself in his emotional life only as 
comfort’. 
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The third point is the false dilemma of either we accept ‘things are as they are’ or we 
fall into ‘big state fascism’. The critique is not about reaffirming the state’s lost control 
of space. As Zukin (2010, p. 30) asserts, in the privatisation of public spaces and 
regeneration schemes, the state plays a strong role in guaranteeing that big business 
gains control over the city. As she demonstrated in the case of the WTC in New York, 
in these schemes, state control can become more repressive, more ideological and less 
representative than in former types of intervention (Zukin, 2010, p. 150–158). 
The last point is straightforward: the cognitive mapping of this reproduction reveals 
how naive it is to consider any ‘thing’ as ‘natural’, as it is to consider any ‘fact’ as 
‘unquestionable’, although these are the basis of their arguments. 
 
4.5. Getting into the swing of things 
Many authors argue that conflict and tension are inherent to democracy in space. 
Rancière (2005, p. 18-26) stated that the Agora had a fluid existence sustained by the 
living words of its interlocutors – the breath of life. The reality of the polis itself was 
like a dancing chorus, like a choreography created by the changing pace of the Agora’s 
speakers. For Zukin (2011, p. 130), democracy is intrinsically loud, unruly, 
unpredictable and dangerous. Therefore, the calm business-friendly environment of 
today exists only through negation and through a soft-disciplining disguised as service 
to ‘better serve you’, which serve to hide any sign of this environment’s imposed social 
order. 
Sennett argues that the transition from Christianity to Modernity changed rituals for 
labour and self-discipline such that comfort was directed to home and fatigue was 
directed to the workplace, thereby suspending the sensory functions of the body. A 
passive relationship with the environment was built by the anaesthesia offered at home, 
on the one hand, and the disciplinary punishment of the street, on the other. Today, we 
observe the emergence of a new type of sensory suspension that is formed by both 
velvet discipline and tangled alienation.  
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These new public spaces extend the enclosure of the subject to the whole field of the 
urban experience. If, in early modernity, the social relations engraved in urban ‘things’ 
enabled the emergence of a new subjectivity in the metropolis, as well as a new 
revolutionary politics of the masses, the move towards an enclosed urban space 
extended the capitalist reification from the working space towards the total social space. 
It is in this sense that we argued that reification is part of the process of reproduction, 
always expanding its limits without changing its nature. Therein lies the reproduction of 
social relations by means of architecture. 
In this experience, architecture becomes the means of hiding behind a curtain of 
spectacular images the reproduction of enclosed forms of social relation, i.e., 
reproducing the estrangement of the subject from the means of production of his own 
conditions. In this sense, these ‘things’ are a process of enclosing the urban space in a 
neoliberal experience of precariousness and consumerism.  
 
4.6. Putting things together: the route to fetish and desire 
This investigation has forced us to confront the social reality of things. Georg Lukács 
(1971) developed his analysis of thingification by confronting mediated and immediate, 
form and content, reason and thing-in-itself, thus revealing how what ‘is’ is the result of 
a process of human production in a historical and social context. Our investigation 
revealed how architectural things is a transformation of social prerogatives into an 
objectification of the entire city, thus framing the experience of reality and the 
possibilities of its appropriation. 
It is in this way that the new forms produced in London are similar to the process of 
primitive accumulation, in which the citizen is progressively separated from the means 
of production and appropriation of the place, and at the same time behaviours are 
reified. This new condition of 'urban enclosure' reasserts the role of cities in the global 
economy by amplifying the reification of social relations beyond the realm of work to 
encompass the entire scenario of one's everyday experience in the city. 
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This process transforms users into 'free sellers' of their citizenship through reified 
mechanisms of tangled social rules, driven spatial consumption and velvet architecture. 
Cosy and kind, domestic and comfortable, these are the new, emerging, bird’s-nest 
forms of imprisonment (completely different from the former means of control); they 
operate through disorientation and comfort, rather than disciplining and punishment. 
The investigation of the production of ‘things' in London’s public space shows that 
there are hidden intentions lying beneath their appearances. These things are the result – 
the spatial individuation – of a deeper layer in the architectural unconscious. The 
products delivered by the profession of architecture are rooted in unconscious methods 
of the discipline. Arguably, the way forward if we are to expand Lukács’ self-critique is 
to investigate the means of architectural reproduction. 
Although the assessment of architectural ‘things’ and its ‘immediate appearances’ has 
already provided a revealing picture, the investigation must go beyond actualised 
appearances because these appearances are produced by acts of power, which install a 
social order and perform a social function. It is for this reason alone that these things 
seem to be objectively real. In this sense, not only do Latham and Koch’s elements 
appear to be real, they also have real social implications. As Marx noted, 
The categories of bourgeois economics consist precisely of forms of this 
kind. They are forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore 
objective, for the relations of production belonging to this historically 
determined mode of social production, i.e. commodity production. The 
whole mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy that 
surrounds the products of labour on the basis of commodity production, 
vanishes therefore as soon as we come to other forms of production 
(Marx, 1990, p. 169). 
It is to this ‘mystery’ and ‘magic’ that we shall turn our investigation in the next 
chapters – as we already dealt with ‘necromancy’ in Chapter 3. Reification is possible 
through 'fetish'. Investigating the contradiction and struggles of the process of spatial 
production should reveal the means by which architecture reproduces social relations, 
i.e., its techniques of phenomena. For now, we would like to summarise one last point 
about objects, so we can find in our map the direction to take towards this fetish. 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1909) identified objects (or, we could say, ‘things’) as the 
representation of the ‘will’ (or, we could say, desire). This means that the subject frames 
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reality to make the subject’s desire possible. To identify an object in the real world is to 
build the means of achieving a goal (i.e., the world is formed by desires). Schopenhauer 
finds this conclusion in the integration of the idea (from Plato) and the a priori (from 
Kant). For Schopenhauer (1909, §31), the thing-in-itself is the same as ‘will’. Thus, all 
phenomena are only re-presentations of desire, i.e., ‘objectified will’. He reaches this 
conclusion by asserting that the world outside Plato’s Cavern is only another world of 
shadows (appearances). Thus, knowledge of the world resides precisely in the logic and 
judgements that allow the subject to predict the sequence of and relationship between 
the shadows, which are actually truthful to both inside and outside the cavern: 
Their wisdom would thus consist in predicting the order of the shadows learned 
from experience. The real archetypes, on the other hand, to which these shadows 
correspond, the eternal Ideas, the original forms of all things, can alone be said 
to have true being (óntôs ón), because they always are, but never become nor 
pass away. To them belongs no multiplicity; for each of them is according to its 
nature only one, for it is the archetype itself…’ (Schopenhauer, 1909, §31). 
In this philosophical framework, we can visualise that the ideas recognising the 
interaction between the shadows are actually the only reality that is always true in itself, 
and exists throughout the different incarnations of these shadows (both the things inside 
and outside the cave). This idea is what Schopenhauer calls the will, and therefore 
objects are the representations of the will. In this sense, although subjects’ desires might 
be hidden in things, these desires are what brings things into existence. Nevertheless, 
updating Schopenhauer’s universalist ontology into historical and materialist reasoning 
is fundamental. This ‘will’ is not a universal and abstract spirit (as reason is in Hegel); 
rather, it is historically produced collective desires. 
In these terms, the objectification of architecture in Rem Koolhaas’ Biennale is only a 
symptom of a deeper process. In the overall scheme of things, architecture itself is 
turned into a reifying practice, wherein reified desires are reproduced by means of 
disciplined transubjectivities and, ultimately, architects are objectified, as we shall 
investigate in the next chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
 Unveiling fetish: hidden artifices and techniques of phenomena 
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5.1. A dancing table 
We have seen how architecture is not a simple thing. It is reified social relations, and 
furthermore, this reification frames subjectivities in cities. How does architecture 
achieve this reification? 
Marx (1990, 163-164) started his conclusion regarding the fetish of the commodity by 
analysing the secret behind a simple table. He urged the reader to turn that ‘sensuous’ 
form (with its four legs) upside down in order to see how it ‘evolves out of its wooden 
brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own 
free will’. It is not only because behind its forms, still made of wood, the table also 
becomes an object to be exchanged, thus creating interactions between subjects in the 
‘market’. Furthermore, that ‘thing’ the table ‘is’ is not only what architects would 
normally make of it: lines, planes, shapes and styles. It is not even what more sensible 
architects would envision as social constructions encircling a cultural habit of sharing 
food. This metaphorical dancing table ‘rather transforms every product of labour into a 
social hieroglyphic. Later on, men try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the 
secret of their own social product’ (Marx, 1990, 167). In this dancing table, Marx finds 
the hidden means through which it was produced: the social knowledge involved, the 
science of materials, the symbolic value it carries, the mobilisation of desire, the logic 
of commodities, the division of labour and, furthermore, subjects enclosed in a chain of 
actions. In other words, he finds the hidden forces reproducing social relations by means 
of an object of design – he finds, namely, the fetish. 
In this sense, the fetish of this dancing table cannot be understood either under the sign 
of a simple verb or as a simple noun. The mysterious character of the fetish of 
commodity in Marx has the ambiguous meaning that it is both a (social) action and the 
result of this (social) action. It has the ambiguous property of being produced by social 
relations and of being productive of social relations. It has the ambiguous property of 
being believed to (or seeming to) have powers that it does not have and at the same time 
constituting forces that could not exist without it. It has the property of being 
simultaneously ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’. 
It is in this sense that we will use the word fetish as a present participle, in the original 
Latin sense of being at the same time an adjective, a noun and a verb. In this sense, the 
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fetish in architecture can be seen as the characteristic in an object or as the constitutive 
forces of this object. Therefore, fetish can be understood as a verb in the original Latin 
partem capit (literally meaning ‘an action’ that ‘takes part’ – a present action). This 
does not intend to add imprecision to the concept. Rather, it draws upon the imprecision 
that makes fetish possible and causes past reified social relations to be accepted as 
natural phenomena. Only in this way can we understand how the table is not a table that 
can dance; rather, it is a dancing table in its very stillness. 
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to understand how architectural operations inhabits 
things, continuing to act in their very stillness. We aim to understand how architecture 
mobilises mediated social processes in the form of immediate truthful things. We aim to 
understand how architecture transforms ‘things into persons, and persons into things’ 
(Marx, 1990, p. 209). In this sense, we will need to unveil the black box of the non-
trivial machinery of architecture, we will need to unveil the enigmatic operations behind 
the production of architectural things, and we will need to unfold the methods implied 
in the production of ‘architectural truths’. Only after deciphering this hieroglyphic 
enigma will we be able to recognise, later on in Chapter 6, how architects ultimately 
subject themselves to the fetishes of the discipline (namely, the objectification of 
architects themselves by means of shared phantasies). 
5.2. Intermezzo: magic blasphemies 
It is interesting that in Ancient Egypt, and certainly in South Asia as 
well, the architect was privy to secret knowledge, again knowledge 
that would be used in constructing a temple, constructing a palace, 
again, building typologies really associated with the upper echelons 
of society and power. And so, architects were also thought, 
particularly in Egypt, to possess magical powers and I think in 
today's architecture profession they still cultivate on that as well, 
with the star architect. I mean, I was just reading now, he would 
probably dispute this, you know, identification with the star 
architect… the Swiss architect Peter Zumthor and the notion that he 
has to interview the client, and the client has to convince him that 
she or he is worthy of having a Peters Zumthor architecture. So, 
again, sort of being initiated into the cult of the priestly caste of 
architecture in some way. And, in a funny kind of way, I think that 
mixing up architects with magic and religion and, again, having 
certain powers still continues on today. (Interview with Mary 
Woods, in Arbuckle Industries, 2015) 
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In January 2016, David Cameron (2016) identified the demolition of council houses as a 
key strategy to tackle social problems, to help businesses flourish, and even to improve 
‘national security’ against ‘Islamist extremism’. For him, ‘the bulldozing of sink 
estates’ was at ‘the heart of turnaround Britain’. For David Cameron, the strategy was 
simple: to ‘sweep away the planning blockages’ so that the rules in play for all would 
not apply to the people in power, to build ‘new steps’ that would ‘reduce political and 
reputational risk’ so that the reputations of the people involved would not be destroyed 
by the outrage caused by the measures, and to create new uses for public spaces that 
were seen as ‘wasted open space’. As a nice aristocrat, Cameron saw utility only in the 
areas of the ‘park’ (for pleasure) and the ‘garden’ (of earthly delights), which valorise 
the buildings as commodities, and, of course, he stated: ‘To finance this, we’ll establish 
a new £140 million fund’, as the supposed entrepreneurs could only make this enterprise 
possible through the exceptional channelling of public funding (thus appropriated as 
private). With that, Cameron’s plan was to destroy 100 housing estates, displacing 
100,000 poor residents. Thus, what was put into play was precisely an assault (by the 
rich) on the most vulnerable and poor, or, as Cameron would put it ‘my second term 
agenda is to wage an all-out assault on poverty’; and he added: ‘regeneration plans. For 
some, this will simply mean knocking them down’ (Cameron, 2016). How could David 
Cameron so influentially identify the root causes of all social evil in council estates? 
Well, he did not do that alone; he used architecture (research and theory) to support his 
conclusion, thus glossing it with an air of objective truth: 
The riots of 2011 didn’t emerge from within terraced streets or low-rise 
apartment buildings. As spatial analysis of the riots has shown, the 
rioters came overwhelmingly from these post-war estates. Almost 3 
quarters of those convicted lived within them. That’s not a coincidence 
(Cameron, 2016). 
Of course, we do not aim to argue that this is coincidence. Quite the opposite: we want 
to determine how architecture became, on the one hand, an instrument used to manage 
inequalities resulting from years of segregation and lack of social investment and, on the 
other hand, a source of powerful rhetoric to further expropriate the poor. This is exactly 
what was done by the prestigious Space Syntax Laboratory at the Bartlett Architectural 
School, in partnership with Space Syntax Limited, a company funded to develop 
commercially viable applications of the work developed in the Laboratory, ‘to provide 
industry-focused research for commercially-minded clients’ (see 
www.spacesyntax.com). 
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Space Syntax aims to use the technology of mapping and data processing in urban 
spaces to improve the ‘operational performance’ of these spaces. Thus, the company 
uses a series of techniques to conduct simulations and the spatial modelling of data, to 
forecast models and predict human behaviour, to produce highly graphic visual analyses 
and find patterns and geometries, all ‘evaluated using a mathematical algorithm’ and 
with ‘the use of our evidence-informed tools and techniques’. In this way, its research 
decisions seem to be the products of an automaton, with no ethical choices involved; 
they seem to be based only on ‘objective truth’. Fetish does not lie, fetish creates 
concrete reality in a realm of simulacra (see ‘service offer’ in www.spacesyntax.com). 
In its report titled London, Riots Research, the Space Syntax (2011) group eliminates all 
variables that might interfere with the model it has built – for instance, access to good 
quality health and educational services – so that the result of the research coincides with 
the pre-existing hypothesis, namely ‘a hypothesis that riot incidents occurred in places 
that were both near town centres and near large post-war housing estates’. As we saw in 
Lukács’ and Marx’s discussions about the fetish of things, once you take the immediate 
as an absolute, thus eliminating any critical considerations of the whole of society (say 
exclusion, education, inequalities, racism, and so on), the reification of reality becomes 
effective truth. 
In addition to the astonishing complexity of the ‘algorithms’ deployed, which makes 
viewers feel they are witnessing a magic show, the studies of the Laboratory generally 
deploy a simple method based on the theory that ‘Space is the machine’ (Hillier, 2007). 
First, a total reification of space into a trivial machinist system is assumed; then, 
convoluted methods and vast amounts of collected data are presented; then, some type 
of automaton algorithm performs calculations that are impossible to understand (always 
summarily mentioned, as they are too complex for a detailed explanation, and 
sometimes presented as a short video of moving objects); then, the rendering of models, 
maps and astonishing graphics makes the simulation seem more real than reality itself. 
After this careful manipulation of information, the conclusions (especially the raw and 
simplistic ones) magically confirm the first ‘hypothesis’.82 Thus, any conclusion is 
                                                          
82 The conception of information in Simondon (2013), discussed in chapter 2, helps to clarify how this 
fetish operates. For Simondon, information is not simply a message transmitted between two individuals.  
For him, information is a mise en form (setting in form) because a mediation must be created to create and 
maintain a connection between two disparate realms. This mediation articulates the preindividualities on 
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presented as the revelation of an invisible truth (for instance, one might ‘see’ the 
‘invisible architecture of Venice’ magically coinciding with a Le Corbusier design in 
Psarra, 2012). 
It is in this sense that the production of truth cannot be separated from its ethical and 
political implications because these implications are the sources of that production, even 
when they are presented as impartial. Just as Jane Jacobs was engaged (as we discussed 
in chapter 1) in the move from an aesthetic of the ‘big state’ towards a neoliberal 
ideology of small entrepreneurs, the contemporary ‘discourses on complexity’ are also 
engaged in procedures of fetish. 
Douglas Spencer (2012) demonstrated how hegemonic architectural discourses on 
complexity are engaged not only in legitimating but also in constituting the special 
means of post-disciplinary societies of control (2012, pp. 3-11, 98). For instance, in his 
account of the BMW headquarters designed by the Zaha Hadid Office and the 
Ravensbourne College designed by FOA, Spencer systematically unveils how 
contradiction is wiped off the concept of complexity. In the case of the BMW project, 
this is done by an attempt at ‘managing’ and ‘articulating’ complexity (pp. 41, 76) by 
naturalising humans as ‘molecular’ agents subjected to self-organisation in a ‘laissez 
faire naturalism’ (pp. 66-67), which is carefully produced by architecture to apply the 
general means of a swarm theory (p. 62), thus producing a collective subjectivity 
passive enough to be captured (p. 67). 
In the case of FOA, the office conceives ‘complexity’ as a sort of universal Hegelian 
ideal emerging as a natural process without agency (Spencer, 2012, 131, 134). In so 
doing, the Office conceives a theory of complexity that eliminates politics, history, 
criticality and any conceptual speculation (p. 122-134). In this way, complexity can 
become a means of steering and control (p. 137) in the foundation of a sort of 
‘ordoliberalism’ (p. 163). In FOA’s project for the Ravensbourne College, the 
conditions of contemporary capitalism (such as precariousness, market realism, citizens 
as consumers, fragmentation, deterritorialisation, and networking) are designed into the 
building spaces, aiming to naturally frame the students’ subjectivities. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
both sides of the field; thus, it is a process that structures the potentialities. In this sense, information is an 
action that forms the object. The active process of articulating a form and its content reveals how the 
message is actually forming the individuation of the supposedly neutral object. 
 
 
183 
 
In this sense, fetish does not simply ‘hide’ truth as if it were lying. Fetish actually 
creates reality in a very specific way. It not only provides a logic for the functioning of 
objective reality, it does so by means of mysterious artifices operating through the 
created objects. In this sense, architecture not only hides intentions within space, it also 
reproduces them, as the viewpoint – framed into the reality – further frames the 
subjectivity of others, as if it were a magical power revealing the natural character of 
existing reality (see Mary Woods quote above). 
In this chapter, we shall first establish a definition of fetish in architecture; second, we 
shall identify and analyse the use of architecture as fetish through concrete examples of 
housing policies in London; third, we shall perform a regressive analysis of the 
operational use of fetish in architecture, highlighting how its roots are associated with 
the discipline of architecture – an orchestrated carnival of architects, pirates, courtiers 
and stewards; finally, we shall discuss how architecture produces things through 
phenomena-techniques and how this renders contradictions that are always on the brink 
of collapsing.  This picture aims to reveal how fetish not only operates in the production 
of ‘external’ objects but also produces an objectification of architects themselves.  
The point is not to blame architects for how things are; rather, we aim to reveal how 
things come to inhabit the architectural unconscious. Or, as Adorno explains: 
‘Dialectics is the self-consciousness of the objective context of delusion; it does not 
mean to have escaped from that context. Its objective goal is to break out of the context 
from within’ (Adorno, 2004, p. 406).  
5.3. The fetish of facts 
‘The good historian, the genealogist, will know what one must think of 
this masquerade. He must absolutely not refuse the spirit of seriousness, 
but instead he should want to take it to the extreme: he wants to stage a 
big carnival for the time when the masks return incessantly. [...] 
genealogy is a history just like an orchestrated carnival (Foucault 2005, 
p. 278). 
In the quotation above, Foucault was emphasising the mechanism through which he 
investigated the history of ideas as a succession of truths produced socially and 
emphasised as reality by means of power. For him, the question was not whether 
knowledge is power; rather, power was the position from which subjects could impose a 
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notion as truth. In this sense, the concepts accepted by society as truths have a history of 
creation and struggle, which occurs through the institutions of society. 
When Bruno Latour went to a laboratory of Neuroendocrinology (Latour and Woolgar, 
1986) in 1979, he entered the world of scientific truth production as an anthropologist 
who was entering a mysterious primitive tribe, trying to understand its activities and 
how these activities would produce the tribe’s beliefs. He would soon unveil a world 
full of veiled hierarchies, machinations, and procedures for the creation of new 
phenomena. He noted: 
It is thus possible that there is some useful similarity between Marx's 
(1867) notion of fetishism and the notion of scientific facts. (Both fact 
and fetish share a common etymological origin.) In both cases, a 
complex variety of processes come into play whereby participants forget 
that what is ‘out there’ is the product of their own ‘alienated’ work 
(Latour and Woolgar, 1986, p. 259). 
Later, Latour (1999) would develop the idea of ‘factishes’. While a fact is supposed to 
be a property of an independent object, and a fetish is supposed to be the projections of 
a subject's idea upon the things-in-themselves, the idea of factishes presupposes an 
indivisibility between object and subject, with the product being the result of an action, 
an event, where the subject acts upon reality and reality acts upon the subject. However, 
it is exactly because factishes are produced that they have real effects on humans, on 
things, and even on nature. 
Thus, in Latour’s sense, fetish is a fact of human life. Again, fetish would be not a 
simple lie, nor would it be a simple deceiving mechanism hiding intentions behind the 
appearance of a thing. Although Latour’s perspective recognises how fetish creates 
actual things that have concrete consequences, this perspective falls into an argument 
for multiplicity, in which the truth becomes only a play, and as long as you connect your 
fetish with multiple ‘others’, it would become more operative, in a sort of postmodernist 
argument for diversity. What this argument fails to do is to take into account – behind 
the production of truth – the game of power, the imposition of a ‘will’ and the notion of 
the ‘whole’. 
When Lukács (1990) points to the centrality of the notion of the whole, he is implying 
that in the production of things – mediated by fetish – therein lies a way of reasoning 
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and an ethical conception of man and society. As we have seen, in his conception, in 
each part, each singular thing, there is the presence of the historical context and of a 
philosophical understanding of the world. For him, the mathematical and pragmatic 
reasoning reduces social relations to things as they exist here and now, thus ignoring 
their historical formation, which usually is based on blood, violence, or exploitation. 
Furthermore, the conception of things implies an ethical view of the whole community 
of man, including an understanding of what is fair, an understanding of how life should 
be lived and what is dignifying in existence, a division of labour, a conception of the 
agents in play, a conception of politics and economy, and even an understanding of how 
we should or should not respect the points of view of others. 
Therefore, fetish is not the same as, for instance, the idea of ‘method’. Fetish is not 
simply a procedure, but it is a mystifying procedure, it gives birth to an event – in the 
sense of Baudiou as we saw in Chapter 3, with ethical consequences – and creates 
reality. However, it does that with the appearance of a ‘naturally existing’ thing. In this 
sense, fetish is not magic (i.e., where the magician and the public know it is all a trick), 
because he who acts by means of fetish leads to the belief in that truth. Thus, fetish is 
eminently a social device, it actualises an ethics in reality, and it is subjected to struggle 
between competing arguments. 
Therefore, when Mies Van Der Rohe praised ‘Less is More’, he was actually saying ‘if 
you hide the true artifices of the building process of architecture beneath a clean 
appearance, you will make people believe that that intriguing and unnatural beauty was 
achieved with pure procedures, thus they will be strangely seduced by it’. Nevertheless, 
he might have actually believed he was only doing ‘less’ and not hiding the ‘more’, just 
as the Egyptian priest performing his fetish, in the quotation above from Mary Woods, 
was acting with the knowledge available and controlled by him, thus making this 
knowledge real – as much as this knowledge was making him real – through the actual 
construction of a temple. Similarly, Mies Van Der Rohe hides the constructive pillars of 
the Barcelona Pavilion by adding a clean chrome cover – what is, at least, one thing 
‘more’. Additionally, the massive marble walls are in fact hollow spaces. In the unseen 
void the ‘more’ is hidden: the effect of a clean massive wall is produced by placing 
massive blocks in the corners (so that there are no visible joints in the marble), while the 
middle blocks are in fact thin marble finishing plates covering the elements of support. 
Thus, perhaps unconsciously, the fetish of ‘less’ is produced by hiding the ‘more’. 
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When artifices are consciously managed, arguably, we enter the realm of ‘sprezzatura’, 
an essentially modern technique of concealing artifice. In the opening chapter of 
Manfredo Tafuri's (2006) magna opera on the Renaissance, he discusses the concept of 
sprezzatura. Mentioned in Castiglioni's book The Courtier (about the etiquette of the 
court), sprezzatura is the main aesthetic attitude expected from a courtier or artist. This 
procedure consists of creating an 'illusion', just as the 'perspective' creates one in a 
painting, but it is applied to various realms. For instance, a courtier's 'gait' was of the 
utmost importance for social distinction; this gait entailed the transformation of regular 
walking by a series of small variations to create grace, lightness, structure, delicacy and 
grandeur. However, all transgression of a normal walk should be concealed, so it would 
not look fake. Thus, a product could keep the appearance of being 'naturally artificial'. 
In the final result, an elegant courtier gait 'looks effortless' and distinct. Fetish and 
sprezzatura have in common this ability to produce phenomena by hiding artifice (as we 
shall see towards the end of this chapter). In the social realm, revealing the means of 
this type of production demands a form of social struggle. 
When Marx (1990, pp. 163-177) spoke of the fetish of the commodity, he was forging 
the intellectual weapons of an imminent struggle in a period between the age of 
revolutions and the age of extremes (as Hobsbawm would term it). Thus, Marx was 
emphasising that what the powerful regarded as simple facts were – concretely – the 
products of the historical development of capitalist society. The aim here is to reveal 
how intentions are hidden behind the affirmation of certain social facts.83 Thus, fetish 
can be understood as a key element in the struggle against the reproduction of society. 
Furthermore, as in Adorno’s quote above, the analysis of fetish is not to deny its reality 
but to help build the ‘consciousness of the objective context of delusion... Its objective 
goal is to break out of the context from within’ (Adorno, 2004, p. 406). 
In the next section, we will look behind the stage to unmask the tricks of the magicians, 
but only as a first step to, in the following section, understand how the whole theatre 
operates, placing active subjects in the stage and passive spectators in comfortable seats. 
In this way, just as Hamlet’s theatre in the theatre revealed the phantasm to be true, we 
                                                          
83 If we return to the example Schopenhauer’s cavern, there is a ‘will’ that connects the shadows both 
inside and outside the cavern. And, we should reinforce, this will is not to be seen as a universal spirit but 
as the concrete manifestation of an ethical approach to society and as an engaged action of collective 
subjectivities towards the construction of social objects. 
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aim to turn fetish against itself, and reveal how it is the means of the architectural 
objectification of architects. 
5.4. Tracing fetish in the production of London 
To assess the process of fetish, this study turned to the production of space in London 
and assessed the new 'housing' policy proposed by the mayor of London (Johnson, 
2009, 2010, 2013 and 2014). The formulation of the housing problem in these terms 
resulted in the imposition of a large-scale-capital solution upon the interests of common 
citizens. 
 To 'bring forward land' for development, the proposed tactic was to change the laws 
governing 'compulsory purchase', 'land assembly', 'anti-social behaviour' and 'affordable 
housing' – a concept that imposes a substitute ethics on and hides a new logic in place of 
council housing strategies. The result of these changes was the dismantling of 
traditional communities and urban places through a process of accumulation by 
dispossession – a term used by David Harvey, 2004, to acknowledge how ‘new’ 
imperialism uses laws to strip local citizens of older forms of wealth to which they held 
title – and a subsequent re-concentration of property in the hands of big real estate 
actors. In other words, in a time of financial crisis, architecture became a tool for 
transforming individually dispersed patrimonial capital into concentrated capital for a 
centralised renting economy. 
Historical data collected by the organisation Shelter (2015a) have demonstrated that the 
1980s witnessed a significant decrease in the construction of social housing in England. 
Currently, the annual construction rate of social housing is 90% lower than the rate of 
production in the mid-1950s. In this context, the use of Compulsory Purchase Orders 
(CPOs) has been advocated as the foremost tool to be used in producing a greater 
number of houses. An analysis of that will reveal the fetish of this proposal. 
Although CPOs are a legal instrument that has existed since 1961 with the purpose of 
enabling authorities to serve public interests (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2005), the large-scale use of CPOs as an instrument of housing production 
in London is a current trend. Evidence of this change is seen in the creation (in 2002) of 
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the Compulsory Purchase Association, a member organisation that aims to guide and 
promote the practice as well as to support relevant expertise and networking. The result 
is that the majority of local authorities make use of 1 or 2 orders per year, for a total of 
more than 40 per year (Dees, 2012). This instrument has been endorsed by the former 
mayor of London (Johnson, 2013, p. 77) as a key strategy for 'land assembly'. 
Furthermore, the major shift in the use of this instrument is related to a shift in 
interpretation. Since the economic crisis of 2009, any benefit to the economy has been 
interpreted as ‘of public interest'. In this sense, an instrument that was intended for the 
common good has been oriented to favour the market. In the case of a regeneration 
process in Barnet Council, which faced massive street protests and resistance from local 
residents, the council leader, Richard Cornelius, reportedly said,  
The regeneration project will transform the estate and will provide high 
quality and attractive new homes at a time when public finances are 
incredibly tight. We believe that this is very much in the public interest 
(Booth, 2015). 
Another common justification for this process is the austerity imposed upon local 
governments. The regeneration process is often connected with the process of 
privatising public spaces, a process that saves local authorities from the maintenance of 
streets and squares. When asked whether the new policies on creating housing using 
CPOs could be implemented in public spaces in a manner consistent with the public 
interest, a Great London Authority higher officer – who asked to remain anonymous –  
answered as follows: 
It could be coherent with it. But it will not. It is not the interest of 
housing developers. It is not just a problem of design. The Planning 
Department will not reinforce it. (...) The public management of the 
streets involves funding. So it needs money. (...) There is a large amount 
of things to be done in the public space, and it is simply easier to do it 
with corporations and a local authority. When there is many landlords 
involved, things becomes difficult, and it is hard to negotiate all the 
interests. With a local authority holding the land, it is easier. There is just 
no money to do otherwise (Anonymous, 2014, in an interview to the 
author in the process of developing this thesis). 
In addition to this point, data from Shelter (2015a) demonstrated that from 2003 to 
2014, the number of rented social houses remained nearly stable. After 2003, there was 
an increasing shift from houses being rented by local authorities to houses being rented 
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by housing associations. These associations are non-profit organisations; thus, they 
represented one more step in the downturn of the welfare state. Furthermore, the 
National Affordable Housing Programme, created in 2008, is a step away from the 
previous models; in this new programme, public funding is allocated to partner 
developers to deliver homes for both rent and ownership at 80% of the market price. 
This policy ostensibly provides socially committed houses. Nevertheless, with a 72% 
increase in the ratio of the median house price to the median salary between 2008 and 
2014, this 20% discount offers little to people excluded from the market. A rigorous 
analysis should reveal it to be nothing more than an instrument of wealth dispossession 
and property accumulation. 
London's current housing policy was first detailed in a 2010 document (Johnson, 2010). 
In 2013, a draft document for consultancy was elaborated (Johnson, 2013) and, later, a 
final statutory document was formally approved (Johnson, 2014). The 2014 version is 
an especially tricky and artful text, wherein statements at the beginning support 
contradictory proposals in the middle. Furthermore, a careful analysis comparing the 
two versions of the documents (the consultancy document and the approved document 
were compared using the tools of common word software) exposes a series of key 
changes. 
Although none of the proposals underwent any substantial changes, and many of them 
were amended on an ongoing basis, two facts are especially important. On the one hand, 
part 5, 'About this Strategy', which revealed the subjectivity of choices made in the 
proposals, simply disappeared, as if the proposals were the result of mysterious 
technicalities. On the other hand, a vast series of sentences and paragraphs – direct and 
revealing statements regarding the chosen strategies – were altered into obscure, 
labyrinthine rhetoric. The following analysis of this procedure will reveal the devices 
used by this politics of appearances and disappearances – a politics that governs the 
production of urban space.  
Here, we encounter what we conceived above as a fetish by sprezzatura. There are 
many examples, but due to the constraints of this chapter, only one will be presented. 
For instance, the sentence 'The GLA is particularly keen to explore the concept of a 
London Housing Bank focused on large-scale developments to generate additional 
supply' (Johnson, 2013, p. 39) was changed to: 
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The Mayor wishes to develop a London Housing Bank with the aim of 
accelerating the pace of development and generating additional housing 
supply, particularly on large sites where speed of delivery is significantly 
constrained by the traditional house-builder business model (Johnson, 
2014, p. 68).  
A further analysis of the documents reveals many such sprezzaturas. Of great 
importance is the account of the Localism Act of 2011 that transferred planning powers 
to the Great London Authority (GLA), 'while removing the legal restriction on the 
Mayor to spend money on housing' (Johnson, 2013). In this case, the policy builds the 
discourse on public investment in the private sector to legitimise the creation of the 
'London Housing Bank' as a funding body of the private sector. This is one of the main 
strategies in London's housing policy: 'due to the imperative for increased supply of 
homes of all tenures, it is expected that cross-subsidy will primarily come through the 
provision of open market housing' (Johnson, 2014, p. 70). 'The Mayor wants to 
accelerate delivery, bringing new buyers into the market via a Build to Rent fund, 
backed by the government's debt guarantee' (Johnson, 2013, p. 48). 
In a context of financial crises, the risk of such large investments is not in the banks' 
interest. Therefore, it is proposed that all the risk should be assumed by the public 
sector, while the profit remains in the hands of the developers. This is the case because 
the loans will be 'available at below market rents for a fixed period, at the end of which 
the homes can be sold on. The funding provided by the public sector would be repaid, 
potentially including a value uplift' (Johnson, 2013, p. 39). Therefore, developers are 
granted the use of public money as capital and will only ‘potentially’ pay it back with 
some uplift; but they will surely profit with zero risk: 
[T]he London Housing Bank should initially utilize up to £200 million of 
this funding (…) There will be flexible loan terms at lower than 
commercial rates, to enable registered providers to offer sub-market rents 
for the period of the loan. At the end of the loan period the Mayor will 
expect a positive return on the loan and the initial capital to be paid back 
(Johnson, 2014, p. 69). 
Furthermore, the Localism Act 2011 created a mass transfer of land ownership to the 
GLA, which became the largest public landowner. Therefore, the policy document has a 
specific section on how to privatise this public land, entitled: '4.12 Bringing forward 
public sector land.’ It aims to do so 'by making it faster, easier and cheaper for public 
landowners to bring forward land for development. It establishes a framework 
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agreement of 25 developers and contractors' (Johnson, 2014, p. 77). In addition, the 
'housing zones' would create 'lighter touch planning and effective land assembly, 
including, where necessary, the use of compulsory purchase powers’ (Johnson, 2014, p. 
77).  In her analysis of this trend, Raquel Rolnik notes that this easy access to planning 
permits without any control of land speculation is leading to further land banking (UN, 
2014, p. 10). 
This new 'lighter touch planning' (so dear to neoliberal rhetoric) is (not so) surprisingly 
accompanied by an intensive mobilisation of the state apparatus to benefit big industry: 
'The Mayor will use his full range of powers to get more homes built in all sectors, and 
this will involve new initiatives to secure additional finance, bring forward the land for 
development and build the industry capacity' (Johnson, 2014, p. 24). If assessed 
fragmentally, this statement could seem to indicate that the government is somehow 
retaking public control over the development of the housing sector. Nevertheless, the 
majority of new houses will be produced by the private sector as supposedly 'affordable 
houses’. Understanding the 'unaffordability' of these 'affordable' houses should be 
sufficient to unveil this sprezzatura. 
In the previously mentioned Barnet Council case, original two-bedroom flats were 
offered at a value of £175,000 to those from whom they were being compulsorily 
purchased, whilst the new one-bedroom 'affordable' flats were expected to be sold for 
£415,000. In addition, the proposed scheme would provide 199 fewer 'affordable' 
houses compared to the number of social houses previously available (Booth, 2015). 
Furthermore, former council tenants were not given any choices other than buying a 
new flat or facing the private rental market. This made it impossible for the local 
community to participate in the 'sustainability' of the development. This situation is 
similar to the city’s other regeneration schemes. In the case of the Elephant and Castle 
regeneration scheme, 'affordable rents' are expected to be double the price of previous 
rents, and new flats cost almost three times what the originals cost (Wainwright, 2014). 
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Diagram 27: Dislocation of Heygate Estate Residents. Source: the author (based on 
information from Better Elephant, 2013). 
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In reaction, local residents created an association called Better Elephant to fight this 
process of dispossession using live information about the social effects of the new 
policies. The diagram 27 (in the previous page) was produced on the basis of a map 
created by the association to illustrate where the scheme was displacing current 
residents (Better Elephant, 2013). 
In their efforts to provide land for development, the creators of these strategies 
consistently articulate tactics of compulsory purchase and land assembly that overlap 
the local scale. All of the solutions produce space on a scale that overrides the local 
level. As Zukin (2010: p. 222) asserts, we may have not seen the end of history, but we 
are certainly seeing the end of 'place-bound culture'. Therefore, there is a different 
housing problem that does not fit the rhetoric of the policy document.  
The problem that needs to be solved is not that of producing as many expensive flats as 
possible; it is that of providing housing for Londoners. The reality that is not addressed 
by any of the proposals is that of the crude living conditions in London. Despite efforts 
to rectify these precarious conditions, data from Shelter (2015b) show that 20.6% of the 
houses in England are 'non-decent' (i.e., houses in bad physical condition with 'modern' 
facilities that are failing, not thermally adequate or fall below minimum standards). 
Furthermore, 35% of private rented households in England fail to meet the Decent 
Homes Standard (UN, 2014, p. 8). In addition, 11.3% of London households are 
overcrowded (ONS, 2014). 
Thus, London's housing problem is formulated in an illusionistic manner, and the 
proposed way of managing the crisis creates a 'false solution'. The assumption of 
London's housing strategy is that an increase in private production is the solution that 
will enable the delivery of necessary housing. Although 77% of the production of new 
homes is already in the hands of the private sector, overall production remains at less 
than half of the baseline needed (UN, 2014, p. 7). Therefore, London's policies are 
actually disenfranchising the city’s most vulnerable residents of the right to adequate 
housing (UN, 2014, p. 20) whilst producing a massive process of property accumulation 
by dispossession. This reveals the fetish that empowers a 'naturally artificial' process of 
dispossession. 
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Although David Cameron’s use of spatial syntax simulations was a means of imposing a 
truth, and Boris Johnson’s sprezzatura was used to create a false problem, those are 
only two steps in the long history of using architecture as an instrument of fetish in 
social space. How deeply into the discipline of architecture do these fetishist procedures 
go? Are these magical phenomena of architecture isolated cases, or do they have roots 
in a broader social experience? 
We can envisage a conflict of logics emerging from these black boxes of neutral 
theories and methodologies. There is a conflict between fetish as a means of 
reproducing social relations and the events that (ethically) create such relations as 
possible alternatives. In addition, we saw in previous chapters how this urban condition 
surpasses gentrification (the exchange of one class by other) and entails the reification 
of the whole experience of citizenship in the city.  
Next, we diverge into a regressive analysis of the discipline of architecture with the aim 
of revealing the fissures in its linear narrative of neutrality. With that, we aim to further 
reveal the roots of fetish, the fundaments of the theatre that make it possible in the first 
place. 
 
5.5. Regressions in the production of fetish 
As we saw above, the production of urban ‘things’ presupposes an image of the whole 
or, more precisely, institutionalises a way of conceiving truth and society. Thus, the 
production of things is simultaneously the reproduction of specific forms of social 
relations. The architect functions as a gear in the manufacturing of these social orders. 
As we go deeper into our analysis of fetish in the discipline of architecture, we shall 
recognise that fetish not only reproduces social relations and produces things, it also 
reproduces the discipline of architecture itself and produces an architectural reified 
consciousness. Thus, the production of truth in architecture, in addition to having an 
implicit conception of society, also has an implicit conception of what architects are and 
how architectural production happens. Next, we aim to investigate regressively the 
mechanisms involved in picturing the ‘geniality’ of the architect, who supposedly acts 
as a super-individual – conceiving and creating social space. 
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Mary Woods (1999) termed this vision of a super-individual architect as ‘Roarkism’, 
after the character Howard Roark in Ayn Rand’s novel The Fountainhead, which 
‘focus[es] on the architect as solitary creator to the exclusion of other narrators and 
narratives’ (Woods, 1999, p. 1).84 Thus, Woods aims to bring the mise-en-scène and the 
background to the forefront in order to understand the formation of the profession of 
architecture; she investigates the conflicts and the multiple participants that support the 
actions of the architect (such as the schools, the building committee, the courtroom, the 
clients, the admirers and the critics). In doing so, she aims to break with the traditional 
narrative of architectural history – a narrative based on the architects’ biographies (as 
we discussed in chapter 3) that has little to say about how architecture is actually done. 
However, despite Woods’ intention, over the course of the book, the individual figures 
of the first professional architects in America continue to play the role of guiding lights 
in her historical fabric. 
The above observation is not, in itself, a depreciative comment on her work; as we have 
seen, fetishes have a real impact on reality. Nevertheless, next, we aim to investigate 
how, besides using fetish to forge an implicit vision of the whole, the discipline also 
produces a specific form of fetish: the ‘architect’ himself. Once we reveal the fetish 
creating the image of the architect, we shall uncover the underlying fantasy (the third 
and supporting layer in our unconscious architectural pyramid). 
This is not, however, an eccentricity of the figure of the architect (although it is not a 
coincidence that it was the chosen subject of Rand’s ‘bible’ of individualism). As in all 
reifications, the whole of society is constitutive of its parts. Thus, we shall use examples 
of major figures of fetish in the contemporary mythology of ‘genius’ to develop a 
critical awareness of those types of social ‘facts’. We shall start by recalling the most 
emblematic figure of the ‘genius’ in our times (mentioned in Chapter 3), namely, Steve 
Jobs. 
Biographies of Steve Jobs (Jobs, 2013) usually present the narrative of a brilliant mind 
who leads a revolution, and the narrative continues: despite facing much difficulty, 
                                                          
84 Adam Curtis (2002), in the documentary The Century of the Self, captures how – progressively over the 
last century – the narrative of the self, and the individual’s self-realisation, spread as a dominant ideology 
in connection with a change in the mode of production and a new focus on consumerism and the 
realisation of personal wishes. 
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indifference and resistance, in a magical moment induced by an LSD hallucination, Jobs 
had a vision of the future and worked hard to realise it. Nevertheless, the actual 
operative means of production he created functioned through propaganda. By 
constructing a magical narrative, he was able to recruit brilliant minds to work in his 
name. Furthermore, the actual elements of innovation (the GPS, the voice-activated 
system, the touch-screen display and the internet) in his most famous ‘invention’ – the 
iPhone – were actually developed by state-funded research (see Mazzucato, 2010). 
Thus, the fetish of Jobs was not to mysteriously create the iPhone; rather, it was the 
creation of a company/narrative able to appropriate both the work of individuals and the 
social work developed by state-funded research. Thus, the secret of his success was the 
creation of this accepted mythology that he was himself a genius. By this means – the 
fetish of the genius – he concretely managed to appropriate the work of others as the 
result of his own genius. 
Furthermore, Jobs did not invent this abstract machinery for expropriating inventions. 
Thomas Edison is perhaps the most iconic modern ‘inventor’ and has been 
systematically depicted in schools and by the media as the genius behind the invention 
of such things as the ‘light bulb’. Nevertheless, a series of studies of the actual means by 
which the inventions (commonly attributed to Edison) were produced shows a different 
picture. In the early days of the Thomas Edison laboratory in West Orange, he was 
employing more than 200 scientists, craftsmen, labourers and machinists. When the 
laboratory expanded and became associated with a factory complex, the number of 
employees jumped to 5000, and today General Electric employs more than 300,000 
people (Padgett, 2016). At the beginning, these men were paid only ‘working man’s 
wage’; however, the famous inventor reportedly said that – in exchange for their 
ambition – his employees were given the opportunity to work side-by-side with a genius 
(Bellis, 2016). However, how much of the lab’s creative labour came from Edison and 
how much came from his workers? 
Carlson (1988) has studied the process by which the alkaline storage battery was 
invented. He argues that during the course of this invention, Thomas Edison developed 
a new way to produce inventions. Previously, Edison would work with mechanics and 
craftsmen in a relatively loose way, wherein those workers would investigate diverse 
aspects of an invention, and eventually Edison would step in ‘only at the appropriate 
moment’ to ‘pull together the various discoveries and improvements into a successful 
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invention’. Later, in Edison’s laboratory, large groups of chemists, engineers and 
college-educated scientists would work on experiments focused on very specific goals, 
in a systematic, step-by-step arrangement of assignments. In shifting from a ‘divergent’ 
to a ‘convergent’ style, Edison became a manager who oversaw the project, a role that 
left him time to focus on strategies of productivity and commercialisation.85 However, 
the ‘most important’ role now played by Edison was to ‘motivate his research team’, 
using ‘decidedly informal’ techniques of ‘motivating and directing’ through his ‘use of 
a personal, folksy style [that] may well have been deliberate’ (Carlson, 1988, p. 10-11). 
 Although this convergent approach produced highly reliable results, it 
came at the cost of requiring over 50,000 individual experiments. 
Furthermore, Edison had thoroughly routinized the innovation process. 
By breaking down the research into a sequence of small, standardized 
experiments, Edison had altered the creative process from hands-on 
ingenuity and skilled observation to persistence and careful record-
keeping. Gone were the last vestiges of the ‘heroic’ myth of invention in 
which insight came in a blinding flash; results now came by plodding 
through innumerable experiments (Carlson, 1988, p. 6). 
 
Invention became an ‘orderly’, ‘predictable’ process, making Edison’s ‘large staff and 
substantial facilities’ an advantage to beat competitors, which in turn made ‘the 
innovation process a reliable component of business strategy’ (Carlson, 1988, p. 11). 
For these reasons, his friend Henry Ford reportedly said, ‘Mr. Edison gave America just 
what was needed at that moment in history. They say that when people think of me, they 
think of my assembly line. Mr. Edison, you built an assembly line which brought 
together the genius of invention, science, and industry’ (quoted in Newton, 1987, p. 31). 
For these reasons, the same critique Marx applied to the fetish of the commodity (used 
by capitalists to alienate products from workers in industrial assembly lines) can be 
applied to the fetish of the invention (used by the ‘genius’ to alienate the creative work 
of a collective). Correspondingly, if Thomas Edison was famously fond of saying 
‘Genius is 1% inspiration and 99% perspiration’, we could say that what was actually 
taking place was 1% fetish and 99% expropriated work. 
In addition to developing this abstract assembly line to expropriate the work of others, 
Thomas Edison cultivated his fame through vast investments in marketing and 
                                                          
85 For instance, he participated in the association that developed ‘programmed obsolescence’. 
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especially through the legal mechanism of patents. Edison alone is credited with the 
invention of 1,093 patents (Simonton et al., 2015). Lemley (2011) investigated how the 
conception of a sole inventor – which is implied in patent law – is a myth, as inventions 
come from progressive collective work and are therefore frequently produced 
simultaneously by independent groups, as ‘Inventors build on the work of those who 
came before, and new ideas are often “in the air”’. Thus, a patent is also a means of 
privatising the work of others. 
That said, we should not be at all surprised by the fact that the most mythological figure 
of modern science was working in a patent office in the year he published a series of 
‘ground breaking’ papers, causing scholars to nickname that year ‘annus mirabilis’ (see 
Rynasiewicz and Renn, J., 2006; Sallent Del Colombo, 2013). Indeed, Albert Einstein 
was well versed in the art of the patent (the assembly of small step-by-step innovations 
into a big invention). When he finished his university studies with low grades, he did 
not find a job as a researcher and was left working as a clerk in a patent office, with no 
research group and no assistants (Contieri, 2005). 
Nevertheless, Einstein’s papers – quite unusually – contained no references at all to 
previous studies, a finding that has recently raised a series of doubts regarding credit for 
the theory of relativity (Gine, 2010).  Although Einstein did not reference Poincaré with 
regard to the conception of relativity (Darrigol, 2004), he also failed to mention the 
source of his famous equation – whether it was from the Englishman Oliver Heaviside, 
the Frenchman Henri Poincaré, the Italian Olinto de Pretto, or perhaps all of them (see 
Bartocci, 1999; Drageset, 2015; Socolovsky, 2012). The point here is not to suggest that 
he was simply a ‘plagiarist’, as many have recently argued. Rather, he was just a 
‘scientist’ doing the regular work of a ‘genius’ by presenting the result of a socially 
constructed theoretical development as his own magical invention. 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this event is the fact that while Poincaré was 
capturing the work of a legion of disciples in his academic work and managing his 
distinct position in the academic field, Einstein was able to surpass Poincaré through a 
new modern form of fetish enabled by the political context of struggle between empires. 
In this context, Germany was struggling to emerge as a dominant power as tensions 
were building between the end of the 19th century and the breakout of World War 1. 
Thus, although Einstein had no position in the academy – which means no support from 
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academic corporations – he was supposedly able, in a short period of time, to publish a 
series of papers ‘revolutionising’ physics. Furthermore, the ‘mysterious’ (Darrigol, 
2004) similarities between his theory and Poincaré’s were simply ignored not only by 
the German journal Annalen der Physik, which published it, but also by the enormous 
machinery of propaganda erected at the dawn of media and cinema in the years 
immediately before World War 2. At this time, Einstein was exiled to the emergent 
power of the US. In this way, Einstein emerged as the first celebrity scientist, as 
‘famous as Chaplin’, and he became symbol of a pure (detached and objective) science 
in opposition to the ideological Nazis.  
Again, this is not to say that relativity is false, nor that Einstein was lying about 
relativity. Perhaps he was not lying that he had formulated the theory, as he likely 
believed in his own fetish. However, precisely because of that belief, it is possible to see 
how the fame of this iconic figure was produced upon a fetishistic device (the patent) 
and to see how his own status as a genius was produced by another fetishist device (the 
media) – two devices that precisely composed the main geopolitical power of the 
emergent empire.86 
                                                          
86  In this sense, what the genius creates is actually a collective work captured by some fetish apparatus, 
and what creates the genius is not simply himself, but the ‘field’ that recognizes him as such (the media 
that creates the propaganda, the academy that creates distinction, and so on). In this sense, what should 
we think (besides the narrative of his father, who was also his devoted teacher and an indistinct 
composer) about Mozart composing his first music at the age of 4 and his first symphonies at the age of 
8? Again, this is not simply to emphasize that his composition was a lie, rather that the whole myth of a 
genius composer is a fetish. Paradoxically, the controversy among specialists, totally immersed in this 
reified field, is about whether he composed the first concerto at the age of 4 or 5. The great exception (yet 
not fully a critic of the ‘myth’, much like the above-quoted Mazzucato) is the work of Woodfield (2012). 
Woodfield traces the transition that erudite musicians underwent during Mozart’s lifetime, moving from 
being members of the court to participating in the business of big Opera companies. Woodfield study 
‘aims to draw upon this wide range of primary sources to give a systematic account of the Bondini-
Guardasoni Company and thus of the organisational context in which Mozart’s Italian operas came to be 
performed in Prague and Leipzig. It will show how the Italianische Opera-Virtuosen came into being as 
part of Bondini’s wider Theatrical empire, along the well-established cultural axis linking Bohemia with 
Saxony (…) No study of the Bohemian reception history of Mozart’s opera can avoid an overriding 
question: the extent to which the narrative of the composer’s professional dealings with Prague, 
promulgated by Niemetschek and others, represents history or myth-making.(…) While there may be an 
element of truth in this, the present study will suggest that Prague and Leipzig played a seminal role in the 
years immediately after the composer’s death, when Guardasoni, ignoring commentators (…) continued 
to promote them as core repertoire works. (…) two doctoral dissertations on Don Giovanni have provided 
insights (…) [that] reconstruct the personnel and repertoire of the Bondini troupe in the early 1780s and 
proposes a new interpretation of the events surrounding the genesis of Don Giovanni. ’ (Woodfield, 2012: 
4-5). In the same sense, how much does Van Gogh’s genius owe to his brother, an experienced art 
merchant, and to his sister, who managed his spoils and the posthumous narrative of his life? Similarly, a 
recent exhibition at the National Gallery, called ‘The Invention of Impressionism,’ shows how the 
narrative of the group and the development of the style were closely managed by Paul Durand-Ruel, ‘the 
entrepreneurial art dealer’ who ‘discovered’ them, spread their style to the centre of Empire, gave lodging 
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Again, it must come as no surprise that one of the chief theoreticians of the United 
States’ empire was also an architect. Thomas Jefferson was not only the architect of a 
few buildings but also one of the architects of the US Empire. He once asserted: ‘I am 
persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive 
empire and self-government’ (quoted in Negri, 2000: 160). 
Here, Jefferson was praising the construction of what he termed the ‘Empire of 
Freedom’, where power was to be exercised over others while internal democracy 
would construct an apparently natural state of justice. Thus, freedom in this empire has 
distinct meanings – whether you consider it to be used inside or outside – while equality 
and fraternity were not even part of the formula. Tocqueville interpreted the foundation 
of this new form of power as ‘soft despotism’, in which the actual means of power were 
exercised using deceitful – as opposed to frank and open – methods of violence. 
Noam Chomsky (2003) analyses the formation of this empire to understand both the 
contemporary state of affairs and what would ultimately lead it to become a Terrorist 
State, promoting wars against non-aligned states in order to impose rules, laws, and 
means of production (in short, the means of fetish). As a metaphor, he asserts that 
behind the mask of the Emperor there is a Pirate: 
St. Augustine tells the story of a pirate captured by Alexander the Great, 
who asked him ‘how he dares molest the sea.’ ‘How dare you molest the 
whole world?’ the pirate replied: ‘Because I do it with a little ship only, I 
am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy, are called an Emperor’ 
(Chomsky, 2003, p. vii). 
Thus, the fetish of empire is only a more sophisticated means of expropriation. 
Nevertheless, this is not a completely new invention. The British Empire already ruled a 
vast area ‘through and by the natives’ (Frederick Lugard) using the symbolic power of 
coercion to impose its rules and laws on colonies, as in the famous couplet ‘Whatever 
happens, we have got the Maxim Gun, and they have not’ – the Maxim Gun was the 
weapon most associated with the British imperial conquest, and it was patented by the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and food to most of them in exchange for their work, helped to develop the unity of this fast-producing 
style and later managed their work as valuable ‘assets’. The question, again, is not simply to determine 
whether impressionism is a fetish or a ‘discovery’; rather, the question is to understand how the whole 
field of art is full of these types of ‘bets’, where the whole field is just a systemic casino, in which the 
people in positions of power create the rules (and manoeuvres) of how the dice rolls. It goes without 
saying that impressionist painting indeed has a magical beauty. 
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former American and later British inventor Hiram Stevens. Hiram Stevens was also 
famous for litigating in court against Thomas Jefferson over the patent of the light bulb. 
These episodes, in which the truth of an invention is litigated, are not exceptions of 
contexts of wars. There are many such cases: the litigation between Newton and 
Leibnitz over the invention of the differential calculus, or Santos Dumont and the 
Wright brothers over the invention of the airplane, or even the centrality of Darwin in 
the ‘invention’ of evolution. All of those can only be explained by the analysis of 
Empires fighting for positions of power, which allows imposing their fetish. 
Investigating architecture in Thomas Jefferson’s Empire, Mary Woods (1999) unveiled 
the formation of the ‘professional architect’ in America, replacing the former version of 
gentlemen architects such as Jefferson himself. Instead of coming from a noble 
background, this new kind of architect emerged as a modern professional, situated in 
between clients and builders. Nevertheless, Woods asserts that Jefferson personally 
supported many such architects, and the profession was gradually constructed outside 
the realms of the old elite, thus developing into a new field of liberal professionals. A 
new (liberal) Empire creates a new (liberal) form of fetish. 
The above discussion comes to a high point that closes a circle. As we mentioned 
above, Foucault asserted that it is not the case that knowledge is power; rather, power is 
the position of defining knowledge and truth. Thus, those in positions of power (be they 
nobles in the courts, Boris Johnson or David Cameron) are able to impose a specific 
sprezzatura of reality. This circle brings us back to the first quotation of Mary Woods in 
the intermezzo. In Egypt, architects were part of the royal court, and the very first figure 
of an architect was Senenmut. Senenmut was a former Steward of the Queen, a position 
that developed his knowledge and allowed him to serve members of royalty by 
transforming fetish into concrete architectural objects, the fundaments of Egyptian 
civilisation. Thus, the re-emergence of the new class of butlers in London (Batty, 2016) 
– highly educated professionals occupied with serving the 1000 ‘family offices’ and 
managing the wealth of the new superrich from inside their houses – should come as no 
surprise. The circle is closed: the new geniuses are themselves objects, servants of the 
status quo. 
Despite the advances of her research, in an interview, Mariana Mazzucato declared that 
she was not saying that Steve Jobs was not a genius but rather that one should recognise 
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the bigger picture of how innovation is really developed in society. With this analysis, 
we show that one must go a step further and assert the unpleasant consequences of these 
findings. Steve Jobs was not a genius who invented the iPhone, he was a representation 
of a collective desire, a narrative able to capture the work of others as his own. This 
representation is the figure of a Prince (in Althusser’s sense, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
and to be further developed in the next chapter dealing with phantasies). However, this 
point should be sufficient for now, as we should summarise the topic of fetish in 
architecture. 
 
5.6. The techniques of phenomena: conceptualising fetish in architecture 
Arguably, the movement known as ‘Autonomism’ has investigated production through 
a renewed analysis of Marx’s (no date [1857]) account of the ‘general intellect’ in the 
‘Fragments on Machines’ in his notes called the Grundrisse. There, Marx proposes that 
the actual force of production is the general knowledge that results from society’s 
functioning as a complete ensemble. Nevertheless, this knowledge is increasingly 
objectified into machines, which, in turn, function as devices to capture more of 
society’s collective productive forces. Thus, machines function as means of control and 
expropriation: ‘In machinery, knowledge appears as alien, external to him [the 
labourer]; and living labour [appears as] subsumed under self-activating objectified 
labour’ (Marx, no date [1857], p. 695). This passage in Marx has been very fruitful for 
contemporary critical theory because it envisions how the actual production of 
innovation, science and technological development occurs under the development of 
mechanisms to frame and capture social work.87 
For Paolo Virno (2001), the dialectical nature of Marx’s materialism could not be seen 
as today’s ‘Marxism’, as for Virno, Marx reveals how the material conditions of 
production are objectified abstract scientific knowledge fixed into capital (one could say 
                                                          
87 The fundamental contradiction between the (neo)classical economy and a (neo)Marxist political 
economy is thus the theory of ‘Labour’ value. In Marx, the value of a product comes from labour. Indeed, 
for Adam Smith and David Ricardo, that was also the case. However, mathematically, this is 
incompatible with any ethical justification of capitalism because value has to be extracted from the 
workers by the capitalist. This sheds light on the neo-classical mathematical economy of Michio 
Morishima (1977), which ultimately demonstrates micro-economy’s assumptions to be incompatible with 
the labour theory of value. Morishima resolves this problem by simply eliminating (‘abandoning’) 
concrete labour from his formulas. 
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‘past labour’), thus revealing an ‘inter-subjective foundation’ in any labour praxis.88 For 
Lazzarato (2014, p. 31), this radically changes the search for a subject of history, as this 
condition is neither a representation nor a consciousness but rather a mechanistic 
entanglement of molecular parts. In this realm, there are no individual subjects being 
dominated (as in personal enslavement), rather, there is diagrammatic management of 
all workers in society.89  
In addition, David Harvey (2010, p. 40) stretches the emphases of Marx’s Capital into 
the ‘roles’ people play in the market system. In this system, social relations are 
                                                          
88 For Virno (2001), the fundamental contradiction between knowledge and product did not – due to new 
forms of domination in post-Fordist societies – result in the breakdown of capitalism as expected by 
Marx. For Virno, the mass intellectuality that is not objectified in machines is later captured by a mass 
control of communication and sharing, thus controlling living labour. Furthermore, a politics of affects 
and cynicism makes possible a widespread pseudo-solidarity with those suffering, and at the same time it 
becomes the basis of ferocious forms of competition. As Jason Reads puts it: ‘Competition is a 
paradoxical form of individuation in that it produces individuals who are all the more alike in that they 
see themselves as absolutely opposed to each other, locked into bitter struggle.’ (Read, 2010, 130) 
89 Some critics are correct about the contemporary neoliberal emphasis on creative and immaterial labour 
as a more radical form of expropriation, but they presuppose that critically approaching a topic 
corresponds to a naïve acceptance of the process, thus equating praise (Florida, 2002) and critique 
(Lazzarato, 1993) (see Brouillette, 2009). Nevertheless, a careful reading of Lazzarato (2014), searching 
for context rather than fragmented contradictions, could not avoid the fact that Lazzarato is well aware of 
the paradoxes involved (as Marx was in his fragments), aiming to develop an account of how labour is 
increasingly being reified by abstract machines, thus, no being is a naïve safe harbour for freedom. Even 
if one might disagree with the lack of concreteness (Lazzarato, 2014, pp. 26, 37), the myth of free will 
and the complete human (p. 27), the disregard of how this complete man could also be exploited (p. 38), 
an excessive semiotic (p. 39) and excessive effectiveness of abstract causality (p. 42), a lack of attention 
to the production of the consumer rather than just the producer (p. 43), punctual reinforcements of the 
myth of the bourgeois inventor (p. 45) and some absurd accounts of the conception of machines 
producing themselves as a magic trick (accepting fetish) or the idea of consuming as producing (the 
distinction of realisation and the increasing role of reproduction on it) (p. 49) and a non-reflexive account 
as if processes of subjectification would happen only under capitalism (p. 51), and thus disagree with his 
conclusions, this disagreement does not justify matching the critic and the described object. Therefore, 
apart from academic competition and its endless necessity of proving creativeness and originality 
(Brouillette, 2013), it is fair to say Lazzarato is not Florida. Brouillette references her critique of the 
multitude in Postone (see Postone, 1995; Slater, 2006), who is very keen to develop straw man arguments 
to produce superficial slogans supposedly able to capture absolute essences and dismiss, once and for all, 
entire lines of thought. Nevertheless, Postone aims to assert that labour is already a historical form 
inserted in the context of capitalism, thus, the party responsible for capitalist expropriation (a clear 
inversion of cause and effect) is thus unable to provide any source of autonomy and should rather be 
combated. For Scholz (2016), Postone focuses on the first 150 pages of Marx volume 1, circumscribing 
his critique on commodity and abstraction of labour, thus disregarding how the capitalist system is 
considered as a whole and how the third volume reveals the inherent contradiction of commodity, only 
superficially addressed in volume 1. For Scholz, the result of Postone is to understand Marx’s suggestion 
of the overcoming of the proletarian class as a defence of the enlightenment of the middle class as the 
subject of history. As it relates to our study in this moment, it will suffice it to say that the autonomists 
and such are trying to develop, as criticism, their own version of a gramscian subject, be it the ‘multitude’ 
or the ‘enlightened’. Rather than asking if the worker is the ‘soul’, ‘stolen’ or ‘colonised’, we aim to 
investigate how, besides being produced, these (architect-)subjects are theoretical devices that do not 
comprise the collective nature of culture and identity. Thus, architects (subjects) are neither enclosed 
capsules nor a collection of capsules, leading to the analysis of how subjectivities are socially produced 
and composed transversally and meta-individually. 
 
 
204 
 
presented as an exchange of things (Harvey, 2010, p. 41). In addition, even if one might 
have ethical and moral principles when dealing with people face-to-face in the buying 
of a commodity in the market, these relations appear as relations between things 
(commodity-money) and therefore as inevitable facts. For instance, at the moment you 
buy bread, you are reinforcing the system as much as your retirement fund is managing 
assets in the global market. For this reason, Harvey (2010, p. 47) says this creates an 
unavoidable condition, which imposes specific ‘roles’ because ‘the characters who 
appear on the economic stage are merely personifications of economic relations’. 
Therefore, people will, even unwillingly, become ‘the bearers’ of capitalistic social 
relations.90 In this sense, it is not a matter of a ‘bad’ architect enslaving another but 
rather of a whole field of practice working as a collective apparatus reifying 
subjectivities, which is producing new object-subjects of fetish. 
Thus, Marx’s fragment on machines and his considerations of the production of social 
relations in the form of fetishism led many authors to investigate how subjectivity is 
produced in contemporary society rather than to investigate how subjects could free 
themselves, find their supposed true natures and be autonomous individuals acting in 
the historical process (Guattari, 1995; Lazzarato, 2014; Read, 2010; Spencer, 2012). 
For Jason Read (2010, p. 155), the expression ‘production of subjectivity’ has a double 
meaning: as something ‘productive’ and as something ‘produced’. Subjectivity is 
historically produced by multiple processes of individualisation in physical, biological, 
collective, psychic, linguistic, and cultural sensibilities and through power struggles. At 
the same time, it is productive of social relations that impact the possibilities of action in 
society. Read rescues this idea from Marx’s Capital: 
                                                          
90 Harvey elucidates this point with an example: ‘recognizing that individuals can and do often occupy 
several different roles, even deeply contradictory positions (as when, in our time, a worker has a pension 
fund invested in the stock market). This focus on roles rather than individuals is as perfectly legitimate as 
if we were analysing the relations between drivers and pedestrians in the streets of Manhattan: most of us 
have taken on both roles and adapt our behaviors accordingly’ (Harvey, 2010, p. 48). The implication, he 
explains, is ‘that our social relation to the laboring activities of others is disguised in the relationships 
between things. You cannot, for example, figure out in the supermarket whether the lettuce has been 
produced by happy laborers, miserable laborers, slave laborers, wage laborers or some self-employed 
peasant. The lettuces are mute, as it were, as to how they were produced and who produced them […] It is 
all very well to insist on "good" face-to-face relations and to be helpful to one's neighbor, but what is the 
point of that if we are totally indifferent to all those whom we do not know and can never know, but who 
plays a vital role in providing us with our daily bread?’ (Harvey, 2010, 40) 
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the special productive power of the combined working day, is under all 
circumstances, the social productive power of labour, or the productive 
power of social labour. This power arises from cooperation itself. When 
the worker co-operates in a planned way with others, he strips off the 
fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of this species 
(Marx, 1990, p. 447). 
Subjects are always subjects in a collective, therefore, a differentially articulated part of 
a whole, and the individuations of a metastable field of trans-individuality. This means 
that a subjectivity is formed by a priori elements (language, culture, structure, social 
expectations, and so on) ‘externalised in machines and internalised in concepts, habits, 
and ways of thinking’ (Read, 2010, p. 118-119). The political problem emerges 
regarding how these machines operate not as atoms but transversally, capturing the 
collective intellect formed by society. 
In the contemporary mode of production, there are many examples of such processes. 
The biggest new businesses are only abstract machineries, platforms that capture not 
only the labour of others but also their everyday lifestyle. Today, Facebook is the 
biggest platform for sharing information, which it does without producing any content, 
only capturing a series of ‘interconnected’ users gladly producing content as a form of 
leisure, without recognising it as production. Uber might be considered the biggest 
transportation company in our ‘smart’ times; without owning or maintaining any 
vehicles, it transfers all the risks of the business to its workers while it also exploits the 
socially produced infrastructure of the city without paying taxes for it. Similarly, Airbnb 
offers the largest variety of lodging without owning any of the properties, but it still 
creates new subjectivities of trendy travellers and kind hostesses based on people gladly 
providing undervalued goods and/or services in exchange for a ‘social experience’. This 
goes far beyond Le Corbusier’s trivial house-machine or the pathetic concrete life in 
Koolhaas’ trivial machinist house depicted in the film ‘Houselife’. Closer to the new 
non-trivial machines are initiatives at the MIT Media lab, which are creating 
automatons that reproduce ideological systems through the deployment of algorithmic 
fetishes in architecture (see Shvartzberg, 2015).  
However, the fundamental question here is how does fetish come to inhabit these non-
trivial machines? Latour (1986) investigated how abstractions would acquire life when 
they were reified into technical apparatuses. When a scientist uses an apparatus to 
observe phenomena, what he sees on the other side of the ‘black box’ of the apparatus is 
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framed by the past theories and hypothesis that produced that ‘black box’. Thus, he 
argues, the phenomena this scientist sees only existed through the mediation of the 
machine, and the machine only existed through the past labour reified on it (the theories 
inscribed in this material basis). In his words, 
The central importance of this material arrangement is that none of the 
phenomena ‘about which’ participants talk could exist without it. 
Without a bioassay, for example, a substance could not be said to exist. 
The bioassay is not merely a means of obtaining some independently 
given entity; the bioassay constitutes the construction of the substance. 
Similarly, a substance could not be said to exist without fractionating 
columns (Photograph 7) since a fraction only exists by virtue of the 
process of discrimination. Likewise, the spectrum produced by a nuclear 
magnetic resonance (NMR) spectrometer (Photograph 8) would not exist 
but for the spectrometer. It is not simply that phenomena depend on 
certain material instrumentation; rather, the phenomena are thoroughly 
constituted by the material setting of the laboratory. The artificial reality, 
which participants describe in terms of an objective entity, has in fact 
been constructed by the use of inscription devices. Such a reality, which 
Bachelard (1953) terms the ‘phenomenotechnique,’ takes on the 
appearance of a phenomenon by virtue of its construction through 
material techniques (Latour, 1986, p. 64). 
It is in this sense that he explains the ‘black box’ of laboratory equipment using 
Bachelard’s idea that these scientific apparatuses are ‘reified theories’: ‘When another 
member handles the NMR spectrometer (…) to check the purity of his compounds, he is 
utilising spin theory and the outcome of some twenty years of basic physics research’ 
(Latour, 1986, p. 66). The ideas inscribed and configured on the machine were based on 
arguments and theories, and these were the results of discussions at conferences and 
disputes in journals and articles, until they were finally accepted as facts. Thus, the ‘so-
called material elements of the laboratory are based upon the reified outcomes of past 
controversies’ (Latour, 1986, p. 87). 
To create a theory of photography, Vilém Flusser (1985) developed a ‘philosophy of the 
black box’. Flusser (1985, p. 43) argued that it is the photographic camera that performs 
the operation of transforming reality into codified signals of visual communication, and 
the photographer is manoeuvred by the few potentialities inscribed in the apparatus. 
Therefore, the photographer actually looks inside the apparatus rather that outside, thus 
‘revealing’ rather than creating.  However, for Cabral and Baltazar (2010), analysing 
Flusser’s theory in the realm of art and technology, it is not a matter of destroying the 
‘magic’ of the black box or of making its devices predicable and dull but rather of 
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opening its internal mechanisms for potential interactivity. A music box would have 
interactivity, but only repetition; a piano does not reveal its content but allows creation 
and interactivity, but in the same way as a photographic camera, it does so within a 
framed realm of possibilities. The challenge is to open the inner realms of the devices 
for interactivity and creation. 
In the field of architecture, the emergence of apparatuses such as CAD, renderers, and 
3D software are increasingly ‘entailing’ the production of architecture, in the same 
sense that a refrigerator ‘entails’ a power source (to use an example from Taylor, 2010, 
p. 44), thus transforming architects into operators of machined global styles who share 
content that is capitalised by companies providing access to this content. Furthermore, 
one could agree with Mark Cousins (2016) that whereas previously, the artist had a 
symbiotic relation with the ‘brush’, and the architect with the ‘pencil’, today the 
ultimate apparatus of architectural production is the ‘office’, which enables a ‘genius’ to 
seduce followers and to channel the work of a legion of workers. With a high-profile 
office, an architect can expropriate the work of hundreds of others. However, this non-
trivial machinery only works if architects desire to be part of it. 
Deleuze has famously asked: how do people come to desire their own oppression? For 
Zizek (2014), the answer of what we desire lies in Phantasies: the narratives a subject 
creates to build a logical chain of causalities that assures his desires as unconditional. In 
architecture, once the fetish of the genius architect has collapsed, these phantasies start 
to emerge raw and naked. This is the topic of the next – and last – chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
Traversing phantasies: the narratives of desire in architecture 
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Proceeding with our investigation of the reproduction of architecture, in this chapter, we 
aim to finally investigate how this reproduction operates not only in the production of 
things but also through the reification of the architect’s subjectivity itself. If Michel 
Foucault (1979) investigated how Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon framed the subjectivity 
of modern subjects, we aim to investigate the reproduction of ‘Bentham’s’ subjectivity 
itself: how his desires and phantasies framed the ways in which he addressed the 
problem of the production of social relations. 
As we observed in Chapter 3, the discipline of architecture is rooted in a narcissistic 
principle, against which we have launched a ‘Copernican Revolution’. The unconscious 
traces of subjectivities form the preindividualities that allow architects to operate and 
become individuals in the disciplinary field. Nevertheless, this principle is reproduced 
on three levels: from reification to fetish to phantasies.  
First, the transformation of social relations into things (reification) ultimately reifies 
architecture itself (transforming it into a collection of things rather than social relations), 
which, in turn, reifies users and architects (as we observed in the ‘fetish’ of new public 
spaces in London). However, if architectural things are actually produced social 
relations, how can they be taken into consideration as neutral or natural facts? 
In the last chapter, we focused on the ‘how’ of this question. Through the reification of 
the practice of architecture, a fetish becomes a truth (an ‘action’ that remains part of the 
delivered ‘noun’: a verb-noun as a present participle, i.e., a ‘dancing table’). Thus, 
architecture becomes a way of creating truths and hiding artifices about society, 
architecture and architects themselves. Architects are ultimately reified by their own 
means of production: the phenomena techniques – which operate in objects (black 
boxes) through the reification of subjectivities. 
Now, we focus on the ‘taken into consideration’ of this question. Fetish is only able to 
function if subjects believe in it and desire to take part in it (parten capit). However, 
how do architects come to desire their own reification? 
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6.1. The aim: traversing the phantastic character of architecture 
Our argument in this chapter is that reification and fetish are based on the reproduction 
of architectural phantasies. Phantasies are narratives that build a logical chain of 
causality that mobilises ‘desires’ and justifies them as if they were ‘facts’. As we shall 
develop later, we distinguish between fantasy (conscious) and phantasy (unconscious). 
On the one hand, a fantasy is an imaginary construct, an image, a representation 
presented as a non-existent object that can be desired or despised. Here, desire is based 
on a ‘presented’ object of desire. On the other hand, a phantasy operates unconsciously, 
framing our methods, our senses, our perceptions, and our very ways of reasoning. As 
phantasies exist a priori, architects remain unaware of the phantasies operating through 
their subjectivities. Because architects believe their methods to be impartial – 
supposedly universal, necessary, unequivocal, unconditional, value free, positive, and 
fundamental – their fantasies are based on an ‘absent’ object of desire. 
This chapter investigates how the phantasies of the discipline operate a triple 
narcissism. At the same time, what the architect take into consideration becomes a fact, 
phantasies turn desires into facts and, inversely, these phantasies also produce desire 
itself. The latter is the case because phantasies frame ‘subjective senses’, i.e., the ways 
that architects view themselves in their relation to the conditions of production. Thus, 
the discipline of architecture creates potential preindividualities and conditions the 
emergence of transindividuations. 
This notion implies a politics and an ethics in the discussions of what is ‘fundamental’ 
in architecture. To approach that aspect, we made a return to Vygotsky’s dialectical 
psychology and moved forward to understand how pre- and transindividuations are 
produced. Through architectural phantasies ideologies are incorporated and articulated 
in units of subjective senses. 
With that critical map, we can locate the different politics of phantasies in the 
subjectivity of the architect. For now, we should remind the reader that our intention is 
not to present the whole scope of those phantasies (as in a 1:1 map of the territory); 
instead, we aim to bring examples to the fore to mark points of reference, to trace axes 
and to suggest poles in a map conceived to orientate self-reflexivity. 
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To do that, we chose to consider two phantasies that have deeper and longer traditions 
and implications in the politics of architecture: the prince and utopia.  
Our ultimate aim is not to find the positive truth behind the fake appearance of these 
phantasies; instead, we aim to unveil how these phantasies have concrete implications in 
reproducing transindividualities. As such, instead of negating them, we aim to ‘traverse’ 
these phantasies. This idea comes from Lacan, who argues that a subject cannot escape 
phantasy but can recognise the elements that constitute his desire and its representation 
in objects, thus enabling the subject to act reflexively towards his impulses.  
Ideally, this traversing of phantasies could enable an architect to reposition himself in 
the field that reproduces his own desires. Changing the position of the subject also 
changes the projection of the map (just as the repositioning of the camera changes the 
picture). Thus, who repositions himself also produces a new map. This does not 
eliminate the projection distortion; rather, it only makes it identifiable, traversable and 
available to reflexivity. However, to change the distortion does not mean to be aware of 
its fetish. 
Mythologically, when Buckminster Fuller conceived the Dymaxion map in 1943, he 
discarded any other alternative by showing off bad ones (just as a magician shows his 
left hand to hide the card with his right hand). 91  
                                                          
91 Here we turn the fetish against itself (just as Marx did in Capital, temporarily assuming in 
Volume 1 that the market is in equilibrium, allowing him to focus on production, an argument 
of Harvey, 2010). Anyway, it is worth noting that B. Fuller’s map was not the first to project the 
world map in icosahedrons, nor was it the first with uninterrupted continents and minimal 
distortion (Keyes, 2009). In addition, Irving Fisher’s version of regular projection distortions on 
the icosahedron, was developed by a draftsman and freelance cartographer named Richard Edes 
Harrison, who worked for Time-Life’s Fortune magazine where Fuller first announced his map. 
In an interview with Keyes, Harrison recalled how Fuller opposed the icosahedron map at that 
time, insisting on the virtues of the cubo-octahedron. Eleven years later, and after the death of 
Cahill (the owner of a patent for uninterrupted continents map), Fuller applied for the patent of 
the Dymaxion map with a modified version on an icosahedron. Keys suggests that Harrison 
worked with Fuller, although he was given minor credits in the Life publication (which says ‘R. 
Buckminster Fuller & Life's cartographic staff’). Nonetheless, it is strictly deductive to assert 
that Fuller was aware of these former projections, that his proposal was developed with the help 
of the work of others. The exercise of deconstructing Fuller’s map was done in the first semester 
of this research. As it happened, the exercise was one of the fundamental moments to gain 
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Although he argued it was a technical solution to reduce distortion in the planar 
geometric projection, he was sedimenting a fetish. Concretely, he was taking Europe 
from the top of Mercator’s map and setting the US as the new (horizontal) axe of the 
world (the ‘new Greenwich’). Maybe, he did this to give an aesthetic to the North 
American civilisation (a fantasy like the one we shall discuss in Frank Lloyd Wright), or 
maybe his fetishism was unconscious (a phantasy); either way, a [ph]antasy supported a 
fetish that sedimented a thing that reproduced subjectivities. 
Alternatively, when the Uruguayan artist Joaquin Torres Garcia painted an inverted map 
of the Americas in 1943, he did it to enhance the political visibility of post-colonial 
choices. Although, his map was technically useless to eliminate distortion, it was 
aesthetically useful to traverse these distortions. However, it entered the game through 
protest, demanding the representation of the south-on-top-fetish, and no solution was 
provided for the north’s hierarchical enlarged projection. Arguably, one step further 
could combine the two maps into a device to traverse its own phantasies. 
In the diagram 28 below, we ‘traversed’ Fuller’s map, because the distortion of his 
geographic coordinates are random and serpentine, making Fuller’s fetishistic 
coordinates worse than useless for navigation. To traverse his fetish, we rotated the 
icosahedron to a position where two vertices could match the Earth’s poles. Although 
the new range of possible maps does not escape distortions completely, this operation 
made these distortions less ambiguous and the map more intelligible. 
 
Diagram 28: Traversing map phantasies. Source: the author. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
awareness of the fetishes involved in the production of this map and in the reproduction of 
architecture as a whole. That said, the awareness of these other maps would have made easier 
our effort to rebuild Fuller’s projections. 
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Similarly, the following discussion primarily seeks to make less ambiguous and more 
predictable the role of ‘utopia’ and ‘the prince’ as constitutive fantasies of architecture. 
Although they cannot be eliminated, they can be traversed through understanding their 
phantastic truths, tracing their social ‘creations’ and inherent ethics, and revealing how 
the part is related to the whole – always partially negating and partially departing from 
it. As such, architectural subjectivity can be understood as the historical inheritance of a 
culture of things that have been framed by past subjects, who have themselves been 
inserted into other (ethical and social) contexts. 
Žižek argues that Lacan is a key reference to discuss the ‘traversing of phantasies’. For 
Žižek, the subject can avoid the confusion of ‘what he is’ and ‘what he desires’ not only 
by recognising the phantastic frames setting these desires in motion (1997, p. 62) but 
also by closing the gap between ‘imposed’ choices and ‘framed’ choices (Žižek, 1997, 
p. 40). Vanheule (2011, p. 8) further explains the importance of ‘traversing the fantasy’ 
for Lacan: 
Traversing the fantasy, in its turn, means that through ongoing free 
association, the positions the analysant has been occupying in relation to 
the object ‘a’ [the unattainable object of desire] are mapped with the aim 
of enabling different positions toward the Other’s desire and toward the 
object ‘a’. The fantasy is traversed with the aim of breaking the repetitive 
cycle of incarnating the same position in relation to the Other and to the 
object ‘a’. 
In this sense, our cognitive map of phantasies aims to enable subjects to break the cycle 
of repetition and reproduction of architecture. However, rather than understanding the 
‘Other’ as the (absent) ‘structure’ of language or any other deeper ‘dark matter’ in the 
individual (as does the first, the middle and the last Lacan, respectively representing it 
in a mirror, in a semiotic double mirror, and in a Moebius individual inner substance), 
we aim to understand the process of instituting these phantasies as historical and 
collective operations, i.e., as the social production of collective subjective senses. 
To realise this aim, we shall use a preliminary set of examples to elucidate the political 
and conflicting aspects of the architectural field of phantasies. 
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6.2. Intermezzo: Strawberry Fields 
Living is easy with eyes closed 
Misunderstanding all you see 
It's getting hard to be someone 
But it all works out 
It doesn't matter much to me 
Let me take you down 
'Cause I'm going to Strawberry Fields 
Nothing is real 
And nothing to get hung about 
Strawberry Fields forever 
 (The Beatles, Strawberry Fields) 
 
In the process of architectural design, on the one hand, we should expect a series of 
ideologies to frame possible design solutions. On the other hand, the architectural 
discipline also functions as a phantasy to justify and valorise specific fundaments for 
social spaces. However, these processes hide internal contradictions and political 
presuppositions, which we can approach through some preliminary examples.  
A classic example of a ‘substantial fundament’ of architecture is that of Marc-Antoine 
Laugier’s (1755a and 1755b) ‘primitive hut’.92 His theory explained the Doric order as a 
mirror of the supposed essence of habitation. This primitive “essence” is formed of a 
series of simple and round tree columns with primitive capitals at the top that support a 
triangular pediment, providing the model of the most ‘essential’ of shapes. Therefore, 
he argues, the ‘good judgement of a gentleman’ demands an architecture founded in 
simple, rational and pure elements. In addition, Laugier’s conception of the true origins 
of architecture would justify the neoclassical (and later the modern) architectural 
aesthetic. However, Viollet le Duc designed his own version of the ‘primitive hut’ 
                                                          
92 For the English edition with a title that reveals some of these paradoxes, see Marc-Antoine Laugier, An 
essay on architecture; in which its true principles are explained, and invariable rules proposed, for 
directing the judgement and forming the taste of the gentleman and the architect, with regard to the 
different kinds of buildings, the embellishment of cities and the planning of gardens (London: Gray’s inn, 
1755), accessed 22 April 2015, 
https://ia902706.us.archive.org/35/items/essayonarchitect00laugrich/essayonarchitect00laugrich.pdf. 
For the image to be discussed here, see Marc-Antoine Laugier, Essai sur l’architecture. Nouvelle edition, 
revue, corrigée, & augmentée, (Paris: Chez Duchesne, 1755), Accessed 22 April 2015, http://www.e-
rara.ch/zut/content/pageview/31371. 
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(Viollet-le-Duc, 1875), drawing on a different logic, as he was fascinated with the 
‘rationalisme structurel’ of Gothic architecture. In le Duc’s hut, there was no place for 
‘elementarisation’: the structure was a continuous and sinuous whole in which each part 
had a role to play in the overall effect. His essential architecture was based on the 
systematic structural logic of medieval scholasticism (Panofsky, 1957). A non-trivial 
question emerges: how can something be universal, fundamental and essential if it is not 
unconditional? Or would it be the case that the ‘intrinsic nature’ or ‘indispensable 
quality’ (the essence) of architecture is extraneous and artificial? 
Using two contemporary examples, I would like to illustrate how architecture proceeds 
in the naturalisation of different ethics within its discourses of truth. The first is from 
Axel Paredes, a Guatemalan architect who developed his own version of the primitive 
hut. In his thesis project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Paredes 
(2007) replaced Laugier’s columns with computer-generated structures and surrounded 
them with (what are now vintage) Apple Macintosh computers. His argument was that 
new technologies were reinventing the foundations of the discipline. Therefore, when 
Paredes was commissioned to build an internet facility for a community in Tecpan, 
Chimaltenango, he was not interested in the ancient Mayan ruins that dotted the 
landscape with horizontal monuments. Paradoxically, as the “good judgement” of any 
contemporary architect demands, he was very keen to open a ‘dialogue’ with the local 
context. To do so, he understood the context as ‘strawberry fields’, because, while 
holding a strawberry in his hand, a ‘selfie’ photo magically captured the beauty of the 
red strawberries as it stood in front of green fields.93 Without a doubt in his mind, he 
proposed a red steel building. The prefabricated object appears in photos populated by 
indigenous people in traditional clothes. The curious kids in the pictures give the scene 
a sentimental feel. However, the object has no connection to local traditions or local 
ways of building. Here, modernisation is something to be given – not developed. 
Therefore, locals are invited to enjoy ‘modernity’ in a few square metres rather than 
acquiring the means to hold its reins. Locals become visitors in their own territory. 
A conflicting example is the proposal of a cultural house for the Xakriabá, an 
indigenous community in central Brazil that has faced devastating historical pressures to 
                                                          
93 Photos of the projects are available at the architects’ Facebook page. Accessed 10 August 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/paredesaleman/photos_stream?tab=photos_stream. 
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acculturate to Western society. These pressures have detached the community members 
from old forms of architecture. Inversely, also many forms of resistance emerged, 
leading to a partnership with the Federal University of Minas Gerais. This includes an 
interdisciplinary research programme and specific courses and diplomas for mestizo 
knowledge (for mestizo knowledge theory, see Gruzinski, 2002). One of these 
programmes investigated local building knowledge and traditional means of production. 
Traditional materials and skills were redeveloped together with local artisans, which led 
to a project brief for a new community house to articulate the activities. In this way, 
architecture was neither image nor object; it was instead a means through which the 
community could reinvent itself. Through architecture as a means of ‘researching’, 
alternative forms of economy – ways of tying wood, ceramics knowledge, mestizo 
techniques and artisanal brick machines – and local work was developed. In this sense, 
the choice of materials was also a choice for an ‘economy of local solidarity’ (Monte-
mór, et al., 2006). Although arguably beautiful, its style was not a frozen image, it had 
no ‘formal integrity’ to be preserved (Kapp, 2006). Thus, the community appropriated 
the house in an open way, continuously growing, developing and transforming it. The 
role of architects became one of partnership, co-creation, and ‘ethno-development’ 
(Monte-mór, et al., 2006). 
These conflicting examples illustrate how the game of the ‘essence’ of architecture is 
informed by different political agendas, shaping the territory in which architecture is 
grounded and architects and users are placed. Different aims do not simply inform 
different inputs of an essential process; instead, architecture itself is a metastable field 
of conflicting energies. For that reason, one should go all the way through the 
‘Strawberry Fields’, where ‘nothing is real’, if one aims to traverse what the above 
quote of the Beatles’ song described as ‘Living is easy with eyes closed’. 
 
6.3. Phantasies and the reproduction of ideological subjective senses 
In Chapter 3, we mapped how Simondon developed an account of individuation that 
surpasses the simple stability of ontological essences, thus producing a philosophy of 
ontogenesis by adding a third term to the hylemorphism of matter and form, namely, 
energy (work, action, tensions, forces). This notion helped us to see that the creation of 
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a new fetish does not overcome the reproduction of architecture, nor does it mean 
awareness of the process. It is useless to find beyond one thing another thing (e.g., 
beyond a ‘primitive hut’ to find a ‘vintage high-tech primitive hut’, or beyond a ‘north-
on-top-map’ to find an ‘inverted-map’). This is the reproduction of architecture (S-O-S). 
Arguably, traversing the phantasies (as in the traversed map) is to recognise the 
fundamental gap between the desire that mobilises actions and architectural things 
(which we used the algorithm O< >S< >O to express). In addition, we can envision how 
an individual is not a molecule, he shares a common knowledge and a series of myths 
and the subject is a metastable system with internal contradictions (in the strawberry 
fields nothing is real).94 The subject mediates interior-exterior with a limit and 
sometimes with an enclosure, but potentially capable of collective individuations (the 
Xakriabá house is a collective process). 
These contradictions, leads us to the key question in this chapter: how do these 
conflicting subjective senses come into operation? Despite the great interpretative 
achievements so far, the point is to change architecture: an architecture to change. To 
advance our understanding of how conflictive preindividualities are produced and how 
transindividualities are reified, we must explore how ‘subjective senses’ are produced 
by the linking of the symbolic and the emotional (phantasies), and how this disciplines 
and reproduces ‘subjective senses’. 
We argue that phantasies are the means of operation of the ideological reproduction of 
subjective senses. Phantasies are the units that constitute one’s subjectivities. We would 
like to explore this point. Arguing that ideology frames subjectivities via phantasies, 
Žižek (1997) approximates the concept of ideology and the concept of fantasy, 
providing an alternative to the Freudian use of the term.95 For Žižek, phantasies are not 
inserted in a mysterious centre of the individual; they are instead socially produced, 
                                                          
94 In this sense, a conception of architecture – or a particular school of architecture or a certain discipline 
within this practice – is the production of one dimension in a complex field of multiple dimensions of 
subjectivity. Consequently, our two-dimensional allegory of the pyramid of the architectural unconscious 
ultimately reveals itself to be insufficient: this map should also be traversed. Not simply three-
dimensional, this territory is multi-dimensional, whereby contradictory psychic states coexist. 
95 The concept of phantasy is not the sole invention of Freud (as the fetishist myth would lead us to 
believe); it can be traced back to Aristotle. See the Journal of Ancient Philosophy - FFLCH/USP 
(www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga) (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.7, n.1. p. 19-48, 2013. and Kevin White 
The Meaning of Phantasia in Aristotle's De Anima, III. in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / 
Revue canadienne de philosophie. Volume 24 Issue 3 October 1985, pp. 483-505.  
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although they actively exercise power over the individual. Thus, Žižek (1997) inverts 
the psychoanalytic causality of phantasies from an ‘unconscious drive’ to the 
‘narratives’ that produce or justify desire. For him, the fundamental question is as 
follows: how do we know that we desire a ‘strawberry pie’ in the first place?96 
The first thing to note is that fantasy does not simply realize a desire in a 
hallucinatory way: rather, its function is similar to that of Kantian 
'transcendental schematism': a fantasy constitutes our desire, provides its 
coordinates; that is, it literally 'teaches us how to desire'. (…) To put it in 
somewhat simplified terms: fantasy does not mean that when I desire a 
strawberry cake and cannot get it in reality, I fantasize about eating it; the 
problem is, rather: how do I know that I desire a strawberry cake in the 
first place? This is what fantasy tells me (Žižek, 1997, p. 7). 
Returning to our intermezzo, we might ask the following: how does an architect know 
that he desires a ‘strawberry field’ in the first place? 
As subjective senses assume an actualised individuation in the subject through the 
production of phantasies (a narrative that provides linear causal links to justify one’s 
desire), Žižek argues that desire does not create fantasy; instead, phantasy produces 
desire. For Žižek, 
Desire emerges when drive gets caught in the cobweb of Law/prohibition 
(…) and fantasy is the narrative of this primordial loss, since it stages the 
process of this renunciation (…) In this precise sense, fantasy is the very 
screen that separates desire from drive*, it tells the story which allows 
the subject to (misperceive the void around which drive circulates as the 
primordial loss constitutive of desire. In other words, fantasy provides a 
rationale for the inherent deadlock of desire (Žižek, 1997, p. 43). 
Nevertheless, ‘drive’ is an inconvenient reminiscent of Freud’s substantialism in 
Žižek’s argument. Here, we do conceive phantasy as the appearance – a ‘mask’ – of a 
‘dark’ substance (nor we conceive phantasy as a multi-layered mask of a drive’s 
substantive void, as Žižek argues for). Instead, we understand phantasy in the context of 
a ‘production of subjective senses’ (in the tradition of Vygotsky), operating in 
Simondon’s transindividual field. If in Plato’s philosophy the ‘phantasma’ is the 
                                                          
96 Zizek does not make clear a difference between fantasy and phantasy, as we mentioned in the 
introduction. But this quote points to the conflicting meanings, differentiating ‘fantasy’ and ‘fantasise 
about’. Arguably the two variations (conscious and unconscious) have roles in the architectural 
reproduction, and we shall demonstrate this below, in section 6.5. 
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distortion of reality produced by the five senses of perception, here, the phantasy is the 
actualised reality reproduced by the subjective senses. 
This theoretical framework (a unit of ‘subjective sense’ under construction) offers new 
possibilities for approaching architecture and its production of the architect’s 
subjectivity, elucidating not only the paradoxes that emerged in our fieldworks but also 
the overall process: phantasies reproducing trapped practices of architects. This is the 
overall process because, as in the case of utopias, phantasies only function if we believe 
in them, as is also the case in, for instance, religion.  Thus, our inquiry reaches its 
climax: what causes architects to desire their own oppression? The reproduction of 
architecture: entangled reifications (disentangled in Chapter 4), which are produced by 
veiled fetish (unveiled in Chapter 5), which are reproduced by disciplined phantasies, 
i.e., reified subjective senses (to be traversed below). 
Next, we aim to map two of these phantasies that are at the core of the discipline of 
architecture (prince complex and utopia). We aim to untie the deadlocks of architectural 
desire and to trace the picture architects create of themselves and their action in the 
world. These phantasies will be approached according to the systematisation of the table 
below. 
 
Core phantasies of architecture 
The Prince Utopia 
Individual Collective Absent Present 
Machiavellian Gramscian Blind Naïve 
Pathetikos Commons Resigned/Tailist Virtual 
Hysterical  U-utopian  
(Transindividual) (Traversing) 
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We will start with the prince phantasy, because we have already introduced the topic in 
earlier chapters, especially in Chapter 3 where we discussed the main conceptions of the 
subject of architecture, and how this is reproduced in architecture and in Chapter 5 
where we identified how the reification of architecture leads to the reification of the 
architect by means of fetish. Taking those analysis into account, in section 6.4 we will 
trace back how these different subjects of architecture operate, resulting in the 
characterisation of six types of prince. To use the metaphor of diagram 28, this creates a 
new set of geographic coordinate projections in our cognitive map, aiming to make the 
differences less ambiguous and more intelligible. In section 6.5, we will investigate 
another set of coordinates for utopia, this time exploring deeper and in more details the 
contradictions of each type, so we can finally (in section 6.6.) trace the route to traverse 
these phantasies. 
 
6.4. The prince phantasy: an architecture of the self 
As we argued in Chapter 3, Jodi Dean’s inversion of Althusser’s argument revealed how 
the capitalist ideology interpellates the subject as an individual. Similarly, our point here 
is not that the subject of architecture is a prince; rather, current subjective sensibilities 
reproduced by the field of architecture interpellate architects as princely subjects. In 
Chapter 3, we also observed how Althusser turned the Machiavellian prince into a 
concept to understand the means of political action. 
As ghosts in the realm of architectural preindividualities, the prince appears in different 
forms, as subjects are represented differently in their roles in political transformation. A 
geometric plane needs three points to be defined in space. We will use these princely 
forms to create these points of reference in the field. The diagram 29 below locates 
different points of representation for such princes. Two axes are traced – a horizontal 
axis that opposes the poles of dialectics and discipline and a vertical axis that opposes 
the phantasmatic and the potential poles.  
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Diagram 29: Axes of the prince phantasies. Source: the author. 
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In the diagram 29, the classic Machiavellian prince is designed within the ‘rules of the 
game’, but this prince crosses the boundaries of the common sense, because it 
acknowledges and instrumentalises his phantasmatic image. The image of the prince is a 
‘representation’ of collective desires, which captures social power. The pathetikos 
prince receives his name from Aristotelian psychology, in which ‘nous pathetikos’ is a 
passive form of subjectivity. As such, the pathetikos prince manages to articulate great 
potentials in the field, although never crossing the boundary into creating new 
opportunities. Aravena is the epitome of the pathetikos prince of architecture. As 
Gramsci (no date [1929-1935]) formulated the ‘cultural block’ and the ‘organic 
intellectual’ based on a dialectical critique of Machiavelli, this Gramscian prince 
occupies a diametrically opposed position in the field. Although able to mobilise new 
potentials, in the way back to architecture this prince does not manage to traverse 
representations. This condition locks him in a deadlock of ‘protest’, as we observed in 
the work of Aldo Rossi (see Chapters 1 and 3). In Antonio Negri, the multitude (i.e., the 
‘commons’ as a prince) is diametrically opposed to a pathetic acceptance of reality. 
Nevertheless, the commons is still trapped within the limitations of the status quo, as 
the average character of the commons cannot be based on anything but current common 
sense, itself a terrifying ideological field, ignoring fetish completely. Cunningly, the 
hysterical prince operates by moving along the vertical axis, connecting phantasies and 
potentials. Nevertheless, trapped within the constraints of the status quo, the hysterical 
prince acts to frame potentialities into phantasmagorias. Alternatively, traversing the 
prince phantasy depends on acknowledging the phantastic character of architectural 
transindividuality and his own phantasmagorical individuation. For that, a mediation of 
new potential and old individuated phantasies must be operated to create an 
individualisation of new collective subjects, who are aware of their existence in a 
relation to the world and in a position from which they can act in it. 
Before we use this framework to enlighten the current condition, an important point 
must be made: although the prince provides no ‘substantial’ truth about how 
architecture is made, he represents a phantasy that has concrete consequences. 
Architectural princes are individuations that only reproduce the field of architecture into 
new appearances (S1 - O1 - S1’). Nevertheless, as we observed above, to conceive of an 
actual transformation (O1<  >S1+ S2+ S3<  >O2) the role of collective individuations of 
architecture must be repositioned (an event in Badiou’s theory). In other words, 
collapsing the naturalness of the architectural princes is a small first step on new routes, 
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but it is a hard one to build. We have been building this step since the beginning, and 
now we have traced the coordinates to assess “coordinate distortions”. With that, we 
move on to look back at the field and identify the position of key points of reference – 
princes – for the discipline.  
As we have observed throughout the history of architecture, subjects are being trapped 
in the field – from Senenmut, effectively a butler to the elite, to Thomas Jefferson, the 
pirate emperor, who are still preindividualities being reproduced in the field of 
architecture. Throughout this history, architects have had a special relationship with 
power. As Le Courbusier cheered the rise of fascism in Italy (see Brott, 2013) and 
worked alongside the Vichy government in France (Jackson, 2001), he proposed his 
famous axiom: ‘architecture or revolution’. Koolhaas approaches power in a similar 
way, he admires the Chinese State power ability to impose utopias (Spencer, 2016), 
praises the association of Japanese metabolists with political centralisation 
(Cunningham and Goodbun, 2012), and worked with the European Union in the 
reification of the European flag into a symbol of commoditisation – the barcode. The 
information is always the same: we architects serve fetish for power. 
As Cunningham and Goodbun (2012) note, Koolhaas start his account of the metabolist 
princes almost as a fairytale, but one where cities were demolished ‘into radioactive 
rubble’ in a new post-apocalyptic tabula rasa. But we shall instead start our tale of 
phantasies by noting that there is no tabula rasa in the architectural disciplining of 
subjectivities, and hysterical princes, such as Koolhaas himself, are the radioactive 
reminiscences of a practice permanently on the verge of collapsing. As a matter of 
fact[ish], collapse is the very means of their triumph. 
 
The Machiavellian prince  
Althusser (2000) understands Machiavelli’s prince as the production of a device that 
manages fortuna (the unpredictable contingency of context) to capture public will by 
means of virtu (i.e., the wise and rational orchestration of collective desire and, we 
could say, through phantasies). In this sense, the prince is only a public image, who is 
concerned with only the effective power of producing a certain truth rather than with 
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truth itself. Thus, this image could support a mystical narrative of social affairs, which 
is capable of capturing social expectations to build a chain of causalities in a linear 
narrative that increases the power of the prince. 
In this sense, the prince is not power himself; instead, he is an effective image for 
political aims. In these terms, a prince is not a substance or a structure, and he provides 
power as long as his image is able to guide operations. Only by means of this fetish is a 
prince the subject of transformation. Arguably, applying the concept of the prince to 
architecture better captures how architecture interpellates the subjectivity of architects 
because he can provide an account of the politics of fetish and the mobilisation of 
transindividual desires. Although many current critiques of architecture use the term 
‘star architects’, these critiques do not provide a viable framework for answering these 
questions, thus reinforcing the myths they aim to criticise. 
Derived from its use to describe celebrities in movies and music, the ‘star’ concept 
implies that an individual has special qualities, outstanding abilities, or the capacity to 
impose his magnetic power over others, just as astronomical stars do. In the same way 
that we analysed – in Chapter 5 – the myth of the genius in various fields, a close 
approach to actors would reveal that they too are representations, myths, and images of 
their underlying means of production (marketing, film industry, magazines, professional 
agents, schools, class hierarchy, social connection, and so on). In this sense, the star 
concept only reproduces the reality that it aims to criticise. 
Comparing architects to film directors or producers would also be flawed, as the latter 
two are also only mythological effective images that mask what is actually collective 
work. As we observed in Chapter 3, using Tafuri’s (2006) approach to the prince will 
also be inadequate. Although his work made great advances in locating the social 
context of architectural production, his method ultimately reproduces (without 
acknowledging) the interpellation of the ‘genius’ because it critiques architecture by 
approaching individual architects. Simondon’s terms might elucidate this point: Tafuri 
critiques the already individuated architects as though they were the fundamental 
substance. The torsion of Tafuri is the following: first he asserts that the ‘base’ is the 
cause and architecture is the automatic effect, and immediately after, he focuses his 
account on the effect (the individual architects) rather than on the process (the 
individuation of subjectivities and the production of phantasies). But the prince 
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architects that he criticises are just images capturing what is a transubjective and 
collective work. 
For instance, although Tafuri (1976b, p. 140) noted that Frank Lloyd Wright made the 
decisive shift towards what would become his famous style by using all of his wife’s 
fortune in The Broadacre City project, he fails to address the means by which this 
project was produced. With that capital, Wright created the ‘Taliesin Fellowship’ (a 
messianic school in the middle of the desert), with this means he appropriated the work 
of a series of collaborators and apprentices as his own (Friedland and Zellman, 2007). 
Wright’s style is the product of a collective that was appropriated by him. Better said, 
appropriated by his myth of genius. If Broadacre City brought him close to bankruptcy, 
it also made him a ‘symbol’ of US architecture. This was not unintentional.  In his 
lectures, he was very clear in the aim to become the icon for the style of a US 
civilisation to be spread around the world. Architecture was a means to capture 
collective subjectivities and to reproduce collective subjectivities. Therefore, the point is 
not to recognise that Broadacre City project is a reflex of the American society (a 
satellite image is enough to reveal how the grid and the arrangement of nature and urban 
interventions is just a representation of the local scenario in an image of a new universal 
truth). The point is to understand how these phantasies (both the prince and the utopia) 
further reproduce this reality by colonising the subjectivity of others. 
In our own society of spectacle and immaterial toil, the “princes” imploded upon 
themselves. If the architectural office was once the elite’s stronghold, dividing 
intellectual and manual work, it is now becoming the new sweatshop. In this sense, 
Bjarke Ingels gives a first-hand account of what it was like to work in Rem Koolhaas’s 
office (Parker, 2012). The only way to rise in rank at OMA was by acquiring ‘more and 
more sorrows’, by creating ‘space for designers beneath me in responsibility to crank 
out cool stuff’. Ingels recalls episodes of yelling and ‘hurling of office supplies’ and that 
designers were under constant tension and stress due to negative reinforcement. At 
some point, he felt he ‘had paid [his] dues’, and decided to open his own office. What 
was his alternative? To create his own sweatshop, employing dozens of architects, using 
up-to-date behaviourist techniques: rather than “negative” he uses “positive” 
reinforcement (a more tender dressage). 
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This transforms intellectual work into subjectification. The role of Craig Webb in Frank 
Gehry’s office, captured in the movie Sketches of Frank Gehry (2006), demonstrates 
how an architect who doesn’t know how to switch on a computer can be the “prince” of 
computer-generated forms by transforming another architect (Webb) into a puppet. The 
image of the prince justifies the expropriation of collective work. 
 In this sense, a critical approach to Machiavelli’s account can focus on the process of 
‘becoming being’ of an architect. Althusser’s interpretation of Machiavelli’s prince is 
capable of systematising the process of producing this fetishist practice in critical terms. 
In addition, to achieve these ends, his interpretation includes a dimension of political 
power in the production of accepted collective narratives (as socially shared chains of 
causality). The ontogenesis of individuated architectural princes reveals a preindividual 
field that not only frames possible individuations but also constructs a field of 
inequalities that reproduces reification and fetish. 
 
The Gramscian prince 
In his research on the development of political struggles, Gramsci (no date [1929-1925) 
combined the discussion of Machiavelli and the Marxist debate, developing the 
concepts of ‘historical bloc’ and ‘organic intellectual’ (Gramsci, 1989), which inspired 
many counter-hegemonic struggles. For Gramsci (1929-1935), a revolutionary moment 
in history would only occur when ‘social groups become conscious of their own social 
being, their own strength, their own tasks’. His historical bloc was a widespread and 
transversal consciousness that would unite divergent individuals in one unique 
endeavour. Thus, consciousness would depend on a mixed convergence of social 
conditions. 
Perhaps Aldo Rossi’s take on the organic intellectual in architecture has been the most 
influential one, even though the radicalism of his propositions has been largely 
downplayed by pacifying his thoughts. To understand how architecture produces 
‘historical blocs’, Aldo Rossi (1982) developed a political anthropology to understand 
urban spaces as artefacts of labour and thus concrete forms filled with abstract and 
collective desires. 
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Rossi’s concept of Genius Loci aimed to capture this complex network of territory, 
history and collective memories that shapes a peculiar form of living. We can 
understand his concept as a parallel to Hegel’s spirit of the time: the Genius Loci as a 
concrete spirit (or a de-spiritualised subjectivity), i.e., a culture engraved in a place. 
Thus, Rossi would argue that the city is a political and cultural project built over time 
and that this condition creates what he called a Tendenza – i.e., a direction that shapes 
the possibility of life in a specific place.97 
Nevertheless, Rossi is trapped in the ‘protest’ deadlock, as we saw above. Although he 
enabled a powerful critical view to identify how architecture is used as an instrument to 
capture the general intellect, his works accept the field of architecture ‘as it is’ and, as 
alternative, they use architecture to represent the ‘proletariat’. Ultimately, architecture 
remains trapped in the same system of representation and reproduction. In this sense, to 
overcome the idea of a ‘prince’ as the subject of history seems to demand the 
development of a ‘neo’-Gramscian perspective on architectural production (as argued 
Jameson, 2000, p. 452).98 
 
The multitude 
The debate surrounding subjects’ ‘place’ in society, the subject that can transform 
society and which ‘class’ is to be object of his consciousness has stretched into the 
present, with theoreticians such as Negri (1997; 2000, pp. 393-413; 2003) identifying 
‘empire’ as the place and ‘multitude’ as the identity of the subject or Standing (2011) 
identifying the ‘precariat’ as a new class to gain consciousness and act as subjects of 
history. As mentioned in the introduction, David Harvey (2000, p. 32) proposes a 
generalisation of this search. For him, as factory workers could universalise their 
                                                          
97 As Aureli demonstrates (2008, p. 4 -20), Aldo Rossi has a long-standing relationship with the Left, 
particularly with the Venice group Tendenza and the Autonomists. Aureli (2008, p. 53-54) argues that 
Rossi has developed the concept of locus in architecture as a political category of the city. Instead of blind 
modernisation, he proposes a re-foundation of the city via a new relationship with architecture. For Rossi, 
to propose a building is to simultaneously recreate the city’s symbolic structure. In this sense, a city 
should construct its own tradition when re-appropriating the bourgeoisie city. Therefore, architecture 
should create alternatives: ‘a political and cultural project, a tendenza’ (Aureli, 2008, p.58). 
98 Arguably, to go beyond Gramscian architects (organic intellectuals who produce new historical blocs, 
while reproducing the existing discipline and reproducing himself as an individual prince), one will need 
to traverse the dialectical interpellations of the discipline of architecture (which produces the subjectivity 
of architects and users, while reproducing their architectural unconscious and reproducing society). 
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demands to the benefit of society as a whole, any kind of particularity able to create a 
universal claim could assume the character of a conscious subject to move history 
forward. This would be the case as long as they manage to ‘project their militant 
particularism as the basis for a wide-ranging social reconstruction that will advantage, if 
not save, us all’ (as was the case with ecological movements, feminists, gay pride, and 
so on). 
Nevertheless, the idea of the ‘The Commons’ (with capital ‘T’ and ‘C’) does not take 
into account the reproduction of subjectivities and the permanence of reified 
presubjectivities inside the very common sense. The Commons presupposes a collective 
and social nature of shared subjectivities, which, arguably, is not a unity in principle, as 
the emergence of the Podemos in Spain was accompanied by the emergence of 
Ciudadanos; the emergence of Syriza in Greece by the rise of Golden Dawn; the 
protests for free transportation in Brazil by a coup d’état; the rise of Jeremy Corbyn in 
Britain by the campaign for Brexit; the rise of Bernie Sanders in the US by Donald 
Trump; and so on. This means that the subjectivity commonly shared has contradictions, 
and although collective, it might negate this very collectivity. In this sense, in a field 
shaped by discipline (such as architecture) could be expected to have more conservative 
than radical potentialities, and its commons is exactly the object that should be 
traversed. 
Therefore, trapped within the limitations of the status quo and relying on the common 
ground of a society immersed in reified subjectivities, this account is unable to traverse 
its own phantasies, thereby at best encouraging conspiracy theories. Thus, this account 
becomes the inverted image of that which it fights against: the pathetic acceptance of 
reality as it is (i.e., our next prince). 
 
The pathetikos prince 
In Modern Painters, John Ruskin (1987) created the term pathetic fallacy to address the 
sentimentality of 18th-century poetry, asserting that ‘the foam is not cruel, neither does it 
crawl. The state of mind which attributes to it these characters of a living creature is one 
in which the reason is unhinged by grief’. 
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The Venice Biennale of 2016 was directed by Alejandro Aravena. In Chapter 1, we 
delineated how Aravena’s architecture is fundamentally a charitable dead end 
(pretending to solving a problem with the poison that has created it). At the Biennale, he 
achieved an outstanding sublimation of this position.  
Drawing upon a vague sentimentality, we could reframe Ruskin’s argument as follows: 
Aravena’s conception of architecture does not simply fallaciously describe the cruelty 
of the world and the messianic role of his ‘good design’; it is a fetishist description of 
his own desires for poverty as an object of manipulation. This reframing takes the 
deadlock of resignation to an entirely new level. As in the Foucauldian management of 
inequalities, architecture becomes an instrument of surveillance in response to a 
perceived risk. The precarious condition of poverty becomes an instrument of both 
conversion into the system and exploitation. 
As Douglas Spencer (2016) asserts, the resignation of the ‘Franciscan Turn’ was the 
foundation of the logic of neoliberalism. Claiming evangelical poverty, the order had 
subjected itself to a precarious life that, rather than being reclusive, depended on the 
status quo for mendicancy and trading, which ranged from donations to the selling of 
places in heaven. Similarly, Mother Teresa has been criticised for using charity as a 
means of imposing colonialism and racism; reinforcing questionable regimes, self-
promotion, money laundering; and, ultimately, converting people in precarious 
conditions to her own beliefs. 
Similarly, this type of prince, now shining in the field of architecture, is not simply 
accepting the status quo anymore, nor is it simply ignoring the ‘real tackling of the 
problem’ in favour of beautiful design. This architecture depends on the reproduction of 
inequalities as a source of objects of manipulation. Marvellously conceived, with 
spectacular images and installations, the last Biennale is the beauty-reification of 
poverty. This world is cruel, and it crawls. As Aristotle divided the intellect into the 
active intellect (nous poietikos) and the passive intellect (nous pathetikos), intellectuals 
in architecture have become the passive matter on which the logic of neoliberal 
capitalism operates. Beyond blind or resigned, architecture becomes pathetic. 
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The hysterical prince 
Despite Koolhaas’ (no date [1976]) description of his method in Freudian terms, it is not 
a paranoid method (deconstructing imposed identities for fear of being manipulated by 
others), nor is it psychosis (the impairment of thought and emotion that detaches from 
external reality) or even what others have described as perversion (a behaviour that 
enjoys breaking away from orthodoxy but that paradoxically reinforces it). Instead, this 
kind of prince is based on hysteria: a repetitive traumatic behaviour triggered by the 
anxiety of the ‘loss’ of power. 
Here, there is a delight in abdicating (as we mapped in Chapter 1). The architect does 
not exercise power; he serves power. Architecture is considered an automatic response 
to ‘natural’ tendencies in society. Thus, architects do not act; they merely actualise 
tendencies. In this sense, they express the symptoms of crises, pathologically enjoying 
them. The subject does not fear being controlled by others (as in the case of paranoia); 
because there is no other subject of action than ‘just the way things are’. Thus, the 
architect can locate himself outside any ‘blame’ (and ethics), enjoying his pathological 
behaviour and the ‘madness’ of reality as an inescapable condition, as though he were 
not taking part in the action. 
Examples of that attitude (as we shall return to below in our analysis of utopias) are two 
of Koolhaas’ proposals: ‘The City of the Captive Globe’ – from his book Delirious New 
York (Koolhaas, 1994), where he turns neoliberalism, egotism and the ‘technology of 
the fantastic’ into an unconditional condition – and ‘Exodus: or the Voluntary Prisoners 
of Architecture’ – from his 1972 Architectural Association thesis, where he extends the 
horror of the Berlin Wall’s segregation into an architectural condition for freedom 
through self-imprisonment. The same is true for his more recent proposals, such as 
Junkspace (Koolhaas, 2002), where he aestheticises the slums to create a slogan for the 
enjoyment of the madness of contemporary reality: enjoy it because that is just the way 
things are. 
In this sense, Koolhaas’ primary strategy is based on a ‘progressive’ perspective, where 
progress is matched with better (the Tailism we saw in Chapter 1). This strategy 
assumes that the existing tendency represents the correct political alternative to follow. 
Therefore, the role of the architect is to accelerate the emergence of a given condition. 
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This position of resignation clearly has a close relationship with positivism. The belief 
that all social problems will be solved by technology and the progress has its roots in 
Saint Simon. Be that as it may, Comte (no date [1848]) systematises the doctrine 
asserting the ‘relative nature of the positive spirit’, which addresses only the truth and 
renounces the discovery of the earliest origins and the final destinations of all things. 
For him, all propositions are imperfect and speculative, given their situated conditions. 
Therefore, Comte argues that we can approach rightness only by using the most 
advanced techniques and science. Positivism assumes that if everything is relative, then 
only progress – what is to come – can be used to measure truth. Positivism has a blind 
belief in the future. 
In Koolhaas, history is used simply as an imaginary identity; social contexts are used as 
mystic allegories; and laws are merely the rules in a frivolous game. Therefore, these 
tendencies can be explored through an apparent aspect of psychotic perversion: what is 
inherent to the system but denied by ideology is converted into positive emotion by 
accepting it as ‘given’, as what we inescapably (naturally) are. Although called a 
dialectical strategy, no negation is involved. The conceived political act is to interpret 
intrinsic virtualities, not to invent or construct a potential – not even to choose a path. 
Here, pluralism is simply the acceptance of everything that is already individuated. In 
this sense, there is a double contradiction in terms. Its method is supposedly not 
technocratic but relies on the architect’s ‘interpretation’. It is supposedly political, but it 
makes no choice. 
Thus, accelerating the current tendencies – whatever they may be – becomes the right 
choice for positivists and hysterical princes alike.  
A second radioactive activity of hysterical princes can be seen in the moment that 
collapse becomes glory in the field of architecture. Ten days after Kunlé Adeyemi won 
the Silver Lion at the Biennal of Venice for the simulacrum of his floating school in 
Lagos, Nigeria, the original and (most of time) ‘to be occupied’ school suffered an 
‘abrupt collapse’. Similarly, Kunlé recently designed a small pavilion at the Serpentine, 
whose benches are ergonomic only in the renders. 
The politics of hysteria is, on the one hand, reality as it is (mad, and collapsing); on the 
other hand, a simulacrum of glory (freedom without choice, and schools without roofs). 
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However, the Serpentine pavilion of Koolhaas’ former disciple, perhaps represents a 
more visionary collapse. Showing signs of structural fatigue and deformation since its 
inauguration, staff at the gallery confirmed that work was completed later to avoid 
structural collapse. However, the pavilion’s collapsing aspect (parten capit) remained 
visible. Thus, phantasy itself surpasses architecture; as the architect proclaimed in praise 
of the project: ‘We can turn fantasy into concrete reality’. 
Koolhaas asserts the following about this famous disciple: 
Contrary to many, maybe including himself, I do not consider Bjarke 
Ingels the reincarnation of this or that architect from the past. On the 
contrary, he is the embodiment of a fully fledged new typology, which 
responds perfectly to the current zeitgeist. Bjarke is the first major 
architect who disconnected the profession completely from angst. He 
threw out the ballast and soared. With that, he is completely in tune with 
the thinkers of Silicon Valley, who want to make the world a better place 
without the existential hand-wringing that previous generations felt was 
crucial to earn utopianist credibility. 
We are friends. Once, during lunchtime, I used his office to prepare a 
competition presentation. (We lost.) On the menu that day was quiche. 
Wow, I wondered, so you can do great architecture without violating 
anyone’s comfort zone? (Koolhaas, 2016). 
Therefore, Koolhaas can be credited for inventing not only a new version of the prince 
but also one that is self-reproductive, a hysterical theatre that continuously surpasses 
itself. His fascination with Coney Island and its ‘Technology of the Fantastic’ became 
an inverted automaton: both a technical phantasy and a phantasy of technique. His 
princely action is a radioactive implosion of the field on the belly of the architect. 
 
6.5. The inescapable condition of utopian phantasies: on present and absent objects 
of desire 
We will start our mapping of utopian phantasies in architecture with Mannheim’s 
inversion of the correlation between the following pairs: ‘reasonable-utopia’ and 
‘possible-impossible’ (Mannheim, 2000, pp. 173-175). For him, the ideological 
interpretation of ‘reality as it is’ as something ‘natural’ completely ignores the concrete 
history that has produced that reality. To match social reality with ‘unconditional’ is an 
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ideology (an idea and a type of logic). It assumes the mystifications of society as 
already realised (such as all ‘men are born free’), although they might never be 
accomplished in the current logic of things. Thus, ideology (i.e., the hegemonic cultural 
logic) assumes its abstract ideas as if they were already on place (thus they are ‘u-topic’, 
‘out of place’). 
If ideology has played a key role in ‘the conversion of things into persons and the 
conversion of persons into things’ (Marx 1990, pp. 209), utopia is the element that 
justifies and reproduces the order of these things in the field of architecture (departing 
from existing things and existing social relations). Thus, utopia operates on two levels: 
justification and reproduction. The first is usually the object of classical utopian 
thought, while the second is that of pseudo anti-utopian proposals. This situation leads 
us back to the distinction between fantasy (conscious) and phantasy (unconscious), 
which can help us overcome that limitation. 
On the one hand, utopia functions in architecture as fantasy, providing a reasonable 
narrative about how an architect has reached a specific proposition and thus becoming a 
story that justifies his desired proposals, mobilises the desires of others and justifies the 
repetition of a series of ‘things’ (social relations) in the name of the production of an 
image. In this sense, this type of utopia is a narrative produced consciously by the 
architect to justify and mobilise desire. Therefore, it is a ‘presented’ object that the 
architect desires. This ‘present’ and ‘conscious’ object is the fantasy. 
On the other hand, utopia has an ‘absent’ object of desire (phantasy) in the various ways 
architecture functions as a method of social fetish, where this process is framed by the 
discipline of architecture (here, discipline in its full sense of disciplining subjectivities 
and a way of doing things). In phantasy, architects are relatively unaware of the 
‘process’ embedded in architectural things, believing their methods to be impartial 
technical methods dealing with a priori substances. At this unconscious level, utopia 
operates as a phantasy (rather than a conscious fantasy). Here, even if utopia is a 
partially built narrative, it emerges from unconscious assumptions, thus turning 
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preindividual desires into generalisations and requirements. Here, utopia is phantasy: an 
‘absent’ object that the architect desires.99 
In this sense, trying to escape the paradox of utopia by simply denying it is a senseless 
endeavour. Instead, we argue the inverse: the phantastic character of utopia is an 
inescapable condition; therefore, we need to traverse these phantasies and to make the 
artificial nature of our desires and the fetishist nature of its production conscious. Thus, 
the detour to follow involves traversing these constructive phantasies and making the 
ethical grounding and drives behind these mobilising images conscious. Doing so 
reveals the political dimension of phantasies, as any proposal is founded on a 
representation of reality (a conceptual framework outside the topos). 
In this sense, Jameson’s (2004) ultimate argument is that the value of ‘utopia is 
somehow negative’:  
…and that it is most authentic when we cannot imagine it. Its function 
lies not in helping us to imagine a better future but rather in 
demonstrating our utter incapacity to imagine such a future – our 
imprisonment in a non-utopian present without historicity or futurity – so 
as to reveal the ideological closure of the system in which we are 
somehow trapped and confined (Jameson, 2004, p. 45). 
For this reason, Jameson asserts that ‘each of these utopias is a fantasy, and has 
precisely the value of a fantasy’ (Jameson, 2004, p. 50) and asks the following question: 
‘Is this to say that we can form no substantive or positive picture of utopia, short of 
embracing all the multiple contradictory pictures that coexist in our collective social 
unconscious?’ (Jameson, 2004, p. 51). 
To answer this question, we will need to make one last effort in our cognitive mapping 
of the architectural unconscious. Metaphorically speaking, this is our last section with 
architecture on the psychoanalytic divan. 
In this sense, we will initially divide utopia into two main groups. On the one hand, one 
group of utopias represents ‘absent objects’ (subdivided into the blind and the resigned), 
                                                          
99 Even if some architects claim to be non-utopians (even if conceived in objective, positivist, or 
pragmatic terms), they are putting forward one conception of ‘truthful’ architecture, among infinite other 
possibilities. Therefore, their own subjective condition is the ‘absent’ object of phantasy. 
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as they suppose that their ideas do not exist – that they are supposedly dealing with only 
‘positive’ reality. This is the uncritical disciplined ideological conception of being 
‘impartial’. On the other hand, the other group of utopias represents ‘present objects’ 
(subdivided into the naïve and virtual), as they consciously propose utopian objects 
(fantasies) even if mediated by unconscious ones (phantasies). If not dialectical, this 
group is at least critical of the status quo. 
Following a pattern similar to that of the diagram of the prince phantasy, the following 
diagram 30 is divided into a virtual horizontal axis where the poles are dialectic and 
disciplined, and a vertical axis where the poles are phantasmatic and potential. 
In diagram 30, blind utopias are positioned in a disciplined phantasmatic position, and 
their actions only result in the reproduction of the centrality of the architectural 
discipline. They do not produce new phantasies and only reproduce existing ones. 
Resigned utopias are positioned in such a way that they reify actual potentialities into 
new phantasmagorias. Naïve utopias are on the dialectical side, although they operate in 
the existing phantasies of the field; thus, they only rearrange existing ‘things’, 
ultimately reinforcing the centre of the discipline. Virtual utopias are dialectical; 
nevertheless, they are engaged in realising virtualities (what the ‘tree’ is for the ‘seed’) 
and not in producing new potentialities (as we observed in Simondon, the creation of a 
new reality through the creation of new mediation). Arguably, u-utopias (such as the 
negative dialectics of Tafuri) can traverse the phantasmatic nature of utopias, but it does 
so in a direction contrary to the production of potentialities (thus, as in the case of 
Tafuri, utopias are simply regarded as equivalent to the current ideology).  The 
following analysis of those key utopian phantasies aims to traverse this field, moving 
from recognising its phantasies towards producing new potentials. 
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Diagram 30: Axes of utopian phantasies. Source: the author.  
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A conservative critique of utopia has a long history. In these studies, utopia is equated 
with architectonic modernism, as in Alice Coleman’s Utopia on Trial (1985) and Colin 
Rowe’s Collage City (Rowe and Koeter, 2000 [1978]); however, variations appear in 
works such as Jane Jacobs’ The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1992) and 
Eisenman’s The End of the Classical (2006). 
In these criticisms, politics is suspended, and social and political aspirations are equated 
with illusions of technically unfit architectonic proposals. The main point to retain is 
Lukács (1972) critique that the ideologist considers capitalism to be ‘natural’; therefore, 
any attempt to change it is likened to authoritarianism (supposed artificial interventions 
against the human nature). Nevertheless, these criticisms do not consider any social 
product to have an inherent subjective, historical and social character. 
This is a simulacrum of a radical critique of utopia, pretending to achieve what u-
utopias do, but instead of critiquing the topos as false ideologies, they take their 
conceptions of topos as absolute, therefore, only reproducing it. Those are the absent 
utopias. An absent utopia can easily become an instrument of distancing and 
estrangement to protect architects from the traumatic failure of their proposals, 
establishing a narrative about the absolute separation between the conceived ideal and 
the real to be blamed for any mistakes. This ultimately transforms architecture into a 
straightforward fetish. These utopias produce fetish in two ways: on the one hand, it 
creates a mask, which covers, ornaments and hides the concrete aspects of an 
architectural proposition; on the other hand, utopia becomes a fetish in the sense of a 
‘magical technique’, i.e., a method of hiding artifices (as in the case of sprezzatura), 
thus concealing the real means of production of a spatial object. 
Unconscious utopian phantasy in architecture operates in a preindividual realm, and it is 
even more intensively at play when utopia is said to be denied. To illustrate this point, I 
would like to start the following discussion by investigating two manifestations of 
allegedly non-utopian practices, which propose discourses of non-politics and radical 
acceptance of the real, even though they produce and reproduce social relations, i.e., 
imposing abstractions on the topos. Later, we will discuss the dialectical utopias, and 
the limitations they face, so we can find the route to traversing the phantasy of utopia. 
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Blind utopias 
Blind utopias aim to negate the political dimension of architecture and reset the 
discipline under an ‘autonomous’ field. To do so, proponents suggest they have 
recognised the failures of the discipline in a changing society and have tried to 
demonstrate how modernism ignored tradition and the value of historical experiences. 
As a methodological strategy, they suggest that architects should focus on the elements 
considered ‘essential’ to the field. In this new tradition, the elements that were 
considered ‘pure’, part of the ‘true’ tradition of architecture, and ‘objectives’ were 
primarily informed by geometry, ironically, a historically produced abstraction. 
Consequently, this method reaffirms context (status quo) as inevitable only through the 
negation of its own contextual inferences. In this sense, this drive to eliminate the social 
role of architecture by sublimating the political condition can be called a ‘blind utopia’. 
Colin Rowe (Rowe and Koetter, 2000 [1978]) is the referential theorist to adopt this 
approach, and Peter Eisenman is the main disciple of this new tradition.100 
Colin Rowe elaborates a simplification of architectural ambitions. To escape from the 
contradictions and anxieties of the social effect of architectural practice, Rowe proposes 
an autonomous architecture. According to Michael Hays (2000, p. 72), Rowe argues for 
a pure form – against any ‘escapist myths’, moral incantations and external sentiments, 
social vision, or future vision. In these terms, architecture should be ‘ideologically 
indifferent’, result from the demands of the flesh, and simply be the ‘best’ possible 
proposal in a contingent condition.  
Colin Rowe (1972, p. 74-75) attacks the ‘modern architect’ for his presumption of being 
not only scientific but also sentimental. He argues that the fantasies of the ‘true 
believer’ had failed and that the total design of a social revolution did not make sense in 
America because the American Revolution had (in his mind) already occurred in 1776. 
Therefore, he argues that the American architect became a bon vivant, passionate about 
                                                          
100 In the period of postmodernism, the negation of the dialectical relationship between architecture and 
society assumed two sides of a same coin. On the one hand, architecture was treated as an objective 
technique in which the role of the architect was to develop a superior form of art out of geometric studies. 
On the other hand, architecture was expected to avoid any sublime aesthetical or social intention. From 
this perspective, architecture should learn from reality as is. For architecture to regain a publicly 
accessible language, architects should mimic popular behaviour and apply ordinary strategies. In this 
sense, Kevin Lynch (1965), Robert Venturi (1965, 1972), and Charles Jencks (1977) could be argued to 
be different versions of this same tradition. 
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sports, full of youth, dedicated to a simple life, and interested in allegorical sociology 
and technology, and for Rowe, so should it be: he argues that buildings should be 
elegant personifications of that way of life. Therefore, he argues modern architecture in 
America became a decor de la vie or a veneer for enlightened capital. This condition 
supposedly revealed the most important contribution of America to architecture: ‘the 
disinfection from [the] political’ or a modernism that was ‘safe for capitalism’ (Rowe, 
1972, p. 76).  
Rowe (1972, pp. 79-80) then issues a series of ‘false-dilemma’ criticisms. He suggests 
that the utopian visions of modernism were trapped in a paradox of positivism (its 
supposed scientific techniques) and the representation of a teleological future, whereas 
architecture should be the ‘midwife’ of history, who plays no active role. For Rowe, 
‘prophetic speculations’ should be replaced by memory and meanings in overtones to 
‘communicate’.  
In a later book, Rowe (1978) establishes the principles and strategies for his Collage 
City. His mix of ideas proposes strategies such as cross-breeding, assimilation, 
distortion, challenge, superimposition, and figure ground (1978, p. 92). These strategies 
result from fusing the concept of bricolage from Lévi-Strauss and the anti-utopian open 
society discussed by Karl Popper. This operation allows Rowe to create an absolute 
overlapping of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’, where the new is the result of a use of tradition 
without contextual critique, which he considered to be abstract utopian reasoning (1978, 
p.100). The use of tradition as a hypothesis that has been tested would allow architects 
to use urban solutions freely. 
According to this assumption, there is no space for action in history. Rowe approaches 
‘tradition’ as if it were not ‘produced’ socially. Without a history, without invention, 
without social, political and ethical origins and consequences, tradition can be regarded 
as a catalogue of ‘things’. However, as we observed in Chapter 4, ‘things’ are nothing 
more than social relations. Furthermore, by ignoring fetish, Rowe does not even address 
social change, as his methods imply the blind repetition of previous social relations. In 
short, Rowe cannot escape the reproduction of the discipline’s prejudices. 
As an example of his (anti)ethical approach, Rowe addresses the segregation and 
integration of African Americans in the USA (Rowe, 1978, p. 97-98). Without stating 
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his position, he indicates that there are arguments for one and the other, both proper and 
improper. Nevertheless, he concludes that segregation and integration are a matter of 
natural grouping equals and ordering freedom in the city. For him, although the matter 
is open as an ‘idea’, it is closed as a ‘fact’. Therefore, for him, segregation is 
paradoxically the result of the free association of equals. With that he ignores the 
history that created inequalities, and the social relations of power that sustains it. 
Notably, his proposal, while claiming to be ‘impartial’ (and therefore displacing ethics), 
actually accepted the result of ethical choices as a natural fact. 
This blindness allows Rowe to suggest that one should not be political ‘beyond a point’ 
(whatever that might be). For him, such political dilemmas should be treated in a ‘third 
way’ – technical solutions. Overly comprehensive design considerations should be 
avoided, and the focus should remain on form. This tactic, which he calls ‘sublimated 
conflict’, is what reproduces architecture into a state of ambivalence, ambiguity and, 
ultimately, ineffectiveness. In his words, this ‘virtue of irony’ is ‘a technique for using 
things and simultaneously disbelieving in them, it is also a strategy which can allow 
utopia to be dealt with as image, to be dealt with in fragments without our having to 
accept it in toto’ (Rowe, 1978, p. 109). This criticism of modernism became very 
influential among students and young architects. Nevertheless, despite its popularity, the 
focus on ‘form’ only emphasised one aspect of hylemorphism; ‘sublimated conflict’ is 
only the disregard of the metastable character of systems; the only virtue of irony is to 
misrepresent the production of things (social relations). More than an image, utopia is a 
phantasy of that Rowe does not escape. 
An example of these deadlocks in practice is the production of Peter Eisenman. As 
Eisenman (2008) suggests, Rowe was his greatest mentor: ‘The time I spent with Rowe 
was my education’.101 Eisenman describes a ‘Grand Tour’ that the two took together in 
which Eisenman assumed the role of the ‘noble savage’ and Rowe taught him how to 
see, interpret, and think about architecture. They visited the classical buildings of the 
Italian Renaissance, and Eisenman absorbed Rowe’s teachings like a ‘sponge’. This 
experience led Eisenman to have a peculiar view of architecture and a keen ability to 
depoliticise philosophies. 
                                                          
101 The relation to a court affiliation and the attempt to derive distinction via an established intellectual in 
the field are notable. 
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In his text ‘The End of the Classical’, Eisenman (2006) states that objects have no 
enduring values and that, in turn, no value can legitimate architecture. For Eisenman, 
this means the end of classical architecture (including modern architecture) because he 
argues that there is no longer a truth upon which all architects can base their 
architecture. There is no unchanging ideal; thus, architecture can no longer represent 
any ideal. Therefore, architecture should be the result of an infinite play with abstract 
forms, depending on the designer’s technical methods. Paradoxically, behind what he 
sees as ‘masks’ of truth, Eisenman finds the substance on which to base architecture: the 
syntagmatic rules – semiotics structures – of the basic elements of geometry – Euclidian 
geometry.  
Eisenman’s House VI is an example of that notion in practice. Its unemotional name is 
the first indication of its pretended impartiality. The house emerges from a flat site as a 
sculpture that is isolated from its context. No symbolism is intended. No functionality is 
determinative. The house is the result of a geometrical exercise. As a result, the couple’s 
bed is divided in half, and everyday life is ‘accidently’ conditioned by an ‘impartial’ 
process (although architecture can become inadequate, it is not intentional, i.e., it does 
not involve a conception of a new typology of romantic relationships for postmodern 
couples). Here, the absolute abstraction of values makes no concessions to the concrete 
experience. Values, ideals, conceptions, traditions, and so forth are neither actively 
denied nor transformed; they are simply disregarded and overlooked. The result is that 
the status quo is simply reproduced.102 
 
 
 
                                                          
102 The blindness of these ‘revolutions’ of the modernist utopia can also be applied to the formulations of 
Robert Venturi (1965, 1972) and Charles Jencks (1977). Although they represent a tentative triumph over 
the monotony of the universal proposals of modernism, they remain a fundamentally linguistic form of 
criticism. In this sense, the failures of modernism are explained as a problem of communication. 
Therefore, forms should be more popular, ambivalent, complex, and exciting. The crises in the realisation 
of utopias are interpreted as communication failures: modern architecture did not adequately 
communicate its message to the public. Additionally, the Enlightenment belief that humans’ problems can 
be solved rationally is invalidated. Therefore, this theory not only ‘asserts’ that the only alternative is to 
accept consumerism and mass culture but also reproduces this condition. 
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Resigned utopias  
A different phantastic utopia is elaborated through the lineage of Oswald Mathias 
Ungers (Aureli, 2008, p. 177-228). Although the universal aims of modernism are 
denied, reality is addressed as a flattened present in which current tendencies are 
explored. In this tradition, a free pluralism of methods is employed to find the inherent 
tendencies of a place. In this case, the deepness of the urban context is exploited but not 
radically challenged. In this sense, the primary strategy is based on a ‘progressive’ 
perspective (progress as a goal). It assumes that the existing tendency represents the 
correct direction to be followed. The role of the architect is therefore to accelerate the 
emergence of a given condition. His influence in contemporary production can be 
analysed in the work of Koolhaas (1994). Here, the utopia of a project is not invented; it 
is merely found (retroactively). Although what we shall call ‘resigned utopias’ produces 
simulacra of ‘radicality’, they merely constitute an irreverent acceptance of what is 
bizarre in the status quo. 
In the 1970s, Oswald Mathias Ungers also attempted to develop a ‘third way’ to 
overcome a duality that he identified as ‘technocratic architecture’ and ‘postmodernism’ 
at that time. According to Aureli (2008, pp. 177-228), Ungers developed his theories 
based on a dialect between the simplicity of the parts and the complexity of the whole 
city. By proposing a Dialectic City, he aimed to contrast his position with Rowe’s 
Collage City, with whom he previously had imagined proximities. Nevertheless, 
Ungers’ call for ‘dialectics’ has a contextual meaning: he was opposed to Rowe’s 
individualism. Where Rowe observed an ad hoc accumulation of forms, Ungers 
observed dialectical tension between situations. Where Rowe sought idiosyncratic 
architectural figures, Ungers sought the collective nature of the city. 
Ungers based his political dialectics on his previous research on the housing 
interventions in ‘Red Vienna’. Those interventions created isolated superblocks as ideal 
spaces for workers. These spaces were not like the modernist minimum standard; 
instead, they were performance spaces for the full realisation of life. In addition, Ungers 
researched alternative communities in the USA and became convinced of the possibility 
of creating autonomous entities from the overall social system. These ideas would 
combine to form his most famous paradigm: the Archipelago. 
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The Archipelago was inspired by Schinkel’s interventions in Berlin. It was conceived as 
an alternative to urban expansion because, by the 1970s, Berlin was actually shrinking. 
Therefore, Ungers proposed the city as a system of ‘cities within the city’, archipelagos 
of urbanity surrounded by green spaces. In this sense, the city would be formed by 
contrasts, opposing forms, conflicts, and different collective dimensions. Therefore, 
each island would become a ‘micro-city’ (based on the terms of Aureli, 2008, p. 178). 
In other words, each island could create its own utopic proposal. 
According to Aureli (2008, pp. 194-197), the initial projects of Unger, such as Grüzug 
Sud, propose a ‘retroactive’ rationalisation of the existing conditions. By exaggerating 
the natural ingredients of the city (such as aggression, enmity, and separation) and its 
contrasting parts, Unger transforms the most controversial aspects into the drivers of the 
project. 
Koolhaas extends this perspective – he worked with Ungers on the Berlin project – and 
explores it in several projects. In Koolhaas’ (1994) fictional conclusion of the book 
‘Delirious New York’, he unveils what the utopia of New York would be, as though it 
were developed by a single project (a method that he would mimic in future works). 
There, he stated that 
The City of the Captive Globe is devoted to the artificial conception and 
accelerated birth of theories, interpretations, mental constructions, 
proposals and their infliction on the World. It is the capital of Ego, where 
science, art, poetry and forms of madness compete under ideal conditions 
to invent, destroy and restore the world of phenomenal Reality 
(Koolhaas, 1994, p. 294). 
In this retroactive (resigned) utopia, Koolhaas aims to capture the supposed 
‘democratic’ aspect of the iron grid of Manhattan.103 He creates an equal context for 
each block, simultaneously creating the conditions of freedom to allow each to develop 
its own spaces in a completely autonomous way, as in an archipelago of islands. The 
forms of the building are generic and express images of themselves, whereas their 
interiors are both completely divorced from and flexible to the instability of the 
metropolitan way of life. However, instead of proposing an isolated micro-utopia here, 
                                                          
103 Although, notably, in 1970, New York was ravaged by inequality, crime and violence. 
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his ‘retroactive manifesto’ proposes accelerating the already existent tendencies of the 
city’s liberalism. 
In the case of Koolhaas’ former utopian project, ‘Exodus: or the Voluntary Prisoners of 
Architecture’, this enthusiastic resignation is even clearer. As Aureli (2008, p. 197) 
asserts, it ‘deliberately accepts the reality of the city as made of separation and 
exclusion rather than unity and inclusion’. Here, Koolhaas accelerates the condition of 
segregation and social division, not only accepting it but also transforming it into a 
voluntary state in the sense of ‘love it or leave it’. This proposal emerged from his third-
year project, which he elaborated on a visit to the Berlin Wall. Instead of engaging in a 
political discussion of the Berlin Wall, he opted to observe the different ‘landscapes’ 
that it generated. Koolhaas approached the Berlin Wall more as a series of spatial 
discontinuities, a series of impressions and spatial situations, than as a massive object of 
terrible social consequence and immense political conflict. By accepting all ethical, 
social and political consequences of the Berlin Wall as a given, Koolhaas was allowed 
to propose the creation of two of these walls in London (certainly doubling his artistic 
license). 
In this sense, in Simondonian terms, the fetish of Koolhaas’ office arguably does not 
produce any operation. At play in this method is the rescue of implicit unrealised 
structures in the field of preindividualities, without proposing any transduction (t), any 
mediation (M) or any interaction (I) between conflicting instances (see diagram 25 in 
Chapter 3). He creates a vulgar image of the perverse repressed character of current 
ideology. Without perverting it, he only presents the perverse side of the current 
structure as a given reality, served in a well-dressed dish. Similar to how Freud’s ultra-
individualism is only the systematisation of the current ideology, Koolhaas’ proposals 
have the precise value of depicting a phantastic image of the dystopian character of 
current ideologies. 
 
Naïve utopias 
Naïve Utopia has a long tradition in architecture; thus, it has been extensively submitted 
to different accounts. On the one hand, a traditional view of utopia becomes a collection 
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of narratives, a historiographic enumeration of dreams, as shown in the classic book of 
Mumford (1928) up until the recent work of Vidler (2011).  On the other hand, a radical 
critique of utopia originates in Engels’s Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (1880), in 
which utopian proposals are regarded as a result of a cultural and social condition. 
Because of these restraints, a utopia cannot free itself from the status quo. In these 
terms, a utopia will not produce an actual negative version of reality (a proper u-topia); 
instead, it will produce a rearranged version of ‘things’ as they already exist. 
A naïve utopia risks becoming its opposite, namely, the narcissistic fetish. The 
architectural field actively produces phantasmatic glances, disciplining subjectivities to 
see the outside as a mirror of individuated narratives. A clear example of how a utopia 
can be trapped in the fundamental narcissistic principle is Le Corbusier’s Modulor. By 
attempting to find the ‘hidden’ principle of beauty, he ultimately denied the other. The 
feminine body is not part of his formula. Furthermore, the architectural game does not 
simply subjugate the other in the sense of exclusion. It is not just the ignorance of 
‘Echo’ (the nymph ignored by Narcissus) or the hiding of her reverberating truth. A 
transformation of the self and the world (not only the end point but also the starting 
point) reifies both reality and the self. In this sense, the architectural discipline functions 
as preindividual political device, imposing subjective senses and reproducing the status 
quo. 
In architecture, interpellations are being imposed at three different levels: first, by the 
architectonic objects produced, which create a ritual that constantly reinforces how 
architecture should be understood;  second, by the instruments that architects use, such 
as perspective or computational techniques, which both frame and produce facts; and, 
finally, through the disciplining process (institutions, boards, academia, clients, the 
market, and so on), which function as ‘others’ to create the architect’s own fantasy. 
Architecture does not simply present ideologies as facts, as though it were lying; it 
transforms ideologies into social facts. 
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Virtual utopias 
Many attempts have been made to produce a dialectical version of utopia, in the sense 
of being an imaginary object of future possibilities that counter the concrete reality of 
things as they appear in a particular social context. In Mannheim’s classical study, a 
utopia is an idea that is able to envision new possibilities. Thus, utopias should be 
understood as the construction of real possibilities that depart from an existing context, 
which is deemed to be changed. 
The classic study of Ernst Bloch (1986) would argue that utopia is fundamental because 
it is a ‘principle of hope’: once one understands that the reality of ‘things’ is not as 
natural as it seem, then hope can be converted into a different reality for things. In 
Spaces of Hope, David Harvey (2001) argues for the conception of dialectical utopias, 
which avoids the simple ‘imagination’ of alternative worlds; such utopias should be 
conceived as counter-topias, devices that relate negatively to reality, thus allowing for 
the imagining of future alternatives rooted in the concrete. 
Similarly, in his book The Right to the City, Henri Lefebvre (2000) proposes an 
experimental utopia, developed in an intellectual operation that he calls ‘transduction’: 
the production of theoretical possible object’s as references, a strategy designed to 
transform society (his most famous ‘possible object’ being the ‘urban revolution’). 
As discussed before, the limitation of proposing a utopia as the production of a ‘virtual’ 
object is that such a proposal implies that the seeds are already there. The virtuality of a 
‘seed’ can only be its corresponding ‘tree’. In this sense, there is no room to produce 
new mediations and the structuration of new individuations, as it concerns the idea of 
‘potentials’. 
 
U-utopias 
Baudrillard’s (2006) writings in the group ‘Utopie’ mark the beginning of a process that 
would lead him to condemn reality as a series of simulacra. Similarly, Tafuri (1976) 
investigates how modernist utopias were all versions of a transformation in the mode of 
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production, thus only formulating the ideology of late capitalism. This vision relies on 
the necessity of a radical rupture with the present, which makes it possible for the new 
to emerge; thus, it focuses on ‘negating’ the present rather than formulating the future. 
The fundamental problem in this take is an inverted version of ‘Tailism’. Lukács (2000) 
resurrects one of Lenin’s concepts, in which society is assumed to develop itself 
spontaneously, following the ‘tail’ of progress. This inverted tailism imagines progress 
automatically following the negation of all that exists, without the need to conceive an 
alternative. The negation of the possibility of negating the social space (i.e., a u-utopia) 
can deliver only fatalism and despair. Thus, the problem of conceiving an alternative 
future remains. 
This ultimately inextricably links the negation of utopia to the topos: without the 
possibility of imagination, reification becomes omnipresent. From a reflexive activity, 
critique becomes the affirmation of the inevitability of the status quo. I do not aim to 
ignore these critiques; instead, I seek to further investigate how we can move in the 
opposite direction in our cognitive map: how can a critique provide the basis for the 
creation of new potentialities? 
As we noticed in Lukács self-critique, the production of objects is the creation of 
mediations that allows thought to intervene in reality, and the problem is not the 
production of objects, but the ethical consequences of those objects. Overcoming this 
paradox does not involve condemning the world as ‘utopian’ and claiming to find the 
absolute ‘rightness’ in a negative thought that exists only in your mind; instead, it 
should generate a conscious awareness of how different utopias actively operates in the 
process of becoming being of any architectural account. 
 
6.6. Traversing architectural phantasies (and the insufficiency of this phantasy) 
Hamlet, the prince of a rotten kingdom in Shakespeare’s play, was informed by a 
phantasm that he was living in a net of lies and simulations. Thus, he became 
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melancholic104, trapped between two worlds: one of the pompous lies of the court, 
which made his uncle a king; and the other the phantasmagorical truth, revealing all to 
be a game of appearances. To test whether the ‘accepted courtly phantasies’ or the 
‘phantasmagoria awareness’ was the truth, he staged a play inside the play, a theatre 
inside the theatre, which revealed the lies of his uncle-king. Our map is a kind of theatre 
inside the theatre, a phantasy inside the phantasies, to reveal their own limitations.  
For instance, regarding the prince phantasy as we mapped it, Koolhaas’ hysterical 
method has the appearance of being ‘critical’ because it is based on the actualisation of 
existing social potential; it is the actualisation of preindividualities in the field (or the 
acceleration of tendencies). Nevertheless, his actions do not create a new mediation that 
structures new radical potentialities; instead, the movement is the inverse, capturing 
potentials from already disciplined phantasies of the field. In other words, to traverse 
the phantasy of that kind of prince, the inverse movement must be mediated: instead of 
turning potentials into further phantasies, one should unveil the operating phantasies to 
create radical new potentials (see Diagram 29, page 221). 
Our first step was to identify the prince phantasies and to position them in a political 
and ethical field. The second step depends on the ways in which the map is used rather 
than on the map itself. As an instrument, this map is just a heuristic device that allows 
subjects to recognise their own desires and the phantasies that support them. As we 
observed in Simondon’s account of the subject, the creation of a conscious 
individuation depends on a choice that connects preindividualities and 
transindividualities, already individuated individuals, and the possible transindividual 
individuations. Although the critical production of this mapping is the first step in the 
process of traversing the phantasy of the prince, it is insufficient on its own. 
The movement towards acknowledging the phantasmatic nature of architectural princes 
and the shift upwards on the diagram’s vertical axis – to create mediations for the 
emergency of potential collective subjects who are aware of their existence in relation 
to the world and in a position from which they can act in it – is a continuous theatre of 
                                                          
104 Here we extend Vygotsky’s (no date [1925]) long analysis of the play, to counter the commonly 
accepted interpretation that Hamlet was lying to be mad, he was actually melancholic: a feeling common 
at the time, when a profound depression was reached by perceiving how the instruments of reason were 
insufficient to find the truth of the world, as depicted in the Albrecht Dürer painting Melencolia I. 
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individuation, a dynamic field of operations, which is informed by its context and by the 
choices that subjects make in any given moment. 
Regarding the utopian phantasies, to traverse them is not simply to note failures of 
utopias and the miserable conditions of its existence as a simulacrum; instead, it is a 
matter of recognising that the production of utopian phantasies is the production of a 
preindividual field, which allows the emergence of architecture and architects. Instead 
of blindly accepting or resigning, unveiling the process of production of these units of 
‘subjective sense’ helps in the perception that its artificiality is inevitable; and, 
therefore, open the possibility of transformation. In other words, it is a map that 
orientates subjects in the ‘Bacchantic orgy’ of the reproduction of architecture, ‘in 
which no one escapes being drunk’ (as we already quoted from Hegel). 
Once again, as we excavate deep within our pyramid of the architectural unconscious, 
an inconvenient revelation is that this model cannot adequately inform such a map. This 
pyramid not only has multiple dimensions, which are produced over time, but also has a 
mysterious passage that connects fantasies with the interior of the estrangement wall. In 
this sense, instead of being the unconscious substances of an individual, phantasies are 
the collective subjectivity that enables such subjects to emerge, they are social 
operations that reproduce what separates us from the means of producing architecture 
and our role in it. 
We should move beyond Lacan, for whom traversing the fantasy (the visible image, the 
shining appearance) is to traverse what conceals the dark emptiness of the inner 
subject’s drives. To traverse the produced phantasies, one should not attempt to go 
deep; instead, one should return to how appearances are effective in reality, as 
phantasies are manifested in the open air as though they were reality. Thus, traversing 
the phantasy does not involve eliminating it or scouring beneath it; instead, it involves 
abstracting the subject from his original position so that he can look to himself, not from 
outside, but transversely, recognising the preindividual subjective senses as part of his 
most intimate desires. However, this idea does not mean assigning the blame for one’s 
failures to the ‘Other’ (asserting that the object of one’s desire is absent because it is 
subtracted by somebody else); it is quite the inverse: although the object of one’s desire 
is always socially constructed, it is fundamentally mediated by each subject’s process of 
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individuation. In other words, there is no ‘blame’ in the world nor in the subject; it is a 
question of transforming the mediations that exists between subjects and the world. 
Although they are not the only ones, the prince complex and utopias are important 
mediators of the architectural unconscious; for that reason, they play an important role 
in how architecture operates today in society. To understand their role is just the first 
step in conceiving architectural interventions that are fundamentally critical operations, 
which starts with a reflexive self-critique. This understanding might provide a genuine 
utopia of traversing utopias, i.e., a critical map of the political praxis reproduced by the 
phantasies of the field, thus allowing a self-critique that dares to see the prejudices 
inside our own minds. 
This map started with the analysis of workshops developed as critical interventions, 
where we were able to identify unresolved paradoxes in the attempt of critical 
interventions. These paradoxes revealed a series of deadlocks in architectural 
subjectivity, the main one being the question of whether architecture can shape society. 
To trace this question, we started developing a cognitive map of architecture to unveil 
how architecture is formed of both disciplining and dialectical elements. Furthermore, 
this map revealed how the discipline interpellates a specific subject to inhabit this map. 
Although different conceptions of this subject are possible, a pre- and transindividual 
unconscious will reproduce architecture on three different levels: reification, in which 
architecture transforms social relations into architectural things; fetish, or the means 
through which architecture creates truth as a means of power and mechanisms that 
capture social work; and, finally, the phantasies that mobilise desire in architects and 
that, if unconscious, ultimately transform architects themselves into things. Only 
through the recognition of the becoming being of architecture can we conceive of 
architecture as an ‘event’, a dynamic and continuous theatre, in which architecture is not 
a thing but a series of ethical operations that enables other operations to emerge. 
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Diagram 31: Traversed pyramid: the secret passage. Source: the author. 
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CONCLUSION 
To approach architecture through its means of reproduction turns the disciplinary field 
of architectural theory upside down. In this approach, rather than investigating 
architecture as a neutral set of skills, methods and concepts that aims to produce things, 
architecture is revealed to be a process of objectifying subjectivities. Furthermore, this 
approach also turns the critique of architecture upside down. If we return to an earlier 
illustration, rather than investigating how the panopticon can produce subjectivities, we 
investigated how the panopticon was the reproduction of an already disciplined 
subjectivity. 
The object of our analysis was not the first intended result of the research. As science 
boasts many famous accidental discoveries – such as penicillin, plastic and radiation – 
the research aim was to investigate how architecture could be revolutionary. To do so, 
we turned the fieldwork into a laboratory and started our investigation with the working 
hypothesis of hacking and micro-utopias. As the participant observation of this 
architectural ‘laboratory life’ was transformed into a ‘live laboratory’ that was subjected 
to an observation of our own participation, a new full-blown picture emerged: the 
reproduction of architectural discipline. 
Even though the research departs from these specific fieldworks, these experiments 
enabled us to track down the wider limits of this disciplinary practice. We called those 
perceived limits ‘stake points’ (which are the reference points in our subsequent 
analysis and the points at stake in the production of new social relations through 
architecture). Thus, the investigation of possible architectural alternatives as 
revolutionary forces unexpectedly illuminated the means of the reproduction of 
architecture. 
This reproduction of architecture is not formed by a linear causality; it instead functions 
dialectically. Architecture reproduces social relations in space by reproducing itself and 
the subjectivities (of both architects and those who appropriate architecture immersed in 
distraction). Therefore, architecture cannot be understood to be developed by an 
individual. 
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The critique of the concept of the ‘genius’ producing architecture leads to a ‘Copernican 
Revolution’ of the concept of the subject. Rather than focusing on the supposed 
immutable and essential centre of creativity within a singular individual, subjects were 
found to be the void floating in outer space – a collective transsubjectivity. These 
individuals are just actualisations of pre-existent potentialities – the preindividualities – 
which are dynamic and collectively shared. Architecture is not the agency of an 
architect but the manifest operations of preceding dynamics.105 This acknowledgement 
renders most of the histories of architecture, which fill libraries worldwide, futile. 
Furthermore, this acknowledgement casts the problem of a radical architecture in a 
totally new light. The question is not how architects are able to do revolutionary 
proposals but how they ultimately reproduce society in their proposals. This question 
also has implications for the concept of revolution itself. It is not about what should be 
done now, to refer to Lenin’s famous assertion; it instead reveals the intricate 
relationship between revolution and consciousness. 
It is not about conceiving the right model for the freedom of mankind; it is instead about 
enabling a conscious positioning towards the means of production of one’s social 
condition, which results in both a new understanding of the ‘big scheme of things’ and a 
new understanding of the ‘least little things’. It implies the non-essence of objects, the 
non-existence of individuals and the dialectical collective nature of the subjects 
themselves. 
In these terms, the investigation provides neither a fixed image nor an ultimate 
algorithm of architecture. Instead, it became a matter of enabling the visualisation of the 
process of reproduction. Therefore, the dissertation became an instrument: a cognitive 
map to reveal and elucidate the limits and contradictions involved in the exercise of 
architecture.106 
                                                          
105 The first two live projects presented in Appendix 3 revealed how the insertion of two concepts in the 
practice of architecture could not avoid the reproduction of architecture. Instead, this action revealed how 
the discipline constrains how architects can place themselves in relation to the mode or production of 
architecture. Brought to its limits in these experiments, architecture became an event, an operation that 
mediated different forces at play, and its structures became only effemeral instruments to bring into life a 
new set of possible operations. 
106 This thesis as a whole can be seen as a cognitive map, whereas the diagrams are heuristic devices to 
approach this map. Future research in the development of these two-dimensional diagrammatic 
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As we argued, this map is not a 1:1 representation of the field. Instead, it traced 
coordinates departing from the identified points at stake. Two coordinating lines were of 
special interest: estrangement (how the architectural discipline separates subjects from 
the means of producing their own conditions) and reproduction (the means through 
which architecture would create a cycle of repetition in the guise of new appearances). 
Estrangement and reproduction are the coordinating lines of the two parts of this thesis. 
In the first part of this thesis, we identified the deadlocks of the discipline or the ways in 
which the theory of architecture traps the production of architecture within a series of 
dead ends, fallacies, false dilemmas, denials of dialectic, resignation, protest, escapism 
and, ultimately, a lack of reflexivity that prevents self-conscious actions. Nevertheless, 
the architectural discipline is not a closed system; it is instead an enclosing operation. It 
restricts, delimits, differentiates, values and establishes the rules of a game to be played. 
However, contradictions are manifested in the permanent tensions. In other words, 
history reproduces not only the system but also its dialectical contradictions.  
Hence, this internal conflict between discipline and contradiction creates a paradoxical 
condition. Architecture both shapes and does not shape society. Architectural reification 
is not ‘everything’, yet we are all subjects who act from within a given condition. Our 
actions are reified into a specific logic from the early hours when we buy bread until the 
late night when we work out the design for a competition. 
Therefore, this cognitive mapping is not a prescriptive model; it is merely the first 
instrument to allow a self-conscious positioning towards our condition. Our cognitive 
map departed from the fieldwork, and therefore is related with the process of identifying 
the concrete points at stake in the experiments observed. Nonetheless, these points at 
stake revealed the underlying process of the reproduction of architecture. In other 
words, the particular experiments revealed connections with overall social processes. As 
a first step, this map was concerned in perceiving (aesthetically identifying) the means 
through which architecture subjectivity is reproduced – namely, reification, fetish and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
representations could add important contributions for this topic. In addition, recent research in the field of 
quantum cognitive mapping could provide important insight in further explaining how consciousness is 
produced and shared between different subjects (for an example of quantum cognitive mapping of 
physical properties as interaction of conscious agents rather than things, see Hoffman, 2014). 
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phantasy. These three aspects were than investigated in an enlightened return to the 
common practice of architecture, in the second part of the thesis. 
The investigation of things in architecture revealed how any supposed objectivity is 
informed by social relations. This was attained by the investigation of the privatisation 
of public spaces in London, revealing further aspects of how social relations are 
reproduced through the production of the aesthetics of ‘things’ in a contemporary city. 
These social relations are present in any architectural product through its information 
(mise en forme, shaping). These social relations not only are operative reflections of a 
given condition but also operate through architecture to build this very social condition. 
Therefore, reification is not simply a perversion of the natural processes of things – the 
conversion of social relations and humans being into things. Instead, all things are social 
relations, including human nature and nature itself. Things are desires that are 
represented in objects.  
Objectification is needed for mediated reflection (as noted Lukács); and further, all 
things are mediations and – ultimately – social relations. The problem thus lies in the 
enclosure produced by these objects, as revealed by the analysis of privatised public 
spaces in London. There, the production of things is not simply the production of limits, 
separations and delimitations but also the production of facts, the reproduction of 
hidden intentions and the reproduction of collective sensibilities through the aesthetics 
of things. Therefore, things are always ethical actions, in the sense that to present an 
object is to represent one’s desire. 
From Alberti to Koolhaas, the production of architecture as things incorporates sets of 
relations into form (mise en forme) and make these relations invisible – this is the 
fetish’s participium praesens. The consequences of such production are not 
unimportant: the reification of architecture is the first step in the instrumentalisation of 
the collective subjects that produce space. As we observed in the ‘observation of our 
participation’ in the last workshop – described in the Appendix 3 – the figure of the 
genius in power controls the possibilities of the collective work, reifies the subjectivity 
of other architects at work, exploits the surplus of creation as if it was his own product 
and hides its desire through narratives of legitimation (phantasies). 
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Thus, architecture not only aligns itself with power but also reproduces the hierarchy 
that empower some subjects and instrumentalise others. Architecture places power. 
Power is established by concrete social spaces. Power is everywhere – it is not in space; 
it is space. As we have observed, space is not a neutral void; it is historically and 
socially produced. As history, space is the result of conflicts and struggles. As a 
product, space is the result of actions and intents. Hence, those in position of power are 
supported by the reproduction of space. 
Power is not necessarily based on lies. The invisible social relations that inhabit things 
in space are not lies. They have truthful consequences. They do socially exist. 
Therefore, they are real, but theirs is a special form of reality, one that is produced by 
hiding the artifices of its creation. This operation is what lies behind social 
reproduction: its fetish – its magic blasphemies. 
Furthermore, architecture plays a key role in these magic blasphemies, as it produces 
the perceived ‘facts’ of social space. These facts are the result of a process of 
production, which includes a means of production and a social division of labour. In 
architecture, fetish is both a verb and a noun – a ‘dancing table’ – because this 
subjective action is present in inanimate things. Actions take part in things, forming 
their core. As we have observed, the intensification of this process has taken on not only 
inanimate things but also inanimate architects. The fetish of the geniuses now survives 
the precarious existence of their own bodies – in the whispering of dead architects, as 
we observed in the case of Zaha Hadid.107 
The regressive investigation of the role of fetish in architecture traced its relation to 
power. It is not only a technique that produces social space phenomena (i.e., a means of 
power exercised from the field of architecture on society, thus, reinforcing positions of 
power) but also a social power exercised within the field (i.e., a means of enforcing 
assembly lines of architectural creation, thus, reproducing the instrumentalisation of 
architects). Fetish in architecture is thus a means of expropriating collective social work. 
This expropriation of the collective work of architecture is only possible because 
architects come to desire their own oppression through phantasies. 
                                                          
107 Recently, a popular online magazine placed Zaha Hadid – despite her sad passing earlier last year – as 
#1 on its ‘hot list’ of November 2016. 
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Phantasies are conscious narratives of unconscious desires. For instance, the myth of the 
genius is only socially effective because architects (not so) secretly want to be the next 
genius, as they are captives in a ‘Bacchantic orgy in which no one escapes being drunk’ 
(as Hegel once said). These phantasies provide the narratives that sustain the field and 
hide the artifices that produce the ‘causal chains’ of ‘an orchestrated carnival of 
masquerades’ (as Foucault once said). 
For instance, as we saw, the narrative that sustains the field says that the genius of Frank 
Lloyd Wright magically invented a whole new style for modern architecture, while the 
hidden artifice was to expropriate the work of hundreds of architects in the Taliesin 
Fellowship sponsored by the fortune of his wife. The causal chain ‘the genius had an 
idea and invented a new style’ hides the actual process of production. Namely, it was 
produced by a collective work and expropriated by financial and cultural capital.  
Again, a particular narrative was socially reproduced. 
This socially produced logic of things depends on the production of subjectivities. 
Subjects are the actualisation of potential pre-subjectivities. The politics of subjectivity 
thus relies on an investigation of the production of potential pre-subjectivities. The 
dialectical ‘subjective senses’ are blocks of perception, framing possible actions in the 
world. By framing the minds of architects, providing narratives for their desires, 
architecture reproduces its very means of (self)oppression and estrangement. 
The result of this discussion is quite striking for architectural theory. As architecture 
becomes successful in the very moment of its collapse, a road is bound to collapse under 
the weight of its dearest myths: the prince, the utopia, the facts and the architectural 
object. On the one hand, the ‘prince’ is a powerful political device; Machiavelli has 
noted this figure’s power more than five hundred years ago. Again, princes are not ‘lies’ 
because they have true consequences and they articulate and colonise collective 
subjects. Furthermore, this myth is based on the myth of the individual. It is a myth 
based on a narcissist epistemology that is unable to see what is beyond itself – the belly 
of the architect. On the other hand, very dear in the field of architecture, utopia is also a 
myth: a myth of a myth. Utopia does not escape the topos, because it rearranges the 
status quo. Utopia is nothing but desire, because it reproduces narratives of causality. 
All mainstream histories of architecture – compendiums of collective phantasies – are 
rendered futile. 
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However, there is no escape from such phantasies; the ‘Bacchantic orgy’ and the 
‘carnival of masquerades’ cannot simply be ended – ‘no one escapes being drunk’. 
Instead, one must traverse these phantasies, which relates to developing a consciousness 
to understand how social myths come into concrete operation. 
Architecture has no essence, no ontology. Such things do not exist a priori; they are 
produced. There are only processes of production – actions. Architecture is a series of 
operations, which are incorporated into structures only as a means of creating new 
operations; it is a non-trivial machine that reproduces collective subjects. 
This thesis is not a model. It is a theoretical instrument for aesthetically instigating the 
perception of a particular reality: the reproduction of architecture. This investigation 
used cognitive mapping to unveil the means of architectural reification and its 
transindividual subjectivity; it also challenges its common ontology (from structure to 
operation, from thing to action, from mythological narratives to concrete labour). This 
map is only an instrument to help architects better situate themselves in the field of 
reproduction of their means of production – and hopefully more ably avoid the traps. 
Rather than answering a question, this thesis uncovers a problem, setting the stage for 
new enquiries. 
The moment that architecture is most used in the reproduction of ideology is also the 
moment that architects have become less important. With the findings of this theoretical 
investigation, we do not aim to resurrect the importance of architects nor to find 
salvation in this ‘moment of greatest peril’, as there is no redemption after death. In 
other words, redemption after death is part of the problem, as architects do not even die 
anymore. However, the road to the solution of this paradoxes might be found in this 
phantas(ma)tic implosion, as the black box of deadlocks is ready to be opened. To open 
this box does not make us free of the ghosts, rather it releases them. The only solution is 
reflexivity, i.e., being conscious of the ghosts haunting our subjectivities. 
In short, this cognitive map is programmed to ignite from within the heads of the 
architects. 
If Tafuri argued that there is no radical architecture, only radical critiques of 
architecture, we argue that his critique of architecture was not radical enough because it 
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was not a self-critique. Text is a way of thinking with concepts just as much as 
architecture is a way of thinking with space. However, more striking is the fact that 
architecture is just as much a means of reproducing ways of thinking as texts are. 
Therefore, both are threatened by the same ghosts (such as ‘the architectural princes’ in 
Tafuri). 
Returning to the example of Schopenhauer’s reading of Plato’s Cavern, the logic that 
connects the shadows is both inside and outside the cavern. Similarly, the radical in 
architecture (whatever one might conceive it to be) should be traversed inside and 
outside the shadows of architecture. Radical awareness exists precisely in the 
recognition that what connects the shadows are ideas and logics – ideology is our very 
means of thinking. The investigation of the ways of thinking about architecture is a 
radical road to be paved. To know the way that one is thinking about architecture does 
not involve a retelling of the idiosyncratic tale of a prince; instead, it involves 
uncovering the historically and socially produced realm of subjectivity that allowed this 
prince to think in the first place.  
If there is no salvation, the alternative is not to go beyond the illusions but to traverse 
them – to be aware of the mediations that each one of them imply. In this way, this 
research returns somehow to its original intent. Although the initial mistake was to 
search for a model that could deliver revolutionary architecture – hacking reified social 
relations through micro-utopian interventions – in the end the research revealed the key 
to the black box: revolution is consciousness. Therefore, the answer is not to invent the 
ultimate anti-illusion, nor any form of escapism – notably, many radical critics of 
architecture become painters, as they refuse to produce new illusions through 
architecture. To be sober and to refuse to enter the ‘Bacchantic orgy’ is just another way 
of being drunk. The alternative is to be conscious of the ethical implications and of the 
social artifices involved in the illusions one has chosen to propose and to be able to 
successfully demonstrate those aspects in other architects’ proposals. 
For this reason, the product of this research is a cognitive map of the reproduction of 
architecture. It supports a continuous dialectical disenchantment of the field’s 
phantasies. More important than the small step taken by this map is the landscape it 
helps to envision. Although there are no predicaments or prescriptions, it enables a vast 
landscape of new studies in architecture, such as the analysis of the material and 
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transubjective base of theoretical deadlocks in architectural proposals, the unveiling of 
the hidden artifices behind architectural discourses, the unveiling of concrete labour 
behind the architectural production of geniuses, and assessing the concrete power of 
reproduced illusions. 
Furthermore, the enquiry must go beyond an awareness of the subjects’ position in 
relation to the means of production. We are all disciplined subjects of architecture. The 
fight is against ourselves in a self-critique that traverses the reproduction of architecture 
inhabiting our deepest desires. 
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University of East London, Docklands Campus, University Way, E16 2RD 
 
PROJECT TITLE: Architecture and revolution in the 21st century: 
Micro-utopian spaces as hacking of objectified social relations in the city. 
 
THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:  Camilo Vladimir de Lima Amaral 
Docklands Campus, University Way, London E16 2RD, 
Phone: 07552887318 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information that you need to consider in 
deciding whether to participate in this study. 
 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
The Research will investigate the field of architecture and how small practices are challenging 
its structure. It also investigates how social relations occur in the activities and products in the 
field of architecture. 
This project will use techniques of grounding theory, which involves field observation of 
architectural projects, participant observation in design workshops and qualitative interviews. 
I would ask for your account on your practical experience in the field of architecture. This 
information would be important for the research to assess how social relations are involved in 
the production of architecture. 
For this reason, the participants will be asked how they experience the constraints to the 
freedom of their everyday professional practices. For this, they will be asked to describe the 
process of design and contact with clients and the market, and how these affect their work. 
They will also be asked if they have developed strategies to overcome these constraints. 
Participants will also be asked to give an account of their labour conditions, and how they relate 
to other architects, professionals and users, and how this relates to their process of design. 
Finally, we will ask on how those questions interfere in the products they can deliver as an 
architect, what currently would be the social impact of his work. 
There is no hazard risk other then we face in normal everyday life experience, and you would be 
expected only to give your view on your own experience in the field of architecture. 
 
AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
The proposal aims to assess how alternative architectural practices can challenge social 
relations that are objectified in architectural elements, spatial rules and urban objects. The 
hypothesis is that architecture can produce emancipated social relations in temporary spatial 
agencies. This hypothesis, if confirmed, can explain the current changing in architectural 
practice, and foment new forms of practices among architects. The subject about architectural 
production and social transformation has been debated in theory for a long period, but no 
experimental assessment has been done. Therefore, the results may give a new basis for 
objective and scientific debate on the subject. 
Although the field of architecture is structurally constrained by its founding preconceptions, the 
recent economic crises created the conditions for the emergence of new social roles for 
architects. This research is a critical immersion in the practices that proposes socioeconomic 
alternatives that enables a revolutionary role for architects. Revolution is understood, in the 
realm of this study, as a conscious action of radical subversion of the social role of architects, as 
framed in current context. 
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The aim is to investigate how these practices are challenging the reproduction of the field, as 
well as its objectified complex social relations, as well as the limits and challenges they face. 
Ultimately, this perspective aims to contribute with benchmarks for alternative modes of practice 
and to construct a socially active approach. 
The hypothesis is these practices create ‘micro-utopian’ alternatives, which act as hacking 
devices in current architectural field. 
Here, hacking is understood as attitudes as techniques for subverting and reconfigure social 
protocols, rather than a concept or definition. This enables to understand a peculiar aesthetic 
and practices emerging in the current informational mode of production, without restricting it to a 
meaning. 
Thus, this dialectical approach repositions utopia as immanent kaleidoscopic fragments in a 
condition marked by complexity and uncertainties. The focus is on experiences producing a 
creative fissure in the field. A new framework for understanding these transformations is being 
constructed, thus rendering a new image for the field. 
 
NON-CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE DATA 
The data will be secured by protocols in accordance with the University’s Data Protection Policy. 
This data will be used for the elaboration of a PhD dissertation and possible paper publications. 
Due to the qualitative character of the sample, the technical nature of the questions, and the 
intended association with case studies of your work, the participants might be identified in the 
publication of the material. 
 
LOCATION AND INTERVIEW FORMAT 
The research is being carried at UEL school of Architecture, with supervision of Professors 
Hassan Abdala, Douglas Spencer, Roland Karthaus and Alan Chandler, and with support from 
the Federal University of Goias and a scholarship from CAPES/Brazil. 
As a participant, I would like to interview you at a location of your choice, or if you prefer at 
proper locations in our university. The questions I would like to ask are related to architecture 
and your professional practice. Interviews would cordially last less than 1 hour, and I would be 
recording you on audio or video, at your discretion, for the purpose of data collection and 
presentations. The record will then be transcribed by me. You might decline to be video 
recorded, and still would be welcome to participate in the research. 
 
DISCLAIMER 
There is no remuneration for participating in this research, and interviews will be conducted on a 
voluntary basis. 
You are not obliged to take part in this study, and are free to withdraw at any time during tests 
and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied. Should you choose to withdraw 
from the programme you may do so without disadvantage to yourself and without any obligation 
to give a reason. 
As participants are not in a dependent relationship with any of the researchers, the participation 
in this research will have no impact on assessment, treatment, service-use or support provided 
by UEL. 
In any possible case, UEL students choosing to decline or to participate in this research, it is 
ensured this will not have any impact on their assessment neither on their learning experience. 
 
 
This research has received formal approval from the University Research Ethics Committee. 
If you have any queries regarding the conduct of this programme, please contact:  
Catherine Fieulleteau, Ethics Integrity Manager, Graduate School, EB 1.43 
University of East London, Docklands Campus, London E16 2RD  
(Telephone: 020 8223 6683, Email: researchethics@uel.ac.uk). 
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UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
 
Consent to Participate in an Experimental Programme  
Involving the Use of Human Participants (professionals): 
 
Architecture and revolution in the 21st century: micro-utopian spaces as hacking of 
objectified social relations in the city. 
 
 
I have read the information leaflet relating to the above programme of research in which I have 
been asked to participate and have been given a copy to keep. The nature and purposes of the 
research have been explained to me, and I have had the opportunity to discuss the details and 
ask questions about this information. I understand what is being proposed, the procedures in 
which I will be involved have been explained to me, and I understand the intended use of the 
data. 
 
I understand that my involvement in this study is voluntary. 
 
I understand that this research is being held at University of East London, as part of a PhD 
research, which has received support from the Federal University of Goias and CAPES/Brazil 
research founding agency. 
 
I understand that information and non anonymised quotes might be used in the publication of 
the PhD thesis, scientific papers, conferences and internet. 
 
I understand the interviews will be recorded, and I authorize the collection and use of the 
following data (inscribe ‘Yes’ or ‘No’): 
 Audio recording 
  
 Video recording 
 
I hereby freely and fully consent to participate in the study which has been fully explained to 
me and for the information obtained to be used in relevant research publications, and 
acknowledge that no hazard risk other then faced in normal everyday life experience is involved. 
Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study at 
any time without disadvantage to myself and without being obliged to give any reason. 
 
Participant’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS) …………………………………………………………… 
 
Participant’s Signature ………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Investigator’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS) …………………………………………………………… 
 
Investigator’s Signature ………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Date: …………………………. 
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UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
 
Consent to Participate in an Experimental Programme  
Involving the Use of Human Participants (students): 
 
Architecture and revolution in the 21st century: micro-utopian spaces as hacking of 
objectified social relations in the city. 
 
 
I have read the information leaflet relating to the above programme of research in which I have 
been asked to participate and have been given a copy to keep. The nature and purposes of the 
research have been explained to me, and I have had the opportunity to discuss the details and 
ask questions about this information. I understand what is being proposed, the procedures in 
which I will be involved have been explained to me, and I understand the intended use of the 
data. 
 
I understand that my involvement in this study is voluntary and that I am free to participate or to 
choose to decline, as this research will not impact on any UEL assessment neither on any 
learning experience held in that institution. 
 
I understand that this research is being held at University of East London, as part of a PhD 
research, which has received support from the Federal University of Goias and CAPES/Brazil 
research founding agency. 
 
I understand that procedures for the anonymization of data will be conducted, even though the 
small number of participants might compromise my anonymity, as this data will be used on the 
publication of a PhD thesis, scientific papers, conferences and internet. 
 
I hereby freely and fully consent to participate in the study which has been fully explained to 
me and for the information obtained to be used in relevant research publications, and 
acknowledge that no hazard risk other then faced in normal everyday life experience is involved. 
Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study at 
any time without disadvantage to myself and without being obliged to give any reason. 
 
 
Participant’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS) …………………………………………………………… 
 
Participant’s Signature ………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Investigator’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS) …………………………………………………………… 
 
Investigator’s Signature ………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Date: …………………………. 
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University of East London 
Docklands Campus, University Way, London E16 2RD 
 
Interview topic guide (professionals): 
Main theme 1: the Field Constraints 
1. How would you describe your role as an architect in the process that goes from the 
"need" of space to the final use, passing through the processes such as the design, the 
construction site and the market? 
Did any change occur recently? 
 
2. Does the structure of the profession, the work market and the real estate market 
constrain your work? 
What are the signs of this? 
How do you feel it interferes in your work? 
 
3. How do you deal with such constraints (if any)? 
Do you have strategies to overcome these kind s of limitations? 
 
Main theme 2: Labour Conditions 
4. How would you describe the relations you have with other architects, clients and 
technicians in the process of designing a space? 
 
5. What you look for when you search for an employee? 
What kind of work arrangements you have with other architects 
(contracts/outsourcing)? 
 
6. Do you think users, builders and other workers should have a say in process of design? 
How does this occur and how important is this for your process of design? 
Could you name who you consider the main actors in the process of 
architectural design? 
 
Main theme 3: Production of Objects 
7. Do you consider the current professional rules interfere in the products you can deliver? 
What would you consider the main constraints to the free exercise of your 
work? 
 
8. On the other hand, do you consider your recent work to be able in any way to reacted or 
interfere in the society and its relation to the city? 
Could you give examples? 
Do your practice interfere in matters of construction organization? 
 
9. What do you consider to be good architecture? 
How is your architecture being assessed and valued by your peers? 
What you consider to be the main agents/instances that set value to your work? 
Has it changed recently? 
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University of East London 
Docklands Campus, University Way, London E16 2RD 
 
Questionnaire (students): 
Answer the questions from 0 to 4, where 0 is negative, and 4 is positive. 
 
 
1. Was working in this workshop different from the architectural education you have experienced 
before? 
0     1     2     3     4  
2. Was the working experience more rewarding than your experiences in architecture to date? 
0     1     2     3     4  
3. How would you evaluate the importance of your role in the final artefact proposed?  
0     1     2     3     4  
4. Did external constraints (market, bureaucracy, and so on) interfere in the process of project? 
0     1     2     3     4  
5. Do you consider that these constraints held back your proposal? 
0     1     2     3     4  
6. Do you think your ideas (and your colleagues’) were considered in a fair way during the design? 
0     1     2     3     4  
7. Did you feel comfortable and open to discuss with your peers the issues involved in the design 
process? 
0     1     2     3     4  
8. Would you consider the decisions in your project were taken in a democratic manner? 
0     1     2     3     4  
9. Did users, builders and local community have real input in the product delivered? 
0     1     2     3     4  
10. Do you think the proposals had a good impact on the place, the users and the community? 
0     1     2     3     4  
11. Did the construction and the creative experience come together in your experience? 
0     1     2     3     4  
12. Do you think the actual result was different from what a conventional architectural practice can 
deliver? 
0     1     2     3     4  
13. Would you consider the final product as a ‘valuable’ architectural product? 
0     1     2     3     4  
14. What stakeholders you would consider important to be engaged in any architectural design?  
 
 
 
15. Please describe what you consider most important in your experience of the workshop. 
 
 
 
16. Please give any examples of any constraints or negative points you felt in your experience. 
 
 
 
17. Please share bellow any further comments/suggestions you would like. 
 
 
  
Appendices 
300 
 
(2) FIELD WORK I: COMMON PLACES IN LONDON 
The context 
First considerations 
New common places in London 
Background noise – urban experience and social relations 
 
The methodology 
The research design 
General points on the methodology 
Specific points on the methodology 
 
Critical observations I: Outside Observation 
First phase data 
Second Phase Data: 3 Dimensions of the new reified experience 
Stake point 1: common places and the aesthetic of things 
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The Context 
First considerations 
This appendix reports on the first of three phases of fieldwork. This ‘first observations’ 
refer to a classical observation, in which a view on the ‘results’ of contemporary 
architecture is developed from an outside point of view, addressing the external effect of 
architectural products and the aesthetic experience produced by architecture in the 
contemporary production of London (‘Outside Observation’). 
The Appendix 3 reports on the fieldworks of ‘Participant Observation’ and ‘Observation 
of Participation’. The ‘Participant Observation’ refers to case studies conducted as 
anthropological investigations, as if the researcher were studying architects as some sort 
of exotic tribe with their own rites and rules. The ‘Observation of Participation’ goes a 
step further by fully immersing the researcher in the anthropological object of study, 
with its paradoxes and discipline, as though the ethnographer had ‘become native’ (we 
shall develop further this concept below). 
This movement of thought enabled a perception of not only the contradictions in 
architectural products but also the ways in which these live contradictions are part of the 
disciplining process in architectural production. We called such contradictions ‘stake 
points’ not only because they were used as ‘construction surveying’ points for the 
presented thesis but also because they revealed the borders of the discipline at stake and 
thus the limits of the experiments’ successes and failures. 
These live contradictions made it possible to identify the deadlocks of the field – the 
points of no detour – making architecture an abstract disciplinary force that reproduces 
current social relations, despite its promises to do the opposite.  
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New common places in London 
The end of the 1980s saw the birth of a new kind of space as a result of political and 
economic reconfiguration. The metropolis in centralized economies faced a process of 
deindustrialization; which, with the increasing flexibility of work relations and the 
pressure on the welfare state, reframed the mass production economy into the so-called 
toyotist economy (Harvey, 1990). For this new neoliberal economy, a new form of 
space was produced. The paradigmatic example was Canary Wharf. Developed in an 
old industrial area, a vast new financial centre was designed from scratch, where the 
streets and squares were no longer 'adopted' by the weakening welfare state, but, were 
controlled by another entity: the corporation. 
In the book Ground Control, Anna Minton (2009) analyses the emergence of privatised 
public spaces, arguing that Canary Wharf became a model for almost all recent 
developments in England (Minton, 2009, p. 3-14). Although maintaining the appearance 
of public spaces, these streets are not democratically accountable. Such spaces are 
privately managed and are based on specific strategies and sets of rules. The result is 
high levels of management, stratification, big chain stores and corporate control over 
public security to avoid any disruption of capitalist activities. Besides maintaining the 
appearance of public spaces, these streets are not adopted by the local government. 
Zukin (2010: p.222) state that this is a long process that took place in the period after 
the great wars, creating what she called the ‘corporate city’. This city has been produced 
by specific arrangements of: private capital investment, State specific policies and rules 
design, media image construction and direction of consumers tastes (Zukin, 2010: p.30). 
This new configuration of social space (capital, state, media) excluded civil society 
from the formula. Not surprisingly, the collapse of public spaces are accompanied by 
the collapse of democracy itself, as empirical studies demonstrate that political 
decisions are defined by corporation interests, and are no longer influenced by the 
public opinion (Gilens and Page, 2014). 
For Smith and Low (2006: p. 14-16) as we watch the collapse of basic rights, public 
space emerges in the centre of the contemporary debate on democracy, as the 
production of space is a central strategy for the implementation of neoliberal concepts. 
For Smith and Low, this is the reason why political movements are always attached to 
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places (the archetypical mass in a public space). As we will see, changes in the 
production and control of public spaces will also have implications on the political 
potential of those places. Zukin (2010: p.145) argues that schemes of private city space 
management are a new form oligarchy. For instance, the votes and decisions in Business 
Improvement Districts are balanced by the size of ownership in the local arrangement, 
and usually the vote is proportional to the size of the property. Based on the argument 
that the State does not have funds in a moment of economic crises, therefore, those who 
have capital should rule. For instance, in this equation both homeless and unemployed 
simply do not exists. Smith and Low (2006: p. 15) reinforce the argument stating that 
this is the formation of a new apartheid, excluding the poor, the homeless and the 
immigrants out of the city spaces. 
Furthermore, local authorities now expect buildings and streets to be designed according 
to the guidance of 'Security by Design' manuals (Minton, 2009: 61–82). These manuals 
establish a series of design measures that incorporate implicit strategies into physical 
objects. Thus, space is filled with social rules that are designed strategically in order to 
avoid conflict, control use, orient behaviour and guarantee a business-friendly 
environment. Therefore, both Appleton (2014) and Zukin (2010) emphasise that laws 
are increasingly a mixture of authorities' wish to control society and business' interests 
framing decisions in the management of social spaces. 
In addition to these measures, and in order to reinforce control of behaviour in urban 
places, the recent creation of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act in England challenges the 
conventional rights of citizens in the public space. Along with many mechanisms to 
assure dispersal powers to the police, the new law creates a mechanism in which 
specific punishments can address specific individuals and behaviours, depending on the 
understanding of a court (Minton, 2009, p. 132–178). The modern idea that the public 
space is a place in which people can manifest their freedom has been significantly 
diminished.  
Moreover, Appleton (2014) analyses a new bill currently passing through the UK 
parliament that will ensure even more restrictions upon the public. He argues that the 
law gives authorities an almost free hand to control who can do what in public spaces, 
with complete flexibility in rule design. In this sense, there is no previous definition of 
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what is prohibited, nor any previous definition of the scale of the sentence, thus holding 
people in a state of permanent self vigilance. 
In London and United Kingdom recent public spaces polices, yet a new series of 
instruments are being set in use in order to build a new urban neoliberal context. For 
instance, in order to 'bring forward land' for development, the proposed tactic is to 
change the laws governing 'compulsory purchase', 'land assembly' and 'affordable 
housing' (as a replacement for council housing strategies). We further analyze the 
process of how government is using architecture and other techniques to justify and 
produce reified public spaces in Chapter 5.  
It is important to notice that the result of that process is the dismantling of traditional 
communities and urban places through a process of accumulation by dispossession 
(laws that stripped local citizens of older forms of wealth to which they held title) and a 
subsequent re-concentration of property in the hands of big real estate actors. In other 
words, in a time of financial crisis, architecture became a form of releasing real state 
capital from the hands of citizens into new forms associated with rental economy. 
 
Background noise – urban experience and social relations 
Many intellectuals have observed the connection between metropolitan space and social 
freedom (Simmel, 1903, Lefebvre, 1991, Berman, 1990, Baudelaire, 1995, Sennet, 
2002, inter alia). Although this connection could hardly be dismissed, there is a great 
deal of complexity in the topic. This relationship has changed in different historical 
moments, and cities have played different roles in the formation of modern citizenship, 
in these new common spaces, old hierarchical social relations are intensified under the 
guise of new appearances. Therefore, rather than repetition, this process reproduces 
social relations through space – as discussed in the introduction.  
Charles Baudelaire is perhaps the most cited author on the account of the modern 
construction of freedom through the experience of the city. In his literature he was able 
to express how the modern metropolis became an instrument to create an ephemeral and 
free spirit in the modern man (cf. Baudelaire, 1996). For Baudelaire (1995) the modern 
man is like the modern painter, who is able to design his own life, as freely as an artist 
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design his paintings. This freedom was enabled by the sudden transformation of the 
small, closed and stable traditional space, into a multitude, open and the constant 
changing fashion. This atmosphere was founded in the city itself, and was experienced 
by the flaneur attitude: a modern man that would engage in the news and movement of 
the city, connecting freely with the street’s ‘family of eyes’, and swimming in the 
stream (Berman, 1990: p. 148-154). 
Marshal Berman (1990) examines how different cities in the 19th century transformed 
the citizens' social perception. Contrasting the boulevard's experience in Paris with the 
Prospect's experience in Saint Petersburg, Berman demonstrates the intimate relation 
between the social awareness and the city forms.  
In this sense, Sharon Zukin (2010, p. 129) argues that public space has had an important 
role in the democratisation process.1 For instance, even before the French Revolution 
clashed against the previous classes' privileges, the mixture that was promoted by the 
markets' space was creating the basis for modern democracy and paving the way for the 
city space to be open for all. Moreover, Zukin highlights that London and New York 
created public spaces in the 19th century, such as libraries, parks and museums, even 
before the right to vote was available to everyone. Rather than just an effect or image, 
public spaces were also generating democracy and are, therefore, politics in praxis2. 
Moreover, Georg Simmel (1903), from a different perspective, analyses how the 
experience of the metropolis changes modern men's consciousness and, therefore, social 
relations. For Simmel, the modern city creates an intensification of 'nervous 
stimulation', a continuous confrontation with the unexpected, a highly impersonal 
relationship with others, an abstract mode of mediation (money) and, therefore, the 
                                                          
1 Neil Smith and Setha Low (2006) analyse the political role of public space in  modern society. They 
argue that the definition of Public Space has been constructed as the opposite of Private Space . 
Therefore, both social constructions are the result of modern capitalist society. In this sense, this 
phenomena is the result of social struggles against the former feudalist spatial order, and it is even a 
progressive development from the Greek polis, which did exclude both slaves and women from its 
political space, the Agora. Thus, public space arises as a new set of social relations, articulating the 
power of civil society, the market and the modern State (2006: p. 4). 
2 Specifically in London, the struggle for the control of public spaces and streets was the outcome of a 
long dispute that happened towards the end of 19th century (Minton, 2009, p. 19–21). By this time, 
major squares of the city were enclosed, guarded by private security and surrounded by sentry boxes. 
After a conflict with guards resulted in a murder, social unrest and the involvement of the printed media 
resulted in two major parliamentary inquiries. These inquiries resulted in streets becoming 'adopted' by 
the local authorities, which were gaining power by this time. In this sense, the rise of the public space 
coincided with and represented the construction of local democracy in London. 
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necessity of fast reactions. That situation leads to the unconditional use or rationality. In 
other words, by these new features, the modern man is ripped apart from the old 'orbit' 
of the feudal village. Therefore, for Simmel the modern metropolis experience generates 
freedom by the transcending of its own displacement, thus only accounting to its 'inner 
laws'. 
Nevertheless, David Harvey (1992) and Fredric Jameson (1991), among others, have 
discussed how changes in the mode of production have transformed the way spaces are 
produced with the intention of reshaping the way society operates. They argue that the 
move towards a post-fordist mode of production is articulated with many aspects of 
post-modern urbanism and spectacular architecture. This aims to change the very nature 
of work, society, control and space, arguably to adapt it to a new condition formed by 
contemporary logistics, automation of production, and cybernetics (Antonio Negri, 
2000; Nick Srnicek, 2013). 
Michel Foucault (1980) and Gilles Deleuze (1992) argued that, with modernization, 
capitalism moved from a centralized society, controlled by despotic power, with 
hierarchy and direct modes of punishment and control, towards a disciplinary society, 
organized by a strong bureaucracy, were the descentralization of control was enabled 
trough rigid set of laws and education. Henri Lefebvre (1971a) called that society “The 
Bureaucratic Society of Controlled Consumption”. Nevertheless, in one of his latest 
works, Deleuze (1992), asserts that society was moving towards a new form of social 
organization, where the economy would be organized by cybernetic machines and 
computers, with a new kind of social control being born, which is much more diffuse 
and implicit. 
In this sense, Alexader Galloway (2004) argues against arguments such as Castells’ 
(2002), which considers the network implicitly free. He argues that today control is 
established in the same manner as the protocol controls the internet. Protocols are the 
system that rules exchanging data between different machines. Because software are 
made of algorithms, he argues that control have become much softer. Therefore, he 
compares this softness of control with the kind of control one can feel in the highway: 
To help understand the concept of computer protocols, consider the 
analogy of the highway system. Many different combinations of roads 
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are available to a person driving from point A to point B. However, en 
route one is compelled to stop at red lights, stay between the white lines, 
follow a reasonably direct path, and so on. These conventional rules that 
govern the set of possible behavior patterns within a heterogeneous 
system are what computer scientists call protocol. Thus, protocol is a 
technique for achieving voluntary regulation within a contingent 
environment. (Galloway, 2004: 7) 
Therefore, Galloway uses the architecture of the internet to generate very powerful 
insights about the structure of control in contemporary society, such as the double 
structure of the internet protocol (TCP/IP versus DNS). These systems works with two 
abstract machines: one with a ‘formatted’ freedom (of the highway kind), and the other 
with a ‘hierarchical’ control, as Galloway (2004: 10) puts it, of the kind one could 
simple delete the entire China from the internet. He concludes that what were the 
mysteries of commodity for Marx’s time may be the mysteries of protocol for our time. 
In the same way that this dual structure is omnipresent on the virtual world, two forms 
of social control are now being spread in urban spaces: the public (formatted in new 
forms by the State) and the privatized public spaces (hierarchically controlled by 
corporations). This situation creates a logic in which one is free to navigate, but only 
under certain rules, which are designed to secure control under certain roles, which 
transforms individuals into consumers.3 
Douglas Spencer (2011) has studied how contemporary architecture is producing spaces 
with complex forms, smoothness, folding and responsive to difference, but, at the same 
moment, conceiving the buildings in order to achieve a new kind of smooth and 
invisible form of control4. They move these ideas from ‘critique’ to ‘valorization’, 
                                                          
3 Nevertheless, Alex Williams (2013) argues that the idea of ‘everything being capitalism’ is either 
fallacious or a misunderstanding of how systems’ works. He argues that the entity called ‘capitalism’ 
cannot be omnipresent and omniscient, because it is not a ‘closed system’. In contrast, it is an assembly 
of many open systems interacting with each other. He concludes that, besides Capitalism being 
totalizing, it is not absolute. Therefore, it is important to investigate how dissent and alternatives may 
be produced by the capitalist space itself. 
4 Spencer (2011) analysis a new educational building, for accommodating Ravensbourne’s relocation to 
Greenwich, showing how educational spaces and ‘public spaces’ are carefully interconnected in order to 
make the students engaged with marketing at all time, whereas the public is invited in the building as 
‘consumers’. The building also facilitates a flexible agenda that narrows the gap between education and 
‘industry experience’. The engagement between building and new technologies opens the old 
enclosured spaces of education, towards the market and the new mode of production. The architects 
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manipulating a new kind of “politics of affect”, in a kind of a-political politics (Spencer: 
2011: 18). Therefore, terms once used to build a critical and negative analysis (such as 
nomadism, differential, micro-politics) are now used in order to achieve its furthermost 
neoliberal potential, transforming what was saw as negative into positive. The seemly 
fluid, free and liquefied space is, indeed, a very controlled one. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
used a fusion of architectural theory, drained philosophy and managerial business strategies (Spencer, 
2011: 13). 
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The methodology 
The research design 
The research is conceived in a series of “constant comparative analysis” as proposed in 
the Grounded Theory approach (Guest et alli, 2011, Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Fundamentally, this is a qualitative sociological method that aims to develop theories on 
the basis of rigorous observations. In this sense, the process of data collection, analysis 
and theoretical explanation is in constant movement. Thus the codes and themes 
extracted from a first data collection are constantly confronted to new observations, new 
reconsiderations and new tests. Drawing upon this, the research is divided into 7 stages. 
The first initiative was to develop a rigorous project, develop research skills and 
throughout a literature review pinpoint the main concepts to be tested (privatization of 
public spaces, micro-utopia, mode of spatial production, hacking strategies, and so on). 
Secondly, on the basis of these enquiries, case studies of “modern architectural praxis” 
and of “contemporary architectural practices” were developed in order to reveal their 
fundamental differences and originalities. These practices were focused on the spatial 
production of public spaces in the city of London. 
Thirdly, a process of “grounding the theory” took place, identifying main “codes” 
(patterns of behaviour, segments of data, preliminary categories, and so on) in these 
architectural social practices. These observations were assembled into main themes 
(such as Hacking of Objectified Social Relations, Velvet Ground, Tangled Orbits and 
Repeated Compulsion of Space Consumption). 
Fourthly, these themes were subject to fieldwork confrontation, directing activities of 
participant observation in two UEL Architectural workshops (Urban Ecology 
Prototypes and Construction Week) and debated with peer in conferences. 
Fifthly, the systematization of this new data is making possible to develop a preliminary 
map of theories about the field of architecture (which included concepts such as Prince 
Complex, Silent Utopias, Kaleidoscopic Interventions, Tangled Social Control, Driven 
Spatial Consumption, Velvet Architecture, Soft Urban Dispossession, and so on). 
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Sixthly, this new set of theories were tested in a last round of fieldwork that involves 
semi-structured Interviews, Participant Observation, observation of participation, two 
new workshops and conference debates. 
The last step was the conclusion of the critical analysis process, during which theories 
were validated or falsified, allowing a final map of the theories to be drawn. Then, the 
limits and advantages of the framework were considered, and the dissertation was 
written down.  
 
Diagram 32: The research design. Source: the author. 
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General points on the methodology 
The positive approach towards science has mutated into different frameworks during the 
last centuries. The question of how close ideas and theories can reach reality is an issue 
deeply connected to the process of rational thinking itself. From conservative to 
moderate positions, many strategies have been developed in order to classify theories as 
more valid or less legitimate (Popper, 1989, Feyerabend, 1989, Khun, 1987, Adorno e 
Horkheim, 1996, Santos, 2003, Guest et alli, 2011). Science has become a game of 
power and instrumental control of nature and social work. 
Ultimately, in contemporary circumstances, the truth of a theory is measured only by its 
effectiveness in mobilizing human efforts, attention or hierarchical control of labour 
division. Bourdieu (1996) studied the formation of “fields” (such as art, literature or 
education) as a set of social rules, scientific paradigms and ideologies that legitimate the 
value and dominance of certain “habitus”. Uneven relations are established to secure the 
concentration of production, as well as secure the cult of personality and verify the 
accordance of ideas to the centre of the system. 
On one hand, this means that every explanation is socially engaged (Santos, 2001) even 
acceptance of the status quo. On the other hand, this means everything that exists was 
artificially constructed (Escobar, 1996, Lefebvre, 1967, Rancière, 2005, Santos, 2007). 
Two antagonistic effects are fundamental in this research approach: the weight of 
tradition is, paradoxically, much heavier than one would accept, as everything have 
been constructed through the long evolution of architecture as a social practice, thus 
imposing a scenario to our rational thinking and its capability of deconstruction; and 
there is no limit to creatively inventing new truths, other than its social effects and its 
endurance (impact, toleration, flexibility and deepness). 
Therefore, the research uses a methodological pluralism of philosophical argumentation, 
social science techniques of qualitative research (Grounding Theory, Thematic 
Analysis, Participant Observation, Semi-structured Interviews). 
Furthermore, the reproduction of social relations by the production of public spaces is a 
complex aspect to observe. This diffusion of control is one element that makes it 
difficult to assess, as well as the different means to influence behaviour and articulate 
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relations between people in space. Furthermore, there is a conceptual difficulty in 
defining public space and how it relates to the promotion of social relations. The related 
literature presents multiple methodologies that assess the 'publicness' of a place into 
divergent grids and concepts (Varna and Tiesdell, 2010, Benn and Gauss, 1983, Kohn, 
2004, Németh and Schmidt, 2011, Németh, 2012, Lessing, 2001, Staeheli and Mitchell, 
2008, Iveson, 2007).  
A review of this literature provided two main themes for a first-phase analysis based on 
publicly available data, and supported the more qualitative approach of the second 
phase of the research, in which techniques of field study were applied and the 
development of a form was used to notate the observations. This form was created by a 
critical synthesis of the many methodologies to measure the 'publicness' of spaces, 
resulting in 36 elements/criteria to be checked.5 
Furthermore, the research combined this assessment with the analysis of the new 
strategies for 'public spaces' (Johnson, 2009) and the  'housing' policy proposed by the 
mayor of London (Johnson, 2010, 2013 and 2015). The formulation of the investigation 
in these terms allowed to investigate how punctual actions related with the big picture, 
thus further revelling how architectural reification becomes a means in the trans-
subjective agencies identified in our cognitive map. 
In this way, the analysis presented  here aimed to reveal how these new common spaces 
go beyond the simple process of gentrification – the replacement of one class by another 
– and produce a new ‘aesthetical dimension’ over the reproduction of specific social 
relations, whereby the urban condition operates as its material means. 
In short, the current scenario in London is a combination of private tangled social 
control, driven spatial consumption, and the pacification of conflicts by comfort rather 
than punishment. In this scenario, while former Londoners are expelled to outside the 
city limits, top-down strategies are targeting the international market for luxurious (and 
empty) apartments. The first hypothesis was that this process relates to urban enclosure, 
as in the historical ‘land enclosure’ in England, but it is now packed into a nice velvet 
architecture. Nevertheless, the research points to the fact that enclosure is a ‘primitive 
                                                          
5 See image bellow. 
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accumulation’ of a deeper process of reification (a matter we wll explored theoretically 
in Chapter 4). 
 
Specific points on the methodology 
In the first phase of the research was accomplished through an initial inventory 
conducted by combining information from various entities, including the planning 
portal of the UK government, the Greater London Authority website, the British 
Property Federation website, the New London Architecture organisation, and the 
websites of major property corporations and local authorities.  
From an initial list of 1024 projects, 708 developments were found to be already 
completed. After that, the approval dates of the projects were searched. It was not 
possible to determine the approval date of 32 projects; therefore, these were eliminated 
from the analysis. 101 projects fit the criteria of having been approved after the mayor's 
first policy documents were drafted. Of those, 25 were found to not enter the realm of 
public and private boundaries (being mainly internal refurbishments). Each one of the 
32 boroughs and the Corporation of the City of London have different websites with 
different search engines, which means that the information is neither transparent nor 
accountable. 
Seventy-six cases were initially analysed through their projects' online information. The 
public realm impact; the public space privatisation and the resulting public space's 
'coefficient of conversion' into privatised public space were assessed. The average of 
these three analysis creates the overall coefficient of reification of the intervention in the 
public space. 
In the second phase of the assessment, 20 spaces with different private/public 
arrangements were subjected to a field investigation that collected the information on 36 
criteria (to be described below) that were developed upon state of the art research on 
public space. The aspects and considerations derived for the observations came 
especially from the following studies: 
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(1) Varna and Tiesdell (2010) characterized the conceptualization of publicness in two 
major effort groups: (a) Inductive: the quality of been public comes from external 
element, physical properties, material elements and barriers; (b) Deductive: comes from 
internal issues, symbolic interpretations, rules, socially constructed meanings, (in the 
eyes of the beholder). They propose a model for publicness interpretation by measuring: 
ownership, physical configuration, control, civility, and animation.  
(2) Benn and Gauss (1983) propose three dimensions for the publicness examination: 
(a) Access: the ability people have to occupy the space, i.e. appropriate the space and 
recreating its function; (b) Agency: the examination of who defines how the space is 
controlled, i.e. if the rules have social accountability; and (c) Interest: the examination 
of the space management decision, interpreting on if the ‘rules’ are in benefit of the 
public or particular interests. 
(3) Kohn (2004) uses three criteria for publicness: (a) ownership; (b) accessibility: the 
freedom, control and neutrality of access; and (c) intersubjectivity: how the elements of 
the urban space facilitate or make difficult the encounter and interactions of people, 
allowing difference to emerge. 
(4) Németh and Schmidt (2011) has used three axes to analyse publicness: ownership, 
management, and uses/users.  
(5) Staeheli and Mitchell (2008) argued that a space is truly public when it can integrate 
the inhabitants into the creation and use of the space. For that, is important to analyse 
the receptivity, welcome, and comfort provided. 
(6) For Iveson (2007) spaces becomes public trough a process that engage people the 
debate of the space’s proprieties itself. Therefore, a place is public when is subjected to 
public assessment, or if it becomes a means of public conscience. 
(7) Lessing (2001) creates a model of interpretation of the space creating a 
interpretation grid drawn upon information networks society. He uses three ‘layers’ for 
that: (a) Physical: the hardware is the material elements and infrastructure (as cables, 
mediums, objects); (b) Code: that are the laws, codes, protocols and rules that mediates 
the exchanges; (c) Content: the actual information and elements involved in the 
transaction between people. 
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(8) Németh (2012) asserts that ‘truly public forum is characterized by (relatively) open 
access, unmediated deliberation, and shared participation (...) Nevertheless, publicness 
is always subjective: whereas some might feel a space full of homeless persons is “truly 
public,” this sight might drive other users away. (...) A simple metric might examine 
public space vis-à-vis’ [a] Free Access and [b] Behaviour Freedom. He suggests that a 
complete analysis should consider the following aspects: Physical (spatial 
programming, mobility, restrictions and aesthetic); Code (laws, regulations, policing, 
norms, language and guidelines); content (use, behaviour, symbolism meaning). 
(9) For Zukin, S. (2010) culture used to be place-bounded, and Public Space was 
connected to its history, but, it is not anymore. Rather than preserve only the buildings, 
Public Spaces should also preserve the community that created the authenticity of the 
place. Domestication by cappuccino is a form of controlling the space by consumption 
taste. She argues one should not lose the big picture: the issue is about capital granting 
incomes, controlling workers, associating with state to make profitable rules, and using 
media apparatus for managing consumers’ tastes. For her, authentic democracy is loud, 
unruly, unpredictable, dangerous, undisciplined, independent and non-programmed 
behaviour. Therefore, Public Spaces should be free for Protest, as the political aspect is 
one of most important elements of the polis. 
  
In short, the reification in contemporary metropolitan spaces can only be understood by 
the dialectic between the physical arrangements and the economical, political and social 
doctrines. As we saw, ‘things’ in public space are not a matter of simple barriers, cosy 
benches or fancy comfortable materials, but how the objectified social relations 
reproduce citizenship roles in the space. These things are the social codes and 
interpersonal rules that are graved in spatial elements. 
Thus, the matter in the analysis of architectonic reification does not deals simply with 
objects per se6, but also with the social relations implemented when fences, doors, 
tables, and even grass and pavement directs social behaviour.  Social roles are the 
                                                          
6 Note that this proposition is completely different from Object Oriented Ontology (OOO), that supposes 
objects to have and positive existence, with no special status, and nothing beyond pragmatic aspects. In 
this sense, OOO makes a tabula rasa, completely avoiding dialectical thinking, and ignoring history and 
the genealogy of ideas that produced both the objects and their own theories about them, what the first 
part of this dissertation argued impossible, naïve and non reflexive. 
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activities people are expected and accepted to play in specific places. Beyond the 
apparent accessibility of privatized public spaces and beyond its physical beautification, 
the metropolitan space, once symbol of difference, rationality and freedom is being 
transformed into a space of fragmented orbits of control, engraved in fractal and cosy 
objects. This creates a new spatiality, where citizens move across it in unconventional 
dimensions. If we take dimensions as the measure and directions of the space, thus, we 
will need concepts other than forward, sideways and vertically, as this question involves 
multiple aspects and tensions. 
For doing so, the field analysis involved a multi-layered methodology registering 
different aspects of the space, aiming on the one hand, a rigorous analysis, and on the 
other hand, the observation of regular experience of common users. In this sense, the 
case studies were a mixed methodology involving dialectical investigation, analytical 
techniques, behaviour and aesthetical observation and critical synthesis. The 
observations of each case study were than filled in a form, registering 5 main aspects:  
(1) Descriptive and Informative elements 
General information and data collection is important for the interpretation of the 
impact of the developments in the city. This data was undertaken in a straight 
forward spirit, and is the first moment of analysis, where the accumulation of 
pragmatic facts helps the observer to engage and get closer to the object of 
analysis. It also helps to keep the conclusion in tone with the concrete 
experience, avoiding any excess of speculation and idealism. 
 (2) Territoriality aspects 
In the field investigation, aspects of the construction of the site and the 
production of the territoriality are observed. Those aspects involve the 
production of a character/identity for the object in relation to its surroundings or 
regular spaces in the town. It is a subjective analysis not because of its 
imprecision, but because it depends on the interpretation of the impact of the 
object in the subject that observes it. It is an analysis of how the object presents 
itself as a phenomenon. It is specifically concerned with forms of creating 
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boundaries and managing flows, as those are the aspects that creates its relation 
to the overall system of the city. 
 (3) Mechanisms of Heteronomy 
This aspect is interested on how a series of apparatuses and ‘invisible’ machines 
are set into the place, transforming the territory in an instrument of controlled 
and directed experience. Signs, indications, directions, regular furniture silently 
work together creating patterns of behaviour, and effecting a spatial protocol of 
exchanges and flows. 
 (4) Observation of Public Experience 
This aspect is concerned with elements of affect involved in the sense of 
publicness of a place. Thus, it aims to assess how different perceptions and 
patterns indicates and create expected behaviours. In a sense, how the space, the 
use and the events indicates forms of possible subjectivities, actions and actors, 
much in the sense of an Althusserian ‘interpellation’ of space. Although it is an 
extremely subjective element of experience, it can be registered through 
different concrete elements. 
 (5) Personal experience through photographical register 
Finally, a personal experience using critical and aesthetical techniques aims to 
synthesize the overall experience of the site. 
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Image 1: Example of a field investigation form. Source: the author. 
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Critical observations I 
First phase data 
The following diagram 32 represents the degree of enclosure in these spaces. The first 
bar represents the scale of the public realm impact: 31 projects (40.8%) made a large 
enclosure impact on the surroundings (red); 31 projects (40.8%) made small impacts 
(yellow); and 14 projects (18.4%) had no impact on the openness of the public 
environment (green). The second row represents public space privatisation: 42 projects 
(55.3%) resulted in large privatisations (red); 27 projects (35.5%) privatised a few 
aspects of the space (yellow); and 7 projects (9.2%) did not privatise any aspect of 
public spaces (green). The last bar represents the sum of the two indexes (for each 
project), resulting in the public space's 'coefficient of conversion' into privatised public 
spaces. The average of these three analyses creates the overall coefficient of the 
reification of the public space, diagrammatically represented in the map of London (see 
diagram 32 in the next page). 
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Diagram 33: Public space enclosures in London in a non-georeferenced schematic 
diagram. Source: the author. 
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Second Phase Data: 3 dimensions of the new reified experience 
The analysis of the new housing and public space strategies in the production of spaces 
in London revealed the mechanisms through which the urban space is being enclosed. 
The combined analysis of textual documents, data collection, field qualitative 
interpretation and theoretical reflection made it possible to formulate a grounded theory 
of the contemporary production of reified urban forms. This analysis revealed the 
mechanisms through which urban spaces are creating specific forms of social relations. 
These new forms produce a similar effect to the process of primitive accumulation, in 
which the citizen is progressively separated from the means of free place appropriation 
at the same pace at which reified behaviours are imposed. This procedure is made 
possible by strategies that hide the commodification of place and create a sense of 
'naturally artificial' social order.  
These new urban forms amplify ideologically driven behaviour from the realm of work 
in order to encompass the entire scenario of a person’s everyday experience in the city. 
This process transforms users into 'free sellers' of their citizenship through the 
production of three new dimensions of urban experience: (1) tangled social rules; (2) 
driven spatial consumption and (3) velvet architecture. Cosy and kind, domestic and 
comfortable, these dimensions form a type of bird-nest prison, which differ from the 
former means of (panoptical and gridded) control and operate through disorientation 
and refuge rather than discipline and punishment. 
Furthermore, rather than architecture being appropriated by distraction, as in Benjamin 
(2008) famous theory, architecture here functions creating both smooth flows and 
striated paths (like a highway, as we saw before). Therefore, we need an aesthetic 
narrative able to capture these dialectical dimensions of reified spaces. Therefore, in 
order to present this new observed spatial experience, a different form of presentation is 
demanded beyond a simple collection of numbers. 
For this reason, Image 2 (see below) represents three examples of enclosed spaces in a 
series of film frames, aiming to enlighten how the different elements work together in 
the production of this spatial experience. 
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Image 2: Film frames of enclosed spaces. Source: the author. 
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This strategy of representation aims to present our finding in an account similar to 
Baudrillard’s America (1988) recounting routes and detours in this spatiality using the 
mentioned 3 dimensions as guidance. This strategy aims to rupture, as Baudrillard 
(1988) would put it, with the spectral form of ideological appearances, the emptiness of 
its signs, the seismic form, fractal, interstitial culture, rifting from the world as it is; a 
fragile, tactile, mobile and superficial culture, a vertigo always in imminent collapse, in 
synthesis, holograms of the whole in each part, a spectral, fake serenity of death, in soft 
resort-like simulations of a civilization. Neither dream nor reality, we present this new 
landscape using the identified three dimensions to describe this series of still frames. 
 
 Diagram 34: Velvet ground/nest prison. Source: the author. 
Velvet architecture is the proper product of the regeneration process that is mediated by 
techniques of spectacle; the foreground presents a phantasmagorical image that 
transforms citizens into spectators surrounded by an anaesthetic (untouchable) 
environment (similar to the comfort a person experiences when sitting in a dark 
cinema). The sensation is of velvet spaces built on the negation of the former difficult 
experience of freedom in the city. Thus, velvet architecture provides both comfort and 
spectacle, as seen in the following example. 
New Street Square is an example of velvet architecture (see image above). The 
development is easily perceived when walking down the street, with a gradual transition 
from public streets through the gaps in the buildings’ corners. The access is smooth, and 
almost imperceptible shades of pavement mark the boundaries between the public and 
the private. The space is well maintained and predominantly grey, with all buildings 
carefully designed in a minimalist way. In the form of a patio, the square is separated 
from the noisy surroundings, keeping conflict from entering the space and generating an 
enduring sensation of emptiness, except when social activities are programmed from 
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time to time. Although a profusion of minimalist benches is always available, people sit 
in the comfortable ‘retro’ chairs of the veranda cafe. 
 
 Diagram 35: Tangled control. Source: the author. 
Instituting multiple specific rules, with each place imposing a different set of use norms 
(such as the prohibition of bikes and drinking or the necessity of leaving a licence on a 
parked vehicle), transforms the city into an intertwined set of tangled orbits of hierarchy 
and control. The city becomes a fragmented atmosphere, as if the 'manual' that we need 
to use a place must be changed every step along the way, inspiring a constant feeling of 
impossible idiosyncratic experiences within that space. Every object has its place. In 
this condition, users easily hand over control to the place's automated fractal structure. 
In this condition of uncertainty, people tend to behave as they immediately assume to be 
appropriate in the scenario. This condition is reinforced by hidden artifices of 'security 
by design' and, of course, by anti-social behaviour legislation, which embodies 
censorship. 
An example of that is the Aloft Hotel (see images above), in which the objects of design 
are carefully placed to create a fluid order. Concrete benches zigzag across the access 
platform, simultaneously emphasising the overall design and preventing terrorist attacks 
with vehicles. Across the plaza, a profusion of bollards directs the flux and creates a 
transitional space, distinguishing traffic zones and creating permeable transitions 
between the public and the private. Numerous signs emphasise the different rules for 
each corner of the area. 
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 Diagram 36: Driven spatial consumption. Source: the author. 
This dimension creates a strange kind of anxiety because of a sense of distance whereby 
architecture is no longer appropriated by use (as in the modern metropolis); instead, 
architecture occurs only if it is mediated by an act of consumption. In this condition, the 
subject only shares the experience of place through the 'game' of consumption (which 
can be called driven spatial consumption). 
At the Renaissance development (see image above), the smoothness of the modern 
furniture is interrupted by metallic spikes to avoid spontaneous use by radical urban 
sportsmen; in addition, a sign invites users (i.e., consumers) to enjoy the ‘now even 
greater’ outdoor space of the development by enrolling in one of the outdoor classes 
provided by the development’s gym. Similar to 1 Street Square, where users pay for a 
coffee to sit in a chair instead of on a ‘public’ bench, users here can pay for classes to 
enjoy the public park (thus, citizens become consuming-citizens). 
 
Stake point 1: common places and the aesthetic of things 
Beyond the fact of progressively separating the citizen from the means of freely 
appropriating the place and at the same pace reifying behaviours, these new dimensions 
have mechanisms that hide the place commodification and create a sense of a 'naturally 
artificial' social order.  
Thus, the matter of architectonic reification not only pertains to objects7 but also relates 
to the implicit social relations implemented when fences, doors, tables, and even grass 
and pavements direct social behaviour. Social roles are reified by the activities that 
people are driven to play in each place. Beyond the apparent accessibility of privatised 
                                                          
7 Note that this proposition is completely different from Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), which 
supposes objects to have a positive existence with no special status and nothing beyond pragmatic 
aspects. In this sense, OOO establishes a tabula rasa, completely avoiding dialectical thinking. 
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public spaces and beyond their physical beautification, the metropolitan space – once a 
symbol of difference, rationality and freedom – is being transformed into a space of 
fragmented orbits of control, engraved in fractal and cosy objects. This transformation 
creates a new spatiality in which citizens experience a continuous process of de-
territorialisation as they move across these unconventional dimensions with constantly 
changing rules and coordinates. The result is a new kind of estrangement that leads 
users to an apathetic behaviour – cool and mellow – as no one can be sure of what is 
allowed or prohibited. As they do not know what behaviour is expected, users are held 
in a state of expectancy rather than experience.  
As anthropological archaeologist Timothy Taylor (2010, pp. 160 and 145) argues, 
‘things rule us’ in their ‘slippery and redefinable associations’, and if they ‘appear to 
have no ideology’, ‘in the practice that then emerges, everything may change, and your 
culture and identity may disappear’. Taylor (2010) argues that things are changing 
humans not only in modern times but also since the beginning of our species because 
evidence of the first stone tool dates back 190,000 years before the evidence of the first 
specimen of the genus Homo. These tools allowed a diet rich in protein and, in turn, the 
evolution of big brains in first place. Therefore, for Taylor, there are no natural humans; 
we are ‘artificial apes’. 
In this sense, to understand how the reification of contemporary spaces is changing 
social relations and citizens, we will need to develop a critical and dialectical account 
between physical design and economic, political and social processes. If architectural 
things are social codes and interpersonal rules engraved in space, then these common 
places are not only a matter of built barriers, choices of cosy benches or elegant fancy 
materials but also a matter of objectifying social relations to reproduce and reinforce 
citizenship roles. We develop further this argument in Chapter 4. 
It is important to note that social relations are reproduced by means of the appearances 
of urban things (their aesthetics). Thus, architecture is entangled in this process, as we 
shall uncover in the next case studies. 
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(3) FIELD WORK II: LIVE PROJECTS 
The context 
The live contradictions in architecture 
Other debates: Summary of counterarguments in conferences 
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Interviews  
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Hacking: Experiments in urban ecology 
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Stake point 4  
 
  
Appendices 
331 
 
The Context 
The live contradictions in architecture 
The current transformation of public spaces in contemporary cities does not occur 
without struggles and forms of resistance, both outside and inside the discipline of 
architecture. We can generally organise them into two groups, one occupying space and 
the other developing critical interventions in the production of space. 
On the one hand, recent economic situations have created a series of social movements 
that are directly engaged with the appropriation of space. The most notable of these 
movements is the Occupy Movement, which aimed to regain control of society by 
occupying space (but many others urban conflicts emerged, both symbolic and 
physical). As Smith and Low argue, no revolution can occur without taking over the 
space of the city (Smith and Low, 2006). In many situations, a practical form of 
‘surrealism’ was born in the streets. Protesters would transform everyday objects and 
urban furniture into occupying weapons, subverting the spatial rules of such spaces 
(Singer, 2014). In these strategies, the experience of urban art and social media 
collaboration was fundamental in spreading ready-made strategies. 
On the other hand, a series of experiences have emerged to confront the architectural 
field’s traditional boundaries. Architects have engaged in alternative forms of spatial 
interventions in the city. This dialectic of a software mode of control, urban struggles 
and architectural practice has developed an entirely new set of social intervention 
strategies. A series of small-scale experiences were conducted by architectural groups 
like DK_CM, Assemble and Atelier Urban Nomads. 
David Knight and Cristina Monteiro from the office DK_CM developed the project 
‘Building Rights’ that aims to develop a socially organized systemic database of urban 
planning. As urban rules become more complex, the duo proposes to develop tools that 
make it easier for the popular discourse to regain power over planning rules. Therefore, 
they develop a deep analysis of the rules, exploring alternatives and possible solutions 
to be applied by the population. The project also works as a collaborative tutorial, where 
the community can exchange knowledge on how to ‘break’ the rules without going 
against them. 
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The architectural collective Assemble came up with an initiative to transform an 
abandoned petrol station into an ephemeral hand-built cinema. Developed in the do-it-
yourself spirit, the project was built with ready-made resources, exploring the poetics of 
raw material. Successful architecture is revealed to be more an instrument of 
conviviality and encounter promotion than advanced technology and industrialized 
processes. Built using a volunteer workforce, the construction itself became an 
instrument to transform the place into a landmark for the community. 
The collective Atelier Urban Nomads have created several initiatives that depart from 
engagement with local communities in order to transform and re-appropriate abandoned 
urban spaces. Using hand-made prototypes and small pieces of furniture, they are able 
to transform the perception and use of everyday spaces. In the initiative ‘Jogos de Rua’ 
(Street Games) the group approached different forms of recreational activities to explore 
new possibilities of emptied neighbourhood spaces. Through a series of workshops, 
local residents were invited to participate in all steps of the process from conception to 
construction and use. Once set into practice, the process developed a new bond between 
the community and neighbours, ultimately creating new ‘rituals’ and meanings for 
places.  
These experiences have inspired research and experiments in critical approach to the 
architectural discipline. Specifically, in academia, a form of architectural pedagogy 
emerged that involves concrete projects in what have been called ‘Live Projects’. 
Working along the margins of education and building practices, these projects engaged 
education in communities and local interventions (see Harriss and Widder, 2014). 
Brown (2014), exploring the classical tension between ‘product’ and ‘process’ in 
architectural education, argued that Live Projects provide a base from which to surpass 
the classical pedagogy of architecture based in the design studio. For him, Live Projects 
allow to break with the binary teacher/student and to avoid the conception of a ‘banking 
education’, where knowledge is deposited in a passive student. Such projects point 
towards a critical pedagogy that not only applies an experimental learning model 
(experience>reflection>abstraction>experiment) but also engages architecture as a 
collective process of production. Therefore, students can learn while questioning the 
existing ‘roles’ and ‘positions’ of the architect in a concrete ‘participation in the world’. 
Gloster (2014, pp. 45-55) finds this ‘guerrilla practice’ helpful in supporting the 
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construction of the students’ skills and profile, even as defined by the Royal Institute of 
British Architects (RIBA) accreditation. Additionally, Chandler (2014) notes that the 
aims stated by RIBA criteria of professional standards are more centred on ‘reflection’ 
as separated from ‘doing’, so he argues for a ‘building of reality’ and the ‘reality of 
building’ as a form of breaking the long-standing disengagement of the field. 
This practice of Live Projects has found fertile ground at UEL, as this institution has a 
great interest and a leading position in social engagement. The architectural programme 
has many alternative projects, strategies and tactics to engage with communities and 
public spaces, researching and developing unorthodox practices that have a wider 
impact within and against the established field. For example, the design collective 
Assemble (leaders of some of those Live Projects) recently won the most prestigious 
British prize for innovative artistic practices (the Turner Prize), showing how these 
practices are on the cutting edge – not only in architecture but also in other disciplines. 
 
The workshops’ choice 
Every summer, UEL organises a series of Live Projects called ‘Construction Week’. In 
one or two weeks, groups of students from the master’s and postgraduate architecture 
courses work collaboratively with staff and different communities to design and build a 
1:1 architectural piece. These collaborative efforts aim to give students close contact 
with the concrete processes of producing architecture. The task, the context, the public, 
the learning opportunities and the demand vary, and the workshops range considerably 
in terms of scope. Nevertheless, these projects generally seek to engage students with 
communities and to extend the research of the university to the outside world. 
This research used some of these experiments as a laboratory for our investigation. 
Therefore, although the research is a small investigation, it stands on the ‘shoulders’ of 
a larger collective knowledge developed at UEL, especially at the Place Production 
Laboratory, and therefore represents its greatest potential of contributing to the 
discussion of the limits of the architectural discipline. Before we entered the field of 
participant observation, we developed two hypotheses to assess how these experiments 
challenged the discipline – namely, hacking and micro-utopias. 
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At UEL, I joined many research activities and workshops, especially in the context of 
the ‘Construction Week’ and the ‘Place Production’ research group. I also had the 
opportunity to join other workshops at the University of Hasselt and the University of 
Bergen. I am grateful to these institutions and the teachers involved for those 
opportunities. Although all those experiences were important in the development of this 
research, they were used only as counterexamples, and this report will focus on 
experiments that had a close relation with the reproduction of social relations in cities, 
namely the experiences in the master’s module Urban Ecology in 2013/2014, in one of 
2014’s Construction Week workshops, and in a Summer School workshop in 2015. 
To avoid identification of personal sensitive data, the students mentioned in this report 
will be anonymised. As the analysis of the last workshop also involves other types of 
participants, those were also anonymised. The participants in debates at conferences 
were also anonymised. The students’ responses to the interview forms were 
anonymised. The professionals’ responses to the interview forms were submitted to the 
signature of consent forms that might identify them in the study and subsequent 
dissemination of the research findings and/or publication. 
 
Other debates: Summary of counterarguments in conferences 
At this point, the research had made progress and promoted important debates with 
peers. A series of concepts dealt with the restrictions on the contemporary practice (such 
as velvet architecture, tangled social control, divided spaces and repeated compulsion of 
space consumption), the philosophical flaws that define the problematic relation 
between practitioner and the public (such as silent utopias, prince complex, 
reproduction of spatial valorisation, and urban enclosure), and the construction of new 
modes of operation (such as micro-utopia, kaleidoscopic strategies and hacking of 
objectified social relations). All these concepts were debated and received with both 
polemics and enthusiasm in major conferences of the field. Bellow, we should briefly 
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counter-argue some counter-arguments8, as they were instructive for the deconstruction 
of architecture’s fundamental fantasies. 
(1) Some counter-arguments would simply reaffirm that historical narratives (books, 
documents) and show buildings as the result of individual inventions.9 The fact that 
history is a narrative interconnecting a series of causes and effects, and all these causes 
and effects depend upon a series of choices made by the narrator. As we investigated in 
chapter 5, the work credited to the figure of single architects has actually emerged from 
the collective knowledge appropriated from employees, from a school, or most 
commonly, from a vast number of passionate (and usually unpaid) disciples. 
Furthermore, inventions are always based on previous knowledge, produced over many 
generations, and they are always the product of collective endeavours (Foucault, 2005). 
(2) Secondly, another usual counter-argument is for the benefit of ignorance. Some have 
argued that the field is interesting and concise as it is, that architecture has a great value 
in society, that people are not unhappy with it, and that architects very much like their 
work. Therefore, for the sake of current state of affairs, the situation simply looks much 
better if one ignores any paradox. 
This counter-argument maintains some similarity with the arguments of slave-owners 
against abolitionists, arguing that even if it was ethically reproachable to own another 
human being, if they were to be freed, slaves would not have an owner to take care of 
them, and would thus suffer much more. It is not the case of deconstructing the 
misinterpretations of every step of this argument, but simply to reject what might be 
                                                          
8 These are summaries of counter-arguments expressed on some occasions in which this research was 
presented, especially at the following conferences: International Conference Past Present and Future of 
Public Space, Bologna, June 25 – 27, 2014; International Conference Architecture Philosophy – 
Autonomy Reconsidered, Delft, Netherland, 2014; UEL Postgraduate Research Conference, London, 
2014; CUI '14: II. International Contemporary Urban Issues Conference, Chamber of Architects, Istanbul, 
November, 2014; Conference of European Network for Housing Research, Lisbon, July, 2015; 
International Interdisciplinary Conference: Utopia, at the Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and 
Ethics, at University of Brighton, September, 2015; 16th Utopia Studies Society Conference, at New 
Castle University, July, 2015; 12th AHRA Conference – This Thing Called Theory, Leeds Beckett 
University, November, 2015. Although, we would like to acknowledge the contribution of the 
participants, we opted to remain their contribution anonymous due to ethical issues. 
9 Methodologically, this is akin to leaving the sticker on your brand-new sunglasses, and then 
triumphantly announcing your discovery that the world has a big elliptical dark patch everywhere you 
look, and that this has some important relation with the sun. Besides revealing naivety, and the lack of 
any reflexivity, this argument is inevitably the assertion of a rule by an exception. The argument 
reinforces that if there is one known example of an architect who is deemed to have been a genius, 
thus, it must be true that architecture is produced by individual ingenuity. 
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“reasonable” for the sake of what is “rational”. If it is demonstrated that architecture is 
not produced by “princes”, but by a collective subject acting dialectically (and in 
complex ways) within and against the discipline, it follows that we must have the rigor 
to take this conclusion to its consequences. 
A similar counter-argument advocates a sort of imaginative “laziness” and convenience 
for the sake of tradition: “It has been like this for such a long time, so, I can’t even 
imagine how it could be different”. This sort of argument might also vary to a counter-
argument of moderation: “This idea is too radical; thus, it must be wrong; the answer 
must be harmony with ‘reality’”. This sort of conjecture has the same problem as the 
former. The negative impact of a conjecture does not make it invalid. 
Yet another variation of this argument would urge “not to transform ourselves in the 
neoliberal subjects we so keenly aim to criticize”, meaning that we should not develop a 
critical account that reveal ourselves as part of the problem. Thus, it suggests that the 
aspects of subjectivity being criticized should keep regular critical architects and 
scholars safe. Nevertheless, we are not interested in ‘wining the debate’, and attack 
other to occupy a better position in the field. Rather, we aim to reveal the problems that 
we all share. As a matter of fact, this research aims to unveil how we all share such 
subjectivity10, reproduced through discipline and society as a whole. Thus, the aim is 
not to inflict guilt to some “other”. Rather, the aim is to build a reflexive account of the 
architectural subjectivity, so self-counciouness and reflexive reasoning can emerge. 
(3) Another sort of counter-argument would support “imperfection” in the following 
way: “the world is wrong and bad, it is just part of reality, so we can’t think architecture 
should be perfect”. Thus, it asserts the following logical chain: Reality = imperfection = 
architecture = nothing to do = be glad with what is wrong = only enjoy the flow.  
Initially, it is important to notice that the wide spread of a socially produced mistake 
cannot be an argument for its necessity, as is the case with climate change issues. 
                                                          
10 ‘Yes, we are decentred, caught in  a foreign cobweb, over-determined by unconscious mechanisms; 
yes, I am “spoken” more than speaking, the unconscious Other speaks through me, but simply assuming 
this fact (in the sense of rejecting any responsibility is also false, a case of self-deception. Psychoanalysis 
makes me even more responsible than traditional morality does; it makes me responsible even for what 
is beyond my (conscious) control. What this means is that the dimension of subjectivity (in the sense of 
free autonomous agency) is irreducible: we cannot get rid of it; it continues to haunt every attempt to 
overcome it.’ (Zizek, 2014, 75-76) 
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Furthermore, as we developed previously, architecture is not simply a reflexion of pre-
existent “trends” (such as “base” or “natural” laws), but it is an activity that produces 
and reproduces social realities. In this sense, there is an inevitable ethical “positioning” 
architects cannot avoid. 
(4) Lastly, there is the widespread and popular counter-argument for cynicism: “ok, it is 
fake, it is a lie and a masquerade, but I get some success, I am well paid, and it works 
fairly well, so it does not bother me” 
Indeed, as we saw, this is the root of fetish in architecture. This is also beyond simply 
lying, in the sense of pretending to have some special property. This counter-argument 
is the entrance in the realm of simulacra (Baudrillard, 1994), in the sense of arguing that 
to do architecture is to join its social fantasies. 
The fundamental problem with this counter-argument is that it reveals personal choices, 
but without considering the ethical implications of these choices. Every choice departs 
from assumptions and, above all, every choice has social consequences, and fetish 
becomes an instrument of power and expropriation.11 
The critical point here is not to argue for a “truthful” architecture, neither to become a 
cynical “liar”. It is rather to understand that truths are produced historically in a field 
full of both mistakes and power relations (i.e. discipline). Thus, it is rather fundamental 
to undress architecture, to reveal this process, to unveil its manufacture, its assumptions 
and constructs.  
 Furthermore, in order to move forward in the analysis of architecture and the 
reproduction of social relations, it will be important to critique and overcome the 
traditional forms of historical narrative and valorisation of architecture (unveil its 
collective subject) so we can investigate how emergent and dissentious practices could 
challenge different aspects of the reproduction of the discipline. 
                                                          
11 I am not saying architecture is not a lie. I am rather saying architecture is a very specific form of lying. 
A form of lying that evolved from fetish, to sprezzatura, to parasiting, and then to a full range of 
phenomeno-techniques. None of them eliminate the other. They sum up as a palimpsest. But, those are 
forms of lies that have actual consequences. In this sense, they are truly effective, and act basically in 
the building of truths. Thus, one should understand the mechanisms and choices faced by architects as 
fundamental elements in building social fetish. It is a position of an active nihilism. 
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The methodology 
The research used a methodological variety of qualitative research techniques in social 
sciences (Grounding Theory, Thematic Analysis, Participant Observation, Semi-
structured Interviews, Observation of Participation) and experimental research (as 
though we could machine the chemistry of substances, trying out the results of a 
mixture, as in the ‘hard sciences’).12 In this way, the dialectical reflection could be 
grounded in concrete reality but not concealed by its appearances.  
 
Laboratory life and live laboratories 
In his book Laboratory Life, Bruno Latour (1986) described the ‘construction of 
scientific facts’ in his participant observation in a chemistry laboratory. He used a series 
of fictional characters to recount the observed social production of ‘facts’ (as if he were 
an anthropologist encountering an exotic tribe, as if he were a person who ignored 
science, and so on). This process aimed to reveal the contrasts between the actual 
process and his own explanatory text and to determine how different subjects would 
result in different objects of analysis. 
Similarly, in the first group of workshops, the research aimed to provide an inside view 
of the production of architecture; and furthermore, these workshops were themselves a 
laboratory experimenting with new practices and hypotheses in architecture so that they 
could be subjected to ‘tests’. 
In these experiments, we applied the working hypotheses of ‘hacking’ and ‘micro-
utopias’ in workshops involving interventions in common spaces. For this reason, the 
preliminary case studies are the analysis of common spaces in London, as a ‘first 
observation’ to contextualize the approach to these workshops in ‘participant 
observation’. 
This participant observation enabled the research to examine the ways in which the 
discipline operates, and the ways in which it mobilises its apparatus to produce 
                                                          
12 The analytical part of the research was conceived through a grounded theory approach (Guest et al., 
2011; Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and a critical approach on the epistemology of science (see Popper, 1989; 
Feyerabend, 1989; Khun, 1987; Adorno and Horkheim, 1996; Santos, 2001; Santos, 2003; Santos, 2007; 
Foucault, 2005; Bourdieu, 1996; Escobar, 1996; Lefebvre, 1967; Rancière, 2005; Taylor, 2010). For a 
discussion of the methodological approach, see Appendix 2 and 3. 
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architecture. As we investigated the attempts to use architecture to intervene in and 
transform social relations in the city rather than solving paradoxes in the field, the 
hypotheses revealed further constraints of the discipline of architecture upon the 
participants. 
For that reason, in the last workshop presented, these constraints were explored by 
taking one step further. To further investigate the predicaments, we moved towards an 
‘observation of participation’. Metaphorically, the ethnographer studying the tribe could 
himself, for a moment, become a native. As we will describe in detail later, the 
researcher (an architecture teacher for 14 years) joined a workshop as ‘an architecture 
student’. More than a look ‘at’ the inside, this move provided a full-blown view ‘from 
within’. In this sense, the account of the last workshop enabled a distinct view of the 
paradoxes of attempting to produce critical architecture. 
If in his book ‘Laboratory Life’ Bruno Latour made a report on his participant 
observation in a chemistry laboratory, using fictional characters to recount the observed 
facts; by contrast, in this experiment, I developed ‘personas’ as a direct instrument 
while observing the social relations in the production of architecture.13 
Those personas were: (1) Myself; (2) A student that chose the ‘red pil’; (3) a ‘humble 
student’; (4) an ‘Aspirant Disciple’. In the first case, I found myself lost in the limbo 
between a tutor and a student, culminating with an epic debate and the setup of this 
strategy. In the second case, my positioning was incisively contested by the ones 
holding the symbolic power, always controlling the discussions and avoiding that any 
trace of my positions remained valid in the end of the discussions, thus reifying all 
conclusions in their favour. In the third case, by lowering down my social defences, the 
                                                          
13 As the event that lead me to the position of a participant were dynamic and unpredictable, I used as way 
of conceiving a strategy theories that I knew from other matters, and it was not planned beforehand. I 
thought about the theories of Antonin Artaud, the Theatre of Cruelty and the theory of the Double. In 
these ideas, the actor do not ‘represent’ a text, or a gesture. By contrast the actor engages in an 
embodiment, an incarnation, living  what is happening as personal reality, thus connecting unconscious 
thinking with the body experience. My idea was to experience those events not through representative 
reaction pertinent or constructed for some ‘characters’, but as an embodiment of archetypical traces of 
those personas that might reside in me, in a here-and-now experience. Furthermore, this was also one of 
the elements that made impossible to take notes, as it would imply an external rational reflection, a 
distance I chose to abstain from, but also, inversely, involved deep emotional reactions. Later, after the 
workshop ended, I could reflect upon my own experience. This produced an interesting form of first-
person narrative in a report developed for this workshop, in which my description examines (my own) 
deep thoughts and pragmatic experiences through the standpoint of an omniscient third-person narrator 
(thus, an observation of participation).  
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tutors in a position of symbolic power engaged in a systematic procedure of humiliation 
and bulling, in order to eliminate any symbolic power I could have had with my peers, 
and a systematic procedure of ‘authorship expropriation’ was initiated14. In the last case, 
of an ‘Aspirant Discipuli’, the attack found an armistice, and the teachers in position of 
power returned to listening my opinions and giving me space to work.  
In Tedlock’s account on the evolution of the ethnographic tradition – from the pioneers 
to Edward Said, passing by Levi-Strauss and Clifford Geertz – she notices how not only 
the results changes with the changing in the narrative formats. Therefore, she locates 
Martin Yang’s A Chinese Village (1945) as a benchmark, as the author described the 
village in which he grew up. This serves as the grounds of an ‘ethno-sociology’ and the 
possibility of an ‘auto-ethnography’, but it also makes developing a self-reflexive 
ethnography possible (Tedlock, 1991, pp. 78-80).  
Although both ‘participant observation’ and ‘observation of participation’ keep the 
crucial dilemma between “participation” (which entail emotional involvement) and 
“observation” (which require detachment), in the observation of participation the divide 
between the self and the other is overcome as ethnography becomes a process. Instead 
of representing the findings in a memoir narrative centred in the self (in the shape of a 
novel of education) or as an abstract structure representing the inner scientific nature 
encompassing passive Others (suppressing all individuals, from the ones observed to the 
observer himself, to form abstract nonempirical entities), the findings become the result 
of a unique and specific dialogue, and the mediations shared by those “observing” and 
those “being observed”, in a collectively constructed knowledge. 
For Tedlock (1991, p. 71), this knowledge ‘belongs neither to the realm of objectivity 
nor to that of subjectivity, but rather to “human intersubjectivity”’ (as we will discuss 
later in chapter 3, this is arguably the realm of transindividuality). But, to use an 
example deployed by Tedlock, if being born female does not automatically result in 
feminist consciousness, the same is valid for architects. 
                                                          
14 An interesting parallel to Marina Abramovich art performance called ‘Rhythm 0’ is evident. When she 
allowed the audience to do anything with her for six hours, lowering all her social defenses, people 
revealed their most perverse side, humiliating, harassing and even cutting her neck. Similarly, the 
lowering of my social defenses revealed the darkest sides of architectural disciplining. 
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Therefore, only through a self-reflective effort will we be able to both distance 
ourselves from and engage with the data at an experimental moment to transform the 
emerging paradoxes into a co-produced picture of shared subjectivity. This investigation 
showed how the current architectural disciplining structure is continuously reinforced. 
Therefore, the new hypothesis regarding the ‘reproduction of architecture’ emerged 
from these experiments and became the basis for the philosophical and dialectical 
investigation of each of the thesis’ chapters15. 
In this sense, the results do not point to building ‘the’ revolutionary architecture; rather, 
they provide the stake points with which to sketch our ‘cognitive map’. This map might 
be useful for ‘navigating’ the field and repositioning the subjects involved and their 
relationships to the means of production of architecture (as Jameson, 1990, argues). In 
this sense, the ‘stake points’ from each case study serve as the foundation for the 
construction of the investigation of this thesis. 
 
Working Hypotheses for Live Projects Laboratory 
In order to start the fieldwork, we developed initial working hypotheses. The working 
hypotheses provided a provisional conceptual framework. This framework was a set 
‘constructed expectations’, elements that could subvert or contrast with the different 
elements at play in the production of an architecture that aimed to counter the 
reproduction of social relations in the city. This enabled the research to become an 
experiment. For these fieldworks, the working hypotheses were ‘hacking’ and ‘micro-
utopias’. 
Hacking  
The industrial revolution confronted the social imagination with a fast-mechanical 
change in society, therefore, history was a concept vastly used to explain social 
transformations, through a linear universal concept of time (Lefebvre 1971b, 17, 229-
                                                          
15 Rather than architecture being able to produce new social relations, its disciplinary means could start to 
be tackled, demonstrating how it reproduces social relations, reproduces itself and reproduces the 
subjectivity of architects. For now, suffice it to say that the discipline frames social relations not only in 
its products but also in the process and the mobilization of desires. In this way, the discipline is also a 
form of self-disciplining. 
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230). Recently, a sense that ‘nothing is really changing’ has subjugated many scholars 
with a feeling that ‘the future is dead’ (Wolfe 2012; Berardi 2011; Bauman 2010; inter 
alia). In an informational society, which is changing through reprogramming, how could 
social space transformation be conceived?  
For Antonio Negri, we live in a cognitive labour age, associated with the automation of 
production, where revolution takes a new path. Therefore, he proposes a course of 
struggles towards reformatting and reprogramming platforms (of production, finance, 
logistics and consumption) as a strategy of power subversion (Negri 2014). 
Nevertheless, Mckenzie Wark argues that despite all the changes that have taken place 
in the recent social space, the structural contradiction in capitalism remains the same 
(Wark 2004). On one hand, a social class has control over the means of production. On 
the other hand, there is the class that works and produces and that has become more 
engaged in abstract labour, after automation of production. But, its creativeness is 
extracted by the soft machinery (protocol) of the ruling class (especially by copyright 
strategies). He names ‘hackers’ this contemporary class of dispossessed. In this way, 
Wark brings the idea of hacking to an everyday basis, i.e. creates a new class conscience 
(Wark 2013). 
It is in this sense that we aimed to explore the possibility of social transformation as a 
hacking experiment. But, how could hacking be defined? 
Although many attempts have been made, instead of providing an ideal definition of 
hacking, we tackled hacking as an aesthetic procedure, as a way of ‘seeing’ differently 
and manipulating the system (of social space). In this sense, we started our experiments 
with a new understanding of the means of production in architecture rather than an 
objective aim. Rather than proposing structures, design was concerned with subverting 
existing public spaces rules to test the limits and paradoxes that could emerge from this 
experiment. Therefore, hacking in architecture was conceived as grappling with the 
pragmatic aesthetics of spatial frameworks. This hacking aesthetics was further 
developed and divided into two major dimensions (attitudes and techniques), with each 
of these further divided into three aspects (see diagram 36 below). 
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Diagram 37: Hacking aesthetic. Source: the author. 
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The first attitude usually observed in the hacking experience is the so-called ‘Prank’. 
Hackers tend to use sarcasm as a potential weapon to create awareness, state a point of 
view, destroy reputations, create jokes, or simply, to create surprise (Kushner, 2012; 
The Antics Roadshow, 2011). The power of the prank is to reveal some hidden aspect of 
reality, thus constructing conscience through a ruthless amusement in the form of sharp 
critique.  
The second attitude is what could be called the ‘Hammer’ attitude. The word ‘hack’ also 
means to cut (crop, slash, bang). This attitude requires courage and engagement in 
unknown territories, far from codified and secured spaces. A very famous example is 
the Cory Arcangel hacking incident of a Nintendo Super Mario Brothers cartridge. One 
of the chips is cut off and a new, programmed chip is soldered onto the game. 
The third attitude very often is the collaborative spirit. Besides the fact that hackers 
usually work alone in the shadows, they often engage in anonymous forms of 
collaboration. In fact, the very act of being anonymous potentiates collaboration, as no 
one can identify accomplices or identify copyrights of products. Therefore, hackers tend 
to come together only for specific purposes. This attitude is fundamental, because a 
large amount of knowledge is necessary to subvert a sophisticated system.  
For this same reason, another important technique for a hacker is the development of 
what can be called ‘Ready-made’ solutions. This technique has a very special relation 
with architecture, especially through the work of Christopher Alexander in his book “A 
Pattern Language” (Alexander, 1977). In hacking, those patterns are known as exploits. 
Exploits are specific kinds of ready-made programming codes that explore known 
failures in systems, programs and codes (Galloway and Thacker, 2007). Thus, hackers 
explore weak spots with ready-made packs. The common praxis of copy (cntrl+c) and 
paste (cntrl+v) also be considered a ready-made technique, as well as the act of 
remixing (see RiP: A Remix Manifesto, 2008). 
The second technique is the well-known use of computer viruses to obtain information 
and destroy functionalities in systems. These softwares are usually worms (self-
replicating programs) or Trojans, a concept that has obvious origins in urban struggles. 
A more recent strategy of ‘inception’ is being used.  
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The last techniques can be assembled using the idea of deep-in/ interfacing. A great deal 
of the power to transform systems is the ability to understand the programming, and 
finding the spots to attack, therefore, diving-in its codes. Nevertheless, of equal 
importance is the ability to make this information legible, therefore, developing new 
interfaces that facilitate the manipulation of data. In this process, diagrams become a 
very important tool. Diagrams are graphical and technical frameworks that interpret data 
and transform it into a series of available functionalities.  
For all these reasons, the sum of a new set of techniques and attitudes of the 
‘dispossessed’ is creating a new aesthetics, which requires a kludge wisdom and a tricky 
imagination, just as in the Greek Odyssey Ulysses used ‘mêtis’ (Williams 2013b) in 
contrast to poiesis and techne. Therefore, as architecture is in front of a brave new 
world, it needs the ability to infer and adapt to new situations. 
 
Micro-utopias 
Architects are trapped within expected social roles as the field of work has evolved in 
relation to the social mode of spatial production. But, could architecture develop 
emancipated and autonomous practices within the current conditions? Cultural 
expectations, scientific developments, technological instruments and the new social 
conditions might be changing the architectural field of work. Architectural theory has 
traditionally defended hierarchical forms of work, transforming architecture into an 
instrument for maintaining social inequality. In parallel, critical theories of architecture 
theory have either fought against architecture itself, or searched for alternatives outside 
architecture (e.g. vernacular or pop culture). By contrast, could architects emancipate 
themselves and recreate their set of skills to become “autonomous” players? 
Although architects have not been able to change society, the conception of their role 
may have contributed to this failure. Since the Renaissance, the idea of rationality has 
played a strong role in the hopes of humanist realization. Since the Enlightenment, the 
idea of technology has also come into play, resulting in a strong faith in progress. This 
combination, of rationality, science and technology, produced a revolution in the way 
human kind would understand itself. In the ancient regime, the court (which included 
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architects) held divine rights. By contrast, the French Revolution declared that all 
human beings are born equal, as it was stated on the first Right of Man. Although this is 
one of the greatest inventions of all times, the second right surprisingly declared as 
“natural” the right of property, along with liberty, security and non-oppression. This 
caused great conflict of interests. In parallel, architects have insisted on their divine 
rights, their court privileges, and remained as Machiavellian princes acting in “favour” 
of society. More than 200 years ago, Western societies had not been able to set into 
practice the claims of equality, fraternity and liberty. As a mirror reflecting these 
contradictions, architecture’s own utopias have faced difficulties in becoming realized. 
Nevertheless, a new social role for architecture is emerging, and many debates call into 
question what should be destroyed, what should be built and, furthermore, how it should 
be done. 
The question of social emancipation has also changed accordingly to the new social 
condition. Although, we are facing a new mode of production, the mechanization and 
the automation have not delivered the promises of release from work. Instead, physical 
toil has been replaced by stressful mental work. This happens because production is 
increased in its complexity and instability, and because it demands even more 
immaterial work in order to coordinate production. Even the cases that reduce workday 
hours, workers face an everyday life colonized by productivity: we rest to be 
productive, we have leisure to amplify creativity, we exercise to be more productive, we 
travel to network, and so on (see 24/7 by Jonathan Crary). This social condition also 
fragments production and isolates workers. Therefore, old class identities and old forms 
of social articulation and interaction have changed. This has resulted in new forms of 
social control and hierarchy. 
According to Zizek (2008), among the traditional forms of accepted violence (the State 
monopoly of violence, i.e. the police, the army and the imposition of unilateral laws) we 
are surrounded by symbolic violence and imaginary terror. This happens through a new 
kind of politics of violence, in which a game of objective and subjective violence takes 
place. In this process, the media has a special role by representing violence and 
maintaining it permanently present in people’s unconscious. This is clear in the media 
investment in covering terrorism and internal violence, such as robbery and murders. 
And it is also present in the constant announcements of ‘threats’ to ‘home security. The 
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consequences of this treatment of ‘threats’ can be measured by the increasing 
militarization of international relations. 
Anna Minton (2012) would also argue that the spread of fear among citizens justifies 
increased forms of social control. This control is self-evident in the presence of CCTVs, 
the security protocols, mass espionage, the manipulation of information, the behaviour 
laws and the consumer-driven strategies. In parallel, according to Mackenzie Wark 
(2004), copyrights and laws guarantee the hierarchical control of (intellectual) 
production keeping of the overall social system. Therefore, new social structures are 
used to avoid social transformation and human emancipation. 
Nevertheless, the recent years have been marked by mass rebellions against the 
structured social order. After the 2008 crises, the Occupy movement initiates in EUA, 
and it spreads to the world. In addition, a new set of struggles would emerge from the 
Arab Spring after 2010. These struggles were soon spread to Europe, with the 
emergence of the Indignados Movement in Spain, in 2011-12. The emergence of those 
movements was the condition to inflate an enthusiastic discussion about the possibilities 
to transform the status quo. 
On the one hand, the old social pressure of the masses on the streets proved to still 
matter. It did effectively realize transitions in many Arabian countries, although all the 
challenges are yet to be overcome. Nevertheless, these ‘masses’ were relatively 
ineffective in reclaiming new social gains within the old European democracies. 
Democracy is facing a crisis of representation. This situation has created arguments for 
new forms of democracy and social control. On the other hand, new forms of social 
activism are been born with the creative use of technologies of communication. The 
internet and the new forms of socialization are transforming old identities and blurring 
old international boundaries. This process has boosted new forms of identity and new 
forms of social articulation and struggle. 
For those reasons, the new condition of production demands new strategies of social 
transformation. The technologies of information and communication (TIC) have created 
the hypotheses of a social struggle based on TIC, which has been characterized as 
hacking (the virtual rebel). This new mode of production also creates new forms of 
social space and, therefore, new fields for architecture. TICs have created a new 
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relationship between the city and the world, transforming old distances. The former city 
mosaic is being transformed into a kaleidoscopic urban space, which has intertwined 
complex relations between the parts and the whole. This can be seen in the urban 
interventions, urban redevelopments and retrofits that dominate the city’s spatial 
production. In this sense, the old hierarchy of the “whole” and the “part” is being 
challenged.  
The former division of urban policy planning taking control of the whole and 
architecture being confined into the private realm is being challenged. The scale of the 
‘close’ is also the scale of the concrete realization. For this reason, social rules may be 
more easily manipulated through architecture (as Lefebvre argues in “Architecture of 
Enjoyment”), and still challenge the rules of the ‘big picture’. This hypothesis of an 
emancipated architecture that realizes the human emancipation in a concrete scale (and 
not in an abstract scale), while keeping an impact in the whole image of the 
kaleidoscope, may develop new forms of social struggles and social transformation. 
This strategy we shall call, from now on, ‘micro-utopian’. 
The idea of a micro-utopia was approached through two main aspects. On the one hand, 
it addresses a fractal and kaleidoscopic conception of action (see Soja, 2000). This idea 
builds upon the concept of micropolitics, stating that power is assured by concrete 
strategies in everyday life and the concrete body, both physical and psychological. On 
the other hand, this idea also challenges the traditional sense of scale, which opposes the 
macro and the micro, where the latter is only a reflection of the former. If the scale of 
the ‘close’ is also the scale of the concrete realisation, punctual interventions might 
realise changes in the ‘kaleidoscopic image’ of the whole. In this sense, architectonical 
interventions could develop autonomous social relations on a concrete scale, as occurs 
within institutions (see Lefebvre, 2014), providing the grounds for new forms of social 
struggles. 
In the scale of architectural intervention, micro-utopia may cope with difference and the 
‘Other’, as well as it may cope with the complexity of reality, formed by a juxtaposition 
of political struggles over the city, as intended Aldo Rossi. This ‘strategy’ and this 
‘scale’ form the elements to create freedom as the political enjoyment of the city’s 
aesthetical reconfiguration. 
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According to Lefebvre, revolutions, such as the Paris commune and even the Paris 
Resistance during World War II (in which he took part), are considered by participants 
as being a ‘party’. This is a trace we can identify in many contemporary “revolts”. He 
argues that revolutions are a moment of creative engagement, free exchange, a moment 
when humans interact with each other, recognizing themselves as equal, and experience 
the freedom of manifesting differences. For this reason, the spirit of the party is the 
engine behind the transformation of everyday life into a creative form of existence. As 
if the self and its social position could regain total liberty. Therefore, Lefebvre argues 
that the urban revolution will occur as an artist paints (Lefebvre 1983). Micro-utopia 
should be, therefore, the poetic attitude of recreating one’s social reality thought 
conscience. In other words, micro-utopia should be like a party. 
Furthermore, it implies an inversion of the dichotomy “ideology-utopia”16. Manheim 
would argue that ideology is the unreal, rather than utopia, so Manheim inverts the 
common association of the pairs “ideology-utopia” “possible-impossible” (Manheim, 
2000, 173, 175). For him, ideology (i.e. the hegemonic cultural logic) presents itself as a 
reality ‘de facto’, although it has never been realized (acting only as a form of 
legitimating the existing order), whereas utopia is an idea that envisions a real 
possibility of rupturing with existing order. Thus, utopias should be understood as the 
construction of real possibilities departing from the existing context, which is deemed to 
be changed. Similarly, Lefebvre (1976) argues that ideology presents the status quo both 
as the only possibility – the natural one - and as if it was already the realisation of the 
capitalist promises - its alleged ideals - but in concrete social reality those is in fact the 
impossible. In this sense, Lefebvre (2000) suggests a method of ‘transduction’ - the 
production of a virtual possibility – with which architecture could act in the production 
of possibilities that escapes the realised possibilities. 
In these terms, micro-utopia would be the process of releasing the commons. Galloway 
(2004) argues that concrete forms of freedom in the city are counter spaces that 
generates “temporary autonomous zones” (TAZ). For him, hackers exist in such 
temporary autonomous zones: “The TAZ is like an uprising which does not engage 
directly with the State, a guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of 
imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, before the State 
can crush it.’ (Galloway 2004, 35) In other words, micro-utopias are pure potentiality. 
                                                          
16  This is similar to the way Manheim’s would invert the dichotomy ideology-utopia.  
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Sande argues for the creation of ‘micro-utopias’ as the ‘acting as if one is already free’ 
(Sande 2013). Besides the fact that this idea draws upon Foucault’s concept of micro-
politics, a micro-utopian proposition would need to reclaim Nietzsche’s (1968: §22-23, 
26, 55, 372, 423, 552, 853) ‘active’ nihilism: if there is no ultimate value, then one 
should invent its own and implement it into reality. In other words, micro-utopias 
should be both a fight for freedom and an invention of freedom. 
In order to assess the ability of architecture to develop “micro-utopian projects”, we 
investigated case studies of workshops that aimed to propose small architectural 
prototypes and urban interventions. Therefore, these prototypes could be researched as 
experiments in the urban space, just as a chemist researches experiments inside a 
laboratory. 
 
Interviews 
We focused our discussion on how these experiments elucidate some other points at 
stake in the reproduction of architecture. To do so, we wanted to give voice to those 
involved in these experiences (both students and other practitioners), as they are facing 
such paradoxes on an everyday basis. With this goal in mind, in the next section, we 
present the key points of semi-structured interviews with three practitioners that engage 
in similar practices (Assemble, MUF Architecture/Art and Sarah Wigglesworth) and 
structured interviews with students that joined the Construction Week workshops. 
The questionnaires aimed to assess three main dimensions of the experiences: (1) how 
the field is perceived to interfere with this practice; (2) how the subjects perceive their 
labour conditions; and (3) how they perceive the differences in the products delivered 
through this practice. The questions in these forms had to be marked on a numerical 
scale, ranging from negative to positive, with the midpoint (50%) representing 
neutrality. In this way, we can assess how participants perceived the interference of 
these elements in their activities. 
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(1) Field interference 
As for the ‘field constraints’, the students perceived elements such as the market and 
bureaucracy as relatively neutral, with only 2.7% answering above neutrality and only 
0.9% answering below neutrality with regard to those elements inhibiting their 
proposals. 
Nevertheless, critical practices tend to attribute a larger role to those constraints. On one 
extreme, Wigglesworth considers such constraints a part of reality to be addressed. On 
the other extreme, Assemble considers them a part of reality to be strongly opposed. 
Some architects consider them as a condition that ultimately frames their possible 
practices in a process of co-opting former radical practices.  
As a counterexample, the UEL workshop ‘Into the Green’ also produced an intervention 
in a public space in the form of an event, which also mobilised the community. As a 
result, an office was created at UEL to develop interventions in that space so that the 
ephemeral community activities therein could continue permanently. However, lost in 
the bureaucracy of the university, the office was dissembled, and the community 
became disengaged, putting an end to the process. Therefore, the field matters, even if 
you are not conscious of it: the discipline and social structures are engaged in a 
complex, dialectical relationship (we shall discuss this point further in Chapter 2). 
(2) Labour conditions 
The students assessed ‘labour conditions’ as the best dimension of their experience, 
which generated an average score of 80% positive. This topic was concerned with their 
role in the production, the sharing of ideas, the openness of the debates, and the 
democratic decision making in relation to previous academic experiences. 
Surprisingly, the students did not consider this experience very different from other 
practices from their past. This finding suggests that the actual experience of work in 
practice is always collective, involving the trainees as a decisive part of the design 
process, although the ‘narrative’ in the field is that the production is decided by the 
main architect in the office. Such is the case in the office of Wigglesworth and 
Architects, where the collective is anonymous and the main architect is the reference. 
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Again, Assemble resides on the opposite pole, where the work is done in a collective 
way, whereby all activities – from the design process to lunch preparation – is shared. 
(3) Products delivered 
As for the ‘products delivered’ dimension, the results are more paradoxical given the 
intentions of Live Projects. Students perceived the products to have a small positive 
impact on the place (only 19% above neutrality), the connection between creativity and 
construction to be limited (19.8% above neutrality) and the product to be very similar to 
what a conventional architectural practice can deliver (3.4% above neutrality). 
However, the interventions were considered a ‘valuable project’ (31% above neutrality). 
This finding seems to be linked to the low level of input from the local community in 
terms of the effective products delivered. In the next chapter, we will discuss further 
how participation can become a deadlock in architectural practices. For now, we shall 
notice only the presence of these conflicts and the ways in which they point to 
something beyond (the reproduction of architecture). 
For Sarah Wigglesworth, participation is a fundamental element in her architectural 
design process. In fact, she spends most of the time in any presentation she gives for a 
project talking about participation. Nevertheless, participation seems to be a 
‘consulting’ process, where the users are invited to provide inputs and steer decisions. 
The architect appears as a guide in this process. Nevertheless, the resulting product is a 
conventional design, an object that hides the means of its own production in its 
cleanness. By contrast, for MUF, participation appears as an object to be ‘represented’ 
in architecture, and the traces of participation become a set of elements in the final 
aesthetics of the products delivered. Moreover, for Assemble, participation not only 
enters the process as an input but also becomes an output. As assured in the interview, 
the aesthetics of the products retains a certain openness, as if the user could see the way 
the object was produced and think ‘I could do that myself’. In this way, the product 
becomes an empowering object not a form that masks appearances. Furthermore, as in 
Assemble’s Granby Four Streets project, the process is actually the means of bringing a 
community together to actively produce their own spatial conditions. 
Appendices 
353 
 
These differences seem to bring us back to the Wood Street Workshop. In the Area 
Action Plan, participation was only a simulacrum of input, a means of legitimising 
proposals defined elsewhere. However, in the Live Project workshop, the ‘object’ of 
architecture became a means of bringing together a collective subject that was 
repositioned at the centre of fundamental decisions. This architectural experiment was 
empowering participation rather than being a result of it. 
Another counterexample to demonstrate how this line is blurred is one of the workshops 
engaged in participant observation, which was called ‘Hoppert(h)ings’. Combining the 
name of the city Hoepertingen and the word ‘things’ in a bit of word play, the workshop 
attempted to find what ‘local things’, local desires, and local elements could be brought 
into being. Students struggled to find the limits of their agency, and they were 
continuously concerned with their teachers’ expectations. In addition, further questions 
were brought to light through this experience.  
Of interest was the extent to which the resulting objects were more than sculptures 
representing the punctual interests of the community and the extent to which they were 
not simply playful activities. Here, as the objects represented community participation, 
they could not be any less constrained under the status quo ideology than the average 
‘good citizen’ (this point shall also be discussed in the next chapter). In addition, the 
extent to which architecture ultimately resembled some ‘small project’ that someone did 
to pass the time was a concern because any such resemblance would transform 
participation into a community ‘game’. 
To understand how architecture ultimately not only reproduces the existing social 
conditions but also reproduces its role in this wider reproduction, we moved the 
investigation inside the process itself: not only through an ‘external observation’ of the 
‘internal participants’ but also through participation as a means of self-reflexivity. 
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Critical observations II: 
Participant Observation and Observation of Participation 
Hacking: Experiments in urban ecology 
The urban ecology module of the school of Architecture, Computing and Engineering 
(ACE) at UEL was coordinated by Roland Karthaus, Alan Chandler and Anna Minton 
in 2013/2014. In this module, students developed theoretical research and a design 
experiment. The ecology of the urban space was understood as a complex set of 
relations that surround life in contemporary cities, amplifying the ‘under-theorised’ 
notion of the environment as only the ‘physical’. In this sense, the rules, hierarchies, 
forms of power, modes of production, and even physical objects were understood as 
part of a larger (ecological) system. Thus, urban ecology was understood as ‘the study 
of the city as a site of complex, social interactions and the rules and norms that govern 
them’ (Karthaus, Chandler, Minton, 2013). 
As a methodology, the module proposed a three-stage exercise: first, theoretical 
research; second, a ‘performance’ intended to test the operative concreteness of those 
systemic elements of the city; and third, the production of a material ‘prototype’ 
intended to interfere in those immaterial instances of the city – ‘Drawing the responses 
to your activities will identify a subversive potential that could be exploited through a 
material construction’ (Karthaus, Chandler, Minton, 2013). 
These objects were conceived as prototypes and models ‘built to test a concept or a 
process or to act as a thing to be replicated or learned from’. The prototypes were to 
particularly focus on ‘hacking’ in the privatised urban space in regeneration areas of 
London, which was first explored via special ‘performances’. Those performances were 
events produced by dissonant uses of the space:  
Your performances or activities should have revealed instances of the 
complex, ambiguous or hidden rules that govern most privately-owned 
spaces and some publicly-owned spaces... We ask you to be inspired by 
the philosophy of 'hackers': people with great software skills who enter 
official systems, sometimes to subvert them, but sometimes just to reveal 
their weaknesses.  If we consider the built environment as the hardware 
of the city, then the 'rules' of space become the software to be 
manipulated.  In this case, your prototype should be a physical piece, but 
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it should engage with and disrupt spatial/social rules to achieve an 
alternative outcome (Karthaus, Chandler, Minton, 2013). 
For instance, G.S. investigated the corporate control of images in privatised public 
spaces. These spaces are deeply influenced by symbolic capital and are based on 
‘spectacle’ strategies. Therefore, any photograph is forbidden, unless you have express 
authorisation. In this sense, G.S. subverted the rules by simply drawing pictures in the 
space instead of using a camera. 
 
Image 4: G.S. experiment. Source: G.S., 2012. 
These experiments helped reveal aspects of the contemporary city and served as a 
starting point to isolate and manipulate variables in these spaces; as a collateral effect, 
they also helped trace the first paradoxes and limits of using architecture as a subversive 
tool. For this thesis, we will focus on the experiments of the student Z.Y. (2014). 
In the first phase, Z.Y. worked with F.C., investigating a new privatised public space in 
Granary Square. As the space provides a series of measures to maintain a consumer-
driven experience, security is orientated towards eliminating the practice of begging in 
the square. Nevertheless, the space is supposedly conceived as tool to enhance the 
‘playful’ and ‘free’ interaction of its users. Exploring this limitation, Z.Y. dressed up in 
simple clothes and started to wander around the square asking passers-by if they were 
hungry and if they would accept a candy bar as a gift. 
After a few minutes, security arrived and asked him to leave the square, as his 
behaviour was prohibited. The student explained that he was not begging for food, 
rather he was giving. A superior was called; the activity was understood to be against 
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the ‘rules’, and Z.Y. was warned to step outside the lines on the ground marking the 
division of public and private space or the police would be called. 
 
Image 5: Z.Y. experiment. Source: Z.Y. (2014) 
The activity, although in harmony with the intentions of the place, was somehow 
interfering with the expected uses of the space and with the intended appearance of its 
users. In this sense, the appearance of the activity was more important for the 
functioning of the ecology of the place than its actual agenda.  
In the next phase of the research, Z.Y. investigated the diverse elements in the urban 
space that function as guides and instruments of control. As with the marks in the 
pavement called to Z.Y.’s attention, bollards are also important silent devices. Beyond 
the function of directing the flux of pedestrians and avoiding the flux of cars, they also 
create sensations of borders and delimit transitions. 
As a type of prank intended to create awareness and shock, he proposed a prototype of a 
ready-made basketball net to be attached to these devices. As they would stay within the 
limits of the public and the private, the objects would be outside the jurisdiction of the 
private, despite acting as virus that would infect the uses and image of the space and 
amplifying the ‘playful’ experience of the space beyond the planned limits. In contrast 
to ‘security by design’, the prototype intended to insert ‘fun by design’ into the city. By 
playing with the limits of the public and the private, he was able to insert a challenging 
experience into a controlled space. 
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Image 6: Z.Y. prototype. Source: Z.Y., 2014. 
 
Stake point 2 
Experiments such as the one described above not only have pedagogical value in terms 
of confronting students with the relationship between the production of architecture and 
the reproduction of social relations but also have the potential to investigate how 
architectural skills and knowledge can be mobilised in practices that might subvert the 
smooth systems of social control. By investigating the frontiers of the social rules 
engraved in urban spaces, design is mobilised as a means of change rather than a 
perpetual reinforcement of the establishment.  
The ‘hacking aesthetics’ analogy is helpful and inspiring. The strategy is helpful in 
unveiling the abstract social rules that are considered ‘natural’, thus functioning as a 
means of entering the ‘ecological system’ of the city, which keeps subjects unaware of 
the built intentions and manipulations. Nevertheless, it might be too literal a conversion 
of the concept from the technological realm to the social. The urban space has too many 
particularities, and the dualistic distinctions and absolute categories of the digital realm 
– with abyssal choices between 0 and 1 or between hardware and software – are unable 
to tackle the dialectical dynamics of social spaces. 
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As we discussed in Chapter 1, the belief that technology will ‘redeem us from the old 
social structures’ is an idea as old as the positivism of Comte (1848). This notion 
supports a blind belief in the capacity of technological advancements to potentially 
solve social problems, as though we can find an escape from all our problems by simply 
following the ‘tail’ of progress (what György Lukács, 2000, called ‘Tailism’). This 
assumption is shared by conservatives and some lines of critical thought that are now 
organised under the label of ‘accelerationism’, as if the solution to all problems can be 
found in the acceleration of progress (see Mackay and Avanessian, 2014; Srnicek, 2013; 
Williams, 2013; and, for a critical account see Negri, 2014). We discussed the ‘Tailism’ 
deadlock in Chapter 1, and as we saw in Chapter 3, the urban space is not a trivial 
cybernetic machine. 
Another point at stake in those experiments is the extent to which they become a form 
of ‘protest’ rather than delivering a transformation in the production of social relations. 
The power produced by ‘protest’ comes from its highly symbolic and representative 
dimension. As discussed in Chapter 1, social space cannot be equated with 
representation without falling into a deadlock. 
Finally, the critical stake point relies on the distinction between the ‘tactical’ and 
‘strategic’ agencies provided by these experiments. As in a game of chess, the strategies 
are the general picture, and tactics are the step-by-step actions. On the one hand, 
strategies are concerned with the structure of the game en route to a fundamental aim 
(which is to checkmate the king in chess). Strategic measures are the key elements to be 
controlled, such as dominating the board’s centre and keeping open lines of action for 
protected pieces. On the other hand, tactics are the short-term technical ‘tricks’ 
performed to efficiently obtain gains. In this sense, hacking can be understood more as a 
tactical instrument and less as a ‘whole picture strategy’ – where to go? – and perhaps 
the matter is the same as the difference between efficiency – the ratio of the output work 
to the input energy – and efficacy – the ability to produce the desired result. In short, it 
is the difference between doing things right and doing the right things. 
These series of critical points lead our research to the next investigation. Can 
architecture subvert the traditional duality of scales (the big and the small, the local and 
the global, the part and the whole) and produce interventions that, although small in 
scale, have a concrete impact on the whole? 
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Micro-utopias: the Wood Street Workshop 
Wood Street is a historical shopping street in Walthamstow, London, flanked by a 
council housing estate and a recently redesigned 20th-century plaza. The local council 
developed an ‘Area Action Plan’ for the one-mile long street (see Borough Council of 
Waltham Forest, 2013). This plan is a statutory planning document to guide a process of 
‘regeneration’ over the next 15 years. A consultation process was undertaken between 
2009 and 2011, which involved meetings with council officers, questionnaires with 
retailers and an ‘informal consultation’ through the distribution of leaflets and an 
‘Urban Design Framework’. This last part consisted of a large model of the street with 
the sites of intervention marked in blue, which was presented at a meeting with 
residents, stakeholders, and Ward Members, and further three exhibition ‘events’. As a 
result, a series of actions were planned, which were divided into six ‘clusters’ and 
further subdivided into a total of 19 ‘sites’. The plaza subject of our workshop is in 
Cluster 4 and is divided into ‘Site 10 – Marlowe Road’ and ‘Site 11 – The Plaza’. The 
plan proposes to ‘Demolish the estate, leave Northwood Tower standing and rebuild the 
estate as a mix of private and affordable properties’. In addition, ‘The Plaza should be 
redeveloped to provide flats above shops’. 
This ‘consultation’ process was considered insufficient by some members of the 
organised community, as it simply reinforced the application of ‘regeneration schemes’ 
that have appeared everywhere in London, such as the ones we analysed in the first case 
study. Therefore, a regular methodology to create a ‘consensus’ involved attending to 
planning requirements and simply legitimating preconceived solutions. In the collective 
participation, the report says that people liked ‘local shops, independent/family 
businesses’, prioritised the ‘support for independent retailers’, wanted to encourage 
‘more people to visit Wood Street’ and to improve ‘green space, public realms and play 
areas’, which meant, in the project’s conclusion, the ‘demolition of social housing’ and 
the ‘privatisation of public spaces’. Although the images of the report are charming, 
finding the logical reasoning that leads from the collected participative demands to the 
project’s conclusions is a matter of finding deception. 
In this context, Architects E17 (a non-profit organisation) and Wood St. First (a 
community group) started an independent process of community engagement in the 
discussion: 
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AE17 were keen that local people should be positively engaged in the 
future of the area and wanted to demonstrate how this could be 
facilitated.  With a small grant from Wood Street First and the RIBA, 
AE17 made a post box, called Dolly the Trolley who spent the summer 
in various locations and events around Wood Street collecting people’s 
views on the area and ideas for the square. Workshops were held with 
various local groups, including the Soul Project and Frederick Bremer 
school, the local secondary school located north of Wood Street off 
Fulbourne Road. On Saturday, 6th September, an ideas day was held 
where local people and AE17 together made models of temporary 
interventions that could create new possibilities for the use of the square.  
Representatives from Waltham Forest Council and Wood Street First 
acted as a jury to select the best ideas (Karthaus, 2014). 
This mobilisation attracted the attention of the local council, which lent its support and 
led to a partnership with UEL’s School of Architecture that would be developed as a 
Live Project. The mission of this Live Project was to 
…design and build temporary installations in Wood Street plaza that 
respond to the aspirations of local people and offer broader opportunities 
for the use of the space.  The intervention should occur gradually during 
the week, culminating in an ‘event’ on the final Saturday, the design of 
which is part of this brief.  The duration of the installation is uncertain 
and may be adopted by the local authority or one of the local groups, or 
may be required to be removed after the opening event, depending on its 
nature.  The purpose is to change the perception of the square through 
temporary physical interventions (Karthaus, 2014). 
Seven students, two architectural researchers, one social work researcher and one tutor 
participated in this workshop. Local suppliers secured some recycled materials; RIBA 
provided a small amount of funding reserved for community projects; and a local school 
provided access to their material workshop to be used during the construction process. 
To launch the design process, the students were allowed to gather at a café in the square. 
On the second day, they used donated cardboard boxes to create some ‘performances’ 
and experiments. This exercise intended to get students interacting with locals, to test 
the scale of the place, and to assess how small interventions could interfere with the 
activities in that place. 
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Image 7: Wood Street experiment 1. Source: the author. 
The students began to explore the material that they could use and design possibilities. 
Five days later, they presented some ideas to a local jury at a community centre and 
brought a wood frame to the plaza to support boxes that would hold proposals from 
locals and display historical information about the site. The handling of different 
interests remained concealed, and the overall discussion centred on empowering the 
community in the discussion. 
 
Image 8: Wood Street experiment 2. Source: the author. 
Students from the local school helped construct pieces of the design and participated in 
the assembly testing of the structure. Leaflets were distributed for the event, and the 
local café provided food. Parts were produced during the week, and the structure was 
raised in the morning of the event. A small group of people gathered around the 
structure, and some curiosity was generated for the event, which kindled some heated 
debates. On this occasion, the circumstances of the Area Action Plan and the future of 
the plaza were discussed. Proposals were collected from the local community, and kids 
were encouraged to contribute to the project with their drawings.  
Appendices 
362 
 
 
Image 9: Wood Street experiment 3. Source: the author. 
At the end of the event, when the structure began being disassembled, a group of kids 
furiously demolished all the boxes, somehow reflecting the violence of being deprived 
of power over their local destiny. Something was in the air, exposing the paradoxes 
brought to light through this experience.  
 
Stake point 3 
As the structure was completely removed, the plaza remained just as before, and one of 
the participants asked: ‘Did all this work change the square in any way?’ 
 
Image 10: Wood Street experiment 4. Source: the author. 
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As part of the mobilisation led by Architects E17, this process continued in the form of 
other initiatives. Especially interesting was the fact that this project lead to an initiative 
that introduced a web map called ‘Where in Wally?’, where locals could share places 
that they considered important to the community. According to the Localism Act of 
2012, these places can be listed as ‘Assets of Community Value’ and thus be protected 
from market forces.  
The ephemeral ‘architectonic’ device built in the square was more a means of 
mobilisation than an actual product – more of a process than a thing. This object was 
less important than the event that it produced. If one could argue that the square 
remained physically the same after the event, could an architectural procedure have 
changed this space by not actually changing it? And what would the consequences of 
this event be with regard to the concept of architecture? 
In the case of Wood Street, architecture emerged to produce a greater awareness of the 
process in course, which was fundamental to the fate of the plaza. In general, the 
community had not been engaged in the debate. Architecture became a device that 
changed the actual centre of decisions, bringing into action a collective subject. In this 
way, the fact that the plaza remained unchanged (not regenerated) was the very result of 
the design process. 
Thus, the potential fate of Wood Street was changed, and this ‘architectural’ 
intervention existed in a virtual sense that had real consequences17. In this case, 
architecture became a political tool. This experiment points to a core stake point in this 
thesis. The workshop did not provide ‘architecture’ as a ‘thing’, nor was it an event in 
the sense of Bernard Tschumi (as activities or animated jouissance of a space, see 
Tschumi, 1994). Instead, this workshop represents an event in the sense of Alain Badiou 
(2012). For Badiou, an event is the emergence of a collective subject, the transformation 
of ‘appearances’, where the reality of things is suddenly changed in a ‘moment of truth’, 
when a collective joins together in a singular political process (we shall further develop 
this point in Chapter 3). ‘Things’ here are more than purely positive objects; they 
become a process (as we shall discuss in Chapter 4). 
                                                          
17 See Lefebvre (1967, 1991) and Rancière (2005).  
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To understand how an empty square might be understood as architecture, we will have 
to radically transform the idea of ‘architecture’ from a structure to an operation.  
 
Observation of participation: a view from within 
As we discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the field research moved towards an 
observation of participation, as the researcher entered one of the workshops as a student 
participant. To guarantee the confidentiality of the participants, we will describe the 
main conclusions schematically, explaining the circumstances of their emergence. 
In short, this last experience allowed a visualisation of how the discipline of architecture 
operates in framing the subjectivity of students, reifying not only the results that 
architecture delivers but also the users and the architects themselves. The analysis of 
this process suggested the presence of the means of architectural discipline, as well as 
the ‘phantastic’ narratives supporting it. 
 
Description 
At the end of a large exhibition of international pavilions, the 12-day workshop aimed 
to design a new pavilion to be built permanently in a park in a nearby city, which would 
use recycled materials from the exhibition. The workshop was organised as an 
‘architectural competition’, with students divided into seven groups with five members 
each. These groups would work on different proposals, and a jury would choose the 
proposition to be built. The jury was composed of a tutor, an external professor and the 
managing architect of the original exhibition.  
A large number of teachers and speakers were involved in the workshop. There were 
four groups of such workshop participants: a small group of three dominated the 
decision-making process through various means; another group included ‘assistant’ 
teachers, who lacked recognition as important players, and who endorsed the first 
group, and who mostly occupied administrative roles; the third group included passive 
teachers, who did not make decisions or influence tutorials but who maintained a 
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celebrative role; and a last group included external visiting teachers, who created 
tension when questioning the assumptions of the first group.  
A similar hierarchy emerged among the group of students. Those who were often 
praised by the teachers in charge enjoyed some ‘privileges’, such as jumping the 
plotting queues and having more time under supervision. 
 
Live conflicts 
During the course of the workshop, some conflicts emerged about the methodology 
applied in the workshop, especially during the discussions after lectures. The main 
topics were the rendering and the ‘selling’ of architecture, the privatisation of public 
spaces, the relations among users, clients and architects, and the ‘rules of the game’. 
Following a lecture, a polemic debate emerged about the use of renderings in 
architecture. The external teachers questioned renderings as final products of 
architecture, their role in the spectacularisation of architecture, their distancing from the 
concrete experience and production, and their role of commodification. The dominant 
group fiercely debated the issue, arguing that architecture ‘had to be sold’ and that 
renderings were a way of convincing clients to accept a proposal. One hour after this 
debate, a group of assistant teachers entered the studio and announced the required 
content of the final five boards, of which two should have ‘realistic renderings’. 
In a lecture about privatisation of public spaces, external teachers delivered critiques of 
the process in terms similar to those presented in the first section of this chapter. The 
dominant group countered that ‘good and bad privatisation’ was possible, depending on 
the ‘quality’ of the design. 
With regard to the relations among users, clients and architects, an external lecturer 
presented an office that established the clients as a fundamental part of the design 
process, while the architects were only facilitators in the process. In fact, clients were 
free to contact the architects to make changes to the final building after the construction. 
This point was also passionately opposed by the dominant group, which complained 
that the clients would destroy their design, arguing that ‘participation always results in 
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bad design’ and that the ‘best architecture’ emerges when dictators are in power (e.g., 
Giuseppe Terragni’s Casa del Fascio during the fascist dictatorship of Benito 
Mussolini). 
Conflicts also emerged when the dominant group advocated that ‘you need to play the 
game’ if you want to deliver change. In the fierce debate that followed, the external 
teachers aimed to assert a different concept of beauty and another social role for design. 
In their counterargument, the following metaphor was used: one could not ‘choose to sit 
on the bench, watch the football match, and refuse to go on the pitch’. Opponents 
argued that the whole institution of football is just ideology, a spectacle to create 
identity in an alienated world, reinforcing the notion that winners and losers always 
emerge in free competition. Thus, the alternative to ‘playing the game’ would be to 
destroy the stadium and advocate for the end of football (or collective non-competitive 
alternatives as the ‘altinha’ in Ipanema beach, depicted in many youtube videos). Thus, 
destroying the game rather than playing it would translate into real changes. 
In all the debates, the dominant group was intense and never left the final argument in a 
contradictory or open way, always using the ‘monopoly of the last word’ and raising 
their voices as a means of ending debates. In one case, they ended the discussion with a 
final rhetorical question: ‘Architecture has to be sold, right?’ Our aim here is not to tally 
the many ways in which architecture is not ‘sold’. Instead, we first seek to notice how 
the group’s position of power began to steer the process and frame the ways in which 
discipline was imposed. 
Furthermore, the dominant group imposed an agenda by devaluing any 
counterargument, using irony, cracking jokes and sometimes shouting. However, the 
ultimate source of their power was holding the decision on the grades of the students 
and forming the jury with their ‘friends’. 
 
Stake point 4 
The experience helped us understand how architecture is not simply a practice but also a 
subjectification process based on estrangement and reproduction. In this process, 
architects in positions of power and the institutions that provide them with that power 
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create (phantastic) narratives based on nothing more than their will (and the power to 
impose them). 
These narratives could only stand by means of instrumentalisation. Concretely, 
instrumentalisation resulted in a continuous process of appropriating authorship. This 
process can be called the ‘surplus of creation’. The dominant group not only proposed 
the ideas to be followed by the students but also appropriated the students’ work. In a 
situation, a door was to be made by subtracting modules in the external wall of the 
pavilion. The tutor continuously shouted that she had already solved the problem and 
that the students had only to ‘draw it’.  
As the students engaged in the design process, a series of problems emerged about 
which the tutor was unaware: the symmetry of her sketches was unfeasible; the position 
was impossible because would make a cantilever bigger; and so on. However, she 
would return to the table many times with jokes and irony, as if the students were 
incapable of drawing her solution; by contrast, there was no solution yet. Aware of her 
stance, the students maintained a subservient attitude, repeating that the problem was 
solved. When the tutor turned her back, they would work on a viable solution again, 
which was only attainable by changing the form and rotating the entire structure by a 
number of degrees. However, once the solution was found, the tutor joyfully asserted 
that they finally understood her. 
In another case, the tutor repeatedly changed the ground floor plan designed by the 
students, even though his changes made no practical difference. Better solutions 
proposed by students were re-sketched until the tutor felt that he owned the solutions. 
Again, in a paradigmatic case, a design was structured with larger modules in the base 
and smaller modules on top. The tutor took the model and inverted it. He asked a fellow 
teacher, ‘Should we do it like this? It will create an optical illusion that the structure is 
bigger’. Although the optical illusion intended would technically be delivered by the 
original proposal, the students (tired of continuous conflicts) accepted the tutor’s 
suggestion as a ‘stroke of a genius’. Their initial design was magically reworked by the 
genius (a change without changes), and the whole thing now belonged to his act of 
‘creation’. 
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By these means, in the common practice of the ‘studio’, an academic version of an 
architect’s ‘office’, the architectural product concerns not only the objects delivered but 
also the subjects that deliver those objects and the subjects delivered by those objects, 
resulting in the triple reification of users, architects and architecture (the other, the self 
and the field). 
If the users were completely set aside in the process of this workshop (for instance, the 
students and tutors did not even visit the site), a spectacle of engagement and 
sustainability would be staged (a ‘recycling workshop’). The ‘Other’ became an object 
to manipulate. Similarly, architecture became an ‘object’, not a social process. It 
became a matter of creating beautiful forms in the right style – a rendering of the perfect 
image. The dominant group continued to claim that ‘participation would only result in 
bad design’, leading to a form of internal dictatorship in architecture. Thus, the working 
subjects became instruments that fulfilled the desires of the group in power. This 
hierarchy was gradually built through not-so-subtle gestures, including mocking, jokes, 
irony, and ownership of the last word. ‘Stop discussing and work’ was repeated many 
times.  
In short, this last stake point provides the two main axes of this thesis: estrangement and 
reproduction. On the one hand, this process creates ‘estrangement’, the separation of 
those who are working from the means of architectural production, which are essentially 
concepts and drawing. On the other hand, this estrangement creates a system in which 
the architect must ‘play the game’ to find work. As long as the architect plays the game, 
his practice is enclosed in a field of possibilities, and he reproduces what was initially 
only a condition. 
